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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 43755 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
ELISA G. MASSOTH 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
PAYETTE , IDAHO 
HONORABLE LYNN G. NORTON 
MICHELLE R. POINTS 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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Date: 1/13/2016 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: TCWEGEKE 
Time: 10:27 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 2 Case: CV-OC-2015-03024 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Michael Scott Molen vs. Ronald D Christian 
Michael Scott Molen vs. Ronald D Christian 
Date Code User Judge 
2/17/2015 NCOC CCGARCOS New Case Filed - Other Claims Lynn G Norton 
COMP CCGARCOS Complaint Filed Lynn G Norton 
SMFI CCGARCOS Summons Filed Lynn G Norton 
3/6/2015 ACKS CCBARRSA Acceptance and Acknowledgement Of Service Lynn G Norton 
(03/04/15) 
3/9/2015 NOSV CCLOWEAD Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs First Set of Lynn G Norton 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents 
3/10/2015 MOTN CCMARTJD Motion to Dismiss Lynn G Norton 
MEMO CCMARTJD Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Lynn G Norton 
3/16/2015 NOTH CCRADTER Notice Of Hearing Lynn G Norton 
HRSC CCRADTER Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Lynn G Norton 
04/09/2015 02:45 PM) 
3/26/2015 NOTC CCMYERHK Notice Of Change Of Address Lynn G Norton 
4/6/2015 RSPN CCHOLDKJ Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Lynn G Norton 
Dismiss 
4/7/2015 REPL CCMYERHK Reply To Plaintiffs Response To Defendant's Lynn G Norton 
Motion To Dismiss 
4/9/2015 NOTS CCRADTER Notice Of Service Lynn G Norton 
DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled Lynn G Norton 
on 04/09/2015 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 
4/13/2015 MISC CCMYERHK Supplemental Authority In Support Of Defendant's Lynn G Norton 
Motion To Dismiss 
5/21/2015 ORDR DCKORSJP Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Lynn G Norton 
5/29/2015 ANSW CCHOLDKJ Answer (Points for Ronald Christian) Lynn G Norton 
6/1/2015 HRSC DCKORSJP Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Lynn G Norton 
07/02/2015 02:30 PM) 
DCKORSJP Order for SchedulingConference and Order Re: Lynn G Norton 
Motion Practice 
6/24/2015 STIP CCMARTJD Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Lynn G Norton 
STIP CCMARTJD Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Lynn G Norton 
6/29/2015 HRVC DCKORSJP Hearing result for Scheduling Conference Lynn G Norton 
scheduled on 07/02/2015 02:30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
7/14/2015 HRSC DCKORSJP Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Lynn G Norton 
02/25/2016 02:30 PM) 
HRSC DCKORSJP Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Lynn G Norton 
03/10/2016 02:30 PM) 
HRSC DCKORSJP Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/11/2016 08:30 Lynn G Norton 
AM) 5 days 
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Date: 1/13/2016 
Time: 10:27 AM 
Page 2 of 2 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2015-03024 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Michael Scott Molen vs. Ronald D Christian 
User: TCWEGEKE 
Michael Scott Molen vs. Ronald D Christian 
Date 
7/14/2015 
8/7/2015 
8/10/2015 
9/21/2015 
9/24/2015 
10/1/2015 
10/26/2015 
12/1/2015 
1/13/2016 
Code 
MOTN 
AFSM 
MEMO 
NOTH 
HRSC 
RSPN · 
AFFD 
RPLY 
DCHH 
DEOP 
JDMT 
HRVC 
HRVC 
HRVC 
CDIS 
STAT 
NOTA 
APSC 
NOTC 
User 
DCKORSJP 
TCHOLLJM 
TCHOLLJM 
TCHOLLJM 
CCSNELNJ 
CCSNELNJ 
CCSNELNJ 
CCSNELNJ 
CCVIDASL 
DCKORSJP 
DCKORSJP 
DCKORSJP 
DCKORSJP 
DCKORSJP 
DCKORSJP 
DCKORSJP 
DCKORSJP 
CCBARRSA 
CCBARRSA 
Judge 
Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Lynn G Norton 
Further Proceedings 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment Lynn G Norton 
Affidavit Of Michelle Points In Support Of Lynn G Norton 
Defendant's Motion For Summar Judgment 
Memorandum In Support Of Defendant's Motion Lynn G Norton 
For Summar Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing (10/01/15 @02:45 p.m) Lynn G Norton 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 10/01/2015 02:45 PM) 
Lynn G Norton 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Lynn G Norton 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Elisa G. Massoth in Support of Lynn G Norton 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion 
Summary Judgment 
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Lynn G Norton 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lynn G Norton 
scheduled on 10/01/2015 02:45 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Lynn G Norton 
Summary Judgment 
Judgment Lynn G Norton 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Lynn G Norton 
on 02/25/2016 02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Lynn G Norton 
on 03/10/2016 02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Lynn G Norton 
04/11/2016 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 5 days 
Civil Disposition entered for: Christian, Ronald D, Lynn G Norton 
Defendant; Molen, Michael Scott, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 10/26/2015 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
TCWEGEKE Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court No. Lynn G Norton 
43755 
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Elisa G. Massoth, ISB NO. 5647 
Dartanyon G. Burrows, ISB NO. 8259 
Elisa G. Massoth, PLLC. 
:1--1. Glork 1.:~f l '\ \ I/• I • "') 
' ... _ . _,, 
14 S. Main Street, Suite 200 
P. 0. Box 1003 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
Telephone 208-642-3797 
Facsimile 208-642-3799 
ISB NO. 5647 
ISB NO. 8259 
emassoth@kmrs.net 
dburrows@kmrs.net 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
·'' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
--------
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff, MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, alleges and complains against Defendant, 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, and demanding trial by jury, seeks relief as follows: 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 1 
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NATURE OF CASE 
1. This is a legal malpractice case. Through this Complaint, Mr. Molen seeks 
to recover damages caused by Christian's deficient legal defense of Mr. Molen in a Boise 
County criminal case which resulted in a conviction and Mr. Molen's incarceration. 
THE PARTIES 
2. Plaintiff, MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, (hereinafter "Mr. Molen") is an 
individual residing in Hoquiam, Washington. 
3. Defendant, RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, (hereinafter "Christian") is an 
individual and an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho and residing in Ada County, 
Idaho. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to LC. § 5-514 as Christian entered 
into an agreement in Ada County, Idaho, to represent Mr. Molen in a criminal case. 
5. Venue is proper in Ada County, Idaho, pursuant to LC. § 5-404 as 
Christian resides in Ada County, Idaho. 
BACKGROUND/GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
A. Criminal investigation 
6. In 2004, S.Z. lived with her mother, Tiffany Davidson. Mr. Molen's wife, 
Connie Molen, is Tiffany Davidson's mother. In 2005, S.Z.'s mother arranged for S.Z. to 
live in Garden Valley with Mr. Molen and his wife. S.Z. returned to Arizona after the 
summer. S.Z. again returned to Garden Valley for the 2005 summer. 
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7. On or about June 23 2005, Officer Tammy Serudek (FKA Kennedy) 
("Officer Kennedy") investigated a report that Mr. Molen had engaged in sexual 
misconduct with S.Z. An interview between Officer Kennedy and S.Z. was conducted. In 
the interview, S.Z. made various allegations of sexual misconduct, at various locations in 
the summers of 2004 and 2005. 
8. On or about July 6, 2005, S.Z. was interviewed by CARES social worker 
Stacy Lewis and physically examined by Nurse Alisa Ortega. In the interview between 
S.Z. and Lewis, S.Z. alleged sexual intercourse occurred in Mr. Molen's bedroom in 
2004, and that this was the only incident of genital to genital contact in 2004 and 2005. 
9. On September 19, 2005, the Boise County Prosecutor filed a Criminal 
Complaint charging Mr. Molen with the offense of Felony Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
Child pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-1508. The Complaint alleged that Plaintiff 
engaged in lewd conduct with "S.Z." during the summers of 2004 and 2005 when S.Z. 
was eight (8) and nine (9) years of age. 
B. Mr. Molen retains Christian for criminal legal defense 
10. On November 7, 2005, attorney Ron D. Christian substituted as counsel of 
record for Mr. Molen in Boise County Criminal Case State v. Molen, CR-2005-0001748. 
11. On January 9, 2006, a preliminary hearing was held on the criminal 
complaint. The only witness presented was S.Z. 
12. The magistrate judge found probable cause and bound Mr. Molen over to 
District Court. 
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13. On or about September 13, 2006, Christian was arrested for driving under 
the influence and open container. 
14. On or about January 4, 2007, Christian was arrested for driving under the 
influence and driving without privileges. 
C. Christian failed to investigate (Pretrial) 
15. The Criminal Information was filed with the District Court on January 9, 
2006. Mr. Molen pied not guilty at the arraignment. This case did not proceed to jury trial 
on January 10, 2007 because, on the morning of trial, Christian arrived at the courthouse 
in Idaho City so incapacitated by alcohol that he could not function, and the trial had to 
be vacated. Christian's BAC on the morning of trial was measured at .329/.344. 
16. Christian was in alcohol in-patient treatment during February 2007 and 
March 2007. 
17. Mr. Molen was seriously concerned about Christian's ability to represent 
him, but he was not able to afford new counsel. Accordingly, Christian continued to 
represent Mr. Molen. 
18. On February 9, 2007, attorney Gar Hackney appeared on behalf of 
Christian to reset the jury trial. Mr. Hackney advised that Christian was indisposed and 
unable to attend the hearing but Christian would remain the attorney record in Mr. 
Molen' s criminal case. The jury trial was reset for June 18, 2007. 
19. From the time Christian was out of in-patient treatment (end of March 
2007), he did not maintain sobriety and failed to adequately investigate and prepare for 
Mr. Molen's trial. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 4 
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20. On or about June 2007, Mr. Molen, his wife, and his step-daughter met 
with Christian and attorney Gar Hackney at Christian's house. At this meeting, Christian 
was so intoxicated that he passed out, urinated on himself, and law enforcement and an 
ambulance arrived to assist. 
21. On or about June 2007, Mr. Molen and his wife stayed at Christian's home 
two weeks prior to trial. The Molens took Christian to AA/NA meetings but they 
continued to find empty bourbon and vodka bottles hidden in the bathroom and 
cupboards of the house. During this time period, Christian failed to adequately 
investigate, prepare expert witnesses, prepare himself to cross examine State expert 
witnesses, and interview key witnesses. 
22. Christian failed to discover that colposcope photographs of S.Z.'s hymen 
were taken by Nurse Ortega until her trial testimony. Christian knew that photographs of 
colposcope examinations were standard procedure, but he failed to adequately investigate 
or obtain copies prior to trial. Christian repeatedly advised Mr. Molen that he would 
interview Nurse Ortega, but he failed to conduct this interview. Nurse Ortega was a 
critical witness for the State, as her CARES examination of S.Z. allegedly provided 
evidence of sexual abuse. 
23. Rather than consulting with and retaining an expert in pediatric sexual 
abuse or a master pediatric gynecologist, Christian relied on the services of Dr. Edward 
Friedlander, a general pathologist. Dr. Friedlander testified as an expert witness for the 
defense and acknowledged that he did not specialize in sexual abuse examinations of 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 5 
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children. When questioned about Nurse Ortega's examination of S.Z. he repeatedly 
testified that he would defer to a master pediatric gynecologist. 
24. Christian failed to investigate and prepare Dr. Friedlander as an expert for 
trial. Dr. Friedlander was contacted and communicated with Mr. Molen and his wife. 
Christian met with Dr. Friedlander and provided him with Nurse Ortega's report and 
examination of S.Z. just prior to his trial testimony. Dr. Friedlander reviewed the 
photographs from the colposcope examination of S.Z. for the first time approximately 90 
minutes prior to his trial testimony. Dr. Friedlander acknowledged that he was 
unprepared to testify and would have referred the defense to a master pediatric 
gynecologist had he been provided a complete report and photographs. 
25. On or about May 2007, D. Phil Esplin, Forensic Psychologist, was 
retained as an expert witness for Mr. Molen's defense. Christian failed to prepare Dr. 
Esplin as an expert for trial and failed to return Dr. Esplin's repeated telephone calls prior 
to Dr. Esplin's testimony at trial. 
D. Trial 
26. The criminal case proceeded to jury trial on June 18, 2007, with the 
Honorable George D. Carey presiding. 
27. Mr. Molen smelled the odor of alcohol on Christian's breath during trial 
and received comments from Christian's secretary that Christian would be better if he 
was able to take a few "nips" of alcohol. Mr. Molen's wife Connie also observed 
Christian under the influence during the trial. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 6 
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28. Christian represented on the record to Judge Carey that he was not 
consuming alcohol during trial. However, during the week of trial he was staying in a 
motel in Boise County and there was no actual breath or urine analysis testing done on 
Christian. 
29. Nurse Ortega testified at trial that she conducted the CARES physical 
examination of S.Z. Nurse Ortega testified that when she performed a colposcopic 
examination of S.Z.'s vagina, she observed two healed tears of the hymen that were 
consistent with sexual abuse. 
30. Christian was unprepared to properly cross-examine Nurse Ortega because 
he failed to conduct a pretrial interview of her and failed to communicate with his expert 
who would have prepared him for a proper cross-examination. 
31. During cross-examination of Nurse Ortega, she revealed that colposcope 
photographs of S.Z.'s hymen were taken. Christian failed to immediately move for a 
mistrial or request a continuance so that these photographs could be reviewed by an 
appropriate expert. Rather, the photographs were shown to Mr. Molen's expert Dr. 
Friedlander approximately 90 minutes before he testified. 
32. Dr. Friedlander testified that the photographs were not consistent with 
sexual abuse, but he repeatedly testified that he would defer to a master pediatric 
gynecologist. 
33. Mr. Molen testified at trial. He denied any sexual contact with S.Z. and 
maintained his position that he was innocent of the crime. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 7 
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34. On June 22, 2007, the jury returned a guilty verdict for the charge of Lewd 
Conduct with a minor. 
35. On January 4, 2008, Judge Carey sentenced Mr. Molen a unified term of 
twenty (20) years consisting of eight (8) years fixed followed by twelve (12) years 
indeterminate. 
E. Post-Trial 
36. Mr. Molen appealed his conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed his 
conviction. Molen v. State, 148 Idaho 950 (Ct. App. 2010). The Remittitur from the Court 
of Appeals was filed with the District Court on June 3, 2010. 
3 7. Christian received disciplinary action by the Idaho State Bar for his 
conduct involved in Mr. Molen's criminal case. 
38. Mr. Molen obtained the expertise of Dr. Stephen R. Guertin, an expert in 
pediatric sexual abuse. Dr. Guertin has specialized in pediatric care and has more than 20 
years of experience in examining children suspected of having been sexually abused. Dr. 
Guertin reviewed the colposcopic photographs, and is of the opinion that the photographs 
demonstrate a normal hymen. Dr. Guertin observed no notches, tears, lacerations, scars, 
or distortion. 
39. Mr. Molen retained the expertise of Cari Carusso, an expert in pediatric 
sexual abuse. She has been a Registered Nurse since 1974, and is licensed and Board 
Certified as a Forensic Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner by the State of California. She has 
extensive experience in forensic medical examinations of suspected child victims of 
sexual abuse. Ms. Carusso reviewed the colposcopic photographs and concludes they 
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demonstrate a normal genital examination. In her opinion, there is no evidence of healed 
tears as Nurse Ortega testified at trial and no evidence of sexual abuse. 
40. In May 2011, Mr. Molen filed a petition for post-conviction relief raising, 
inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Molen v. State, CV-2011-124. 
F. District Court grants Mr. Molen's request for post-conviction relief based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel 
41. On December 26, 2013, Mr. Molen, through counsel, and the State filed a 
Statement of Stipulated Reasons to Resolve Post-Conviction Case in which the parties 
agreed that post-conviction relief was warranted. In the Stipulation the parties agreed 
"that the combination of the very serious issues presented by ineffective preparation and 
investigation by trial counsel warrant post-conviction relief on the grounds that Mr. 
Molen's Constitutional rights were violated." Molen v. State, CV-2011-124. 
42. On or about April 2014, Mr. Molen, through counsel, and the State learned 
of the existence of an additional recorded CARES interview of S.Z. that was never 
disclosed. In the interview, S.Z. made statements to Nurse Ortega that contradicted 
statements S.Z. had made in an earlier interview with Stacy Lewis and with her 
preliminary hearing and trial testimony. 
43. On April 23, 2014, Molen, through counsel, and the State filed a Joint 
Stipulation of Facts and Points of Authority Related to Brady Material and a Joint Motion 
for Summary Judgment in Favor of Molen. The District Court agreed to take the Joint 
Stipulation and Motion for Summary Judgment under advisement. 
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44. The District Court granted post-conviction relief to Mr. Molen based upon 
Christian's ineffective assistance. In its Decision issued on June 17, 2014, that court 
found Christian's "performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in 1) 
failing to consult with and/or retain an expert in pediatric sexual abuse; 2) failing to 
discover the existence of the colposcopic photographs prior to trial; and 3) failing to 
request either a continuance of the trial or a mistrial so that the new evidence could be 
reviewed by an expert in pediatric sexual abuse." That court further found that Mr. Molen 
was prejudiced by Christian's deficient performance "because the failure to consult an 
expert in pediatric sexual abuse and the failure to request either a continuance of the trial 
or a mistrial when the photographs were disclosed for the first time during the trial has 
substantially undermined the Court's confidence in the outcome of the trial." Molen v. 
State, CV-2011-124. (Attached Exhibit A - Memorandum Decision and Order). 
45. The District Court vacated Mr. Molen's Judgment of Conviction and 
ordered the Idaho Department of Corrections to release him from its custody. 
46. Mr. Molen was wrongfully incarcerated and in the custody of IDOC from 
June 22, 2007 to June 17, 2014, approximately seven years. 
47. Mr. Molen has consistently maintained that he was wrongfully accused 
and is innocent of the crime for which he was charged and wrongfully convicted. 
COUNT ONE - LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
48. Mr. Molen hereby re-alleges the allegations contained above and 
incorporates the same herein by reference. 
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49. An attorney-client relationship existed between Plaintiff and Defendant 
because Mr. Molen retained Christian to represent him in defending against the crime of 
sexual abuse of a minor. On or about November 7, 2005, Christian substituted as counsel 
of record for Mr. Molen in that criminal case and thereafter Christian continued to 
represent Mr. Molen at trial. 
50. As a result of the attorney-client relationship between Mr. Molen and 
Christian, Christian owed a duty of care and skill to Plaintiff. Christian had a duty to use 
such skill, prudence, and diligence as members of the legal profession commonly possess 
and exercise, in providing legal services to Mr. Molen herein. 
51. An attorney exercising the knowledge, skill, and ability ordinarily 
possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession in similar circumstances 
would investigate and obtain evidence, interview witnesses, investigate and consult with 
qualified expert witnesses, retain qualified expert witnesses and prepare them for trial, 
and adequately prepare for trial. 
52. Christian breached the relevant duty of care to Mr. Molen and was 
negligent by failing to investigate and discover colposcope photographs of S.Z.'s hymen 
that were taken by Nurse Ortega, until trial. 
53. Christian breached the relevant duty of care and acted negligent by failing 
to investigate and consult with or retain qualified expert witnesses necessary for Mr. 
Molen's defense. Specifically, Christian failed to consult with or retain an expert in 
pediatric sexual abuse or a master pediatric gynecologist. Rather than consult and retain a 
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qualified expert in the relevant field, Christian relied on the services of Dr. Friedlander, a 
general pathologist. 
54. Christian breached the relevant duty of care and was negligent by failing 
to sufficiently preparing key experts for their role prior to trial and in failing to correctly 
recognize the issues and define the scope or extent to which the expert needed to prepare 
for trial. Christian met with Dr. Friedlander and provided him with Nurse Ortega's 
complete report and examination of S.Z. just prior to his trial testimony. Dr. Friedlander 
reviewed the colposcope photographs for the first time, approximately 90 minutes before 
his trial testimony. Further, Christian failed to prepare Dr. Esplin as an expert for trial and 
failed to return his repeated telephone calls prior to Dr. Esplin's testimony at trial. 
55. Christian breached the relevant duty of care and was negligent by failing 
to investigate, prepare and interview Nurse Ortega prior to trial and was unprepared to 
properly cross-examine her testimony. 
56. Christian breached the relevant duty of care and was negligent by failing 
to request a continuance of the trial or a mistrial so that the col po scope evidence could be 
reviewed by an expert in pediatric sexual abuse. 
57. Through the conduct alleged in this Complaint, Christian breached his 
duty of care and skill owed to Mr. Molen, as a proximate result of which Mr. Molen has 
suffered injury and damages from his wrongful conviction, the time wrongly spent in 
prison, and the cost of pursuing post-collateral relief, in an amount to be proven at trial, 
but in any event in excess of$10,000.00. 
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58. Mr. Molen's wife, Connie, died during a prison visit of a brain aneurism. 
Mr. Molen has lost the love, companionship and consortium of his wife as a result of his 
incarceration. 
59. Mr. Molen was granted post-conviction relief in Molen v. State, CV-2011-
124, based upon Christian's ineffective assistance and breach of his duty of care and skill 
owed to Mr. Molen. 
60. Mr. Molen would have been acquitted of the charges had Christian not 
breached his duty, as Mr. Molen was innocent of the crime charged. 
COUNT TWO - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
61. Mr. Molen hereby re-alleges all paragraphs above, and incorporates the 
same herein by reference. 
62. Through the conduct alleged in this Complaint, Christian materially 
breached his contractual obligations to Mr. Molen by failing to perform all legal services 
with due care and diligence, and failing to exercise the knowledge, skill, and ability 
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession representing 
defendants facing felony sexual abuse of a minor charges. 
63. As a direct and proximate result of Christian's material breach of contract, 
Mr. Molen has suffered injury and damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but in any 
event exceeding $10,000.00. 
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ATTORNEYS FEES 
64. Mr. Molen is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code Sections §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121, and all other applicable state law and Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Molen prays for judgment against Christian: 
1. For a money judgment reflecting the amount by which Mr. Molen has 
suffered damages due to Christian's breach of his duty of care and negligence in 
Christian's legal representation of Mr. Molen, in a sum to be determined at trial, but in 
excess of$10,000.00. 
2. For a money judgment reflecting the amount by which Mr. Molen has 
suffered damages due to Christian's material breach of contract, in a sum to be 
determined at trial, but in excess of $10,000.00. 
3. For attorney fees in the amount of $40,000.00 if judgment is taken by 
default, or in an amount the Court deems reasonable and just if this matter is contested, 
pursuant to state law, applicable Rules of Civil Procedure, Idaho Code § § 12-120(3) and 
12-121. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury. 
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DATEDthis JJ... dayof ~2015. 
ELISA G. MASSOTH, PLLC 
By~ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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VERIFICATION 
I, MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 
That I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action; that I have read the foregoing 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT, know the contents thereof and believe the same to be true. 
DATED this q? ~ day of January, 2015. 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN 
STATE OF ·w fJ-J ) 
COUNTY OF 6(+ )"' 
~~ 
On this 2:2::::: day of January, 2015, before me, the undersigned, notary public 
in and for said state, personally appeared MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, known or proved 
to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument, 
and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
WHEREFORE, I have set my hand affixed my official seal the day and year in 
this certificate first above written. 
/\~.a"' , ~, Ov:>41 b / 
Not?-1?' Public for %it/I~ /,) n > 
Residing at: 50 ff!(~ 
My Commission expires: Of{'-? 
#or uvi,,.., ~ 
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Michelle R. Points, JSB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
420 W. Main, Ste. 206 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208.287.321 6 
Facsimile: 208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.con-1 
Attorney for Defendant Ronald D. Christian 
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MAR f D 2015 
OMAISTOPHSA D. ~ICH, Clerk 
By JAMIE MARTIN 
DIPUTV 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MULLEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV QC 1503024 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Ronald D. Christian, through .l,js counsel ofrecord Michelle Points of Points Law, PLLC, 
respectfully submits this memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss this case. 
A. Relevant Facts 
Defendant Christian represented Plaintiff his defense of charges of lewd conduct with a 
minor, for which Mr. Mollen was foun.d guilty. 
Judge Patrick Owen recently granted Plainti:trs motion for ,?Ost-conviction relief, based 
on alleged acts or omissions made by Defendant Christian during h.is representation of the 
Plaintiff' in the underlying action. This complaint asserting claims of malpractice against 
Defendant Christian fol lowed. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS ORIG I NAl, 
000021
0~/10/2015 16:26 LAW OFFICES ~ PAGE 05/07 
Plaintiff cannot maintain an action against Defendant Christian because any claim 
PJaintiff might have had, is barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Plaintiff did not 
commence .litigation against Defendant Christian until nearly eight years from the date he adrn.its 
he was damaged . 
. Paragraph one of Plaintiff's complaint states "Mr. Molen seeks to recover damages 
caused by Christian's deficient legal defense of Mr. Mollen in a Boise County criminal case 
which resul.ted in a conviction and Mr. Molcn's incarceration." 
Paragraph thirty-four of the complaint states that "[o]n June 22, 2007, the jury returned a 
guilty verdict for the charge of Lewd Conduct with a minor." 
Paragraph thirty-five states that "[o]n January 4, 2008, Judge Carey sentenced Mr. Molen 
[to] a unified tcm1 of twenty (20) years consisting of eight years fixed followed by twelve (12) 
years indeterminate." 
Paragraph fifty~seven of the complaint states that "[t]htough the conduct alleged in this 
Com.plaint, Christian breached his duty of care and skill owed to Mr. Molen, as a proximate 
result of whi.ch Mr. Molen ha:s suffered injury and damages from his vvrongful conviction, the 
time wrongly spent in prison and the cost of pursuing post ~collateral relief ... " 
Plaintiff admits that he was damaged by his conviction. and time spent in prison, the first 
of which took place on June 22, 2007. 
B. Law Applicable To Tort Cl•im 
A court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) 
''when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [the] 
claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief" Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 405, 
353 P.2d 782, 787 (19150); Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960,962, 895 P.2d S61, 563 
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( 1995). A I 2(b )(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to detcnnine whether a claim for.relief 
has been stated." Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157: 1159 (2002). 
"An action to recover damages for professional malpractice must be commenced within. 
two years after the cause of action accrued." Reynolds v. Trout Jones, 154 Idaho 21,293 P.3d 
645 (2013), quotingStuardv . .Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701,704,249 P.3d 1156, 1150 (2011). 
Idaho Code section 5-219 provides that "the cause of action shall. be deemed to have 
accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complain.ed of, and the limitation 
period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting 
therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party 
and the aJleged wrongdoer.'' id., citing City <?{McCall v .. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659; 201 P.3d 
629, 632 (2009). 
C. Law Applicable to Contract Claim 
Idaho Code section 5-216 provides that a:n action on an oral contl'act shall be brought 
within four years, an.d Idaho Code section 5~216 provides that an action on a written contract 
5hall be brought within five years, of the asserted breach. 
D. The Statute Of Limitations On All Plaintiffs Claims Have Expired 
The conduct of which Plaintiff complains related to Mr. Christian's alleged acts or 
omissions took place prior to June 22, 2007. Plaintiff alleges to have suffered damage as a 
result, as early as June 22, 2007, the date of his "wrong" conviction. If pursuing a tort claim, 
Plaintiff should have filed by June 22, 2009, and if on a written contract, by June 22, 2012. 
Whether Plaintiff couches has claim in tort or in contract, the statute of limitations has clearly 
expired and his complaint should be dismissed. 
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E. Attorney Fees 
Mr. Christian ha,; been forced to retain the finn of Pojnts Law, PLLC to defend himself in 
this grossly untimely filed action and should he awarded his attorney fees and costs incurred in 
doing so pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and all other applicable .law. 
DATED THIS_ day of March, 2015. 
i helle R. Points 
Att 1·ney for Ronald D. Christian 
,•' 
CERTIFlCf 2 0!_ SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_(_ IJP"J~ March, 2015, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS by the 
method indicated below and addressed to each of the following: 
Elisa G. Massoili. 
Dartanyon G. Burrows 
ELISA G. MASSOTH, PLLC 
14 S. Main Street, Ste. 200 
Payette,ldaho 83661 
_ U.S Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delive.red 
/ Overnight Mail 
~ Fax(208)642-3799 
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Elisa G. Massoth, ISB NO. 5647 
Dartanyon G. Burrows, ISB NO. 8259 
Elisa G. Massoth, PLLC. 
14 S. Main Street, Suite 200 
P. 0. Box 1003 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
Telephone 208-642-3797 
Facsimile 208-642-3799 
emassoth@kmrs.net 
dburrows@kmrs.net 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Michael Scott Molen 
e 
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APR O 6 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By HALEY MYERS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CVOC 1503024 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Michael Scott Molen ("Mr. Molen"), by and through his 
attorney of record Elisa G. Massoth of the firm Elisa G. Massoth, PLLC, and hereby 
submits Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court may grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) only when "it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief." Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 405 (1960) 
(internal citation omitted). The nonmoving party is entitled to have all inferences from the 
records and pleadings viewed in his or her favor. See Idaho Schools for Equal Educational 
Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573 (1993). If a trial court considers factual allegations 
outside the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it errs if it fails to convert the motion to 
one for summary judgment. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the affidavits, depositions, admissions, 
and other evidence in the record demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); 
Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847 (1997). When considering a motion for summary judgment, 
the court "liberally construes the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Brooks 
v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574 (1997). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the 
moving party. Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625 (2005). However, if 
the nonmoving party fails to provide a sufficient showing to establish the essential elements 
of his or her case, judgment shall be granted to the moving party. Atwood v. Smith, 143 
Idaho 110, 113 (2006). 
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ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends Mr. Molen's cause of action is barred by the statute of 
limitations. However, Defendant's Motion is procedurally defective and should be denied. 
Even assuming the Court moves forward on Defendant's motion, Mr. Molen's cause of 
action is not barred by the statute of limitations. In this case, there was no objective proof 
of some actual damage until Mr. Molen obtained post-conviction relief, and thus, his cause 
of action against Defendant accrued, for statute of limitations purposes, on June 17, 2014, 
when Mr. Molen was granted post-conviction relief. 
I. Defendant Has Failed To Assert The Affirmative Defense Of Statute Of 
Limitations In A Responsive Pleading And Therefore Defendant's 
Motion To Dismiss Should Be Denied 
Mr. Molen was granted post-conviction relief by the Honorable Patrick Owen on 
June 17, 2014 in Boise County Case No. CV-2011-124. Attached hereto as Exhibit A, is a 
copy of Judge Owen's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Stipulation for 
Summary Judgment and Decision Granting Post-Conviction Relief on Other Grounds. Mr. 
Molen subsequently commenced this action by filing his Complaint on February 17, 2015. 
Defendant accepted service on March 4, 2015. Instead of responding by answer to Mr. 
Molen's Complaint, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P 12(b)(6). 
Defendant contends Mr. Molen's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. 
However, Defendant's Motion is procedurally defective and should be denied. 
"Motions to dismiss complaints on the basis of statutes of limitation are generally 
viewed with disfavor." Singleton v. Foster, 98 Idaho 149, 151 (1977) (citing Duff v. 
Draper, 95 Idaho 299 (1974)). I.R.C.P. 8(c) provides that affirmative defenses, including 
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the defense of the statute of limitations, must be asserted in an answer to a complaint. 
Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 791-92 (Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing "[u]nder the civil 
rules, compliance with the governing statute of limitations is not a requirement for subject 
matter jurisdiction; rather, the time bar of the statute oflimitations is an affirmative defense 
that may be waived if it is not pleaded by the defendant."). "This [Rule] in effect says that 
no complaint can be dismissed under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim 
merely because it does not negate any possible statute oflimitations defenses." Draper, 96 
Idaho at 305. 
In this case, Defendant has failed to file an answer and assert his affirmative defense 
or defenses. He has improperly filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of an affirmative 
defense which must be asserted in a responsive pleading, such as an answer.1.R.C.P. 8(c). 
A motion to dismiss is not a pleading under the civil rules. See I.R.C.P. 7(a). Mr. Molen 
respectfully requests the Court deny Defendant's motion for failing to comply with the 
rules of procedure. 
II. Mr. Molen's Cause Of Action Did Not Accrue Until He Was Granted 
Post Conviction Relief 
The Defendant contends that Mr. Molen's complaint is bared by the statute of 
limitations because Mr. Molen suffered damage on the date of his wrongful conviction on 
June 22, 2007. However, in an action for criminal legal malpractice, objective proof of 
some actual damage occurs when the complaining party obtains direct or collateral relief 
from the underlying criminal conviction. See Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221 (1992). Mr. 
Molen's cause of action against Defendant did not accrue until Mr. Molen was granted 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS- 4 
000028
post-conviction relief on June 17, 2014. Mr. Molen filed his Complaint on February 17, 
2015, which is within the applicable statute oflimitations. Therefore, Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss should be denied. 
"An action to recover damages for professional malpractice must be commenced 
within two years after the cause of action accrues." Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill 
Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21, 24 (2013) (internal citations omitted). "Except for actions 
based upon leaving a foreign object in a person's body or where the fact of damage has 
been fraudulently and knowingly concealed, the cause of action for professional 
malpractice accrues as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission [ of which a party 
complains]." Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585-86 (2002) (internal citations and 
quotation omitted). However, a cause of action "cannot accrue until some damage has 
occurred." City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659 (2009). There must be objective 
proof that would support the existence of some actual damage. Id. at 661. "[S]ome damage 
is required because it would be nonsensical to hold that a cause of action is barred by the 
statute of limitations before that cause of action even accrues." Id. (internal citation 
omitted). "The determination of what constitutes 'damage' for purposes of accrual of a 
cause of action must be decided on the circumstances presented in each individual case." 
Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 543 (1991). "Likewise, what constitutes 'objective 
proof of the existence of some damage suffered by the client also must be decided on the 
circumstances of each case." Buxton, 146 Idaho at 662. 
In Idaho, there is no binding authority directly on point on the issue of when a cause 
of action for criminal legal malpractice accrues, where a criminal defendant successfully 
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obtains direct or collateral relief. However, many courts addressing the issue have held that 
a cause of action for criminal legal malpractice accrues when the criminal defendant 
obtains direct or collateral relief from the underlying criminal conviction. See Noske v. 
Friedberg, 670 N.W.2d 740, 744-45 (Minn. 2003) (concluding action against attorney for 
legal malpractice accrued when client's conviction was set aside after obtaining federal 
habeas corpus relief, prior to that point, a complaint could not survive a motion to dismiss); 
Therrien v. Sullivan, 153 N.H. 211 (2006) (holding limitation period regarding a criminal 
legal malpractice claim would not accrue until the defendant obtained direct or collateral 
relief from underlying criminal conviction as action cannot withstand motion to dismiss); 
Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275, 281-82 (1997) (holding statute oflimitations does not begin 
to run until termination of post-conviction proceedings); Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931 
(Fla. 1999) (holding convicted criminal defendant's action for legal malpractice against 
defense counsel did not accrue until obtaining appellate or post-conviction relief); see also 
Shaw v. State, Dep't of Admin., Pub. Defender Agency, 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 1991) 
(holding convicted criminal defendant must obtain post-conviction relief before pursuing 
action for legal malpractice against former attorney, and statute of limitations must be 
tolled until such relief is granted). 
In Stevens, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that a criminal legal malpractice 
action did not accrue until the date the plaintiff's underlying criminal conviction was set 
aside. 316 Or. at 566. In that case, the plaintiff had his criminal convictions vacated after 
another person confessed to the crimes. He subsequently filed a legal malpractice claim 
against his former criminal defense attorney. The defense attorney moved for summary 
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judgment on the ground that the two year statute of limitations had run, and the trial court 
granted the motion. Id. at 223. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oregon reasoned that the 
pivotal inquiry at issue was determining "when plaintiff is deemed by the law to have 
suffered harm that may be attributed to defendant's alleged negligence. Id. at 228. The 
court stated that "legally cognizable harm," in a criminal legal malpractice case, was 
something more than a plaintiff being wrongfully convicted. Id. at 228-29. In ruling that a 
criminal defendant had not suffered harm until his conviction is set aside, the court made 
several observations. 
First, the court found that persons accused of crimes are afforded extensive 
constitutional and procedural protections. The completeness of the criminal justice process, 
from pretrial proceedings through post-conviction relief proceedings, "demonstrates the 
legislature's intention that only those persons deserving of conviction will be, or will 
remain convicted." Id. at 230. Thus, the court concluded that "it is the public policy of this 
state to treat any person who has been convicted of any criminal offense as validly 
convicted unless and until the person's conviction has been reversed ... . "Id.Next, the 
court reasoned that no other legal outcome of the trial process is as difficult to obtain as a 
criminal conviction. By the nature of a criminal conviction, the complaining party has been 
deemed by law to be guilty. Id. at 231. The court stated: 
The panolply of protections accorded to the criminally accused (including 
direct appeal and post-conviction relief) is so inclusive, and the significance 
of a conviction so important to vindication of the rule of law, that it would 
appear most unusual to permit a person to prosecute a legal malpractice 
action premised on some flaw in the process that led to that person's 
conviction at the same time that the person's conviction remained valid for 
all other purposes. 
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Id. at 231-32. The court ruled that a criminal defendant has not been harmed, for purposes 
of a criminal legal malpractice action, until exonerated through direct appeal, post-
conviction relief, or otherwise. Id. at 238. Thus, the statute of limitations did not accrue 
until the plaintiff suffered legally cognizable harm, which was the date he was exonerated 
of the criminal offense. Id. at 239. 
In another case, the Supreme Court of Minnesota similarly ruled that a criminal 
defendant's cause of action for criminal legal malpractice did not accrue until he was 
granted federal habeas corpus relief. Noske, 670 N.W.2d at 745. The court reasoned that a 
claim for criminal legal malpractice could not withstand a motion to dismiss prior to the 
plaintiff's conviction being overturned, because the plaintiff would be unable to establish 
that his former attorney was the proximate cause of damages. Id. at 744. In reaching this 
decision, the court cited to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Heck v. Humphrey, 
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), for the proposition that prior to exoneration "civil 
proceedings are an inappropriate forum to relitigate an issue that was previously decided 
in a criminal proceeding which resulted in a conviction that has not been reversed." Id. 
In Heck, the United States Supreme Court concluded that in order to recover 
damages under § 1983 based upon allegations that tend to impugn the validity of a criminal 
conviction, a plaintiff must prove "favorable termination" of the criminal action against 
him. 512 U.S. at 486-87. The Court reached this conclusion by examining the common law 
action for malicious prosecution, as it was the closest analogy to the § 1983 claim. The 
common law imposed a "favorable termination" requirement in malicious prosecution 
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actions. First, the Court stated that this requirement "avoids parallel litigation over the 
issues of probable cause and guilt." Id. at 484 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Specifically, it prevents ''the possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action after 
having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution," a result that contravenes "a 
strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the 
same or identical transactions." Id. Second, it prevents "collateral attack on the conviction 
through the vehicle of a civil suit," which is not an appropriate mechanism to challenge the 
validity of an "outstanding criminal judgment." Id. at 484-86. Thus, the Court held: 
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove 
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged 
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make 
such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of 
a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
Id. at 486-87. 
Similarly, Idaho requires that a plaintiff prove damages as well as "favorable 
termination" of a prosecution to recover on the action of malicious prosecution. See Radell 
v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102 (1988). In Taylor v. McNichols, the Supreme Court ofldaho 
discussed the litigation privilege and addressed the issue of when a claim is actionable 
where the conduct of opposing counsel falls outside the protection of the litigation 
privilege. 149 Idaho 826 (2010). With no precedent directly on point, the Court considered 
the analogous actions of malicious prosecution and legal malpractice. Id. at 842-43. The 
Court reasoned, "[ o ]nly when a case has been concluded may one truly identify whether or 
not a prosecution has been malicious, whether an attorney has committed malpractice, or, 
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in the case at hand, whether an attorney has acted fraudulently or solely for his own 
benefit." Id. at 843. Thus, the Court held that a cause of action against one party's 
opponent's attorney, based upon conduct of the attorney during the course of litigation, 
may not be properly instituted prior to the resolution of the underlying litigation. Id. 
In this case, Mr. Molen's action for criminal legal malpractice did not accrue, for 
statute of limitations purposes, until he successfully obtained post-conviction relief. Prior 
to that date, there was no objective proof of some actual damage. Just like the plaintiff in 
Stevens, criminal defendants in Idaho are afforded extensive constitutional and procedural 
protections, including pretrial proceedings through post-conviction relief. Unless a 
conviction is set aside, the criminal defendant is deemed by law to be guilty. As the court 
in Stevens explained, it would be "most unusual to permit a person to prosecute a legal 
malpractice action premised on some flaw in the process that led to that person's conviction 
at the same time that the person's conviction remained valid for all other purposes." There 
was no legally cognizable harm in Stevens until the plaintiff in that case had his conviction 
set aside. As in Stevens, Mr. Molen had not suffered any actual damage until he was granted 
post-conviction relief. 
The decision in Noske further illustrates the fundamental flaw in concluding that at 
the time of conviction a criminal defendant has sustained some actual damage prior to the 
defendant having his or her criminal case set aside - the plaintiff would be unable to 
establish that his former attorney was the proximate cause of damages (plaintiff could not 
withstand a motion to dismiss). With a criminal conviction in place, the plaintiff is deemed 
by law to be guilty. Thus, prior to a conviction being set aside, ruling that a plaintiff 
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suffered actual damage leads to the logical conclusion that plaintiff is the proximate cause 
of any damage. The reasoning in Stevens and Noske make sense. An action for criminal 
legal malpractice accrues on the date the criminal defendant has his conviction set aside. 
This is the date the criminal defendant could maintain an action that his former criminal 
attorney's negligence was the proximate cause of some actual damage suffered. See also 
McCormack v. Caldwell, 152 Idaho 15 (Ct. App. 2011) (recognizing "a cause of action 
generally accrues when a party may maintain a lawsuit against another") (internal citation 
and quotation omitted). Otherwise, a criminal defendant would be unable to maintain a 
lawsuit against his former criminal attorney for malpractice. 
The prudent policy considerations examined in Heck, which requires a plaintiff to 
prove "favorable termination" of the underlying criminal action to recover damages under 
§ 1983 action, are equally applicable in this case.1 Concluding a criminal defendant 
1 In addition to the policy issues addressed in Heck, courts holding that an action for criminal legal 
malpractice does not accrue until relief from the conviction is achieved, advance various policy arguments 
in reaching that conclusion. See e.g. Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Iowa 2003) (finding an 
action for criminal legal malpractice does not accrue until relief from conviction achieved, as such approach 
"preserves key principles of judicial economy and comity, including the avoidance of multiple proceedings 
related to the same factual and procedural issues, respect for other statutorily created processes such as 
postconviction relie±: and the prevention of potentially wasteful practices such as requiring to file a legal 
malpractice claim which may never come to fruition ... "); Canaan v. Bartee, 276 Kan. 116, 123 (2003) 
(finding policy arguments for exoneration rule persuasive: equitable principles against shifting responsibility 
for criminal action; paradoxical difficulties of awarding damages to a guilty person; proving causation; 
potential undermining of post-conviction process; preservation of judicial economy by avoiding relitigation 
of settled matters; creation of bright line rule for statute of limitations; availability of alternative post-
conviction remedies; and chilling effect on thorough defense lawyering); Glaze v. Larsen, 207 Ariz. 26, 31 
(2004) (holding "a rule that requires termination of the underlying criminal proceedings will conserve judicial 
resources; the outcome of post-conviction proceedings will often demonstrate that no malpractice suit will 
lie."); Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1361 (finding requirement of post-conviction relief promotes judicial economy 
because many issues litigated in post-conviction will be duplicated later in the malpractice action); Baran v. 
Estate of Conway, 27 Mass.L.Rptr. 259 *7 (2010) (reasoning that accrual prior to post-conviction relief would 
be detrimental to judicial economy because convicted criminals will "inundate the judicial system with 
motions to stay, thereby clogging the dockets and leaving open a myriad ofunresolved cases for what could 
be decades."). 
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suffered actual damage prior to obtaining direct or collateral relief, creates "the possibility 
of the [criminal defendant] succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the 
underlying criminal prosecution." According to the Supreme Court in Heck, this would be 
in contravention to "a strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting 
resolutions arising out of the same or identical transactions." With extensive constitutional 
and procedural protections in place for criminal defendants, including the remedy uniquely 
available to the criminally convicted to have a judgment set aside because of incompetence 
of counsel, Stevens, 316 Or. at 563 (quoting Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1361-62), it would be 
inappropriate to allow criminal defendant to collaterally attack the outstanding criminal 
conviction. 
The reasoning in Taylor supports Mr. Molen's position that a criminal defendant 
has not suffered damages, and therefore an action for criminal legal malpractice has not 
accrued, until the criminal defendant obtains direct or collateral relief. In Taylor the Idaho 
Supreme Court held, "[ o ]n1y when a case has been concluded may one truly identify 
whether or not a prosecution has been malicious, whether an attorney has committed 
malpractice, or, in the case at hand, whether an attorney has acted fraudulently or solely 
for his own benefit." Id. at 843. 
As noted in Taylor an action for malicious prosecution does not arise without 
damages and a prosecution terminating in favor of the plaintiff, neither of which is possible 
prior to resolution of the underlying case. These two elements ( damages and favorable 
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termination) are not established and remain uncertain until the cessation of the underlying 
action. The same is true for post-conviction relief - damages and favorable termination 
cannot be established until a court has ruled on the matter. See Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1362. In 
Taylor the Court also observed that in a civil legal malpractice case, Buxton, 146 Idaho at 
661, the action did not accrue until the litigation forming the basis of the claim had 
concluded, at that point damages are incurred and "the attorney's conduct can be reviewed 
under the totality of the case." 149 Idaho at 843. While it is true that a criminal defendant 
can raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal or post-conviction, 
the defendant cannot do both. See Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272,274 (1990) ("Although 
a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial may raise the issue on direct 
appeal or reserve it for post-conviction proceedings, he may not do both."). In order to fully 
develop an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a criminal defendant will most certainly 
seek post-conviction relief. See also State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 482 (2008) 
(recognizing if a criminal defendant "wishes the court to consider evidence outside of the 
record on direct appeal, she must pursue post-conviction relief."). Applying the reasoning 
in Taylor in the context of a criminal legal malpractice action, a criminal defendant's 
malpractice claim should not accrue until being granted post-conviction relief. At that 
point, the criminal defendant has incurred damages and the criminal defense attorney's 
conduct can be reviewed "under the totality of the case." 
In this case, there was no objective proof of some actual damage until Mr. Molen 
obtained post-conviction relief. Therefore, his cause of action against Defendant accrued, 
for statute of limitations purposes, on June 17, 2014. Mr. Molen filed his Complaint on 
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February 17, 2015, which is within the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Molen respectfully requests the Court deny 
Defendant's motion and to dismiss. 
Dated this L day of April, 2015. 
ELISA G. MASSOTII, PLLC. 
IJWit 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '} day of April, 2015, I caused to be served, 
by the method(s) as indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Michelle R. Points 
420 W. Main, Ste. 206 
Boise, ID 83 702 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Federal Express 
17 Facsimile (208-336-2088) 
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DISTRICT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDA iO 
Recorded in Book __ Page_-. 
Filed JUN 1 7 2014 N'o 
/ 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0/0ISE 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
UPCPA Case No. CV-2011-124 
(Case No. Cr. 2005-1748) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING STIPULATION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND 
DECISION GRANTING POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF ON OTHER 
GROUNDS 
Before the Court is the parties' Stipulation for the resolution of this post-conviction 
proceeding. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will decline to grant summary judgment 
upon stipulation. However, as explained below, the Court will grant the petition for post-
conviction relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel in that trial counsel failed to either seek a 
continuance or a mistrial based upon the failure to disclose the existence of photographs of the 
colposcopic examination of the victim. 
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Background and Prior Proceedings 
On September 19, 2005, the Boise County Prosecuting Attorney filed a Criminal 
Complaint charging Defendant Michael Scott Molen ("Molen") with the offense of Lewd Conduct 
with a Minor Child, FELONY, Idaho Code § 18-1508. The Complaint alleged that Molen 
engaged in lewd conduct with "S.Z.", the granddaughter of Molen's wife, during the summers of 
2004 and 2005 at a time when S.Z. was eight (8) and nine (9) years of age. 
The case proceeded to a preliminary hearing held on January 6, 2006. Prior to the 
preliminary hearing, Molen filed a Request for Discovery seeking any and all written or recorded 
statements of witnesses, and any and all exculpatory or Brady material. 1 The Honorable Roger E. 
Cockerille, Magistrate Judge, presided at the preliminary hearing. The only witness was the 
victim, S. Z. Molen was represented by attorney Ronald D. Christian. Judge Cockerille found 
probable cause and bound Molen over to District Court. 
The Information was filed with the District Court on January 9, 2006. At his arraignment, 
Molen pied not guilty and the matter was set for a jury trial to begin on June 6, 2006. At a 
hearing on April 14, 2006, the Court reset the trial to begin on August 16, 2006. This trial date 
was also vacated and reset to January 10, 2007. This case did not proceed to a jury lrial on 
January 10, 200Tbecause, on the morning of the trial, Molen's counsel arrived at the courthouse in 
Idaho City so incapacitated by alcohol that he could not function, and the trial had to be vacated. 
Mr. Christian's BAC on the morning of trial was measured at .329/.344. more than four ( 4) times 
the legal limit of 0.08%. 
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An Amended Information was filed on May 11, 2007. The case proceeded to a jury trial on 
June 18, 2007. The Honorable George D. Carey, District Judge, presided. The State was 
represented by Justin D. Whatcott, and Joshua Taylor, Deputy Idaho Attorney Generals, serving as 
Special Prosecutor. Molen was represented by Mr. Christian. The following is a summary of the 
evidence presented to the jury. 
1. S.Z. testified to Molen's sexual contact during her 2004 and 2005 summer visits when 
she stayed with Molen and his wife, Connie Molen, S.Z's maternal grandmother. 
2. Stacy Ross was a friend of S.Z.'s mother, Tiffany Davidson. Tiffany Davidson lived in 
Arizona. Stacy Ross provided a summer home for S.Z.'s brothers during 2004 and 
2005. Stacy Ross testified that she learned from her children that S.z:s brothers, 
Dylan and Lucas, had told her children that S.Z. made a11egations of sexual contact 
involving Molen. She testified that she contacted Tiffany Davidson. and then made a 
call to law enforcement. Stacy Ross accompanied S.Z. to the CARES ("Children at 
Risk Evaluation Services") interview. 
3. Tiffany Davidson, S.Z. 'smother, lived in Arizona but sent her children to Idaho for the 
summer in 2004 and 2005. She testified that she learned of the allegation of sexual 
abuse from Stacy Ross. She testified she asked her mother to take S.Z. to Stacy Ross' 
until allegations against Molen were investigated. She testified that when she asked 
S.Z. about the allegations, S.Z. responded that nothing had happened. When pushed 
further, S.Z. stated, "grandma is going to be mad." 
4. Tammy Sereduk-Kennedy, investigating officer for Boise County Sheriff. She testified 
that she interviewed S.Z. and outlined what S.Z. disclosed about sexual contact by 
Molen including manual to genital contact, genital to genital contact and oral to genital 
contact. 
5. Alisa Ortega was a pediatric nurse practitioner employed by St. Luke's Regional 
Medical Center CARES unit. Nurse Ortega has a Master's degree in nursing and 
specialized training and experience in evaluating children for sexual abuse. She 
testified to the activities of the CARES agency and discussed the referral process for 
children brought into CARES by law enforcement. She testified about the procedures 
1 l3radyv. Unit1tdStates, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 
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for the interview and examination. Nurse Ortega examined S.Z. at CARES on July 6. 
2005. She testified about the genital examination of S.Z. and her conclusion that the 
examination was consistent with the sexual abuse disclosed by S.Z. On cross-
examination, Ms. Ortega disclosed for the first time that there were photographs of the 
colposcopic genital examination of S.Z that had not been provided previously to either 
the State or the defense. 
6. Stacy Lewis was a social worker and forensic interviewer for CARES. Ms. Lc\vis has 
a Master's degree and specialized training and experience in interviewing children 
regarding sexual abuse. She had conducted about 600 such interviews. Ms. I .ewis 
interviewed S.Z. on July 6, 2005. This interview was recorded, and later transcribed. 
Both the recording and the transcript were published to the jury. In the interview, S.Z. 
made accusations of genital to genital, manual to genital and oral to genital contact by 
Molen. 
7. Daniel Holt, the husband of Tiffany Davidson's sister, Nicole Holt, and S.Z.'s uncle 
testified about a conversation he had with Molen in which Molen stated: '"if I take the 
pica bargain, I would never screw up like that again," and that he told Connie Molen. 
Molen's wife, about the statement. He testified that Molen threatened him after Hoh 
disclosed Molen's statement to Connie Molen. Mr. Holt testified he reported Molen's 
threat to the police. 
8. Nicole Marie Holt, Tiffany Davidson's sister, aunt of S.Z. testified that her husband 
told her about Molen stating, ''I'd never screw up like that again." Sometime later. she 
testified that Molen came over to their house and threatened her husband. 
9. Mydell Yeager testified as an expert for the State. She has training and experience as a 
counselor in child sexual abuse cases and about what is customary in a child that has 
been abused, the recollection of the child. and the phases of the abuse. She testified 
that victims of child abuse may have trouble recalling the incidents as time goes on. 
10. Molen testified. He denied any sexual contact with S.Z. He denied ever making the 
statement to H.olt. He testified that he was never approached by law enforcement and 
never asked about the allegations by S.Z. He testified that S.Z. had to leave the home 
because she was acting provocatively, attempting to "French kiss'' Moh:n and his wile. 
11. Edward Rohert Friedlander, M.D. was a defense medical expert. Dr. Friedlander is a 
pathologist who was the Chairman of the Pathok)l,,Y Department at the University of 
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Kansas City. Dr. Friedlander had consulted on about 20 sex abuse cases, but the 
consulting work was not a major part of his practice. Prior to trial, he reviewed the 
report of the physical exam and colposcopy. He did not see the photographs until 
about 90 minutes before he testified. Dr. Friedlander testified that the photographs 
from the colposcopic genital examination did not support a finding of abuse. 
12. Connie Lynn Molen, Molen 's wife, testified about animosity between S.Z.'s mother, 
Tiffany Davidson, and Molen, especially after Tiffany was no longer \velcome to live 
with the Molens. She testified that Molen informed the police of drug activity \vhich 
resulted in the arrest and incarceration of Tiffany·s boyfriend in Arizona. She testified 
that Tiffany hates Molen. She testified that she and Molen have called child protective 
services to investigate Tiffany on numerous occasions. She testified that S.Z. had a 
loving and close relationship with Molen and never seemed uncomfortable around hm. 
She testified she had no concerns about Molen being around children. She testified that 
Tiffany wanted the Molens to have custody of S.Z. but Tiffany changed her mind \vhen 
Tiffany found out Tiffany \vould lose benefits. 
13. Mandy K. Smith-Davidson is Tiffany's sister and S.Z.'s aunt. She testified that Tiffany 
called and asked her to testify falsely that Molen had molested Mandy when Mandy 
was thirteen (13) years old . 
14. Janice Dodd Fowler testified that Tiffany docs not have a good reputation for honesty. 
15. Ginnie Marie Balckner testified that Tiffany did not have a good reputation for honesty. 
16. Valerie Fry testified that Tiffany did not have a good reputation for honesty. 
17. Cheryl J. Hall Goo testified that Tiffany did not have a good reputation for honesty. 
She testified she spoke to Molen about the plea bargain offer and that Molen stated he 
was not going to take it because he was an innocent man. 
18. Kenneth Alvin Molen, Molen's father, testified that the Molens had discussed adopting 
s.z. 
19. Alfred R. Christensen was Molen's employer. lie testified observing Molen nnd the 
victim interact at the job sight, said it appeared to be normal. 
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20. Phillip Esplin, Ph.D. is a forensic psychologist and testified as a defense expert. He 
reviewed the audio-video of the CARES interview, and testified that the CARES 
interview was confusing and that the interviewer did not follow· some protocols in 
conducting the interview. 
21. Nicole Marie Holt was also called as a defense witness. She testified about a recorded 
conversation with S.Z. in which S.Z. reported that Tiffany accust:d Molen of molesting 
Mandy when she was 13. 
22. Tiffany Davidson testified as a rebuttal witness. She testified that the witnesses who 
testified that Tiffany did not have a good reputation for honesty were friends of her 
mother. Molen's wife. She testified she did not hate Molen and would not have sent 
S.Z. to live with the Molens if she did. She denied soliciting falsc statements li·om 
Mandy about Molen. 
On June 22. 2007, the jury returned a guilty verdict. 
On June 27. 2007, Molen filed a motion for a new trial, arguing several grounds. including 
the unfairness of the disclosure, for the first time during the trial. of photographs of the 
colposcopic examination of the victim at CARES. In a Memorandum and Order Concerning 
Motion for New Trial entered on October 30, 2007, Judge Carey denied the motion. J\s to the 
CARES photos, Judge Carey found that the CARES unit was a private hospitaL not an agency of 
the State. The Court also found that prior to trial. the State had served the CARES unit with a 
subpoena duce.\· tecum for all documents and records relating to the victim and that the CARES 
unit did not produce the photographs. Neither the State nor the defense was a\varc of the existl.:ncc 
of the photographs until the CARES nurse referred to them in her testimony. The photographs 
\Vere produced promptly after the disclosure. The defense expert, Dr. Friedlander testilicd at trial 
that the photographs showed the absence of physical abuse. Judge Carey concluded that the post-
trial affidavits of Dr. Friedlander and another defense expert. Dr. Stephen Guertin. simply 
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reiterated what Dr. Friedlander testified to at trial, and were merely cumulative. and not likely to 
produce an acquittal. 
The sentencing hearing occurred on June 4. 2008. Judge Carey entered a Judgment of 
Conviction. imposing a unified term of twenty (20) years consisting of eight (8) years fixed 
followed by twelve ( 12) years indeterminate. Molen appealed his conviction. The Court or 
Appeals ailirmed his conviction. Molen v. State, 148 Idaho 950,231 P.3d 1047 (Ct. App. 2010). 
The Remittitur from the Court of appeals was filed with the District Court on June 3.2010. 
Molen filed a 29 page pro se Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on May 23. 
2011. In the Petition. Molen asserted that trial and appellate counsd were incrtcctivc, and that 
there vva'> prosecutorial misconduct which denied Molen a fair trial. On June 16. 2011. Molen 
filed a 45 page prose Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief The motion was supported by 
numerous exhibits and affidavits. Molen also filed a request for judicial notice of' many or the 
proceedings and filings in the underlying criminal action. The Stale filed an Answer to the 
Amended Petition on June 30. 2011. 
On July 14, 2011, Molen moved for the appointment of counsel. The Court appointed 
counsel in an Order entered October 7. 201 I. On October 26, 2011, William J. Connor substituted 
as counsel for Molen. On January 23. 2012. the State filed a motion for summary dismissal of the 
amended petition. On April 2. 2012. Molen, through counsel, filed an opposition to the State's 
motion for summary dismissal. The opposition was supported by an affidavit of counsel which 
included numerous exhibits. On May 3. 2012, Mokn's counsel filed a motion fi.ir leave to 
withdraw. The motion was based upon health concerns. Molen agreed to the request. and the 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING STIPULATION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DECISION GRANTING POST-CONVICTION RF:LlEF ON OTHER 
GROUNDS-PAGE 7 
000045
?. 
0 
.. , 
I 
8 
10 
.. , 
~.:. 
:..s 
l ') 
2C 
. ..,., 
,./ 
24 
/.6 
• 
State did not o~jcct. In an Order dated May 1 L 2012, the Court granted leave to withdraw and 
reappointed counsel to represent Molen. 
In an Order entered August 29, 2012, the Court granted a request for additional time for 
Molcn's counsel to file an amended petition. No amended petition was tiled. The Court held a 
scheduling conference on January 10, 2013. The Court granted additional time tu file an amended 
petition. and set the cvidcntiary hearing for September 19, 2013. No amended petition was filed . 
On March 5, 2013. the Court entered another order for more time to file an amended petition. 
On April 1, 2013, Molen, through counsel, filed a Second Amended Verified Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief. The Second Amended Petition incorporated the entirety or the Amended 
Petition and added additional specific allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Petition 
is supported by forty-one (41) exhibits. On April 2. 2013. Molen filed prose an unsigned 56 page 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's Ineffective Assistance of [Trial] Counsel daims 
showing a date on the signature page of October_, 2011. On April 2. 2013. Molen Ii led prow 
8 pages of an unsigned and apparently incomplete Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Claims which attached numerous exhibits. It also 
appears that Molen filed a 48 page unsigned pro se Memorandum of I .aw in Support of 
Petitioner's Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims with numerous exhibits. For some reason this 
document was filed, but not entered by the Clerk's oflice. It appears this document was filed on or 
about April 2, 2013 . 
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On April 10, 2013, Elisa G. Massoth filed a suhstitution of counsel f<)r Molen. On May 
28, 2013, the State iiled an Answer to the Second Amended Verified Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief. 
On December 26, 2013, Molen. through counsel. and the State filed a Statement of 
Stipulated Reasons to Resolve Post-Conviction Case in which the parties agreed that post-
conviction relief was ,varrantcd for the reasons set forth in the stipulation. The Court reviewed the 
stipulation and at a later in chambers conference with counsel, advised the parties that the Court 
\\.·ould not grant the stipulated resolution. The Court informed that parties that it would schedule a 
hearing into the post-conviction claims. The Court scheduled the evidcntiary hearing to he held on 
April 28 and April 29, 2014. 
At a status conference with counsel for the parties in chambers on about April 7. 2014. 
counsel disclosed that they had learned recently of the existence of an additional CARES 
interview of the victim which counsel asserted would require granting of post-conviction relief. 
Counsel represented that the CARES file contained a recorded interviev,- with S.Z. that \.Vas never 
disclosed. According to counsel. S.Z. made statements to Nurse Ortega about Molcn·s conduct 
that contradicted statements S.Z. had made in the earlier interview with Stacy Lewis. Counsel 
asserted these statements \vere subject to Brady even if unknown to the State because or the role 
CARES has in criminal investigations of child sexual ahusc. 
On April 23, 2014, Molen. through counseL and the State filed a Joint Stipulation of facts 
and Points of Authority Related to Brady Material and a LJoint]Motion for Summary Judgment in 
Favor of Molen. The parties jointly stipulated that Molen is entitled to post-conviction relief due 
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to the contents of the newly discovered CARES interview·. The Court vacated the April 28-29. 
2014 evidcntiary hearing and agreed to take the Joint Stipulation and Motion for Summary 
Judgment under advisement. 
Discussion 
S.Z. is the daughter of Tiffany Davidson. Tiffany's mother is Connie Molen. Connie is 
married to Molen. In 2004. S.Z. lived with her mother and brothers. Dylan and Lucas. in Arizona. 
In 2004. Tiffany arranged for her children to live in Garden Valley with her mother. Connie Mokn 
and Connie's husband, Scott Molen. Dylan and Lucas stayed \Vith Tiffany's friend. Stacy Ross. 
The children returned to Arizona after the summer. Tiffany made similar arrangements for the 
children to stay in Garden Valley for the 2005 summer. 
In June. 2005, Stacy Ross reported to the Boise County Sheriffs on:ice that S.Z. disclosed 
S.Z. had been molested by Molen. Boise County Sherri ff Corporal Tammy Kennedy interviewed 
S.Z. on June 23. 2005. [n the interview. S.Z. stated that Molen kissed her on the lips and put his 
tongue in her mouth: that he kissed her on her "private parts": that sometimes her clothes \\-ere on 
and sometimes on; and that he put his finger in her vagina on numerous occasions. S.Z. said the 
first incident happened during the 2004 summer; and happened in her grandma·s bedroom: that 
Molen removed her clothing and put his finger in her vagina. She said the last incident happened 
on June 17, 2005 and Molen started by kissing and touching her. She said some im.:idcnts 
happened in the hathroom, some in her bedroom. She told Corporal Kennedy that Molen slated he 
loved S.Z. as "girlfriend and boyfriend'' and told her never to tell. She said Molen put his private 
into her private on grandma's bed last summer. She told the oflicer that the day before father's 
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On July 6, 2005, Stacy Lewis recorded an interview with S.Z. at the CARES facility. The 
video tape of this intervie,v, and a transcript, ,vere published to the jury during the trial as Stale 
Exhibit 1 and Defendant's Exhibit A. S.Z. made the following statements: 
Urn, my grandpa ,vas doing some really bad things. He ,vas doing something bad 
to me. Told me not to tell. but I had to because l knc,v it was \\Ton~. 
llc was. um, touching me in places where he shouldn't. And, um. he ,vas kissing 
me 1ike hmv adults kiss with (indicating). and he stripped in front of me and took 
off his clothes, tried to take off my clothes. Slept ,vith me. [ told him not to, hut he 
did any,vays. I wanted to move onto the floor. but he was trying to pull me back. 
Tr. at p. 17-18.2 S.Z. described the first incident that happened in 2004 as follows: 
S.L Where did that happen at'? 
S.Z. In his room first. And then he moved into the living room and then upstairs 
which is my room. 
S.L So what happened in his room? 
S.Z. Ile stripped in front of me. and, um, started touching me. ripped off my 
clothes. 
S.L. Okay. So he stripped. What do you mean by .. stripped"'? 
S.7. Took off all his clothes. 
Exhibit 4 to the April 22, ~O 14 Affidavit of Elissa G. Massoth purports lo be a ··transcript'" of the CARES interview. 
It is not. There is 110 indication about who prepared this document, or ab\lUl the circumstances. The <locument 
includes observations of the transcriber in bold font. for instance, alp. 9. the transcriber disagrees with an answcr and 
inserts a ditforcnt answer. The transcriber also inserts comments about S.Z.'s hand movements and whether she nods 
her head ··yes" or shakes her head ·'no··. The document also comments on the interviewer (i.e. '"cuts Savannah off"). 
For these reasons. the Court will rely instead upon a reporter's transcript of the interview Adrnittcd as Exhibit A to thl! 
trial. 
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******** 
S.L. So he stripped. And then what's the very next thing that happened'? 
SJ. I le pushed me on the bed and started taking off my pants and my clothes and 
my undenvcar. 
S.L. Okay. And then what happened? 
S.Z. J le started with the sex stuff. 
S.L. What do you mean? 
S./.. Liking putting his thing into me. 
******** 
S.L. .... What do you mean about '·his thing"? 
S.Z. He - ,vas putting his private into mine. 
S.L. What do you mean by '"into"? 
S.Z. He was putting it inside of me near my private. 
******** 
S.L. Okay. What part of the private did it go in? 
S.Z. My vagina. 
Tr. at pp 21-23, 26-27. It seems clear that in this interviev.', S.Z. stated that this ,vas the only 
incidem of genital to genital contact. Tr. at 72-73. S./. recalled that this incident ended when 
S.Z. heard Connie Molen drive up to the residence. Tl'. at 30. 
S.Z. also described an incident that occurred in a camper that ,vas on another 
property where Molen kept a camper. S.Z. said Molen pushed her (.ilm:n onto her back. started 
kissing her with his tongue and Molen got on her and rubbed his hody against hers. S.7. said they 
were fully clothed. Tr. at 31-35. S.Z. said Molen did the same thing on another incident when 
they were in a tent. Tr. at 35-36. S.Z. described another similar incident in her upstairs bedroom 
at Molen 's house. She said Molen got out of a shower and had a tmvel over his waist. She said he 
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dropped the towel, tried but failed to remove her clothing, and that Molen was .. humping" her. Tr. 
at 36-38. In all. S.Z. described a total of four (4) specific incidents in 2004, the tirst involving 
intercourse in his bedroom, then the ''humping'' incidents at the camper. the tent. and in her 
bedroom. Tr. at 39. 
S.Z. told Lewis that the only incident involving intercourse occuJTed in 2004. but that 
Molen continued to hump her with clothes on in 2005. Tr. at 72-73. 
S.Z. stated that Molen used his hands on her chest. Tr. at 42-43. S.Z. stated that Mokn 
used his mouth on her chest. Tr. at 49. S.Z. said Molen tried to get her to lick his private on a 
specific occasion in 2004. but did not make her. Tr. at 56-58. S.7. clescrihed a 2004 incident 
when she saw Molen masturhatc. She said this happened in the hallway. Tr. at 61-63. 
S.Z. also said that Molen kissed her and touched her private parts \Vith his lingers on other 
occasions in 2004 and 2005. Tr. at 40-41. S.Z. also said that Molen engaged in oral to genital 
contact as well. Tr. at 41-42. S.Z. described a specific incident in 2004 where Molen engaged in 
oral to genital contact when S.Z got out of a sho\ver. Tr. at 50-51. S.Z said Molen did the same 
thing in 2005. Many of S.Z. answers did not make it clear whetbi~r what she described happened 
in 2004. 2005 or both. lt is clear that S.Z. asserted that Molen acted inappropriately in 2005. 
S.Z. told Lewis that S.Z.'s mother round underwear with blood on it. and S.Z. knew it was 
from her grandpa. Tr. at 23. 59. S.Z. said it happened \Vhcn she was 8, but her mother found the 
underwear when she was 9. Tr. at 25. S.Z. also told Lewis that the bleeding happened \vhcn she 
was in Utah, attcr being with the Molens in 2004. Id. at 59. 
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The Boise County Prosecuting Attorney filed the Complaint in this case on September 19. 
2005 and alleged that Molen conunitted a lewd act upon S.Z. "'by oral. manual to genital contact"". 
, The preliminary hearing was held on .January 9, 2006. S.Z. was the onlv witness. S.Z. was nine 
,, (9) years old. On direct S.Z. testified to an incident in June 2004 that happened in her hcdroom. 
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She testified that Molen began by touching her with his hands in her private area where he 
shouldn't be touching her, on her chest and her underwear. Prelim Hrg. Tr. at 15-17. She testified 
that Molen than removed his clothes and her clothes and that Molen had intercourse with S.Z. 
against her will. Id. at 18-23. S.Z. testified the incident stopped \\hen Connie Molen came home 
from \-Vot"k. Id. at 21-22. 
When asked by the prosecutor how many times the "same thing'" happened. S.7.. testified 
that Molen did the same thing to her on probably more than t\velve occasions in 2004. !d at 24-
25. S.Z. testified that Molen did the same thing four or five times in 2005. Id. at 26. S.Z. 
described an incident in 2005 when Molen removed her clothing and "started to molest me and 
stuff." Id. at 28. However, she clarified that S.Z. and Molen were wearing undenvcar and that 
there was no genital to genital contact during the incident. Id at 30. S./. could not recall any 
incident in 2005 when there was genital to genital contact. Id .. and at 32. When questioned about 
the twelve times in 2004. S.Z. testified about an incident in a camper and an incident in a tent. and 
she clarified that during each incident she and Molen were wearing underwear and there was no 
genital to genital contact. S.Z. testified she could not recall any incidents or oral to genital contact 
with Molen or any manual to genital contact with Molen. Id. at 33-34. 
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On cross-examination, S.Z testified that Molen put his penis in her vagina 10 times in 
2004. Id. at 37. S.Z. confinned that she could not remember that Molen put his penis in her 
vagina in 2005. and could not recall any oral to genital or manual to genital conlad. Id. at 40. 
4 S.Z. testilied that Molen tried to ··French kiss'' her and she didn't like that. Id On cross-
:i.1 
13 
L 
l i 
23 
.-, ., 
.( ': 
examination, S.Z. testified that nothing happened at either the camper or the tent. Id. at 48. On 
cross. S.Z. testified about the masturbation incident and said that this incident happened in her 
bedroom. Id. at 46. On cross. S.Z. testified that when she returm:d to Arizona in 2004. a pair of 
underwear had blood on it, that she put it under her bed and remained there until her mom found it 
in early 2005. Id at 43-44. S.Z. said she told her mom that Molen had done bad things to make 
her bleed. Jdat 44. On cross. S.Z. said her mom had some testing done and that she confirmed 
that it was S.7.'s blood. Id. at 45. 
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, on January 9, 2006, the State filed an 
Amended Complaint alleging that Molen engaged S.7. in genital to genital comact bctwt!en June 
and July 2004. The same charging language is contained in the lnfrmnation filed on January 9. 
2006. On May 11. 2007, the State filed an Amended Information which alleged that the genital to 
genital contact occurred ·'on or about the I st day of June. 2004 through the 30th <lay or July, 2004 
and/or th<: r1 day of"Junc, 2005 through the 20111 day of.June. 2005.'' 
This case proceeded to trial on June 18. 2007. S.Z. was now eleven ( 11) years old and it 
had been almost 18 months since the preliminary hearing, and almost two ('.:?.) years since the 
CARES interview. On direct S.Z. testified about an incident in 2004 that occurred in Molen ·s 
bedroom when he ''raped'" her. Trial Tr. at 281. S.Z. testified this occurred in his bedroom. Id She 
MEMORANDlJM DECISION AND ORDER DF.NYING STIPllLATION FOR Sl;MMARY 
,JUDGMF.NT AND DECISION GRANTING POST-CONVICTION RELIF.F ON OTHER 
GROUNDS- PAGE 15 
000053
4 
L4 
Jr, 
;o 
22 
., ' 
,:.•:. 
26 
• • 
testified Molen put his private part in her private part and was "humping'' her. Id. at 282-83. S./. 
testified the incident ended when Connie Molen drove up to the residence. id. al .284-85. S./,. 
testified there \Vas an incident in her bedroom when Molen touched her upper and lower body on 
top of her clothing. id. at 285-86. S.Z tcsti lied about the incident when Molen bad his hands on 
his penis. moving his bands up and dovvn and white stuff came out of his penis. id. at 288-89. 
She testified this happened in her bedroom. S.Z. testified she could not remember an incident with 
Molen that occum.:d in the bathroom. or at the camper or in a tent. Id at 289-90. She testified that 
Molen kissed her but denied that Molen put his mouth on any other part or her body. Id. at 290-
91. 
S.Z. testified on cross that Molen put his penis in her vagina only once. Id. at 299-300. On 
cross-examination, S.Z. said she couldn't recall much of \\·hat she told the CARES nurse. Id at 
310-14. S.Z. confirmed that Molen put his penis in her vagina the one time only. Id at 319. S.Z. 
testified she could not remember Molen licking her from her mouth to her vagina. id. at 322. She 
said ··1 don't remember. It's been so long." Id. S.Z could not recall many of the incidents she 
disclosed to Stacy Lewis at CARES in July, 2005. On cross, S.Z. testified the undcnvcar with the 
blood ,-vas put in the laundry at her home in Arizona. Id. at 304-05. S.Z. testified she told her 
mother she did not know how that happened. S.Z. was qucstiorn:d about the underwear \vith 
blood and her statement to Lewis that the incident happened in Utah. Id. al 327-331. S.Z. was 
confronted with discrepancies in her testimony at the preliminary hearing about genital to genital 
contact with Molen. Id. at :BJ-343. These discrepancies included where the contact occurred. and 
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on how many occasions. S.Z. was confronted with different statements she hnd made about the 
underwt:ar with blood. Id. at 346-351. 
On cross, S.Z was asked about where the masturbation incident occurred. She tcstilicd it 
occurred in her bedroom. Id.at 330. She admitted her statement at CARES that this incident 
occurred in the hallway was wrong. Id. 
On cross. S.Z. was confronted with her ditlcrcnt statements about how her mother learned 
of the accusations against Molen. Id at 325. 
On cross examination, S.Z. was questioned about her testimony at the preliminary hearing 
that Molen had intercourse \Vith her in her bedroom. Id. at 336-338. S.Z. admitted sh1: was 
incorrect when she testified at the preliminary hearing that the intercourse incident happened in her 
bedroom, she said it happened in Molcn's bedroom. ld. t 345-46. S.7 .. testified she did not 
remember testifying at the preliminary hearing that Molen had intercourse with her kn times. 
During closing argument. Mr. Christian emphasized the many inconsistem:ies and 
discrepancies between S.Z. 's statements to the police. Stacy Lewis at CARES, and her testimony 
at the preliminary hearing and her trial testimony. Mr. Christian portrayed Tilfany Davidson as a 
liar who had a long standing grudge against Molen. 
In the course of discovery in this post-conviction case. counsd was given the entire 
CARES file to review. The file includes a recorded conversation between Nurse Ortega and 8.Z. 
The conversation took place during the physical examination on July 6, 2005. l!xhibit 3 to the 
April 22. 2014 Anidavit of Elisa G. Massoth purports to he a transcript of that recording. The 
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transcript docs not appear to have been prepared by a reporter. The Court has not hcen provided 
with a copy of the recording. 
In the transcript, S.Z. makes or endorses a number of statements about sexual contact with 
Molen as follO\vs: 
S.Z. Urnmm .... he was touching my chest and near my vagina. 
A.O. OK. what was he touching it with? 
S.Z. Ummmm ..... . 
A.O. I lands? 
S.Z. Uh-huh. 
A.O. Weiner? OD? Did he touch your chest with his \Veiner? Your vagina with his 
wcincr'? How about your rear end with his wciner'? No. OK. So i r that ... let me 
get this straight. The wciner only touched the vagina? Did it go in the vagina'? It 
did. OK. But did that hurt. It did. Was there bleeding? 
S-2. Ummrnm ..... 
A.O. There was. OK How had did it hurt. did you cry? No crying. OK. so did it 
hurt a whole lot or a little bit? 
S.Z. Ummmm ... as bad as a major headache. 
A.O. As bad as a major headache. So pretty bad but not had enough that you 
wanted to cry. So there was bleeding ... ummm ... how about mouths? 
S.Z. UMMM ... 
A.O. Mouths touched chest? OK. yes. Mouths touched the chest. Did mouths 
touch the vagina? Yes. I-low about did mouths touch the ... OK, no. No rear end. 
So mouths touched chest and vagina. I low about your mouth. Did your mouth 
touch his chest? His rear end? How about his weiner? No? OK. good. I lmv many 
times did the ... ? 
S.Z. /\ lot last summer and a lot this summer. 
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A.O. /\ lot this summer? Was there bleeding this summer? S.IZ, 1 your. your 
mom ·s friend Stacy that you ·vc been staying with she said she frmnd some 
underwear vvith blood on it that she thought ,.vas yours. 
S./. That wasn't mine. 
A.O. It wasn't blood? 
S./.. No bleeding. 
A.O. No bleeding this summer, just only last summer? OK. So did he put his 
wcincr in your vagina this summer? Not this summer? OK. Not since you've been 
there this year'? OK. So what has happened recently this year since you \Vere there? 
S.Z. Uhhhh ... he kept his clothes on. 
Ortega Tr. at pp. 2-3. 
Molen and the State assert that these statements were substantially different than the 
statements S.Z. had just made to Stacy Lewis. The parties assert that the statements constitute 
impeachment evidence that would have been favorable to the defense at trial. 
·'Due process does require all material exculpatmy evidence knO\vn to the State or in its 
· f possession he disclosed to the defendant.". Schull::- v. Stale, 155 Idaho 877. 318 P .3d 646. 651 ( Ct. 
l,_l 
l ,, 
'l:"' 
,'.\,' 
App. 2013) (citing Brady v. Mm:rlaml. 373 C.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. I 194. 1196-97, 10 l..F<l.2d 21 S, 
218 (1963): Dunlap 1·. s·1ute. 141 Idaho 50, 64, 106 P.3d 376. 390 (2004)) (emphasis in original). 
The question presented is whether the recorded conversation ,vith Nurse Ortega should he treated 
as evidence known to the State such that the failure to disclose such evidence to the deknsc could 
be regarded as a Brady violation. 
Tht: parties cite to People v. Urihe. 162 Cal.App.4th I 457(Ct. App. 2008) in whid1 a 
California appellate court determined that a defendant was entitled to a new trial hecause the state 
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failed to disclose a videotape of the medical examination of the victim done hy SART (Sexual 
Assault Response Team), and where the information \Vas not othcnvisc knovvn or <lisdosed lo the 
prosecution prior to trial. In determining that the Brm(r duty of disclosure should apply to SART 
investigative information, the Court analyzed whether SART \vas ··acting on the government's 
behalf." Id. at 14 75, quoting Kyles v. Whille_v. 514 U.S. 419. 433-434. ( 1995). '"The individual 
prosecutor is presumed to have knovdcdge of all information gathered in connection \Vith the 
government's investigation:· Id. quoting In re Brown 17 Cal.41h 873, at 879 ( 1998). In attempting 
to define the scope of who is acting on the governments hehalf the Court stated that the 
prosecution was not rcsponsihle for evidence held by all governmental agencies. but instead only 
those involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case. Id. at l 4 76 ( citing In re 5:11.!ele. 32 
Cal. 4 111 682. 697 (2004)). In deciding whether SART \Vas acting on the prosecutions behalt: the 
Court looked at the procedures involved in an examination of a sexual assault victim hy SART. 
SART \vas a unit of the pediatric department of a hospital. SJ\RT rclcnals \\:ere received from 
either law enforcement agencies or social services agencies. An examination by SART staff is 
initiated by an officer or child protective services that calls or brings the child to the hospital. The 
doctors and nurses write reports. take photographs. obtain lah results and send these materials to 
those responsible for charging and prosecuting offenders. These same doctors and nurses often 
tcsti fy on behalf of the prosecution at the criminal trial. 
Herc. CARES has much the same role. CARES only accepts referrals from child 
protective services, law enforcement agcncit:s. prosecutors and the courts. Exhibit '.2 to April 22. 
2014 Anidavit of Elissa G. Massoth. From prior experience as a prosecutor and a trial judge. the 
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Court is aware of the integral role CARES has in investigating cases involving allegations of child 
sexual abuse. The Court of Appeals has referred to CARES as ··a child abuse investigation 
agency"·. State v. /,eh!. 35129. 2009 WL 9152150 (Idaho Ct. App. Dec.7.1009) 
Although Idaho courts have stated that the Brady duty extends lo agents having a role in 
investing crimes. the Court has been unahlc to find an Idaho case involving CARES inv1.:stigative 
materials. The Court concludes that CARES in this case was. in effect. acting on hehair of the 
state in conducting its investigation. As a result. the Court concludes that the failure to disclose 
the recorded conversation with S.Z. as a potential Brnd_v violation. 
The law is settled that there may be a Brmo' violation even i r the information was not 
knovvn or disclosed to the prosecutor. As the Court stated in ,",'fate, .. Gardner. 126 ldaho 428. 433. 
885 P .2d I 144. 1149 (Ct. App. 1994): 
... the duty or disclosure enunciated in Bral{V is an obligation of not just the 
individual prosecutor assigned to the case. but of all the government agents having 
a significant role in investigating and prosecuting the offense. See Famho ,·. S,nith. 
433 F.Supp. 590. 598 (W.D.N.Y.1977). qffd. 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir.1977) . 
Moreover. l.C.R. I 6(a) specifies that the prosecution's duty of automatic disclosure 
under that rule extends to exculpatory evidence and information in the possession 
or control of the prosecuting attorney's staff and of ·'any oth<:rs who have 
participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case who either n:gularly 
report or vvith reference lo the particular case have reported, to the oJliec of the 
prosecuting attorney.'' Thus. the individual prosecutor's innocence does not obviate 
the violation. 
'There arc three essential components of a true Hrady violation: the evidence at issue must 
be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory. or because it is impeaching; that 
evidence must have heen suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently: and pre_judi1.:c 
must have ensued:· Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 64. 106 P.3d at 390 (quoting .\'trickier v. Greene. 527 
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U.S. 263. 281-82. 119 S.Ct. 1936. 1948. 144 L.Ed.2d 286, 301-03 (1999)). The Court is satisfied 
that the Ortega conversation is favorable to the accused hccausc it is impeaching, and that it was 
inadvertently suppressed by the State. There is no evidence the State \Vas ever awan: of the 
,1 existence of the conversation until it \Vas discovered in the course of this post-conviction 
proceeding. In fact, there is every indication that both the State and the defense made reasonable 
efforts to obtain this information by directing pre-trial subpoenas to CARES. 
: i 
1.J 
1 ·1 
'J'' (.\. 
··Prejudice. in the context of Brady. requires a reasonable probability ol' a different result." 
41369. 2014 WL 2442904 (Idaho Ct. App. May 28. 2014) (citing KJ1es v. H'hitley. 514 U.S. 419. 
433 ( 1995)). The court must be satisfied that the suppressed evidence undermines confidence in 
the result of the trial. Id The principal allegation at trial \Vas the single alkgation or genital to 
genital contact during the summer of 2004. In this case, the jury was informed or the many 
discrepancies and inconsistencies between the victim's statements to Corporal Kennedy, her 
statements to Stacy Lewis at CARES. her preliminary hearing testimony and her trial testimony. 
The victim admitted that some of her prior statements were incorrect. and she admit.led that she 
could not rcmemher many of her prior statements and testimony. However. the victim was very 
consistent in asserting tlrnt Molen had engaged her in genital to genital contact in 2004. 
The Court has carefully reviewed the recorded conversation \vith Nurse Ortega. Tht: Court 
does not agree that the statements which S.Z. either made or endorsed were substantially diflcrcnt 
than those she made to Stacy Lewis. S.Z. stated or endorsed that there was manual to genital 
contact. oral to genital contact and genital to genital contact hy Molen. S.Z. denied other types or 
contact included anal contact or oral to genital contact by S.Z. S.Z. denied any genital to genital 
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contact in 2005. S.Z. denied that Molen removed his clothing during any contact in 2005. S.Z. 
stated there was bleeding. S.Z. denied that her blood would have been found on undcn.vear vvhich 
was found by Stacy Ross during 2005. Having considered all of evidence presented at the triaL 
and after reviewing the entirety of S.Z. ·s pre-trial statements and testimony. the Court concludes 
that there was no reasonable probability of a different result solely due to the suppression of the 
Ortega conversation. As a result the Court docs not find that the suppression of the Ortega 
conversation is a Brady violation. For this reason. the Court \Viii decline to follow the stipulated 
motion for summary judgment. 
In the December 26, 20 I 3 Statement of Stipulated Reasons to Resolve Post-Conviction 
Case, the parties cited to numerous claims of inetkctivc assistance of counsel including the 
alcoholism of trial counsel: trial eounscrs failure to adequately prepare expert witnesses: and trial 
counsel's failure to requesl a mistrial or continuance of the trial do lo the failure to disclose the 
existence of photographs of the colposcopic examination of the victim prior to trial. ··To prevail 
on an incflcctive assistance of counsel claim. the defendant must show that the attorney's 
performance was deficient and that the defendant \Vas prejudiced by the ddidcncy ... (,rant v. 
State. 2014 WL 1664086 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 25. 1014) (citing ,\'trick/and \'. Washington. 466 
U.S. 668. 687-88. I 04 S.Ct. 1052. 80 L.Ed.2d 6 74 ( 1984): Hassell r. State. 127 Idaho .113. 3 I 6. 
900 P.2d 221. 224 (Ct.App.1995 )). 'To establish a dcfici,:ncy. the pclitiom:r has the burden or 
showing that the attorney's representation fell hclO\v an objective standard of reasonableness:· 
Aragon\'. Slate. I 14 Idaho 758. 760. 760 P.2d I 174. 1176 (1988). To establish prc_iudice. the 
petitioner must show a reasonable probability that. but for the altorney's (k:licient performance. the 
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outcome or the trial would have been different." Id at 761. 760 P.2d at 1177. To <.kmonstrate 
prejudice. the appellant ··must show a reasonable probability that. hut for the attorney's deficient 
perrormam:e, the outcome of the trial v,ould have been different.'' Id. A ··reasonable probability .. is 
such as would undermine confidence in the outcome or the trial. State ,·. Dunlap. 155 Idaho 345, 
313 P.3d 1. 39 (2013) (citing Cullen r. Pinholster. --···· lJ.S. --. ·--. 131 S.Ct. 1388. 1403. 
179 L.Ed.2<l 557. 575 (2011) (quoting Strickland 466 U.S. at 694. 104 S.Ct. at 2068. 80 L.Fd.2d 
at 698)). 
In revie\ving the pending stipulation. the Court has thoroughly reviewed the transcript of 
the trial. the transcript of the preliminary hearing. the CARES interview and the offici;:r·s report of 
the interview of the victim. The defense was unaware there \Vere photogrnphs of the genital 
, ? examination of the victim. In her direct testimony. Nurse Ortega stated that when she performed a 
colposcopic examination of the victim's vagina, she observed two healed tears or the hymen that 
were consistent with th1.: victim· s allegations of sexual abuse by Molen. Tr. Transcript at 462-72. 
.~. ,.. 
,. '· 
,·, 
,·.,·. 
During her cross-examination. Nurse Ortega revealed that there were photographs taken during the 
genital examination. Id.at 475. Molcn's Trial counsel did not request a continuance so that the 
photographs could be rcvievved by an appropriate expert. Trial counsel did not request a mistrial 
so that these photographs could be reviewed by an appropriate expert. Instead. the photographs 
were shown to Molcn's expert Dr. Friedlander about 90 minutes before he testified. While Dr. 
Friedlander testified that the photographs vverc not consistent with sexual abuse. obviously the jury 
did not !ind his testimony credible. 
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These photographs \:Vere potentially critical evidence to the defense. Dr. Friedlander was a 
pathologist. He was not an expert in pediatric sexual abuse. This is the field of expertise that \Vas 
required in this case. An expet1 in pediatric sexual abuse ,.vould have known that it was a standard 
practice to make photographs of the colposcopic examination of the vagina in an examination 
prompted hy allegations of sexual abuse, and such an expert undoubtedly would have prompted 
c: trial counsel to specifically request the production of such photographs prior to trial. Molen·s trial 
counsel did not make any specific request for the production of photographs of the colposcopic 
examination. 
Stephen R. Guertin, M. D. is an expert in pediatric sexual abuse. In his October 24. 2007 
1: affidavit, attached as Exhibit 9 to the joint stipulation. Dr. Guertin states he has specialized in 
pediatric care and has more than 20 years of experience in examining children suspected of having 
·, ;· been sexually abused. Dr. Guertin reviewed the colposcopic photographs and !:>tales they arc of 
excellent quality. In Dr. Guertin's opinion, the photographs demonstrate a normal hymen. Dr. 
1 4 Guertin states that there are no notches. tears, lacerations, scars or distortion. 
, .. ,, 
i... l 
Cari Camsso is an expert in pediatric sexual abuse. In her April I 4. 2014 affidavit. 
attached as an exhibit to the joint stipulation, she states that she has been a Registered Nurse since 
I 974. is licensed and Board Ccrti lied as a Forensic Sexual Assault Nurse hrnmincr by the State of 
California, and has extensive experience in forensic medical examinations of' suspected child 
victims of sexual abuse. Ms. Carusso has reviewed the colposcopic photographs and concludes 
they demonstrate a normal genital examination. Ms. Camsso states there is no evidence of healed 
tears as Nurse Ortega testified at trial. Ms. Carusso states there is no evidence of sexual abuse. 
Nurse Ortega testified that as an expert in pediatric sex abuse that the colposcopic 
examination revealed two (2) tears in the hymen consistent \Vith sexual abuse. l:ven though he was 
given an opportunity to review the photographs just before he testified for the defense. Dr. 
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1 Friedlander was not an expert in pediatric child abuse. Moreover. Dr. Friedlander did not have the 
) opportunity to have the photographs revicv.red by an expert in pediatric sexual abuse. The 
importance of the photographs of the colposcopic examination case cannot he overstated. 
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The Court concludes that Molen\; trial counsel"s performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness in l) failing to consult with and/or retain an expert in pediatric sexual 
abuse: 2) failing to discover the existence of the colposcopic photographs prior to trial; and 3) 
failing to request either a continuance of the trial or a mistrial so that the nevv evidence cnuld be 
reviewed by an expert in pediatric sexual abuse. The Court also concludes that Molen was 
prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance because the failure to consult with an expert in 
pediatric sexual abuse and the failure to request either a continuance of the trial or a mistrial when 
the photographs were disclosed for the first time during the trial has substantially undermined the 
Court's confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
As a result, the Court is compelled to grant post-conviction relief to Molen. Tbe Court has 
the utmost respect for the jury"s verdict and has come to its conclusion only alter careful and 
thorough review of' the record. 
Conclusion 
I-laving concluded that Molen·s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. pursuant to 
Idaho Code ~ 19-4907 the Court hereby vacates the Judgment of Conviction entered on .I anuary 7. 
2008. The Cowi grants Molen a new trial. The Comi orders the Idaho Dcpanmcnt of Correction 
to release Michael Scott Molen SSN 11)()(' #881 n from its 
custody. The Court further orders Molen. his counsel and the Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
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to appear before the Court at the Boise County Courthouse in Idaho City on July 10. 2014. at 
I 0:00 a.m. for further proceedings in Case No. CR-2005-1748. 
ll lS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this _(r ___ dav of .lune, 2014. 
w/J..~ 
Pairick-H. (hv~;~--- ----···--···----
District Judge 
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"9Vrv IAAltnN 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MULLEN, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1503024 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTTON TO 
DISMISS 
Ronald D. Christian, by and through his counsel of record Michelle Points of 
Points Law, PLLC, respectfully submits this Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. Defendant will address each of Plaintiff's arguments, in turn. 
A. Defendant Properly Filed A Motton to Dismiss Under IRCP 12(b)(6). 
Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, Defendant's motion to dismiss is not 
procedurally defective. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a) allows defenses to be plead 
by a motion to dismiss versus a responsive pleading in the form of an answer. In the 
event a motion to dismiss is denied by the Cou~ the defendant then has ten days from 
notice of the Court's otdcr to serve an answer. See e.g. Bach v. Miller. 148 Idaho 549, 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFeOAIGtNAL 1 
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552,224 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2010)("whcre a motion is made under ntle 12(b) prior to filing 
a responsive pleading, a responsive pleading must be filed within ten days of the denial of 
the last rule 12(b) motion in order to avoid default"). 
The case quoted by Plaintiff (Duff v. Draper, 95 Idaho 299, (1974 )) is taken out 
of context. The district court in that case., in ruling on a motion to intervene under IRCP 
24, held that the claim contained in the proposed con1plaint was time barred and denied 
the motion to intervene. The Idaho Supreme Court in Draper held that the petitioner 
need not demonstrate tbe merits of his case in his motion to intervene, that the petitioner 
,vas entitled to pursue his claim, and that the defendants could raise the statute of 
limitations as a defense. In sum, it was an error for the district court to .ma spcmte deny 
the petition to intervene based on its own finding that the claitn in the accompanying 
complamt (not the petition to intervene) was time barred. 
In this case, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the Defendant because that 
claim is unequivocally time barred. Defendant's 12(b)(6) motion is properly before the 
Court. 
B. Pbt.intifrs Claim Accrued When He Was Convicted In June of 2007. 
The law in Idaho is well developed and very clear: "An action to recover 
damages for professional malpractice must be commenced within two years after the 
cause of action. accrued." .Reynolds v. Trout Jones, 154 Idaho 21, 293 P. 3d 645 (2013), 
quoting Stuardv. Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701,704,249 P.3d 1156, t 150(2011). A 
claimant must suffer objective proof of "some damage'1 that could be recovered in a 
malpractice claim for a claim to accrue. Id. Nothing more is required for an action for 
professional malptactice to accrue under Idaho law. 
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Neither Idaho Code secti.on 5-219 or the body of case law interpreting that statue 
make a distinction between its applicability to underlying cases that are civil or crimio.al 
in nature. That is, they are treated l1niformly under Idaho law. The cause of action to 
recover damages for professional malpractice must be commenced within two years of 
the act or omission complained and when some damage has occurred. Stephen v. 
Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P .2d 41, 46 ( 1984 ). "The limitation period shall not be 
extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages ... " J.C. § 5-219. There 
is no applicable '1discovery'' exception to accrual in this ca..c;e, as Plaintiff has not alleged, 
and has not basis to allege, fraudulent concealment. 
In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff advocates that this Court 
essentially ignore Idaho law and adopt the hold1ngs courts have made in other states 
which purportedly support the proposition that where the underlying case is criminal in 
nature, the plaintiffs claim cannot accnte before they are exonerated or obtain post-
conviction relief. To take Plaintiffs argument a step further, if you never get post-
convicti.on relief you are barred from ever filing a malpractice claim. This is not the law 
in Idaho. 
Plaintiffs argument is akin to saying that a c]aiin for malpractice doesn't accrue 
until a court rules that your attorney breached the standard of care. Such an argument is 
plainly frivolous, particularly given the voluminous and estab.ltshed case law on the 
subject. Take for example the case of Trout Jones, .,upra. Plaintiff argued that until 
Judge Darla Williams ruled against him, there was only a "risk" of dam.age; she could 
have ruled in his favor and therefore his claim didn't accrue until she denied .him relief 
The Idaho Supreme Court held that the plaintiff bad suffered "some damage'' when a 
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third party had refused to refund earnest money - which was due to the alleged poor 
drafting of the earnest money agreement by the attorney. "[W].here a client takes action 
on the advice of an attomey which results in immediate damage, the statute of limitations 
begins to run at the point the damage occurred." Trout .Jones, 154 ldaho 25,293 P.3d at 
649. 
In any event, jt is not as if Plaintiff was '1alerted to" or ]eamed for the first time 
that he had a claim against Defendant upon Judge Owen entering hi!; Memorandum 
Decision. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he was damaged by the alleged acts and 
omissions of the Defendant when convicted and later impri~oned. 
The statutes of li:m.itatiollS being interpreted by the out-of-state cases cited by 
PJaintiff differ greatly from Idaho's statute in that they arc based strictly on a discovery 
rule, or. language akin statutes of limitations commencing when the claim accrues, 
without defining what "accrual" means. For example, in the case of Stevens v. Bispham, 
316 Or. 221, 851 P.2d 556 (1993), the Supreme Court of 0.r.egon recognized that with 
respect to a legal malpractice claim, Oregon follows the "discovery rule'' for establishing 
when a claim accrues; the "statute of limitations does not begin to run until the clie11.t 
knows. or in the exercise of reasonable care, should know 'every fact which it would be 
necessary for the dient to prove in order to support his right to judgment."' Id. at 
224, 8Sl P.2d at 559 (emphasis added). That Court went on to hold that "the claim 
accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the client both suffers damage 
and knows or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should know that the substantial damage 
actually suffered was caused by the lawyers acts or omissi.ons." Id. (emphasis added). 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 4 
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This is not the law in Idaho - only suffering some damage is required following 
the alleged act or omission. Contr:ary to the statutes relied upon in the out-ofwstate cases 
cited by Plaintiff, J.C. ,r 5-219 specifically state~ that "the cause of action shall be deemed 
to have accrued as of the time of the occtmcnce, act or omissio.n complained of, and the 
limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences or 
damages ... '' Cases interpreting the statute consistently hold tbat the accrual is triggered 
by the act or omission and when the claimant suffers some damage. There is absolutely 
no requirement that a claimant has to know every fact it wollld be nccessa.ry to prove to 
be entitled to judgment. Such a holding would be in stark contrast to established Idaho 
law interpreting the subject statute. 
Plaintiff's argument that this recommended departure from Idaho statutory law 
and case law precedent is actually supported by other Idaho Supreme Coud decisions, 
misapplies the holding of those cases cited and fails to distinguish the facts. For 
example, Plaintiff quotes Taylor v. McNichols, 149 ldaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010). The 
statement quoted is "[onlyJ when a case bas been concluded may one truly identify 
whether or not a prosecution baoi; been malicious, whether an attorney has comtnitted 
malpractice, or, in the case at hand, whether an attorney has acted fraudulently or solely 
for his own benefit." Plaintiff's Response, p. 10. This language used by the Supreme 
Court is referring to the outcome of an underlying case, not a subsequent case. In a case 
of malicious prosecution, that a case be ''tenninated" in favor of the plaintiff is an 
element of the claim. See McNichol.<i, .vupra (citations omitted). Tellingly, the Supreme 
Court in McNichols held " ... Idaho courts take into consideration the significant legal 
complexities involved in the application oflaw, such as trial strategies and negotiation 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
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tactics. and. wait until all those comple:xities resolved themselves prior to hearing a 
claim." Id. at 843~ 243 P. 3d 659. That is, wait until your trial is over before you sue 
counsel. ln this case, Plaintiffs trial was over, he was convicted and was then free to sue 
the Defendant. 1 
Nor does the case of !leek v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) assist .Plaintiff in his 
aTgument to change Idaho law. In Heck, "a state prisoner filed suit under § 1983 raising 
claims which, iftn1c, would have established the invalidity of his outstanding conviction. 
[the Supreme Court] analogized his suit as one for malicious prosecution, an element of 
which is favorable termination of criminal proceedings." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 
(2007). The.re is no such requirement in a claim for professional malpractice. The cases 
relied upon by Plaintiff are simply distinguishable on their facts and applicable law. 
Nothing has been cited by Plaintiff to support an argument that he was precluded 
from suing Defendant for malpractice within the applicable statute of limitati.ons. 
Plaintiff appears to be arguing that this Court should change the law in Idaho 
because any malpractice claim brought by anyone that wasn't granted post-conviction 
relief would "certainly" be dismissed. That is simply not the case. This Court is capable 
of detennining whether a plaintiff asserted a claim for malpractice., and whether a 
plaintiff satisfied the elements of a malpractice claim, which are: (a) the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship: (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (c) 
failure: to perfonn the du.ty; and (d) the negligence of the lawyer must have been a 
1 It also appears that the cases from other states require proof of legal innocence. versus 
actual innocence. Defendant is aware ofno Idaho case that bars a claimant from 
asserting actual i.nnocence in the malpractice context. 
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proximate cause of the damage to the client .... " Bi:~lwp v. Owens, 1.52 Idaho 616,272 
P.3d 1247 (2012). 
Any district court can consider. the evidence and make a determination on a 
plaintiff's claim for attorney malpractice. Such decisions are not (and cannot be) 
quarantined only to petition~ for post-conviction relief, and only then in subsequent civil 
claims. That is not the law in Idaho. Plaintiff may be able to use the Memorandum 
Decision granting post~conviction relief might be able to be used in support of his case., 
but based on the allegations contained .in his complaint Plaintiff believes he had a case 
prior to its issuance, therefore it is not clispositive in any manner with respect to the 
statute of limitations. 
There is no dispute that Plaintiff suffered ascertainable damage upon his 
conviction in June of 2007, and his claim against the Defendant began to accrue at that 
time. Plaintiff therefore cannot sustain a claim against Defendant as the complaint was 
filed well beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations and shoid.d be dismissed. 
DATED THIS 7th day of April, 2015. 
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CERTIFJ.CATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day of April, 2015, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS by the method indicated below and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Elisa G. Massoth 
Dartanyon G. Bu1TOWS 
ELISA G. MASSOTH, PLLC 
14 S. Main Street, Ste. 200 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
_ U.S Mail, Postage Pl'epaid 
Hand Delivered 
-~·-1- Overnight Mail 
_u_ Fax (208) 642-3799 
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Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208.287.3216 
Facsimile: 208.336.2088 
Em.ail: mpoints{£qpointslaw.com 
Attorney for Defendant Ronald D. Christian 
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DEPUTY LD!N 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF J:HR FOURTH JUOICI.AL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANU r'UK Ulli CUUNTY U.t:' AUA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MULLEN. 
Plaintiff, 
v~. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1503024 
SUPPLEMENT AL AUTHORITY IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Ronald D. Christi.an, by and through his counsel of record Michelle Points of 
Points Law, PLLC, respectfully submits this Supplemental Authority in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Plaintiff asserts that the statute of limitations in a malpractice cue cannot 
commence until, in this case, post conviction relief was granted. Defendant's initial 
research did not detect the case of Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269,923 P.2d 976 
(1996), as the statute of limitations was not at issue in that case. However, the case does 
establish that jn a malpractice action arising from representation of a defendant in an 
underlying criminal proceeding, the person pursuing the claim must establish the 
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 1 
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ndditionnl elemen.t of actU31 innocence of the underlying criminal charges, and notably 
does not require a claimant to obtain post conviction relief prior to commencing a claim 
against their attorney in the underlying criminal case. 
DATED nns 13th day of April. 2015. 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of April, 2015, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENT AL AUTHORITY DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS by the method indicated below and addressed to each of the following: 
Elisa G. Massoth 
Dartanyon O. Burrows 
ELISA G. MASSOTII, PLLC 
14 S. Main Street, Ste. 200 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
_ U.S Mail, Postage Prepaid 
_ Hand Delivered 
ffiemight Mail 
~~~P F~ax,(208)642-3799 
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129 Idaho 269 (Idaho 1996) 
923 P.2d 976 
Kevin LAMB, Plaintiff .. Appellant, 
v, 
Howard MANWEILER, Defendant-Respondent. 
No. 22549. 
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise. 
August 15, 1996 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 1996. 
(923 P ,2d 977] 
Page 270 
Ellis, Brown and Sheils, Chtd., Boise, for appellant. Allen B. Ellis argued. 
Wilson, Carnahan & McColl, Boise, for respondent. Jeffrey M. Wilson argued. 
SCHROEDER, Justice. 
PAGE 04/09 
This is an appeal of the dismissal of an attomey malpractice action. Kevin Lamb (Lamb) filed 
suit against Howard Manweiler (Manweiler) who had represented Lamb in criminal proceedings. 
Lamb contends that Manweiler was negligent in his representation. The district court granted 
Manweller's motion for summary Judgment. The district court's decision was vacated and the case 
remanded by the Court of Appeals. This 
[923 P .2d 978] 
Page271 
Court granted Manweiler's Petition for Review. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
In 1989 Lamb was initially charged with nine felonies relating to his cattle operations. 
Manweiler defended Lamb in these criminal proceedings. Lamb entered pleas of gullty to four 
felony counts as a result of negotiations. The remaining felony charges were dismissed. The pleas 
were entered upon the advice of counsel. 
Prior to Lamb's sentencing Manweiler discovered evidence which cast doubt on the validity of 
two of the four guilty pleas. Manweiler moved to withdraw two of the four guilty pleas, and the 
district court granted the motion. Manweiler withdrew as Lamb's attorney on the remaining counts 
on the grounds that. ha could not ethlcally present a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas on the two 
remaining charges. New counsel presented a motion to withdraw the remaining two guilty pleas. 
The district court denied the motion. Lamb was sentenced to a two-year fixed period, followed by a 
five~year indeterminate period. He initiated an appeal and post-conviction relief proceedings which 
were subsequently dismissed pursuant to a stipulation with the State. 
Lamb brought the present action against Manweiler, alleging that Manweiler committed 
professional malpractice in representing him in the criminal matters. Lamb argued that Manweiler 
negligently (1) advised Lamb to plead guilty to four criminal counts and advised him that the guilty 
000077
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pleas could be withdrawn; (2) advised Lamb that the jury would find him guilty of all or some of the 
charges against him; (3) withdrew as Lamb's counsel immediately before the hearing on Lamb's 
motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, thereby prejudicing Lamb's chances of having his change of 
plea accepted; and (4) failed to adequately investigate the crlmlnal charges and to determine that 
the charges were not meritorious. Lamb asserted that the negligent acts by Manweiler resulted in 
lamb's Incarceration and addltlonal damages. 
The district court denied Manweller's initial motion for summary judgment or alternative motion 
for dismissal, but the district court subsequently granted Manweiler's renewed motion tor summary 
judgment. The district court held that the sole issue before It was whether Lamb was guilty of the 
underlying criminal charges upon which he based his claim of legal malpractice, reasoning that if 
Lamb were guilty of the underlying charges, a prima facie element of proximate cause In his cause 
of action could not be shown. The district court reviewed the affidavits presented, the transcripts of 
the sentencing hearing and the entry of lamb's gullty pleas and found evidence of Lamb's guilt of 
the crimes charged, concluding that lamb tailed to come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut 
his admissions of guilt or to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact regarding his guilt. 
Summary judgment was granted In favor of Manweiler. The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court's grant of summary Judgment. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal from the Court of Appeals, this Court considers that it is hearing the matter in the 
first instance, and not merely reviewing the Court of Appeals decision. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 
288, 290, 900 P .2d 196, 198 (1995). When reviewing a decision of the Court of Appeals this Court 
gives consideration to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, but performs an independent appellate 
review of the trial court's decision. State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 488, 490, 835 P .2d 1299, 1301 
(1992). 
Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C. P. 56(c); Mutual of Enumclaw v. Bax, 
127 Idaho 851,852,908 P.2d 153, 154 (1995). When this Court reviews the district court's ruling 
on such a motion, this Court employs the same standard properly employed by the district court 
when originally ruling on the motion. Friel v. Boise City Haus. Auth., 126 Idaho 
[923 P .2d 979] 
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484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). Both this Court and the district court must liberally construe the 
record in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, drawing all reasonable 
inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of that party. City of Chubbuck v. City 
of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 200, 899 P .2d 411, 413 (1995). 
Ill. 
ELEMENTS OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION ARISING FROM REPRESENTATION OF A 
DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE 
The elements required to establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of a civil action 
are: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the 
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lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or of the standard of care by the lawyer; and (4) the failure to 
pertorm the duty must have been a proximate cause of the damages suffered by the client. 
Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13,813 P.2d 350,352 (1991); Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 
708, 652 P.2d 650, 654 (1982). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the attorney has 
been negligent or has falled to act with proper skill, as well as the burden of showing that the 
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. Without proximate 
cause there ls no liability for negligence in a malpractice action. Marias, 120 Idaho at 131 813 P .2d 
at 352; Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho at 224, 227, 796 P.2d at 101, 104 (1990); Johnson, 
103 Idaho at 706, 852 P.2d at 654. In a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish that he 
or she would have 11some chance of success" in the underlying action before he or she would be 
entitled to rerover from the attorney. Murray, 118 Idaho at 'l2.7, 796 P.2d at 104; e.g., Fitzgerald v. 
Walker, 121 Idaho 589, 592, 826 P .2d 1301, 1304 (1992). Lamb does not dispute the proposition 
that in a legal malpractice action arising from representation of a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding, the person pursuing the claim must establish the additional element of actual 
innocence of the underlying alminal charges. 
IV. 
LAMB CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT COUNSEL'S ADVICE WAS THE CAUSE OF DAMAGES HE 
SUFFERED BY PLEADING GUil TY. 
Lamb argues that it was Manweller•s negligent advice that caused Lamb to enter the guilty 
pleas. Manweiler, being the party moving for summary judgment, bears the initial burden of 
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. State v. Shama Resources Ltd., 
Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 P .2d 977, 980 (1995); T;ngley v. Haffison, 125 Idaho 86, 90, 
887 P.2d 960,964 (1994). Manweiler has presented evidence that he did not negligently advise 
Lamb wtth respect to his guilty pleas. Manweiler avers that he did not advise Lamb that a guilty 
plea could be withdrawn wlthcut just legal cause and that he never possessed Information that 
would legally justify the withdrawal of the pleas of guilty upon which Lamb was convicted and 
sentenced. 
In his petitlon for post conviction relief Lamb asserted that prior to entering the guilty pleas, he 
told Manweiler he was not guilty. Lamb presented evidence In support of this assertion in his 
affidavit filed February 1, 1991. In this affidavit, Lamb set forth his statements and explanations of 
the course of events leading to the charges being brought against him. Lamb averred that 11 1, at all 
times planned on having the pleas withdrawn, because I was convinced, as I still am, that I am 
Innocent. And I'm being Incarcerated by 'Default,' because of my attorney." Lamb submitted a 
second affidavit in which he stated that •at the time of the guilty plea I thought, because of advice 
of counsel, that the Jury oould find me guilty of intent to defraud, even though the alleged victims 
knew of and agreed to all my actions. I therefore thought a jury could find me guilty, however, at 
this time I know that would be impossible because we oould prove that the alleged victims knew of 
all my actions, agreed to the same and encouraged them for their own monetary gain." Lamb 
asserted his ninnocence" of the crimes charged and supported his assertions with his account of 
the events leading up to his being charged with the crimes for which he was Incarcerated. 
[923 P .2d 980] 
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Regardless of Lamb's assertions, the record is irrefutable that he was properly advised that he 
could not withdraw the pleas of guilty at issue in this case. That advice was given by the district 
judge who ultimately accepted the pleas and who would not allow Lamb to withdraw them. Much 
emphasis is placed upon the development of a complete record in the courtroom to protect the 
rights of the accused. That record also protects others. It is not necessary to weigh the credibility 
of Lamb and Manweiler when the record establ!shes that Lamb was properly advised and 
proceeded with that advice in mind. A review of the transcript of the change of plea hearing of 
March 23, 1890, establishes what Lamb knew. 
When Lamb appeared in the district court on the underlying charges that resulted in his 
incarceration the possibility of withdrawing the pleas of guilty was specifically addressed, along 
with a number of other issue9 that indicated that he. unrlP.rAtnod the nature of the proceedings ario 
their conclusiveness. Prior to entry of the pleas Manweiler specifically addressed problems on the 
two counts to which guilty pleas were entered and subsequently withdrawn, there being no 
ohjar.tion from the prosecution. When asked by the district iudqe if Lamb wanted to withdraw the 
pleas of not guilty he had previously entered and plead guilty, Manweiler stated the following: 
We would, if it please the Court, on one condition. And that is that we would tender a condltional 
plea of guilty to those two charges provided I can convince Mr. Kane [the prosecutor] over there 
that they're not exactly what they1re supposed to be. That we might take that Into consideration at 
the time of sentencing. 
No similar reservation was stated as to the two charges at issue to which Lamb entered pleas 
of guilty and was not allowed to withdraw. 
Following these preliminary statements the district judge engaged Lamb in an extended 
colloquy concerning his rights. Lamb indicated that he had heard a lengthy discussion with another 
individual that had pied guilty. He specifically acknowledged his understanding that when he pied 
guilty he gave up his constitutional right to a trial, the presumption of innocence, the right of 
confrontation and cross-examination, and the right against compulsory self-incrimination. He had 
no questions about those rights, said he understood them, and voluntarily and intentionally waived 
those rights. Additionally, Lamb indicated that his education consisted of high school and two 
years of college. 
Lamb said he understood that no plea agreements that might have been made were binding 
on the court and indicated he had not been threatened, coerced or intimidated to plead guilty. 
The district judge specifically addressed the question of whether Lamb could withdraw his 
guilty pleas: 
COURT: Do you realize that if I accept your pleas of guilty they are flnal pleas? I will not allow you 
to withdraw those pleas like I did in the other cases? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
Whatever Lamb claims his attorney said, those statements cannot be a proximate cause of 
any damages to him. He was properly informed in court by the judge as to his rights and the 
consequences of his guilty pleas. Specifically, he could not withdraw those pleas. He 
acknowledged that he understood that fact, indicated he did not have questions, and said he still 
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wanted to enter pleas of guilty. Thereafter he pied guilty. The district judge engaged him in 
extensive discussion of the charges and his decision to proceed with the guilty pleas. The advice 
the court gave Lamb, together with Lamb1s clear indications that he understood the proceedings, 
supersedes any ideas he might have had before that he could withdraw the pleas. 
The following questions were asked and answers given: 
COURT: Do you still want to enter pleas of guilty? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
COURT: Would you be doing so freely, voluntarily, knowtngly and intentionally, and because you 
are in fact guilty? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
Although the following statements were made with regard to a plea the district judge allowed 
to be withdrawn, the statements are 
[923 P.2d 981] 
Page 274 
applicable to the charges at issue in this case. The statements were made with regard to the 
question of whether a jury might find the defendant guilty, and the defendant's response that it 
could appear he was guilty. 
COURT: And you realize that it's not for your attorney or the State's attorney or me to make that 
decision? It is for the jury or yourself. You1re the only one that has the right to have the jury make 
the decision or you make the decision. Do you understand that? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. sir. 
The following dialogue took place with regard to the counts in issue. 
COURT: In the other case, Count I, the 20th day of May 1988, 65 Brahma-cross heifers, what did 
you do in that case? 
DEFENDANT: We obtained from the victim a right to sell those heifers~~The victim had given us 
many times before the right to do the same thing that was done here. We believe we had him sign 
a Bill of Sale on them. He allowed me to keep the money. He's done that before many times, 
judge. When recounted by the people investigating the case, due to his age and I don't know what 
else, he didn't seem to remember this. 
COURT: Okay. So you're saying that after reviewing the evidence the State has--the facts and 
circumstances--would probably lead 12 reasonably minded people to find you guilty of intentionally 
depriving him, permanently depriving him, of his cattle? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
COURT: And that's also with regard to Count II, $97,968? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
While Mr. Lamb1s numerous financial transactions may have been complex, the elements of 
the two grand theft charges were not. From the transcript of the pleas it is clear that he knew the 
elements and knew the facts. He knew that he might have a defense to the charges before he pied 
cuiltv. He also knew the choice of whether to clead auiltv wu hi~. not that of hi$ attorney. The 
choices he had were explained by the district judge and acknowledged by Mr. Lamb. The 
proximate cause of any damage he may have suffered is the decision to plead guilty following a 
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thorough adVice of rights by the district judge concerning the charge. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's declslon granting summary judgment to Manweiler and dismissing Lamb's 
complaint is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent. No attorney fees are allowed. 
McOEVITT, C.J., and JOHNSON, TROUT and SILAK, JJ., concur. 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-OC-2015-3024 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant Ronald D. Christian's Motion to Dismiss came before the Court for oral 
argument on April 9, 2015. 
Appearances: 
Elisa Massoth, Dartanyon Burrows for Plaintiff Michael Scott Mullen 
Michelle R. Points for Defendant Ronald Christian 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff alleges that on or about September 19, 2005, he was charged with Felony Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor Child.1 Plaintiff retained Defendant Ronald D. Christian to defend him in 
that criminal action.2 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Christian failed to do any pre-trial 
investigation, in part due to Defendant's alcohol abuse.3 Plaintiff further alleges Defendant 
Christian was under the influence of alcohol during trial.4 
At trial, testimony was provided by the State from a nurse that the minor child at issue 
had physical signs and symptoms of sexual abuse. 5 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Christian failed 
4 
Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed Feb. 17, 2015, 19. 
Id., 1 IO. 
Id., 1115-25. 
Id., 127. 
Id., 129. 
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to conduct a pre-trial interview of the nurse, and further retained an expert who was not 
sufficiently qualified or prepared by Defendant to rebut the testimony of the nurse at trial.6 The 
jury in the criminal case returned a guilty verdict for the charge of Lewd Conduct with a Minor. 7 
Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of eight years fixed, followed by 12 years indeterminate, for a 
total unified sentence of 20 years. 8 
In 2011, Plaintiff filed for post-conviction relief, based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel.9 Plaintiff alleges, based on new expert testimony, as well as the newly disclosed 
evidence of contradictory statements made by the minor child, he was granted post-conviction 
relief on June 17, 2014, wherein his conviction was vacated and he was released from State 
custody. 10 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on February 17, 2015, seeking relief against Defendant for 
legal malpractice and breach of contract. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, with 
accompanying memo11, on Marh 10, 2015, arguing the applicable statutes of limitations have 
passed. Plaintiff filed responsive briefing Apr. 2, 2015, which included an attached exhibit. 12 A 
Reply was filed April 7, 2015. A supplemental brief was filed by the Defendant on April 13, 
2015. 13 The Court has considered all of the filings, except as discussed below. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
The current motion before the Court is styled as a Motion to Dismiss. Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to file a motion seeking to dismiss a claim in a pleading 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. "A motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim should not be granted 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the [ non-moving party] 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Taylor v. Maile, 
142 Idaho 253, 257, 127 P.3d 156, 200 (2005); see also Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Com 'n, 141 
Idaho 129, 133, 106 P.3d 455, 459 (2005). "On a motion to dismiss, the court looks only at the 
pleadings, and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party." Owsley, supra. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
2015. 
12 
13 
Id., ~~ 30 - 32. 
Id.~ 34. 
Id.,~ 35. 
Id.,~ 40. 
Id.,~~ 38-45. 
Motion to Dismiss, filed Mar. 10, 2015; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed Mar. 10, 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed Apr. 2, 2015. 
Supplemental Authority in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed Apr. 13, 2015. 
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"Conclusory allegations are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6)". Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Comm 'n, 141 Idaho 129, 136, 106 P.3d 455, 462 (2005). 
Thus, "[a]lthough the non-movant is entitled to have his factual assertions treated as true, this 
privilege does not extend to the conclusions of law the non-movant hopes the court to draw from 
those facts." Id. 
Further, "[i]n order to withstand a motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party must allege all 
essential elements of the claims presented." Johnson v. Boundary School District 101, 13 8 Idaho 
331,334, 63 P.3d 457,500 (2003). "A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state 
a claim must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for 
pleading a claim and calls for 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief and a demand for relief." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 835 P.2d 1346, 
1347 (1992) (citing IRCP 8(a)(l)-(2)). A pleading must "merely state claims upon which relief 
may be granted, and pleadings should be liberally construed in the interest of securing 'a just, 
speeding and inexpensive resolution of the case."' Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 
229 P.3d 1164, 1169 (2010). The court makes "every intendment to sustain a [pleading] that is 
defective, e.g., wrongly captioned or inartful, [but the pleading] cannot be sustained if it fails to 
make a short and plain statement of a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . The key issue 
in determining the validity of a [pleading] is whether the adverse party is put on notice of the 
claims brought against it." Id. 
states, 
The Court notes that though the motion is styled as a Motion to Dismiss, I.R.C.P. 12 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
I.R.C.P. 12(b). Plaintiff attached an exhibit to his responsive briefing. The Court notes this 
document is unverified and unauthenticated, and does not qualify as an affidavit or declaration 
for purposes of I.R.C.P. 56. However, the document is from another court file from another 
county in the Fourth Judicial District. Though the Court cannot find a specific request in the 
Plaintiffs responsive briefing that the Court take judicial notice of this document, such request is 
implied by its inclusion in the Response. Pursuant to I.RE. 201(c) and (d), documents from 
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other court files are subject to judicial notice. A court cannot take judicial notice of a document 
during a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to a summary judgment motion. See 
Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990). Therefore, out of 
an abundance of caution, the Court will treat the present motion as one for summary judgment. 
As one court has stated, "The defense of a statute of limitation is peculiarly suitable as a basis for 
summary judgment." Silvers v. Brodeur, 682 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the nonmoving party's "pleadings, 
affidavits, and discovery documents ... read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002) 
(quoting 1.R.C.P. 56(c)). Summary Judgment is available for a claimant, "upon all or any part 
thereof," of a claim or counterclaim, if moved at least twenty (20) days after service of process 
upon the adverse party. I.R.C.P. 56(a). The Court must construe the evidence liberally and draw 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 84-85, 
73 P.3d 94, 97-98 (2003). If the facts, with inferences favorable to the nonmoving party, are 
such that reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions, summary judgment is not 
available. Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy Inc., 141 Idaho 622,625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005). 
The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact, and then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient 
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 
Idaho 872. 874, 876 P.2d 154. 156 (1994). When the nonmoving party bears the burden of 
proving an element at trial, the moving party may establish a lack of genuine issue of material 
fact by establishing the lack of evidence suppotiing the element. Id. "Such an absence of 
evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own 
evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving paiiy's evidence and the contention that such proof 
of an element is lacking." Id. at fn. 2. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response ... 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). Such 
evidence may consist of affidavits or depositions, but "the Court will consider only that material 
... which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial." Harris v. 
State, Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297-98, 847 P.2d 1156, 1158-59 (1992). If the 
evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains on 
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which the court may then enter summary judgment as a matter of law. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. 
of Idaho, 138 Idaho 443,445, 65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003). 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant argues the statute of limitations has passed on both the malpractice and the 
contract claims. 14 The Court does not need to address the contract claim. Idaho caselaw has 
made it clear that when there is a statute of limitation issue on a lawsuit involving a malpractice 
claim, other statutes of limitations do not apply. "The appropriate statute of limitations is 
determined by the substance, not the form, of the action." Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison 
Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 148, 90 P.3d 894, 898 (2004) (quotation marks omitted). "[T]he 
gist of a malpractice action is negligence and not a breach of the contract of employment." 
Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 495, 389 P.2d 224, 230 (1964); see also 
Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661, 662 (1932). "The appropriate statute of 
limitation is determined by the substance of the claim, not the form of the action, and the first 
analytical step is to classify the cause of action so the applicable statute of limitations can be 
used to determine whether the claim is time barred." McCormack v. Caldwell, 152 Idaho 15, 19, 
266 P.3d 490, 494 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Nerco, quotation marks omitted). The 
characterization of a claim is a question of law. Nerco Minerals Co., 140 Idaho at 148, 90 P .3d 
at 898. 
In this case, there are two (2) causes of action: malpractice and breach of contract. The 
breach of contract claim makes it very clear the breach arises out of the same facts that support 
the malpractice claim. 15 The Court notes the Supreme Court has indicated, "Legal malpractice 
actions are an amalgam of tort and contract theories." Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,620,272 
P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012). For example, "The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is 
defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained." Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 
704, 652 P.2d 650, 652 (1982). There are some circumstances under which the Court will 
analyze malpractice claims through a contract analysis. "The contract basis of legal malpractice 
actions is the failure to perform obligations directly specified in the written contract." Bishop, 
152 Idaho at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. But the general rule is, "Breach of an attorney's duty in 
negligence is a tort." Id. The parties cite to no case, and the Court is aware of no case that 
14 
15 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed Mar. 10, 2015, p.3. 
Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed Feb. 17, 2015, ,r,r 61 -63. 
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addresses the statute of limitations for a malpractice based lawsuit in terms of a contract statute 
of limitations. Therefore, the Court may, as a matter of law, determine the applicable statute of 
limitations for the claims in this case is the statute of limitations for a malpractice claim. 
claims: 
The Supreme Court has very recently and succinctly stated the law that applies to such 
"An action to recover damages for 'professional malpractice' must be commenced 
within two years after the cause of action has accrued." Lapham v. Stewart, 137 
Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396, 399 (2002) (citing LC. § 5-219). The cause of 
action accrues "as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, 
and the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing 
consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or 
commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer." 
LC. §5-219(4). This Court has held that a cause of action for professional 
negligence cannot accrue, however, until "some damage" has occurred. Stephens 
v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249,254,678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984). The reason for the "some 
damage" rule is that "in order to recover under a theory of negligence, the 
plaintiff must prove actual damage." Id The statute's accrual standard operates 
under a completed tort theory in that the cause of action accrues when the tort is 
completed, an event that corresponds with the first objectively ascertainable 
occurrence of some damage. See, e.g., Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 178-80, 
706 P.2d 63, 67-69 (1985). What constitutes some damage turns on the facts and 
circumstances of each case. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 543, 808 P.2d 876, 
880 (1991). 
Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, 157 Idaho 863, 341 P.3d 580, 583-84 (2015) 
( quotations and emphasis in the original). 
There are many cases in Idaho dealing with legal malpractice. However, the only Idaho 
case dealing with legal malpractice arising out of a criminal defense cited in the briefs before this 
Court was Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269, 923 P.2d 976 (1996), which did not address the 
statute of limitations. In the Lamb case, the court stated, "Lamb does not dispute the proposition 
that in a legal malpractice action arising from representation of a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding, the person pursuing the claim must establish the additional element of actual 
innocence of the underlying criminal charge." Id at 272. This case does not identify actual 
innocence as an element of a legal malpractice action arising from representation in a criminal 
case-it just says that element was not in dispute in Lamb. 
Based on the language from civil legal malpractice cases, the Court could easily conclude 
Plaintiff incurred some damage at the moment of judgment, and determine the statute of 
limitations passed two (2) years after the date the judgment was entered. That could have been 
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two (2) years from June 22, 2007 (when verdict was rendered), October 30, 2007 (when the 
motion for new trial was denied), January 4, 2008 (date of judgment according to Complaint), or 
June 4, 2008 (date of judgment according to Judge Owen's decision). The Complaint in the case 
at bar was filed February 17, 2015-well past two (2) years from of any of those dates. 
Like in Lapham, the Court could simply conclude the damage occurred when the 
Defendant's negligent misrepresentation resulted in a verdict or judgment against him. 16 This 
Court also looks to the language in City of McCall v. Buxton, where the Supreme Court provided 
some language which clarifies this situation. After reciting a significant history of legal 
malpractice cases, the Supreme Court stated: 
The statute of limitations for professional malpractice does not begin to run until 
the plaintiff would have a cause of action against the professional. Because some 
damage is required to have a cause of action for negligence, the cause of action 
cannot accrue until there is some damage. Some damage is required because it 
would be nonsensical to hold that a cause of action is barred by the statute of 
limitations before that cause of action even accrues. Negligence that increases the 
risk that a client will be harmed does not trigger the running of the statute of 
limitations until harm actually occurs. 
In addition, there must be objective proof that would support the existence of 
some actual damage. A client simply incurring attorney fees for the attorney who 
negligently represents the client in particular litigation will not by itself be 
objective proof which would support the existence of some damage suffered by 
the client in that litigation. Under the circumstances of these cases, objective 
proof did not occur until there was a court decision adverse to the client because 
of the attorney's negligence. 
City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 661, 201 P .3d 629, 634 (2009) ( citations and quotation 
marks omitted). Admittedly, this language is in the context of a civil legal malpractice claim, 
and could again be interpreted to mean that Plaintiff Molen' s "some damage" occurred at the 
time judgment was entered. But the Supreme Court went on to say the following: 
For example, it would be difficult to conceive of a situation in which the City 
could have recovered on a malpractice claim against its Attorneys had the City 
prevailed in the litigation. Even when an attorney is negligent, that breach of duty 
may not be a proximate cause of the resulting damage to the client. 
16 In Lapham v. Stewart, the Supreme Court addressed a case where a law office dispersed loan proceeds to 
the lendee in one lump sum, instead ofin a piecemeal manner as required by the lender (who was the client of the 
law office). Lapham, 137 Idaho 582, 584-85, 51 P.3d 396, 398-99 (2002). The Supreme Court determined the statute 
oflimitations began running as of the date of the dispersal, as opposed to the date the lendee stopped making 
payments as argued by the lender. Id at 586-87, 51 P.3d at 400-01. 
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Under the circumstances of this case, the existence or effect of any alleged 
negligence on the part of the City's Attorneys regarding their legal advice and 
strategy depended upon the outcome of the litigation against the City by Wausau 
and St. Clair. There would not be objective proof of actual damage until that 
occurred. To hold otherwise in this case would foment future litigation initiated 
on sheer surmise of potential damages in order to avoid the likely consequence of 
seeing actions barred by limitations. Clients involved in lengthy litigation would 
have to file protective lawsuits against their attorneys when following their advice 
and strategy, without yet having any objective proof of actual damage or being 
able to prove a cause of action for professional malpractice. 
Id. at 662-63, 201 P.3d 635-36 (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). This 
language supports the conclusion that it makes little sense for a person to rely on their attorney, 
only to be required to file anticipatory claims against their attorneys or risk losing the chance to 
sue for malpractice. 
In criminal cases, the incentives are reversed. If a person is convicted, that person would 
have to simultaneously sue their attorney for malpractice and continue to seek relief on appeal 
and/or seek post-conviction relief. The direct appeal may or may not be completed before the 
two-year statute of limitation runs. It is unlikely the post-conviction relief decision will be 
completed within two years of the original judgment. Other states have noted the disparity 
between civil and criminal legal malpractice claims. 17 Many states reject barring a criminal 
defendant from bringing a malpractice claim unless it is brought within the given timeframe after 
conviction. Instead, in these states, accrual of the statute of limitations starts at exoneration. For 
example, the Alaska Supreme Court determined, "a convicted criminal defendant must obtain 
post-conviction relief before pursuing an action for legal malpractice against his or her attorney." 
Shaw v. State, Dep't of Admin., Pub. Defender Agency, 816 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Alaska 1991). The 
Court cited reasons for this approach including promoting judicial economy and because 
dispositive post-conviction relief is relevant to the issues of proximate causation and damages. 
The Alaska court viewed the denial of post-conviction relief triggering collateral estoppel which 
then would serve to eliminate frivolous malpractice claims. "Thus, by prioritizing post-
conviction relief judicial resources will be conserved. Moreover, requiring post-conviction relief 
17 "In legal malpractice actions arising out of civil proceedings, an action for malpractice accrues at the date 
of the malpractice, i.e., the date when the injury occurs. A legal malpractice action arising out ofa criminal 
proceeding, however, involves a significant distinction." Britt v. Legal Aid Soc., Inc., 95 N.Y.2d 443,446, 741 
N.E.2d 109 (2000) (citations omitted). 
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as a prerequisite to a legal malpractice action aids in determining whether the statute of 
limitations bars the action. By adopting the date that post-conviction relief is obtained as the 
trigger to the statute of limitations, we establish a bright line test which should significantly 
assist courts in the resolution of statute of limitations issues." Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1361 (citations 
omitted). As a result, the Alaska Supreme Court requires positive post-conviction relief before 
bringing a malpractice claim and tolls the statute of limitations until post-conviction relief is 
granted. Id. at 1360. Many other states have adopted similar type of "exoneration rule" type 
requirements. 18 
In contrast, other courts have rejected this type of rule. For example, a concurring justice 
in California noted: 
Our court has in recent cases made it abundantly clear that we will strictly follow 
the statute that governs the accrual and limitation of claims for attorney 
malpractice. Under this statute, an action against an attorney for a wrongful act or 
omission must ordinarily be commenced within one year after the plaintiff 
discovers, or should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or 
omission. In view of the time required to decide appeals and petitions for habeas 
corpus in criminal cases, the statute of limitations in most cases likely will run 
long before the convicted person has a chance to have the conviction set aside 
and, thus, remove the bar ( collateral estoppel) to establishing his or her actual 
innocence. The majority alludes to this problem, but offers no solution. 
Wiley v. Cnty. of San Diego, 19 Cal. 4th 532, 546, 966 P.2d 983, 992 (1998). The Colorado 
Supreme Court specifically rejected an exoneration type rule, requiring the convicted to pursue 
post-conviction relief and the malpractice action simultaneously, or risk the malpractice action 
being barred by the statute of limitations if the wheels of justice move too slowly. Rantz, 109 
P.3d at 136. Colorado specifically acknowledges that a criminal defendant can suffer damages 
prior to exoneration. 
The Court is inclined to adopt the approach taken by other courts utilizing an exoneration 
rule. First, based on the language in City of McCall v. Buxton stating that protective actions are 
disfavored, the Court believes it is unlikely Idaho will adopt a dual track procedure as required in 
18 See Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 135 (Colo. 2005) (citing numerous cases adopting an "exoneration 
rule"); Schreiber v. Rowe, 814 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. 2002) ("a convicted criminal defendant must obtain appellate or 
postconviction relief as a precondition to maintaining a legal malpractice action .... [T]he statute of limitations in a 
malpractice action does not commence until the criminal defendant has obtained final appellate or postconviction 
relief."); Brittv. Legal Aid Soc., Inc., 95 N.Y.2d 443,446, 741 N.E.2d 109, 111 (2000) ("to state a cause of action 
for legal malpractice arising from negligent representation in a criminal proceeding, plaintiff must allege his 
innocence or a colorable claim of innocence of the underlying offense***, for so long as the determination of his 
guilt of that offense remains undisturbed, no cause of action will lie."). 
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Colorado. Second, it seems all of the states rejecting an exoneration-type rule have a 
"discovery" type rule in place related to their statutes of limitations. Idaho has specifically 
rejected such rule with regard to malpractice claims. See Lapham, 137 Idaho at 587, 51 P.3d 401; 
Elliott v. Parsons, 128 Idaho 723, 725, 918 P.2d 592, 594 (1996). 
The Court notes the decision to adopt an exoneration rule ultimately must be made by the 
Idaho Supreme Court or enacted by specific legislation such as the legislation in the uniform 
post-conviction act that delays the requirement for filing the post-conviction relief petition until a 
time period after the direct appeal is concluded. But the citation of all of these cases is not 
without purpose. Whether the Court were to adopt an exoneration type rule, or were to adopt a 
rule similar to California's or Colorado's, this Court concludes summary judgment is 
inappropriate at this stage in this case. 
Under an exoneration rule, the claim would be timely, because the Complaint was filed 
within two (2) years of the June 2014 order granting post-conviction relief. Under the Idaho 
civil malpractice rules, objective proof of some damage was required to start the accrual of the 
statute of limitations. While Judge Owen concluded the Defendant's actions prior to conviction 
were ineffective under the Constitutional standard of Strickland v. Washington, there remains a 
question of fact in this negligence case whether objective proof of some damage occurred before 
there was proof of Plaintiffs innocence. In reviewing the evidence before the Court at summary 
judgment, a material issue of fact exists whether that proof of Plaintiffs innocence was known 
before the 2014 discovery of conflicting statements made by the minor child witness, which were 
not disclosed by the prosecution. 19 This evidence was only available within two (2) years of the 
date the Complaint was filed, in February 2015. 
The Court believes this result comports with the most recent cases issued by the Supreme 
Court such as Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP. In Minnick, the Supreme Court 
ultimately found that some damage did not occur until the subrogation issue was formally raised 
by the IRS, which occurred in June 2011, or October 2011 at the latest. Id. at 585. 
Had the IRS never raised the issue, and had the Minnicks prevailed on the other 
issues raised, Hawley Troxell's failure to obtain subordination could not have 
harmed the Minnicks and they would not have an actionable claim for legal 
19 The Court notes Plaintiff also indicates he obtained new expert testimony to dispute evidence produced at 
trial. Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed Feb. 17, 2015, ,r,r 38 - 39. Because there is no allegation 
as to when these experts were retained, the Court is unable to detennine whether this would start the statute of 
limitations running. 
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malpractice against the firm for its alleged failure to comply with the 
subordination requirement. 
Id. This analysis shows that it is not necessarily just the negligent act of the attorney which starts 
the accrual of the statute of limitations. There may be some external act after the fact which 
actually starts accrual. In this case, had evidence of the minor child's conflicting statements 
never been disclosed, or other evidence of innocence had not been obtained, Plaintiff would 
likely have remained in prison. He may still have been not guilty, but Plaintiff would have had 
no basis to conclude Defendant's negligence caused damages without this objective proof. 
Because there are questions of fact on these issues, the Court will not grant summary judgment. 
The Court's role on a motion to dismiss is purely to determine whether a valid cause of 
action has been stated. 20 Because this has been converted to a motion for summary judgment, 
the Court's role is to determine whether there are questions of fact and the moving party is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). The Court cannot determine as 
a matter of law at this stage that Plaintiffs causes of action are barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. Because there are questions of fact as to when there was objective proof of some 
damages, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss filed March 10, 2015 is DENIED. 
Ordered this 20th day of May, 2015. 
L ~District Judge 
20 Because Defendant has not raised the issue of whether Plaintiff has stated a valid substantive cause of 
action, the Court makes no ruling on that issue. The ruling today is limited to purely whether a malpractice cause of 
action in a criminal malpractice case began accruing on the date of judgment. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 11 
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Elisa G Massoth 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 1003 
Payette ID 83661 
Michelle R Points 
Attorney at Law 
910 W Main Ste 222 
Boise ID 83702 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
420 W. Main, Ste. 206 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208.287.3216 
Facsimile: 208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.com 
Attorney for Defendant Ronald D. Christian 
MAY 2 9 2015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MULLEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 1503024 
ANSWER 
Ronald D. Christian, through his counsel of record Michelle Points of Points Law, PLLC, 
and by way of answer to the Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint") filed 
by Plaintiff, admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
ADMISSIONS AND DENIALS 
1. Defendant denies all allegations not specifically admitted herein. 
2. To the extent that paragraph 1 of the Complaint contains factual allegations, those 
allegations are denied. 
3. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the Complaint based upon a 
lack of knowledge. 
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4. With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Defendant 
admits that he is an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho, but denies the remaining 
allegation. 
5. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Complaint as those 
allegations set forth legal conclusions to which no response is required. 
6. Defendants admit admits that S.Z. spent 2004 and 2005 with her grandparents in Garden 
Valley, but deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 6 as stated. 
7. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the Complaint. 
8. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 8 of the Complaint as the 
interview speaks for itself. 
9. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraphs 9 though 14 of the Complaint. 
10. Defendant admits the allegations contained in the first two sentences of paragraph 15 of 
the Complaint but denies the remaining allegations as stated. 
11. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraph 16 of the Complaint. 
12. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 17 of the Complaint as those 
allegations are not directed at the Defendant and/or on the basis that those allegations are untrue. 
13. Defendant admits that the jury trial was reset for June 18, 2007, but denies the remaining 
allegations based upon a lack of knowledge. 
14. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 19 of the Complaint. 
15. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 20 of the Complaint as stated. 
16. Defendant admits that Mr. Molen and his wife stayed at Defendant's home prior to trial, 
but denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 21 of the Complaint. 
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17. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Complaint as 
stated. 
18. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 24 of the Complaint as stated 
and/or on the basis oflack of knowledge and/or the referenced opinion speaks for itself. 
19. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 25 of the Complaint. 
20. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraph 26 of the Complaint. 
21. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 2 7 of the Complaint as those 
allegations are not directed at the Defendant and/or on the basis that those allegations are untrue. 
22. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 28, and affirmatively asserts he 
consumed no alcohol during the referenced trial. 
23. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 29 of the Complaint as the 
referenced testimony speaks for itself. 
24. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 30 of the Complaint. 
25. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 31 of the Complaint as stated. 
26. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the Complaint as 
the referenced testimony speaks for itself. 
27. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the Complaint. 
28. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 36 of the Complaint. 
29. Defendant the allegations contained in paragraph 37 of the Complaint as stated. 
30. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the Complaint as 
those allegations are not directed to the Defendant. 
31. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraph 40 of the Complaint. 
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32. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 41 of the Complaint as the 
referenced record and documents speak for themselves. 
33. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 42 of the Complaint, as those 
allegations are not directed at the Defendant and/or based upon a lack of knowledge. 
34. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 43, 44 and 45 of the Complaint 
as the referenced record and documents speak for themselves. 
35. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 46 of the Complaint as those 
allegations set forth a conclusion of law to which no response is required. 
36. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 47 of the Complaint, as those 
allegations are not directed to the Defendant and/or based upon a lack of knowledge. 
37. In response to paragraph 48 of the Complaint, Defendant reasserts all admissions and 
denials previously set forth. 
38. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 49 of the Complaint. 
39. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 50 through 57 of the Complaint 
on the basis that those allegations set forth conclusions of law to which no response in required 
and on the basis that those allegations are not true. 
40. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 58 of the Complaint based upon a 
lack of knowledge. 
41. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 59 of the Complaint as the 
referenced case record speaks for itself. 
42. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 60 of the Complaint based upon a 
lack of knowledge. 
ANSWER 4 
000098
43. In response to paragraph 61 of the Complaint, Defendant reasserts all admissions and 
denials previously set forth. 
44. Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 62 and 63 of the Complaint on 
the basis that those allegations set forth conclusions of law to which no response in required and 
on the basis that those allegations are not true. 
45. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 64 of the Complaint. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation 
of Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and 
all of Plaintiffs claims for relief. In addition, Defendant, in asserting the following defenses, 
does not admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is 
upon Defendant but, to the contrary, asserts that by reason of denials and/or by reason of relevant 
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses 
and/or the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defenses is 
upon Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility 
or liability of Defendant, but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations of 
responsibility and liability in the Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because the statute of 
limitation applicable to Plaintiffs claims has expired. See Idaho Code§ 5-219. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based on the doctrines 
of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. 
ANSWER 5 
000099
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Defendant's 
actions were taken with Plaintiffs consent. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the doctrine 
of estoppel. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Defendant's 
acts were justified. 
RULE 11 STATEMENT 
Defendant has considered and believes that he may have additional defenses, but does not 
have enough information at this time to assert such additional defenses under Rule 11 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant does not intend to waive any such defenses and 
specifically asserts his intention to amend this Answer if, pending research after discovery, facts 
come to light giving rise to such additional defenses. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant has been required to retain the law firm of Points Law, PLLC, to defend him 
in this litigation. Defendant should be awarded his attorney fees and costs incurred in said 
defense. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for entry of judgment, as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed and Plaintiff take nothing thereby; 
ANSWER 6 
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2. That Defendant be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily 
incurred in defending this action; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED THIS 29th day of May, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of May, 2015, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ANSWER by the method indicated below and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Elisa G. Massoth 
Dartanyon G. Burrows 
ELISA G. MASSOTH, PLLC 
14 S. Main Street, Ste. 200 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
ANSWER 
/ U.S Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Fax (208) 642-3799 
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Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208.287.3216 
Facsimile: 208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.com 
Attorney for Defendant Ronald D. Christian 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MULLEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV OC 1503024 
vs. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE POINTS IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Michelle R. Points, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney with the law firm of Points Law, PLLC, which represents the 
Defendant Ronald D. Christiansen in the case. I have personal knowledge of the facts set 
forth and personally obtained the attachments to this affidavit from the respective court 
clerks identified below. 
2. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of pleading titled "MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL", filed in Boise County Case No. CR2005-1748 captioned State v. 
Molen, on June 29, 2007, which I obtained from the Boise County Clerk's office. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE POINTS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY WDGMENT 
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3. Attached as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of pleading titled "NOTICE OF 
LODGING AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ISSUE: 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL", filed in Boise County Case No. 
CR2005-1748 captioned State v. Molen, on October 3, 2007, which I obtained from the 
Boise County Clerk's office. 
4. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of pleading titled "AMENDED 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL", filed in Boise County Case No. CR2005-l 748 captioned 
State v. Molen, on October 5, 2007, which I obtained from the Boise County Clerk's 
office. 
5. Attached as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of pleading titled "AFFIDAVIT 
OF DR. EDWARD FRIEDLANDER", filed in Boise County Case No. CR2005-1748 
captioned State v. Molen, on October 24, 2007, which I obtained from the Boise County 
Clerk's office. 
6. Attached as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of pleading titled "VERIFIED 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF", filed in Boise County Case No. 
CR2005-1748 captioned State v. Molen, on October 24, 2007, which I obtained from the 
Boise County Clerk's office. 
7. Attached as Exhibit Fis a copy of the decision in Lamb v. Manweiler, filed in the 
Court of Appeals of the State ofldaho on August 1, 1995, 1995 Opinion No. 74, Docket 
No. 21266, which I obtained from the Clerk at the Idaho Supreme Court. 
8. Attached as Exhibit G is a copy of a pleading titled "MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO DISMISS/MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE POINTS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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JUDGMENT", filed in Ada County Case No. 96063 captioned Lamb v. Manweiler, on 
May 17, 1993, which I obtained from the Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
9. Attached as Exhibit His a copy of a pleading titled "OPINION RE RENEWED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT", filed in Ada County Case No. 96063 
captioned Lamb v. Manweiler, on January 28, 1994, which I obtained from the Clerk of 
the Idaho Supreme Court. 
10. Attached as Exhibit I is a copy of the RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, filed in 
Case/Docket No. 21266, in the appeal captioned Lamb v. Manweiler, on November 29, 
1994, which I obtained from the Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
11. Attached as Exhibit J is a copy of the PETITION FOR REVIEW filed in 
Case/Docket No. 21266, in the appeal captioned Lamb v. Manweiler, on September 22, 
1996, which I obtained from the Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
12. Attached as Exhibit K is a copy of the MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW filed in Case/Docket No. 21266, in the appeal captioned 
Lamb v. Manweiler, on September 22, 1996, which I obtained from the Clerk of the 
Idaho Supreme Court. 
13. Attached as Exhibit Lis a copy of the BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF filed in Case/Docket No. 21266, in the appeal captioned Lamb v. 
Manweiler, on or about December 13, 1995, which I obtained from the Clerk of the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
14. Attached as Exhibit Mis a copy of the DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT'S REPLY 
TO RESPONSE BRIEF filed in Case/Docket No. 21266, in the appeal captioned Lamb v. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE POINTS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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Manweiler, on December 20, 1995, which I obtained from the Clerk of the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
15. Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) ~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this~ day of ~015 . 
•••• ~ POW1:· 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO /::t;;;;~;'f)(. 
Residing at: (L_ ·, )-.£-- i ! -·- E uo 0 : . = ;, • \ c• .. MyCommissionExpires: O(p /0 ;).Oo-0 \ .n-.-.Pus\.\ •• ~/ 
~~ V")>_ ••••••••• ~\· .... . 
~,,,,,"I l'E Of ~ ,,, .. . 
,,,, ........ ,,, .. 
CERTIFICA~F SERfICE . / 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ //~ day ofN~K I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLEi(j1i'NTS IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated 
below and addressed to each of the following: 
Elisa G. Massoth 
Dartanyon G. Burrows 
ELISA G. MASSOTH, PLLC 
14 S. Main Street, Ste. 200 
Payette,Idaho 83661 
/ U.S Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
~~ Fax(208)642-3799 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE POINTS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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DtSTAICT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO 
. Recorded in Book__Page __ 
Filed ,._.,/ 
Ron Christian, Attorney at Law, PLLC (ISB# 4395) 
Key Bank Building 
702 West Idaho, Ste. 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
JUN 2 9 2007 No. 
(208) 378-0335 
Fax: (208) 429-1027 
Email: rchristian@ronchristianlaw.com 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
THE STATE OF 1DAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SCOTT MOLEN, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2005-1748 
MOTION FOR A NE.W TRIAL 
COMES NOW ltie auove-narnect Oerendanl, by and through his attorney of record, 
Ron Christian, Attorney at Law, PLLC, and moves this Court to set aside the conviction in 
the above c;;ii=.i:i ;;inrl !'=iet thi::; matter for a new jury trial pursuant to ICR Rule 34 and Idaho 
Code Section 19-2406, for the following reasons: 
1. That the jury was prejudiced by incorrect statements regarding defense 
counsel to the extent that Defendant was denied a fair trial; 
2. That the jury was exposed to evidence out of court other than that resulting 
from a view of the premises via conversations had between non-jurors and witnesses in the 
presence of some jurors; 
3. That juror misconduct existed which prevented 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL - 1 
a fair and fa~iraiainid~dii!@i!~!II-, 
EXHIBIT 
I A 
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consideration of the case; 
4. That counsel for the defense was ineffective Jn his defense in this matter; 
5. That the verdict is contrary to law and/or evidenr..;f=; 
6. Thc1t exculpatory physical and photographic evidence1 properly requested by 
the DefAn!;P. over a year before trial, was not disclosed by the State until the evening before 
the last day of trial, thereby making it impossible for the Defense to have its experts 
property evaluate and respond to that evidence at trial; 
7. That trial court improperly admitted into evidence a statement by the alleged 
victim's mother that she had never discussed sex with the alleged victim. This extremely 
false statement was in viol.ation of the trial court's orders in lim{ne, thus allowing the jury the 
misleading impression that the alleged victim was a normal, pre-teen girl with little or no 
knowledge of sexual matters, when in fact, she had been exposed to a hypersexualized 
environment by her mother since birth. This preJudicial error wa::; cu111pounded by the 
State's closing argument in which it argued that the alleged victim must have been 
molested because of the sexual detail of hAr tP.~timony. This combination of allowing the 
State to falsely portray the alleged victim's lack of knowledge of sexual detail while 
prohibiting the Defense from countering it resulted in manifest injustice and an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion. 
THEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully asks this Court to order a new jury trial 
pursuant to ICR Rule 34 and Idaho Code Section 19-2406 in the above matter. 
DATED this iq-ta'y of June, 2007. b-r&. 
Ron Christiar.i 
Attorn~y for Defendant 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY ll1al uri U1E:: 'J.,0%ay of June, 2007, c:J true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing document was·delivered to the following person by regular mail: 
Justin D. Whatcott 
Idaho Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 93720-0010 
Fax: (208) 854-8074 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL - 3 
Ron Christian 
Attorney for Defendant 
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DISTRICT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO 
Recorded In Book Paga . 
MCKINNIE LAW OFFICE 
Jeffrey McKinnie, !SB: 7020 
P.O. Box 9469 
Boise, ID 83707 
Ph; 208-429-0088 
Fax: 208-336~2088 
Attorney For Defendant 
IN l'HE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAiIO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR 05-1748 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
ISSUE: INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that JEFFREY MCKINNIE, of MCKINNIE LAW OFFICE, 
hereby NOTIFIES this Court that the Affidavits in Support of Motion for a New Trial of the 
Defendant in the above entitled-action has been sent by Facsimile to the Honorable Judge and to 
the Attorney General's Office. 
DATED this 3RD day of OCTOBER, 2007. 
·/ 
DEPUTY 
EXHIBIT 
NOTICE OF l.ODGlNO 
1 I :B 
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By 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3RD day of October, 2007, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing doclllllent by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of 
record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Attorney General 
Fax!854-8074 
Boise County Clerk 
Fax: 392-6712 
N01'1CE OF LOOOINC 
2 
[ x l U.S. Mail~ postage prepaid 
[] Hand-Delivered/Filed with Court 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[] Pl in Basket at Canyon County 
courth se. 
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DISTRICT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IDAHO 
Recorded in Book Page __ 
MCKINNIE LAW OFFICE 
Jeffrey McKinnie, ISB: 7020 
P.O. Box 9469 
Filed OCT - 5 2007 /' 
No. 
Boise, ID 83707 
Ph: 208-429-0088 
NCE §Wµi:UNGEN, Clerk 
By----::~~:::i..1:;:..--1-~L4-~·___.;.~ 
DEPUTY 
Fax: 208-336-2088 
Attorney For Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR 2005-1748 
AMENDED MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL 
TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Defendant, by and through their attorney, JEFFREY 
MCKINNIE of MCKINNIE LAW OFFICE, hereby MOVES this honorable court for an 
ORDER granting the Defendant a new trial in the above entitled action, pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rules for the following reasons: 
1. Newly discovered evidence: Medical reports of alleged Victim's hymeneal 
area See Defendants attached exhibit "A". 
Amended Motion fbr a New Trial 
I 
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DATED this t:.y of r£.ff>IDw , 2007. 
By 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY~ on this ..S day ?f' _L)~ 2007, I served a~ 
and cottect copy of the foregoing document by dehvenng the same to each of the followmg 
attorneys of recor~ by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Attorney General 
Fax: 854-8074 
Boise County Clerk 
Fax: 392-6712 
Amended Motian for a New Trial 
2 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ X ] Facsimile 
[ ] Placed in Basket at C01mty 
courthouse. 
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,PARROW 
Lfi 
C R E G l ON A Ls HILDREN' CENTER 
Division of Pediatric 
Critical Care Medicine, 
Stephen R, ()1,1ert1n, Mo 
Jo MoGlaw, MD 
Pinhas Geva. Mo 
www .sparrow.org 
1a1s E. Michigan Ave. 
PO Sox 30480 
Lansing, Ml 48909•7~et> 
617.364.2117 
faic: 517.364.3994 
Connie Molen 
24 Castli:: Meadow 
Gm-den Valley, IP 83622 
October~, 2007 
I have had tho opportunity to review the five colposcopic photograph.s that were 
done on your granddaughter. These photographs show a very 
typical mildly irregular posten.or rim configuration hymen.. There is a fairly 
prominent bump from the 5:00 to 6:00 position, The hymenal edge is complet~ly 
uninterrupted and is completely and well visualized. Th.ere a.re no notches, clefts, 
tQars, lacerations, soars~ distortions or areas oflllarked focal narrowing;. There is 
no evidence of venereal diittJll.!le. 
An irregular hymen is found i-it up to 44% of oases of normal children who have 
not been abused. A$ytntnetry of the hyr:nenal orifice is typical; in fact, this is 
present in approximately 50% or more of no~n'Ull children.. In Savannah ts case, 
approximately 25% of the introitus is covered by hymen which is found in 
between 25% and 40% pf normal children. The pr0sence of a bump or molll1d is 
seen in up to 33% of normal children. Finally, although I do not see actual 
measurements, the gradually concave areas at 3 :30 and at 9:00, where there is 
relative narrowing~ do not have the sharp angula.tion nor are they deep enoµgh to 
he cha:ractemed as actual notches. Also, the hymen in that lo~ation appears to 
still be ~t least 1.0 mm or greater in width. 
In other words, you have a normal shaped h.yrn.en.. You havi:: irregularity of the 
hymen which is rtor.ittal You have a bump or mound of the hym.en which is 
normal. You have gradual concavities which arc kiorntal You do not have 
excessive focal narrowing (againt normal). The combination of all these normal 
findings adds up to a normal exam. 
l Strongly urge you to take theso photos to_ the nearest a.oademio center that has a 
child abuse clinic. Certainly, in Iw;lianapolis, and wherovor- thoro is a medical 
school, there should be faculty who could objectively look at these photos. One 
of the purposes of taking photos is to allow far a review of them by someone who 
was not the examinet. l am complet<:ly oonfid.ent that an academic review of 
these photographs will conclude that what is seen on them is normal. 
I personal! y for greater ~ 20 years have been. examining children suspected of 
having been sexually abused. I have always used tti.agnification and have used a 
1£1,1 ()U;:: 
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colposcopic camera for 10 -15 yeMs. 'The colposcopicphotographs of 
exoi,llent quality. 
Thank :you again. J hope this bi3S been ofhe)p. 
Sincerely, 
~€~ .. 
Stephen R. Guertin, MD 
Medical Director, Pedia1ric Intensive Care Unit 
Director? Sparrow Regional Children's Center 
~UU:.I 
arc of 
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e DISTRICT COURT BOISE COUNTY, IOAHO 
Recorded In Book ,,,,,.,Page, __ _ 
Mr. Michael Scott Molen 
Idaho Correctional Center 
PO Box 70010 
F~ed MAY· 2 3 2011 ~ No. 
Boise, ID 83 707 
~::~~ 
Pro Se 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. C-V-- 'J.Of/- 121 Petitioner, 
vs. VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
1. Petitioner, Mr. Michael Scott Molen, is presently incarcerated at the Idaho 
Correctional Center in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction. 
2. On January 4, 2008, the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District in the State 
ofldaho, Boise C~unty, the Honorable G.D. Carey presiding ("district court") entered a 
Judgment of Conviction and Order of Commitment decreeing that Mr. Molen was guilty of Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor in case number CR-2005-0001748. The district court sentenced Mr. 
Molen to a unified term of twenty years with a minimum period of confinement of 8 years. 
3. The district court adjudged Mr. Molen guilty based on a jury's verdict following a 
five day trial which commenced on June 18, 2007. 
4. On June 29, 2007, Mr. Molen filed a motion for a new trial. 
5. On October 30, 2007, the district comi entered a Memorandum and Order denying 
Mr. Molen's motion for a new trial. 
EXHIBIT 
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6. Mr. Molen filed a motion pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, which the district 
court denied on May 21, 2008. 
7. Mr. Molen appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The case was assigned to the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, which affirmed Mr. Molen' s judgment of conviction and sentence in a 
published opinion, State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 231 P .3d 104 7 (Ct. App. 2010). The Idaho 
Supreme Court denied Mr. Molen's petition for review and issued a remittitur on May 24, 2010. 
II. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS: 
8. In June 2005, Tammy Serudek (FKA Kennedy) ("Officer Kennedy") investigated 
a report that Mr. Molen engaged in sexual misconduct with S.Z., the nine-year-old granddaughter 
of his wife, Connie Molen. 
9. Improper interviewing techniques generate a significant risk of corrupting the 
memories of children. Suggested information or misinformation can influence people and result 
in the creation of actual changes or distortions to the memory. Thus, misleading information 
about an event can become incorporated into a child's memory as though it was personally 
experienced and the child's attempts to respond truthfully to questions about the event will be 
honest but inaccurate. Once a child's memory is tainted, the memory disto1iion is irremediable 
and the false memory is from that point on as real to the child as any other. 
10. Children in the larger Boise area who have allegedly been abused are generally 
referred to the Children at Risk Evaluation Services through Saint Luke's Hospital ("CARES") 
so that a trained forensic interviewer can interview the child regarding the allegations. Having 
the initial in-depth interview conducted by CARES lessens the risks discussed in Paragraph 9, 
above. 
11. Officer Kennedy conducted a detailed interview of S.Z. instead of confirming the 
general nature of the allegation and referring S.Z. to CARES. In so doing, Officer Kennedy 
deviated from standard and preferred practice in allowing forensic interviewers to conduct the 
initial detailed interview. A true and co1Tect copy of the Boise County Sheriffs Department 
report generated following that interview is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
12. At the time she conducted the interview of S .Z., Officer Kennedy had not been 
trained as a forensic interviewer in a manner similar to the interviewers at CARES. 
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13. Following Officer Kennedy's interview, in July 2005, S.Z. was interviewed by 
CARES social worker Stacy Lewis and physically examined by Nurse Alisa Ortega. 
14. On September 19, 2005, the Boise County Prosecuting Attorney filed a criminal 
complaint alleging that Mr. Molen committed one count of lewd conduct with a minor under 
sixteen in violation ofl.C. § 18-1508 ("lewd conduct"). 1 Specifically, the state alleged that "on 
or about the 1st day of June, 2004 through the 30th day of Ju~e, 2005" Mr. Molen committed lewd 
conduct by having "manual to genital contact" with S.Z. On September 19, 2005, the court 
issued a summons ordering Mr. Molen to appear on the complaint. 
15. On November 7, 2005, attorney Ron Christian substituted as counsel ofrecord for 
Mr. Molen. 
16. On January 9, 2006, the preliminary hearing was held on the criminal complaint. 
S.Z. testified that Mr. Molen placed his "wiener" in her private part in June of 2004. Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript2 ("PH Tr.") p. 15, ln. 12 - p. 18, ln. 21; p. 19, ln. 9 - 21, ln. 6. S.Z. testified 
several times that she was unable to recall a specific incident of direct genital to genital contact in 
the summer of 2005. PH Tr. p. 26, ln. 12-18; p. 30, ln. 18 - 24; p. 32, ln. 17-25; p. 35, ln. 5-13. 
At the close of the evidence, the prosecutor elected to charge the alleged incident of direct genital 
to genital contact that S.Z. testified occurred in June 2004. PH Tr. p. 49, ln. 3-11. 
17. On January 9, 2006, the prosecutor filed an amended complaint and an 
information which alleged that Mr. Molen committed lewd conduct between June 1, 2004 and 
June 30, 2004. 
18. On March 14, 2006, Mr. Christian filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the state 
failed to provide potentially exculpatory information. On April 10, 2006, Mr. Christian filed an 
amended motion to dismiss or in the alternative to order production of evidence asserting that 
CARES failed to provide discoverable information in its possession. On April 14, 2006, the 
1 Mr. Molen will file a request for judicial notice asking the Court to take notice of 
pe1iinent documents from the underlying criminal case immediately following the filing of this 
Petition. 
2 The preliminary hearing transcript and transcripts of the district court proceedings which 
were prepared in Mr. Molen's appeal will be submitted shortly after the filing of this petition. 
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district court ordered CARES to produce all personal health information in its possession 
pertaining to S .Z. 's brother and ordered that the previously scheduled jury trial be continued 
until August. 
19. On April 14, 2006, the state filed an affidavit of Officer Kennedy in which she 
averred that she had interviewed S.Z. on June 23, 2005 and that she recorded the interview. 
Officer Kennedy further claimed that she lost the audio recording of this interview during the 
downloading process. 
20. In approximately June 2006, Mr. Molen provided Mr. Christian with two 
photographs of his bed. The first photo showed the height of the bed compared with the stepping 
stool used by Connie to climb onto the bed. In the second photo, S.Z. was standing next to the 
bed. These two photographs illustrate that in light of the height of the bed, S.Z. 's claim that Mr. 
Molen pushed her onto the bed was impossible. 
21. Prior to trial, Mr. Molen provided Mr. Christian with two photographs of Mr. 
Molen's camper. The first photo showed the camper's interior with Connie hunched over in a 
sitting position in the bed area. The other photo depicted the camper's exterior after it 
was crushed to the ground from the snow in the winter between the summers of 2004 and 2005. 
These 2 photographs refuted S.Z's claims of abuse in the camper. 
22. Prior to trial, Mr. Molen provided Mr. Christian with a copy of Mr. Molen's lease 
agreement which demonstrates that the Molens did not begin renting the residence described by 
S.Z. until July 1, 2004. This lease refutes S.Z. 's claim that she was abused in the residence 
refe1Ted to in the lease in June of 2004 while getting ready for V.B.S. (Vacation Bible School). 
A true and co1Tect copy of this lease is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
23. Mr. Molen informed Mr. Christian that Nancy Adair and Connie could testify that 
the Mo lens lived in a travel trailer parked at an R.V. hookup of Valerie Fry's house in June of 
2004. Ms. Adair picked S.Z. up at that location in order to take her to V.B.S. in early June of 
2004. 
24. Mr. Christian indicated that he would have Nurse 01iega interviewed. Mr. 
Christian was aware that it was standard practice for photographs to be taken during an 
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exam, as discussed with defense expert Dr. Edward Friedlander. No photos from Nurse Ortega's 
exam were disclosed prior to trial. 
25. On October 31, 2006, Mr. Christian disclosed Dr. Charles Honts as an expert 
witness who would testify regarding false testimony, tainted memories of child witnesses and the 
techniques used to interview S.Z. 
26. Mr. Christian did not file a motion for taint hearing or otherwise support his 
request to use Dr. Honts's testimony with arguments established in cases such as State v. 
Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1378 (N.J. 1994), which provide that taint and memory corruption are 
relevant to whether a child's memory regarding particular events is reliable. 
27. On November 1, 2006, the state filed a motion in limine to preclude Dr. Honts's 
testimony. 
28. In November 2006, Private Investigator Neil Custer interviewed witness Ben 
Carmack. 
29. On December 21, 2006, the state served notice of its intent to introduce evidence 
of uncharged sexual misconduct. The state alleged that the uncharged conduct was relevant to 
show intent, motive, oppo1iunity, plan and absence of mistake or accident. Mr. Christian did not 
object to the introduction of this evidence as being inadmissible pursuant to I.R.E. 404. 
30. On December 22, 2006, the district comi entered a Memorandum and Order 
granting in part and denying in paii the state's motion in limine. The district court held 
additional information was needed regarding Dr. Honts's potential testimony regarding the result 
of inappropriate interviewing techniques in order to rule that such testimony could be admissible. 
31. Mr. Christian did not provide additional information regarding Dr. Honts's 
potential testimony or seek to utilize another expert to either support a motion to suppress S .Z. 's 
testimony or to inform the jury regarding the concept of taint. 
32. On January 3, 2007, the state disclosed photographs of a drawing from S.Z. 's 
closet at her house in Peoria, Arizona. A true and correct copy of these photographs is attached 
hereto as Exhibit C. 
33. The Molens had many times voiced their concerns to Mr. Christian that they had 
feared that Mike Ernst, the live-in boyfriend of S.Z.'s mother Tiffany Davidson, may have 
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engaged in misconduct with S.Z. because S.Z. repeatedly indicated that she feared Mike Ernst 
and had pleaded with the Molens not to send her back. 
34. The Molens gave a photograph of Mike Ernst to Mr Christian to demonstrate that 
the photographs of the demon like drawing in S .Z.' s closet was very similar to Mike Ernst's 
appearance. A true and correct copy of this photograph is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
35. Mr. Christian assured the Molens that the photographs of the drawings in S.Z.'s 
closet and the photograph with Mike Ernst would be submitted as evidence during trial along 
with their concerns regarding S.Z.'s fears of Mike Ernst. 
36. On January 10, 2007, Mr. Christian anived for the jury trial under the influence of 
alcohol. The district court ordered that Mr. Christian submit to an evidentiary test for the 
presence of alcohol which revealed a blood alcohol content of .329/.344. Transcript on Appeal 
("Tr.") p. 18-23; see also Motion for Assessment of Costs to Defense Counsel filed January 29, · 
2007. 
3 7. Mr. Christian was in an alcohol treatment program during February 2007 and 
most of March 2007. 
38. Although Mr. Molen was gravely concerned about Mr. Christian's ability to 
represent him, he was not able to afford new counsel. Accordingly, Mr. Christian continued to 
represent Mr. Molen in the case. 
3 9. On February 9, 2007, attorney Gar Hackney appeared on behalf of Mr. Christian 
to re-set the jury trial. Mr. Hackney indicated that Mr. Christian would remain the attorney of 
record but that he was indisposed and unable to attend. Mr. Hackney indicated: "He's involved 
in some matters; I think the Court the court is probably aware." Tr. p. 24-25. The jury trial was 
re-set for June 18, 2007. 
40. On March 22, 2007, the state filed a motion for leave to file an amended 
information alleging that Mr. Molen committed lewd conduct "on or about the 1st day of June, 
2004 through the 30th day of July, 2004 and/or the 1st day of June, 2005 through the 20th day of 
June 2005." 
41. On May 11, 2007, a telephonic hearing was held on the state's motion to amend 
the infmmation. Mr. Molen was neither aware of nor participated in this hearing. Mr. Christian 
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indicated that the amendment did not substantially change the nature of the charge and he 
believed any objection would be overruled. Tr. p. 26-27. 
42. Throughout the spring of 2007, the Molens attempted to communicate with Mr. 
Christian regarding the status of the case and investigation. Mr. Christian's voicemail box was 
repeatedly full and he did not respond to emails. 
43. On May 21, 2007, Mr. Christian filed a motion in limine seeking an advance 
ruling that the district court would admit testimony by five family members who would say that 
S.Z.'s mother had exposed the child to graphic sexual conduct prior to the charged offense. In a 
memorandum in support, Mr. Christian argued: 
One of the most pressing questions the jury will ask itself is how this eight 
year old girl would know so much about se,x unless she had actually been 
molested. The Defense will prod_uce several witnesses, including the sisters and 
mother of [T.D.], the alleged victim's mother, who will testify that [T.D.] has 
exposed her daughter [S.Z.] to a constant, graphic, sexually charged lifestyle for 
her entire life, including openly having sex with multiple partners with [S.Z.] in 
the home, openly discussing and showing sex toys and pornography in front of 
[S.Z.J, and openly disrobing in front of other family members in the presence of 
[S.Z.], etc. This evidence is not only relevant under I.R.E. Rule 401 and 402, it is 
crucial to the jury's understanding of [S.Z.'s] knowledge of sexual matters and 
how she obtained it. Without it, the jury will make assumptions that are in no way 
based in reality. 
Molen, 148 Idaho at 956,231 P.3d at 1053. 
44. Mr. Christian's offer of proof indicated the evidence would show that S.Z.'s 
mother exposed S.Z. to a constant, graphic, sexually charged lifestyle, including openly having 
sex with multiple partners with S.Z. in the home, openly discussing sex toys and pornography in 
front of S.Z., and openly disrobing in front of other family members in the presence of [S.Z.]" 
Molen, 148 Idaho at 956,231 P.3d at 1053. 
45. Mr. Christian did not inform the district comi that he sought to cross-examine 
S.Z. but rather sought to show a basis of S.Z.'s sexual knowledge only through the testimony of 
other witnesses. Molen, 148 Idaho at 956,231 P.3d at 1053. 
46. On June 8, 2007, the district court heard motions in limine. The district court 
ruled that Mr. Molen's prior felony conviction for forgery was admissible because it reflected on 
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Mr. Molen' s honesty but Mr. Molen was entitled to indicate that he had not been convicted of a 
sex cnme. 
4 7. The district court ruled that it would not allow: 
testimony of [S .z.' s] life history of exposure to sexual conduct. 
I will allow, however, depending on what comes in with the CARES 
interview and that sort of thing, evidence about her knowledge of the question of 
French kissing. Because that seems to me to be clearly relevant, and I'm not sure 
that that would be precluded by the rule on the victim's prior sexual history. And 
that would include evidence of the child having engaged in that sort of thing in the 
past. 
Tr. p. 52, ln. 6-15. Upon the state's request for clarification, the district court clarified: "Right. 
That is what I was including in my ruling, that the only evidence of her prior conduct is going to 
be about the French kissing." Tr. p. 53, ln. 10-13. 
48. In June 2007, Mr. Molen, Connie and her daughter Mandi met with Mr. Christian 
and attorney Gar Hackney at Mr. Christian's house to prepare for trial. Mr. Christian was very 
intoxicated during this meeting and acted inappropriately. Eventually, the police and paramedics 
were called. 
49. In June 2007, the Molens began staying with Mr. Christian until the trial was 
complete so they could attempt to keep him on track and sober. 
JURY TRIAL 
50. Mr. Moleri's jury trial commenced on June 18, 2007. 
Voir Dire 
51. The prosecutor informed the prospective jmy panel: "The defendant is charged 
with lewd conduct with a minor under the age of 16. He's alleged to have inappropriately 
touched his wife's granddaughter in the summer of2004." Tr. p.110, ln. 1-5. 
52. During voir dire, Benjamin Joseph Riley said that he knew Officer Ke1medy from 
school and that his kids were schoolmates with her kids. He stated: "It would be uncomfortable 
to hear about children, because I have kids." Mr. Riley also indicated that he knew "Justin from 
college" (referring to prosecutor Justin Whatcott). Tr. p. 115, ln.1-25; p. 116, lines 1-1. 
53. During Mr. Riley's questioning, Mr. Molen and his wife informed Mr. Christian 
that they objected to choosing Mr. Riley as a juror. Mr. Christian neither asked follow up 
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questions of Mr. Riley to explore objecting to him for cause nor exercised a peremptory 
· challenge to exclude him. 
54. Potential juror Joann Fisher stated that she had been molested as a child by a 
family member. Tr. p. 127, In. 15-18. When asked by the prosecutor ifit would impede her 
ability to listen to the evidence in this case, she answered: "I think it might." Id. at In. 20-24. 
Ms. Fisher then explained additional circumstances that would "make it hard for me to be 
completely impartial." Id. at p. 128, In. 3-8. The prosecutor inquired: "If you were sitting in the 
defendant's shoes would you want a person in your frame of mind to be sitting on your jury?" to 
which she responded "I understand how serious this is. And I also understand the consequences 
that will come for these decisions. I don't think so." Id. at p. 128, In. 9-15. The prosecutor 
continued: "You don't think so. You're not sure. What if I let you think about it for a minute and 
I'll talk with some other people and come back to you. Id. at p.127, In. 16-19. Ms. Fisher was 
not questioned or dismissed at that point and the prosecutor later passed the panel for cause 
without further questioning Ms. Fisher. 
55. In chambers with counsel, the district court questioned the jurors individually who 
had previously indicated they wished to discuss their concerns in private. Tr. p. 156, In. 7-14. 
However, Ms. Fisher was not among them or dismissed although Mr. Christian noted to the 
district comi that she had expressed bias. Tr. p. 177, In. 12-17. 
56. Ms. Fisher responded affirmatively when Mr. Christian asked if anyone on the 
panel knew anyone who had been sexually abused a child. Tr. p. 202, In. 8-12. Ms. Fisher again 
explained her experience in detail and her resulting bias and Mr. Christian asked that she be 
excused for cause. Tr. p. 202, In 12 - 204, In. 3. 
57. The prosecutor again required Ms. Fisher to explain her uncomfortable position 
and she again explained her inability to be fair and impartial and that she wanted Mr. Molen to 
have a fair trial. Tr. p. 204, In. 5 - p. 206, In. 9. The prosecutor continued: "so if the argument 
was to not believe the child witness, your own personal experience of not being believed 
would ... ?" to which she answered "I'm afraid that my own experience of not being believed 
would make me believe them." Tr. p. 206, ln. 9-14. After further questioning, the prosecutor 
indicated that he had no objection to Ms. Fisher being excused for cause. Tr. p. 206, In. 15-16. 
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Mr. Christian did not object to the prosecutor's questioning or request that the matter be taken up 
outside the presence of the rest of the panel. 
58. During voir dire, at least 6 jurors admitted to knowing Officer Kennedy. Mr. 
Christian did not ask follow up questions regarding the effect the relationship with Officer 
Kennedy had on their ability to be impartial. 
Trial 
59. In his opening statement, the prosecutor informed the jury: "you'll hear of several 
incidents, but there's one incident in paiiicular that the defendant is charged with here today, and 
that is a crime that occurred in his bedroom when the defendant was in his bedroom ... at that 
time, he had genital-to-genital contact with her." Tr. p. 245, ln. 10-19. 
60. S.Z. testified that the first incident of lewd conduct occurred in 2004 in Mr. 
Molen's bedroom when he pushed her onto the bed and placed his penis inside her vagina. Tr. p. 
281 - 283; p. 298, ln. 3-19; p. 313, ln. 9-11; p. 319, ln. 3-10. Mr. Christian clarified on cross-
exainination that S.Z. claimed she was pushed onto the bed rather than picked up and placed onto 
it. Tr. p. 309, ln. 9-19. 
61. The prosecutor elicited testimony from S.Z.'s mother that she had not spoken to 
S.Z. "in detail about sex and how she might talk about that if she were to talk to authorities in 
this case." Tr. p. 407, ln. 23 - p. 408, ln. 2. Mr. Christian again sought leave to present his 
evidence of S.Z. 's exposure to her mother's sexual behavior, contending that the prosecution had 
opened the door to its admission. The district comi held that the proffered evidence was only 
tangentially relevant to the case and excluded it on the ground that its probative value was 
outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and unfair prejudice. 
Tr. 410, In. 22 - p. 411, ln. 20. 
62. During a lunch break directly before Officer Kem1edy's testimony, Mr. Christian, 
Mr. Molen and his wife entered the Gold Mine Restaurant and noticed that Officer Kennedy, 
several jurors and the district judge were already present. Officer Kennedy was leaving as the 
Molens entered and Mr. Molen overheard Officer Kennedy indicate in a loud voice that she was 
about to testify, that this would all be over soon and that it had been going on for two long years. 
Officer Kennedy then noticed the Molens and quickly left the restaurant. 
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63. After Officer Kennedy was sworn to testify, the district court conducted a brief 
voir dire as follows: 
Q: You had lunch today at a restaurant in town? 
A: Yes sir. 
Q: And that restaurant was? 
A: I tried to go to Trudy's, but it was closed. So I think The Gold Mine. 
Q: The Gold Mine? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Yes. And the reason I want to ask you this question - you were there with 
another woman; is that correct? 
A: Yes, a friend of mine. 
Q: And did you - and I'm sure you were not aware of it, but there were 
several jurors also having lunch there at the same time. Did you have any 
discussion with the person you were having lunch with that related to this 
case? 
A: No sir. 
Tr. p. 414, ln. 18 - p. 415, ln. 10. 
64. The district comi did not ask counsel if they wished to inquire and Mr. Christian 
failed to either question Officer Kennedy or to voir dire the jurors about Officer Kennedy's 
comment as she left the restaurant or the discussions she had within hearing of the jurors. 
65. Per defenses discovery request for all training provided to Officer Kennedy, a one 
page document was provided which indicated no training in regards to interviewing and 
investigative allegations of child sexual abuse. A true and correct copy of this document is 
attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
66. On direct examination, Officer Kennedy testified that she attended specialized 
training related to investigating allegations of sexual abuse, including sexual assault classes and 
sex crimes against children. Tr. p. 417 - 418. 
67. In response to the prosecutor's question regarding S.Z. 's demeanor during the 
interview, Officer Kennedy testified: "She was nervous, upset. Pretty common in cases that I've 
had involving sexual abuse against children." Tr. p. 424, ln. 15-22. Mr. Christian did not object 
to this response. 
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68. During direct examination, Officer Kennedy testified to numerous statements by 
S.Z. regarding Mr. Molen's alleged misconduct. Tr. p. 423-429. Mr. Christian did not object to 
this testimony as inadmissable hearsay or on any other basis. 
69. On cross examination, Mr. Christian inquired of Officer Kennedy whether "these 
classes you had in child abuse investigation" were before June of 2005, to which she responded 
"they were way before." Tr. p. 434, ln. 9-12. Officer Kennedy also testified that the classes were 
called: "sexual abuse, sexual assault, I believe, crimes against children. I can't really list them 
all. I can't recall right now." Tr. p. 434, ln. 12-17. 
70. Though the document provided to Mr. Molen in discovery regarding Officer 
Kennedy's training record was void of any training in interviewing children or investigating 
allegations of sexual abuse, Mr. Christian failed to investigate this matter further or to impeach 
Officer Kennedy with her training record. 
71. Mr. Christian did not question Officer Kennedy regarding the purpose in referring 
children to CARES (to be interviewed by forensic interviewers) and how it was a deviation from 
standard practice for Officer Kennedy to conduct a detailed interview instead of simply 
confirming an allegation and allowing CARES to conduct the initial detailed interview. 
72. Nurse Alisa Ortega testified for the state that there were scars on S.Z. 's hymen. 
Tr. p. 469, ln. 19-23. During cross examination of Nurse Ortega, the following exchange 
occurred: 
Q: In this case, you didn't take any photographs? 
A: Photographs were taken. 
Q: They were? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Why were they not provided to the defense? 
A: I do not know. 
Q: You took photographs? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: Did you provide them to the prosecution? 
A: I do not know. Do you - that is not my job. You would have to consult 
the recordkeeper. 
Q: Are you aware that we subpoenaed those records over a year ago? 
A: You're asking the wrong person about information regarding you receiving 
records. 
Q: So you don't know why we didn't get those pictures? 
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A: I do not know why you didn't get those pictures. 
Q: Wouldn't it have been helpful fo us to show those pictures to our expert 
and get their opinion as to what they meant? 
A: Again, you're asking the wrong person. I do not have control over the 
records. 
Q: If you were being asked to provide an opinion about what those 
observations meant as an expe1i, wouldn't you want to see those pictures? 
A: Sure. 
Tr. 475, ln. 11 - p. 476, ln. 18. 
In response to the prosecutor's questions on re-direct, Nurse Ortega indicated that the photos 
could be provided that day for review by the defense. Tr. p. 4 77, ln. 25 - p. 4 78, ln. 18. 
73. Mr. Christian did not move to continue or to dismiss based on the late disclosure 
of the photographs taken during S .z.' s physical exam by Nurse Ortega. 
74. The video recording of the CARES interview of S.Z. conducted by Stacy Lewis 
was introduced into evidence without objection by Mr. Christian. Tr. p. 490, In. 15-17. 
75. Shortly after witness Danny Holt testified on behalf of the state, Mr. Molen 
observed him and a juror, Werner Meserth, speaking together outside the courthouse during a 
break. Mr. Molen notified Mr. Christian who notified the bailiff and the witness and juror were 
separated. Mr. Christian neither informed the judge what had transpired, requested to question 
Mr. Meserth regarding the communication nor moved for a mistrial. 
76. Mydell Yeager testified as an expert witness for the state regarding the dynamics 
of victims and offenders as it relates to the phases of sexual abuse. Mr. Christian failed to 
investigate Ms. Yeager or to object to the inadequate disclosure and foundation for her expert 
testimony. No investigation was performed by defense counsel to discover the basis of Ms. 
Yeager's the testimony. 
77. Mr. Molen testified that his camper had been crushed by snow in the winter of 
2004-2005, thus refuting S.Z. 's claim that he had engaged in sexual misconduct in that camper 
during the summer of 2005. Mr. Christian did not utilize the 2 photographs of the camper to 
illustrate this testimony. 
78. Mr. Molen testified that he lived in a travel trailer at his neighbor's until July 2004 
and that S.Z. had Vacation Bible School in early June 2004. Tr. p. 619, ln. 12-20; 621, In. 18-24. 
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Mr. Christian did not corroborate this testimony with the lease agreement demonstrating the 
Molens did not begin renting the house testified to by S.Z. until July 2004 or the testimony of 
Valerie Fry who could have corroborated the living arrangement and the timing of Bible School. 
79. Mr. Christian did not use the two photographs of the Molen's bed to illustrate his 
and Connie's testimony that the bed was too high off the ground for Mr. Molen to have pushed 
S.Z. onto it. 
80. Mr. Christian did not utilize the photographs of Mike or the drawings from S .Z. 's 
closet attached as Exhibits C and Dor question S.Z. about her fears in returning home. 
81. During Mr. Molen' s direct examination, Mr. Christian inquired whether the state 
had retracted the plea offer and the state objected. Tr. p. 603, ln. 22-25. The district court 
sustained the objection. 
82. During Mr. Molen's direct examination, Mr. Molen testified that he reached the 
decision to send S.Z. home because "she tried French-kissing me, tried French-kissing my wife." 
Tr. p. 637, ln. 3-7. The prosecutor objected: "I think the court has already ruled that these types 
of allegations against a young girl are inappropriate and not admissible. That was the subject of a 
motion in limine." Tr. p. 637, ln. 8-12. Mr. Christian informed the district court: "according to 
Judge Sticklen's ruling, specifically allowed. This particular act of French-kissing was 
specifically allowed by her. She excluded many other things but not that." Tr. p. 637, ln. 21 - p. 
638, In. 2. The prosecutor indicated "this is the first time that this reason has been brought up. 
It's never been brought up before." Tr. p. 638, In. 3-6. 
83. During cross-examination of Mr. Molen, the following exchange occurred: 
Q: And you've seen Stacy Ross's children here at the courthouse this 
week haven't you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Isn't it true that you called one of her kids a piece of shit, earlier 
this week? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: You didn't say that outside this courtroom? You didn't say that on 
Tuesday? 
Tr. p. 669, ln. 15-25. Mr. Christian did not object to this questioning. 
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84. During cross-examination of Mr. Molen, the prosecutor asked: "This isn't your 
first time with this is it?" to which Mr. Christian objected. Tr. p. 671, ln. 23-25. The district 
court admonished the state: "that was a very inappropriate comment. I'll instruct the jury to 
disregard the comment of counsel and admonish him to not make those comments." Tr. p. 672, 
In. 2-5. 
85. The prosecutor cross-examined Mr. Molen on his version of these events as 
follows: 
Q: Mr. Molen, you testified that you wanted to talk to the police, but nobody 
called you; is that correct? Yes or no? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you listened to the testimony of [the officer] on Tuesday, didn't you? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: You heard her say that she called you, and you're saying that didn't 
happen? 
A: I was at my home for two weeks waiting for that call. 
Q: Okay. So you sat at home for two weeks waiting for [the officer] to call 
you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: If you wanted to talk to the police so bad, why didn't you call them? 
A: I was scared. 
Q: You were scared? Okay. But you know how to call the police, right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You could have easily called up [the officer] or any other officer asking to 
tell your side of the story, couldn't you? 
A: It was not my job. 
Q: Yes-or-no answer, Mr. Molen. 
A: You bet I could have called them. Sure. 
Q: But you didn't. You waited until you gotyour chance here to listen to all 
the witnesses and then tell your story, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Tr. p. 672, In. 14 - p. 673, ln. 14. Mr. Christian did not object to this questioning. 
86. During cross.,.examination, the following exchange occurred: 
Q: And so [S.Z.] made up this story to every person that she's ever talked to about 
this case? 
A: That's right. 
Q: And this is just one big conspiracy against you perpetrated by a little girl? 
A: No. It's-
Q: It's perpetrated by her mother, right? 
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A: You bet. 
Tr. p. 676, ln. 17 - p. 677, ln. 1. Mr. Christian did not object to this questioning. 
87. Though Jan Fowler, Valerie Fry, Mandi Smith and Connie Molen testified at the 
trial, Mr. Christian did not ask them about the destruction of the camper or the unusual height of 
the bed. 
8 8. Dr. Edward Friedlander testified that the photographs of S .Z. 's hymen did not 
reveal notches and that he would defer only to a master pediatric gynecologist in his conclusion. 
Tr. p. 692, ln. 4-8; p. 697, ln. 21 - p. 698, ln. 2; p. 718, ln. 13-14. The limited time Dr. 
Friedlander had to review the photographs impacted the value of his opinion that the photos did 
not reveal notches. See Tr. p. 717, ln. 21-25. 
89·. - Tiffany Davidson was recalled as a rebuttal witness by the state. In an attempt to 
discredit the testimony of her sister, Mandi, the state asked whether Mandi was easily confused 
and had a hard time remembering things. Tr. p. 878, ln. 5-12. Mr. Christian objected and the 
objection was overruled. The prosecutor was then allowed to ask ifthere was anything special 
about Mandi or anything that makes it difficult for her to remember her conversations. Mr. 
Christian again objected and was overruled. Ms. Davidson was allowed to testify that Mandi was 
deprived of oxygen during birth, that she was easily confused and misinterprets things. Tr. p. 
879, ln. 11-21. 
90. During closing argument, the prosecutor argued: "we're essentially talking about 
what happened on that day during the summer of2004 and 2005." Tr. 902, ln. 1-9. 
91. During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the evidence was consistent 
with the "four stages" testified to by Mydell Yeager. Tr. p. 903, ln. 11-14. Ms. Yeager actually 
testified to five phases. Tr. p. 561-568. 
92. The prosecutor argued that "whatever appeal [the Molens] had in terms of 
wanting to adopt S.Z., it went away very quickly, and they decided against it. That was their 
testimony." Tr. p. 904, ln 10-15. This argument misrepresents the Molens' testimony. 
93. In an attempt to demonstrate that the evidence was consistent with the 
engagement or opportunity stage of abuse, the prosecutor argued "and you heard [S.Z.J testify 
that he told her that they had a special relationship, that they were ... they had a special 
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boyfriend-girlfriend relationship." Tr. p. 904, ln. 21-24. However, the jury did not hear S.Z. 
testify to this as argued by the prosecutor. Tr. p. 271-359. 
94. In order to convince the jury that Molen had participated in the grooming process 
described by Ms. Yeager, the prosecutor argued that Mr. Molen bought her a moped and that he 
gave her money and special privileges. Tr. 905, ln. 15-17. Mr. Molen testified that he bought 
S.Z. a moped but did not testify regarding any money or special privileges. Tr. p. 648, ln. 23 - p. 
649, ln. 7. 
95. The prosecutor argued; "the next thing you heard that [S.Z.] said that there were 
lots and lots and lots of instances of touching." Tr. p. 906, ln. 12-14. S.Z. did not testify 
regarding lots of incidents of touching. 
96. The prosecutor argued "she testified that his private part was hairy." Tr. p. 21-25. 
S.Z. did not testify to this. 
97. The prosecutor argued: "wasn't it interesting as well that th~re was an instance 
that she remembered where she was being touched and that the truck was stolen." Tr. p. 908, ln. 
13-16; see also Tr. p. 923, ln. 9-12. S.Z. actually testified: "we were laying on the floor, and my 
grandma said she was going to go to sleep, so she went to her room. And he was about to get on 
top of me, but then we heard his truck staii. And that's when it ended, when his truck was 
getting stolen." Tr. p. 287, ln. 3-9. 
98. The prosecutor argued: "And isn't it interesting that when Dan Holt was cross-
examined, that everything he admitted to was consistent with what the defendant testified to; that 
the only thing that was different about that day was the amount of time they spent in that boat. 
Dan clearly mentioned some things that he didn't probably want to admit to in front of you: They 
went squirrel fishing; he was using dynamite down by the dam to fish; that he had used 
mushrooms in the past." Tr. p. 914, ln. 17 - p. 915, ln. 1. Comparison of Mr. Molen and Mr. 
Holt's testimony demonstrates they were inconsistent in other regards than the time spent in the 
boat. 
99. The prosecutor argued: "So what I'm going to ask you next is: Does it make 
sense, when you think about what happened next, that he would just drop it, as he said he did, 
that he never had another conversation with Danny Holt?" Tr. p. 917, ln. 15-19. Actually, Mr. 
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Molen testified, "Yes sir" in response to the prosecutor's question: "Do you agree that you talked 
to him on the phone after that?" Tr. 662, ln. 6-8. 
100. The prosecutor argued: "Or is it what Danny Holt said, that he called the 
defendant on the phone, and they had a confrontation?" Tr. p. 917, 19-22. Mr. Holt testified that 
he spoke on the phone with Mr. Molen, not that Mr. Holt called Mr. Molen. Tr. p. 519, ln. 14-
18. 
101. The prosecutor argued: "You listened to Connie Molen testify. And wasn't it 
interesting when she testified that she could not remember a time when the defendant was alone 
with S.Z." Tr. p. 920, ln. 15-18. Connie actually testified that Mr. Molen was alone with S.Z. 
Tr. p. 747, In. 16 - 749, ln. 6. 
102. The prosecutor referred to Dr. Friedlander as "high-priced" and argued "you pay 
him some money to come out here and say really whatever it is you want him to say." Tr. p. 971, 
ln. 24 - p. 972, ln. 1. 
103. The prosecutor argued that Dr. Friedlander will "come and testify in any case in 
which there's medical evidence involved." Tr. p. 987, ln. 10-12. Dr. Friedlander did not so 
testify. Instead, in response to the prosecutor's question whether he agreed to testify as an expe1i 
after being contacted by the Molens, Dr. Friedlander indicated he agreed to take the case after 
reviewing the materials. Tr. p. 713, ln. 13-19. 
104. The prosecutor argued that in order to accept Mr. Molen's defense, the jury had to 
conclude that there was a conspiracy against Mr. Molen that included the state and CARES. 
105. Most of the evidence of uncharged sexual conduct was introduced by Mr. 
Christian through S.Z.'s cross-examination concerning her various statements made to the police 
and other interviewers, and through stipulation for admission of the CARES video. Molen, 148 
Idaho at 958, 231 P.3d at 1055. 
106. The jury was instructed that to constitute lewd conduct, "it is not necessary that 
bare skin be touched. The touching may be through the clothing." Jury Instruction #12. 
107. The jury returned a guilty verdict. 
108. After trial, Connie consulted with Dr. Stephen Guertin, a physician specializing in 
pediatric care who has examined children who have potentially been sexually abused for twenty 
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years. Dr. Guertin studied the photographs from S .z.' s exam which were disclosed during the 
course of trial and unequivocally said that there were no scars and that S.Z. had a normal hymen. 
Dr. Guertin's affidavit was filed with the district court October 25, 2007. 
109. After trial, the individual who served as the jury foreman, Kenneth McKay, 
contacted Mr. Christian regarding concerns he had regarding the trial and deliberations. Mr. 
McKay was thereafter interviewed by the state's investigator, Jim Kouril and by private 
investigator Neil Custer during which he expressed concerns regarding the verdict. A true and 
correct copy of correspondence from the Idaho Attorney General's Office attaching a 
memorandum and a transcript concerning this interview is attached hereto as Exhibit F. 
Appeal 
110. On direct appeal, the State Appellate Public Defender was appointed to represent 
Mr. Molen and attorney Justin Curtis was assigned to the case. Mr. Curtis argued that the 
judgment of conviction should be vacated because: (1) the district court erred in excluding 
evidence of S.Z.'s prior exposure to sexual activity; (2) the prosecutor's cross-examination of 
Mr. Molen concerning his choice not to contact police; (3) the absence of an unanimity 
instruction; and ( 4) the district court erred in refusing to strike an unsubstantiated allegation from 
the presentence investigation report. 
111. With respect to S .Z.' s prior exposure to sexual activity, the Court of Appeals held: 
Like the courts whose decisions are discussed above, we conclude that evidence 
of an alternate source for a child's knowledge of sexual matters may be relevant in 
the trial of a sexual molestation charge. However, the relevance of a child's prior 
exposure to sexual conduct (either as a victim or as an observer) will depend upon 
the facts of each case. One important factor is the age of the child when he or she 
reports and describes the sexual assault. That is, the probative value of evidence 
of a child's alternative source of sexual knowledge will ordinarily be inversely 
proportional to the child's age, for the younger the child, the stronger the 
likelihood of a jury inference that the child would be too sexually innocent to have 
fabricated the allegations against the defendant. As the victim's age rises, the risk 
of such an inference will diminish and may evaporate. 
A second factor in the relevance analysis is the degree of similarity between the 
acts of which the defendant is accused and the prior sexual activity to which the 
child was exposed. Logical relevance turns upon whether the child's prior sexual 
experience or observation would have enabled the child to describe acts of the 
particular type that she now ascribes to the defendant. For example, evidence that 
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a child previously had been subjected to digital penetration might not be relevant 
on a charge of penile penetration. Thus, to be admissible, alternative source 
evidence must demonstrate the child's experience of or exposure to sexual 
behavior sufficiently similar to that which the child has described in her 
allegations against the defendant. 
Molen, 148 Idaho at 955,231 P.3d at 1052. 
112. The Court of Appeals further concluded: 
We nevertheless conclude that the district court did not err in excluding 
Molen's proffered evidence because Molen's offer of proof does not demonstrate 
that S .z. was previously exposed to the sort of acts and bodily conditions that 
were described in her report of the charged acts. The act with which Molen was 
charged was vaginal intercourse. In her report of the offense at age nine, S.Z. 
described a variety of sexual acts including vaginal intercourse, erections, 
ejaculation, and masturbation. Molen's offer of proof does not demonstrate that 
S.Z. had previously observed such conditions or behavior. The offer of proof 
indicated the evidence would show that S.Z.'s mother exposed S.Z. to "a constant, 
graphic, sexually charged lifestyle ... , including openly having sex with multiple 
partners with [S.Z.] in the home, openly discussing sex toys and pornography in 
front of [S.Z.], and openly disrobing in front of other family members in the 
presence of [S.Z.]" These assertions are too vague and general to establish an 
alternate source of knowledge from which S.Z. could have fabricated her 
description of Molen's acts. Evidence that S.Z.'s mother had sex while S.Z. was 
"in the home" is not equivalent to evidence that S.Z. was present in the same 
room and actually observed the acts, nor does the remainder of the offer of proof 
identify specific instances where S.Z. observed acts or bodily conditions like those 
described in her testimony concerning Molen. Because this offer of proof did not 
tend to show that S.Z. had prior knowledge that would have enabled her to 
fabricate the specific acts alleged against Molen, the proffered evidence was not 
shown to be relevant. In the absence of a showing of relevance, we need not 
discuss application of the Rule 403 balancing test. 
Molen, 148 Idaho at 956,231 P.3d at 1053. 
113. The Comi of Appeals held that the prosecutor's question to Mr. Molen: "But you 
didn't. You waited until you got your chance here to listen to all the witnesses and then tell your 
story, correct?" violated Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) and constituted an improper 
prosecutorial reference to Mr. Molen's right to remain silent. Molen, 148 Idaho at 959,231 P.3d 
at 1056. The Court of Appeals further held that the error standing alone was harmless. 
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114. Additional affidavits, records and other evidence are being prepared in support of 
the instant Petition and will be filed as soon as they become available. 
115. Mr. Molen reserves the right to amend this petition with additional claims at a 
later date. 
III. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner Received Ineffective Assistance of 
Trial Counsel 
116. Mr. Molen re-alleges Paragraphs 1 to 115 as if fully set forth herein. 
117. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), by failing to object to the amended information either at the 
hearing on the state's motion or at anytime thereafter. This deficient performance allowed the 
state to argue that the charged incident was one of the last incidents of misconduct rather than the 
first as established by the evidence at the preliminary hearing and jury trial. No evidence at trial 
or the preliminary hearing supported the conclusion that the alleged incident of direct genital to 
genital contact occurred in 2005. Had Mr. Christian performed effectively in this regard, the jury 
would not have returned a guilty verdict. 
118. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
move for a Taint Hearing or competency hearing regarding the degree to which suggestive 
interview techniques tainted S.Z. 's memories. As a result, neither the district court nor the jury 
were informed of the potential effect of suggestive interviewing teclmiques. Had Mr. Christian 
filed such a motion, the district court would have erred unless it suppressed S .Z. 's testimony 
and/or permitted Mr. Molen to present expert testimony on the concept of taint. Instead, the jury 
was only left with the options of believing that S.Z. was being intentionally dishonest or that Mr. 
Molen was guilty. Had the jury heard testimony regarding the concept of taint, it would not have 
returned a guilty verdict. 
119. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
follow through with and/or renew his motion to dismiss due to Officer Kennedy's destruction of 
evidence by arguing that the recording of S.Z. 's interview was exculpatory and thus a violation of 
due process regardless of whether it was destroyed in bad faith. 
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120. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
ensure that Nurse Ortega was. . ~rviewed prior to trial. Had Nurse Ortega been interviewed, she 
would have admitted that she took photos during her exam as she did during trial. Those photos 
would have then been obtained prior to trial for a careful and thoughtful review by Dr. Edward 
Friedlander. Dr. Friedlander would have deferred to a Master Pediatric Gynecologist and Mr. 
Molen would have then been able to consult with and hire such a gynecologist who would have 
testified. See Affidavit of Dr. Stephen Guertin dated 10-25-2007. Because the prior opportunity 
to review the photos was not afforded to Dr. Friedlander, the prosecutor was able to discredit Dr. 
Friedlander's expertise and credibility. Had Mr. Christian performed effectively in this regard, 
the jury would not have returned a guilty verdict. 
121. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
move to dismiss or to continue for failure to timely disclose the photos taken during Nurse 
Ortega's exam, which were material exculpatory evidence. Had such a motion been made, the 
case would have been dismissed or would have been continued and the additional investigation 
would have occurred as described in the preceding paragraph. 
122. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
provide an adequately detailed offer of proof to support his request to present evidence regarding 
S.Z. 's exposure to sexual activity. As demonstrated by the affidavits of Connie Molen and 
Mandi Davidson, a detailed offer of proof could have been made. Had Mr. Christian provided a 
sufficient offer of proof, the district court would have erred in precluding the testimony and the 
result of Mr. Molen's trial and/or direct appeal would have been different. 
123. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
object to Officer Kennedy's testimony regarding S.Z.'s statements as inadmissible hearsay and 
unreliable. Had Mr. Christian so objected and the jury not heard the hearsay, the jury would not 
have returned a guilty verdict. 
124. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
object to the CARES video as inadmissible hearsay and/or failing to object to the video's 
admissibility after S.Z. contradicted most of her statements therein during her trial testimony. 
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Had Mr. Christian so objected and the jury had not seen the video, the jury would not have 
returned a guilty verdict. 
125. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
impeach Danny Holt's testimony with the Ben Carmack statements made during the recorded 
interview with the private investigator. Had Mr. Christian performed effectively in this regard, 
the jury would not have returned a guilty verdict. 
126. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
protect Mr. Molen's right to a fair and impartial jury by further questioning jurors regarding their 
knowledge of Officer Kennedy and by failing to object to the prosecutor's questioning of Ms. 
Fisher in the presence of the panel. This deficient performance created a structural defect that 
deprived Mr. Molen to his right to a fair trial and requires reversal of his conviction. 
127. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
object to the introduction of testimony through various witnesses including S.Z. regarding 
uncharged incidences of sexual misconduct. Had Mr. Christian so objected - particularly if he 
had also objected to the improper amendment that alleged the charged incident occurred in 2005 
- these incidents of uncharged misconduct would not have been admitted and the jury would not 
have returned a guilty verdict. 
128. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
seek leave to inquire of Officer Kennedy's conduct in the Gold Mine in the jurors' presence 
and/or to seek leave to inquire of the jurors what they overheard. Because he failed to so inquire, 
it is unknown what the jurors overheard and whether they arrived at any assumptions based those 
statements. By failing to protect Mr. Molen' s right to an impaiiial jury in this regard, Mr. 
Christian's deficient performance created a structural defect that requires reversal of the 
judgment of conviction. 
129. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
object to Officer Kennedy's testimony that S.Z.'s nervous and upset demeanor was consistent 
with children who have been abused. Had Mr. Christian objected, the testimony would have 
been stricken as Officer Kennedy was not qualified to give that opinion and in any event the 
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opinion infringed on the jury's duty to tell whether S.Z. had been sexually abused. Had Mr. 
Christian objected, the jury would not have returned a verdict of guilty. 
13 0. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
impeach Officer Kennedy's testimony with her POST training record. Had Mr. Christian 
performed effectively in this regard, the jury would not have returned a guilty verdict. 
13 1. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
inform the district court, request a mistrial and/or Voir Dire the involved jurors after observing 
Danny Holt speaking with jurors and asking the bailiff to separate these jurors from the state's 
witness. Had Mr. Christian performed effectively in this regard, the jury would not have returned 
a guilty verdict. 
132. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by not 
introducing as evidence photographs which show that the height of his bed would prevent him 
from pushing S.Z. onto it. Mr. Christian also performed deficiently by not presenting testimony 
by Jan Fowler, Valerie Fry, Mandi Smith and Connie Molen as to the unusual height of the bed, 
though each of them testified and were expecting to be asked of this matter. C01Toboration was 
greatly needed to overcome the state's attack on Mr. Molen's credibility. Had Mr. Christian 
c01Toborated Mr. Molen's testimony and discredited S.Z. in this respect, the jury would not have 
returned a verdict of guilty. 
133. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
object to prejudicial and inappropriate comments made towards Mr. Molen by prosecution on 
cross-examination. Had Mr. Christian performed effectively in this regard, the jury would not 
have returned a guilty verdict. 
134. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
object to the district comi's erroneous ruling that he could not inquire regarding the terms of the 
plea bargain to rebut Mr. Holt's testimony. Had Mr. Christian performed effectively in this 
regard, the jury would not have returned a guilty verdict. 
135. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
request a Specific Acts Unanimity Instruction. Had Mr. Christian performed effectively in this 
regard, the jury would not have returned a guilty verdict. 
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136. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
object to the jury instruction indicating Mr. Molen could be found guilty for touching through 
clothing as no evidence supported the conclusion that the charged incident involved genital to 
genital contact through clothing. Had Mr. Christian performed effectively in this regard, the jury 
would not have returned a guilty verdict. 
13 7. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
object to Mydell Yeager's testimony. Had Mr. Christian so objected, Ms. Yeager's testimony 
would have been limited or not permitted and the jury would not have returned a guilty verdict. 
13 8. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
object to the prosecutor's impermissible comment on Mr. Molen's right to remain silent. 
13 9. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by failing to 
object to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, including but not limited to multiple 
incidents of misstating or mischaracterizing the evidence and improperly discrediting defense 
expert witnesses. 
140. Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by 
continuing to struggle with alcoholism during preparation for the re-scheduled jury trial and 
during the trial itself. This continued struggle - both in the form of withdrawal and continued 
consumption of alcohol - contributed to many if not all of the errors described above. Had Mr. 
Christian performed effectively in this regard, the jury would not have returned a guilty verdict. 
141. In addition to the prejudice suffered by each individual incidence of deficient 
performance described above, Mr. Molen was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of trial 
counsel's errors and had those errors not occurred, the jury would not have returned a guilty 
verdict. 
142. Mr. Christian's actions and omissions referenced above individually and 
cumulatively deprived Mr. Molen of his right to the effective assistance of counsel and his right 
to confrontation and to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
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IV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner Received Ineffective Assistance of 
Appellate Counsel 
143. Mr. Molen re-alleges Paragraphs 1 to 115 as if fully set forth herein. 
144. Appellate counsel performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by 
failing to argue that the district court erred in permitting the state to amend its information to 
allege the charged incident occurred in 2004 or 2005. Had this fundamental error been raised on 
appeal, Mr. Molen' s judgment of conviction would have been vacated. 
14 5. Appellate counsel performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by 
failing to raise the prosecutor's inappropriate comment: "This isn't your first time with this is 
it?" during Mr. Molen's cross-examination as an issue on appeal. Had this error been raised on 
appeal, Mr. Molen's judgment of conviction would have been vacated. 
146. Appellate counsel performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by 
failing to argue that the district court erred in refusing to allow Mr. Molen to testify whether the 
state retracted its plea offer. Had this error been raised on appeal, Mr. Molen's judgment of 
conviction would have been vacated. 
14 7. Appellate counsel performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by 
failing to raise the prosecutor's mischaracterization of the district court's in limine ruling 
regarding french kissing as an issue on appeal. Had this error been raised on appeal, Mr. Molen's 
judgment of conviction would have been vacated. 
148. Appellate counsel performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by 
failing to raise the district court's error in permitting Tiffany Davidson to discredit her sister's 
reliability by testifying that she was special and had difficulties with memory. Had this en-or 
been raised on appeal, Mr. Molen's judgment of conviction would have been vacated. 
149. Had appellate counsel raised additional issues on appeal, the Comi of Appeals 
would have viewed those errors in combination with the impermissible reference to Mr. Molen's 
right to remain silent. Had the Court of Appeals reviewed that error in combination with other 
errors, it would have concluded that the errors cumulatively deprived Mr. Molen of his right to a 
fair trial. 
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V. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: Prosecutorial Misconduct Deprived Mr. Molen 
of His Right to a Fair Trial 
150. Mr. Molen re-alleges Paragraphs 1 to 115 as if fully set forth herein. 
151. The multiple incidences of prosecutorial misconduct during the voir dire, 
presentation of the evidence, and arguments individually and cumulatively deprived Mr. Molen 
of his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner requests the following relief: 
A. That the conviction be vacated. 
re/ 111A 
Respectfully submitted this.'.2..3 day of {'L Cf l/ 
I 
, 2011. 
71(~~7tU/!~ 
Scott Molen ' 
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STA TE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA 
VERIFICATION OF PETITIONER 
I, Michael Scott Molen, being duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say that I have 
subscribed lo the foregoing petition; that I know the contents thereof; and that the matters and 
allegations therein set forth are true to the best of my knowledge. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this,23_ day of /l)J,;, 
fl~=-;::,.,::::_____ 
~;:tublicforidabo . . 
My commission expiresi:, 0'7 .-~5 -J()J L/ 
PEGGY BURCH 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
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• 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on ihis :E, day of ,day 
and correct copy of the foregoing document to be: 
mailed 
faxed 
~ hand delivered 
to: Boise County Prosecuting Attorney 
406 Montgomery St. 
Idaho City, ID 83631 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 21266 
KEVIN LAMB, 
PlaintilT-Appellant, 
) 
) 
) 1995 Opinion No. 74 
) 
v. ) Filed: August 1, 1995 
) 
HOWARD MANWEILER, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) Frederick C. Lyon, Clerk 
) 
) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Ada County. Hon. J. William Hart, District Judge. 
Summary judgment dismissing action for legal malpractice, vacated and case 
remanded. 
Ellis, Brown and Sheils, Chtd., Boise, for appellant. Allen B. Ellis argued. 
Wilson, Carnahan & McColl, Boise, for respondent. Jeffrey M. Wilson 
argued 
LANSING, Judge 
This is an action against an attorney for alleged malpractice in representing the 
accused in a criminal proceeding. At issue is the propriety of the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorney. For the reasons stated below, we 
vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
The evidence in the record, viewed in a manner most favorable to appellant Kevin 
Lamb, indicates the following history giving rise to this action. Sometime in 1989, Lamb was 
1 EXHIBIT 
I F 
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Manweiler moved for summary judgment on two occasions. In his first motion he 
asserted entitlement to summary judgment on several grounds, including an argument that 
Manweiler's alleged negligence could not be the proximate cause of Lamb's incarceration 
because Lamb was in fact guilty of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. Manweiler also 
moved in the alternative for dismissal of Lamb's complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Following a hearing, the district 
court denied summary judgment, holding that the evidence submitted to the court was 
insufficient to determine whether Manweiler was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
From the record it appears that the district court did not separately address the merits of 
Manweiler's motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
Some four months later, Manweiler filed a "renewed motion for summary judgment" 
in which he relied upon the evidence submitted in support of the original summary judgment 
motion as well as new affidavits. In support of the renewed motion, Manweiler argued that 
as an element of Lamb's malpractice claim, Lamb bore the burden of proving that he was 
in fact innocent of the felony charges to which he had pleaded guilty. Manweiler contended 
that summary judgment should be granted because Lamb, by his guilty plea and statements 
he made at his sentencing hearing, had admitted that he was guilty of the underlying crimes. 
Lamb did not respond to the summary judgment motion by providing the district court with 
an affidavit or other evidence asserting his innocence. 
The district court granted this second motion for summary judgment. The court 
accepted Manweiler's position, which was not disputed by Lamb, that Lamb bore the burden 
of proving not only that he would have been acquitted of the felony charges if his attorney 
had performed competently, but also that he was, as a fact, innocent of the charges. The 
district court found that Lamb's statements at his change of plea and sentencing hearings 
contained in transcripts placed in evidence by Manweiler, were sufficient to establish that 
Lamb was guilty of the two counts of theft. Because Lamb offered no evidence to rebut or 
disavow these admissions of guilt so as to create a genuine issue of fact regarding his guilt, 
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Manweiler. From that judgment 
Lamb appeals. 
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m. 
ANALYSIS 
A ELEMENTS OF ACTION FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE ARISING FROM 
REPRESENTATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 
An essential premise of the district court's decision was its determination that a client 
who sues his former attorney for negligence in defending against criminal charges must 
prove, as an element of the cause of action for malpractice, that the. client was factually 
innocent of the charged crimes. Although the inclusion of actual innocence as an element 
of his cause of action has not been questioned by Lamb, either in the proceedings before 
the district court or on appeal, we will address this determination because it presents an 
issue of first impression in Idaho. 
In the context of a malpractice claim arising from an attorney's representation of a 
client in a civil matter, the elements of the cause of action are well-defined in the 
jurisprudence of this State: 
The elements of a legal malpractice action are: (1) the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the 
lawyer; (3) the failure to perform that duty; and ( 4) the failure to perform that 
duty must be a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the client. 
Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13,813 P.2d 350,352 (1991). See also Johnson v. Jones, 103 
Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 650, (1982); Palmer v. Samuelsen, 124 Idaho 120, 123, 856 P.2d 1287, 
1290 (Ct. App. 1993). The question before us is whether these same four elements also 
define the cause of action where the claim is for legal malpractice in a criminal defense 
context, or whether a fifth element - the actual innocence of the client -- should be added 
as a required element. 
We conclude that public policy considerations militate in favor of a rule that actual 
innocence be proven as a prerequisite to recovery for negligent legal representation in a 
criminal case. We are in agreement with the rationale of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts expressed in Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E. 2d 783 (Mass. 1991): 
There is good reason to place a greater burden on a guilty criminal 
defendant maintaining a claim of malpractice of the type involved in this case 
than is placed on a wronged civil defendant. The underpinnings of common 
law tort liability, compensation and deterrence, do not support a rule that 
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We tum now to the evidence presented on Manweiler's motion for summary 
judgment to determine whether, as contended by Lamb, the evidence was inadmissible and 
therefore insufficient to establish that Manweiler was entitled to judgment. 
Manweiler sought summary judgment on the ground that Lamb, who would bear the 
burden of persuasion at trial, could not establish one of the elements of his cause of action 
-- his factual innocence. It was Manweiler's burden as movant to show the absence of any 
factual issue as to this element. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 697-98, 838 P .2d 293, 300-
01 (1992). He could do this by (1) producing affirmative evidence negating Lamb's 
innocence, or (2) demonstrating that Lamb lacked evidence sufficient to meet his burden of 
proof on this element at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Manweiler proceeded under the first of these alternatives, by 
utilizing Lamb's statements when pleading guilty and at the sentencing hearing as affirmative 
evidence of his guilt of the underlying offenses. Lamb contends on appeal, however, that 
Manweiler did not make the requisite threshold showing of Lamb's guilt because the 
evidence upon which Manweiler relied was not admissible. 
Lamb maintains that because a legal malpractice claim must be addressed as a "suit 
within a suit," evidence procured from his statements made at the taking of his guilty pleas 
and at sentencing must be excluded as not relevant. He contends that his guilt or innocence 
must be determined without reference to these proceedings which, he asserts, would not 
have taken place but for Manweiler's negligence. Lamb would have the trier of fact look 
only to the evidence that the prosecutor would have had at his disposal for the criminal trial 
if Lamb had never entered a guilty plea. 
If Lamb were required to prove only that he would not have been convicted but for 
his attorney's negligence, this argument would have some merit. In the civil context, Idaho's 
appellate courts have recognized that "[t]he peculiar nature of a legal malpractice action 
requires the action to proceed as a suit within a suit." Fitzgerald v. Walker, 121 Idaho 589, 
594, 826 P.2d 1301, 1306 (1992). "[T]he trier of fact in the malpractice action must decide 
what the outcome would have been in the previous case if the lawyer had performed 
properly, a process that has been described as a "suit within a suit." Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 
at 172, 868 P .2d at 500. However, we have held that Lamb must not only prove that he 
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Evidence of Lamb's admissions made in the criminal proceeding, if uncontroverted 
by other evidence, would have been sufficient proof of Lamb's guilt of the underlying crimes 
to entitle Manweiler to summary judgment. However, other evidence before the district 
court created a factual issue as to Lamb's guilt or innocence and made summary judgment 
impermissible. 
In support of his original summary judgment motion, Manweiler had submitted his 
own affidavit and that of his attorney. Attached to his attorney's affidavit were exlubits 
marked A through H which consisted of various portions of the transcripts and clerk's 
records from Lamb's criminal case and his post-conviction relief action. Manweiler 
thereafter specifically adopted and relied upon this same evidence to support his second 
summary judgment motion. He did not purport to limit in any way the purpose for which 
these court records were offered or for which they could be used. Included in the records 
from the post-conviction relief action were three affidavits by Lamb stating facts which, he 
averred, demonstrated that he was innocent of the theft charges and that he had pleaded 
guilty in reliance on faulty advice from his attorney. Examples of Lamb's assertions of 
innocence and explanations of his reason for pleading guilty presented in these affidavits are 
set out in the margin.3 Inexplicably, Lamb did not draw this evidence to the district court's 
3 Affidavit of Kevin Lamb - Filed April 1, 1991: 
That at the time of the guilty plea I thought, because of advice of counsel, that 
the jury could find me guilty of intent to defraud, even though the alleged 
victims knew of and agreed to all my actions. I therefore thought a jury could 
find me guilty, however, at this time I know that would be impossible because 
we could prove that the alleged victims knew of all my actions, agreed to the 
same and encouraged them for their own monetary gain. 
Affidavit of Kevin Lamb - Filed June 7, 1991: 
3. That approximately two weeks subsequent to the entry of my 
pleas of guilty, trial counsel and myself obtained documents that were 
contained in volumes of business records held by the Attorney General's 
Office and which had been seized pursuant to a search warrant. These 
documents were not available to me at the time I entered my pleas of guilty. 
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summary judgment motion court "must look to the totality of the motions, affidavits, 
depositions, pleadings, and attached exlnbits, not merely portions of the record in isolation."). 
We conclude that Lamb's affidavits from his post-conviction proceeding controverted the 
evidence of his guilt upon which Manweiler's summary judgment motion was based and 
thereby framed a factual issue. Consequently, Manweiler never met his initial burden, as 
the moving party, to show that no genuine issue of material fact existed.4 Because the 
record on the motion already disclosed a genuine issue of material fact, Lamb's failure to 
file a counter-affidavit in opposition to the motion was of no consequence, and summary 
judgment was inappropriate. See Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 273, 731 P.2d 813, 816 (Ct. 
App. 1986) (if record already discloses a genuine factual issue it would be "a useless 
procedure" to require affidavits from party defending the motion). 
D. NO ERROR IN DISTRICT COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Manweiler also asserts that the trial court's judgment dismissing Lamb's action should 
be upheld on the alternative ground that Lamb's complaint fails to state a claim for relief 
because the complaint does not include an allegation that Lamb is innocent of the 
underlying criminal charges. Manweiler argues that the district court ought to have granted 
his motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P.12(b)(6), which was made contemporaneously with 
Manweiler's first summary judgment motion. 
We are unpersuaded that I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) provides Manweiler an alternative basis 
for judgment. Rule 12(b) provides that under certain circumstances a motion brought under 
4 This decision should not be viewed as holding that a criminal defendant will, under 
all circumstances, be permitted in a legal malpractice action to disavow a prior clear and 
unequivocal admission of guilt made in a criminal proceeding. Here, Lamb contends that 
the guilty pleas were themselves the product of his attorney's negligent advice and so cannot 
be deemed conclusive proof of his guilt. His other statements relating to his guilt or 
innocence made during the criminal proceedings are sufficiently vague and oblique that we 
cannot say that they constitute unequivocal admissions of the elements of grand theft or that 
they are entirely inconsistent with his later profession of innocence, nor can we determine 
on the record before us that these statements are, as a matter of law, uninfected by the 
alleged malpractice. 
11 
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I concur with the majority in section III A, wherein it holds that in a legal 
malpractice action stemming from an attorney's representation in a criminal case, the 
plaintiff (Lamb) must prove that he or she is in fact innocent of the charge. I further concur 
with the majority in section III B., that in this particular case, the evidence of Lamb's 
statements upon pleading guilty and at sentencing were admissible. 
However, I respectfully dissent as to the majority's opinion in section III C., only as 
to its ultimate conclusion that the record presented by Manweiller in support of his motion 
created a genuine issue of material fact prohibiting summary judgment. Lamb reasserts the 
same factual basis in his post.conviction relief action that was presented at the time his guilty 
pleas were accepted by the district court in the criminal case. I disagree with the majority's 
analysis of that evidence, as set forth not only in the body of its opinion but also in footnote 
4. 
I would affirm the district court's award of summary judgment. 
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• JEFFREY M. WILSON 
WILSON, CARNAHAN & McCOLL 
420 w. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: 208-345-9100 
Attorney for Defendant 
• 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OP 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KEVIN LAMB, 
vs. 
HOWARD MANWEILER, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 96063 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO 
DI$MISS/MOTI0N FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Defendant and by and through his counsel of 
record and submits the following Memorandum in support of the 
Defendant's Alternative Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed contemporaneously herewith. 
I. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 1989, the Plaintiff in this proceeding, Kevin P. Lamb, was 
charged with various felonies via Informations filed in the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon. These charges involved 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO DISMISS/ 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
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• • alleged violations of Idaho Code§ 25-1118, et seq. and Idaho Code 
§ 18-2403, et seq. i.e. presenting false information for brand 
inspection certificates and grand theft, respectively. (See 
Exhibits "E" and "F" attached to Affidavit of Jeffrey M. Wilson). 
Mr. Lamb retained the services of Howard Manweiler to defend 
him in these cases. The State originally plead eleven felony 
counts which were subsequently either reduced or consolidated into 
nine felony counts upon which Preliminary Hearings were scheduled. 
The State in these proceedings was represented by Deputy Attorney 
General Michael Kane. The Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney had 
previously disqualified himself from handling these cases. Through 
negotiations between Mr. Manweiler and Mr. Kane a negotiated plea 
resulted in Mr. Lamb entering pleas of guilty to four of the nine 
counts. These pleas were entered in front of presiding District 
Court Judge Dennis Goff on March 23, 1990. 
At that time, Mr. Lamb plead guilty to one count of violation 
of Idaho Code§ 25-1181(1) and one count of violation of Idaho Code 
§ 18-2403 ( 1) (see Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Jeffrey M. Wilson). 
These pleas were entered in District Court Case No. 89-12380. In 
addition, Mr. Lamb entered pleas of guilty to two counts of 
violating Idaho Code§ 25-1181(1) in District Court Case No. 89-
04720. At that time, Mr. Manweiler indicated to the Court: 
We would, if it please the Court, on one 
condition and that is we would tender a 
conditional plea of guilty to those two charges 
provided± can convince Mr, Kane over there 
that they are not exactly what they are suppose 
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• • to be that we might take that into 
consideration at the time of sentencing. 
(Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Jeffrey M. Wilson, 
page 5, 1.5). 
Further proceedings were conducted in these two cases on 
September 4, 1990. (See Exhibit "B" to Affidavit of Jeffrey M. 
Wilson) . At that time, Mr. Manweiler sought to withdraw Mr. Lamb's 
pleas of guilty to the two counts in Case No. 89-04720. In 
response to Mr. Manweiler's argument in support of such motion, 
(see pages 16-18 of Exhibit "B" to Affidavit of Jeffrey M. Wilson), 
Mr. Kane stated: 
Your honor, I am basically in general agreement 
. . . and as a result of Mr. Manweiler bringing 
that to my attention, we agreed then that what 
we would do is not object to withdraw of the 
plea on the two counts. We would go to 
sentencing on the other two counts and then at 
that point after the sentencing we would then 
decide whether or not it was something that was 
worth then of going forward on as to the other 
two cases. (Exhibit "B" to Affidavit of Jeffrey 
M. Wilson, page 19, 1. 1-18). 
At that same hearing, attorney Wayne Kidwell appeared, 
specially, on behalf of Mr. Lamb seeking to withdraw all four of 
his previously entered and accepted pleas of guilty. The Court 
denied such motion. ( See Exhibit "B" to Affidavit of Jeffrey M. 
Wilson, pages 1-14). Thereafter, Mr. Lamb proceeded to sentencing 
on the two felony counts in Case No. 89-12380 on September 6, 1990. 
At that time, Judge Goff imposed the following sentence: Count One 
- Two years fixed followed by a five year indeterminate period to 
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• • the Idaho State Board of Corrections and a fine in the amount of 
$2,537.50; Count Two - Two years fixed followed by five years 
indeterminate to the Idaho State Board of Corrections and a fine 
in the sum of $2,537.50. 
Thereafter, Mr. Lamb initiated an appeal. Mr. Lamb also 
initiated a Post-Conviction Relief proceeding in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of ~anyon as Case No. SP-90-01658. (See Exhibit "D" to 
Affidavit of Jeffrey M. Wilson). On the 27th day of September, 
1990, Kevin Lamb, through his then counsel Scott E. Fouser and the 
Attorney General's Office through Joel Horton, Special Prosecuting 
Attorney, entered into a Stipulation and Order {Exhibit "H" to 
Affidavit of Jeffrey M. Wilson) which Stipulation and Order 
provided in part: 
1. The Defendant (Lamb) will immediately 
dismiss the pending appeal in the Supreme Court 
case No. 18965. The Defendant will immediately 
dismiss the pending,,- Post Conviction . Re.l.ief 
Pet;it:io,n i.n Case No.,. s.r.,i~O-Q1668. The Antertded 
Judgrt\~rit . and cornmi tment entered on the 20t:h 
day of September, 19~0 be q1nended as follows: 
It is adjudged that the Defendant be 
sentenced to the custody of the Idaho 
State Board of Corrections for a 
minimum period of confinement of one 
year and subsequent indeterrnina.te 
period of confinement not to exceed 
six ,Years for a total aggregate term 
of s.even years. Th,e court ordered 
that Count I and Count II run 
concurrent. 
That the state of Idaho takes no position in 
regard to the Defendant being paroled to the 
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• • Federal Correctional System. That by entering 
into this Stipulation and Agreement neither 
party makes any admissions concerning any 
claims or actions one may have against the 
other. 
subsequently, Mr. Lamb was paroled by the State of Idaho 
Department of Corrections to the Federal Correctional System on 
other charges. 
Mr. Lamb apparently upon gaining his release from the Federal 
authorities prepared and caused to be filed the Complaint 
initiating this cause of action on September 4, 1992. Mr. Lamb's 
Complaint alleges: 
Defendant's conduct in his representation of 
Plaintiff was negligent as follows: 
A. Defendant negligently advised Plaintiff 
that the guilty pleas should be entered and 
could be withdrawn at a later date. 
B. Defendant negligently advised Plaintiff 
that the jury would find him guilty of all or 
some of the charges against him. 
c. Defendant negligently withdrew as 
Plaintiff's counsel immediately prior to change 
of plea hearing thereby prejudicing Plaintiff's 
chances of having his change of plea accepted. 
D. Defendant negligently failed to adequately 
investigate or otherwise prepare for the 
criminal charges against Plaintiff and thereby 
failed to identify that the charges as not 
meritorious (sic). 
Mr. Lamb in his Complaint further alleges: 
As a direct result (emphasis added) of 
Defendant 1 s negligence as aforesaid, the 
Plaintiff (Lamb) was incarcerated in t:,he Idaho 
state Penitentiary. As further direct :result 
(emphasis added) of Defendant's negligence, 
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• • Plaintiff has sustained injuries as follows: 
Deprivation of his liberties, personal 
mortification, humiliation and embarrassment 
and the loss of his society of friends and 
acquaintance resulting from his incarceration 
as aforesaid, emotional distress and loss of 
earnings. 
To this Complaint, Mr. Manweiler filed his Answer on 
November 27, 1992 alleging various affirmative defenses, among 
them, (1) that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, (2) that Plaintiff's Complaint is 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations, i.e. Idaho Code 
§ 5-219 (4), (3) that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from 
pursuing this claim as a result of prior court decisions in the 
case of State of Idaho v. Lamb, Case No. SP-001658 (the Post 
Conviction Relief proceeding) , ( 4) that Plaintiff's Complaint is 
barred by application of the Doctrine of Res Judicata as a result 
of prior court decisions in the case of State of Idaho v. Lamb, 
case No. SP-001658 (the Post Conviction Relief proceeding) and (5) 
that if in fact the Defendant was guilty of negligence, such 
negligence was not the proximate cause of the Plaintiff's 
incarceration nor the damages he now seeks. It is upon these 
specified affirmative defenses that Mr. Manweiler now seeks in the 
alternative either this Court's order dismissing the Plaintiff's 
cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b) (6) or alternatively an order 
granting summary judgment in his favor there being no genuine issue 
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as to any material fact thus entitling Mr. Manweiler to judgment 
as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
part: 
part: 
II. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Rule 12(b) (6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states in 
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for 
relief in any pleading, shall be assert in the 
responsive pleading thereto, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the 
pleader be made by motion (6) failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted ... If 
on a motion asserting the defense ( 6) to 
dismiss for failure of the pleading to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleadings are presented to 
and not excluded by the Court the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56 and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunities 
to present all material made pertinent to such 
motion by Rule 56. 
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
The party against whom a claim, counterclaim 
or crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought may at any time move, with 
or without supporting affidavits, for summary 
judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions on file together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
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• • As stated in Idaho Pre-Trial Civil Procedure: 
The summary judgment procedure is designed to 
provide a means for the disposition of a suit, 
or a portion of a suit, prior to trial when 
there is no significant factual dispute between 
the parties and the dispositive issues present 
only questions of law. It is appropriate when 
the movant can demonstrate by documentary 
evidence - the opponents admissions in the 
pleadings or discovery, or unrebutted 
affidavits or discovery statements by the 
movant' s witnesses - that the controlling facts 
are undisputed. The test for determining when 
summary judgment is appropriate has been said 
to be similar to that for a directed verdict -
when reasonable minds cannot differ as to the 
controlling facts. The rule speaks in terms 
of a genuine issue as to any material fact. 
In order to raise a "genuine issue" under this 
test, a parties contention must be supported 
by more than a "scintilla" of evidence, or 
evidence which only raises the "slightest 
doubt" as to the facts; the evidence must be 
of the type on which a jury would be justified 
in allowing at trial. Evidence will be 
insufficient to raise a genuine issue if the 
jury would be unreasonable in relying on it or 
if the evidence admits to only one reasonable 
inference which is contrary to the factual 
position being asserted. 
See also McNeil v. Gisler, 100 Idaho 693, 604 
P.2d 707 (1980); Jones v. Jones, 100 Idaho 510, 
601 P.2d 1 (1979); Pullin v. City of Kimberly, 
100 Idaho 34, 592 P.2d 849 (1979). 
The purpose of summary judgment proceedings is to eliminate 
the necessity of trial where facts are not in dispute and where 
existent and undisputed facts lead to a conclusion of law which is 
certain. Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441, 690 P.2d 896 (1984). 
Upon a Motion for summary Judgment all facts and inferences 
must be drawn in favor of non-moving party and summary judgment is 
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proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists, the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Perkins 
v. Highland Enterprises, Inc., 120 Idaho 511, 817 P.2d 177 (1991). 
Idaho Code Section 5-219(4) states in part: 
Actions for professional malpractice within two 
years; an action to recover damages for 
professional malpractice . . the cause of 
action shall be deemed to have accrued as of 
the time of the occurrence, act or omission 
complained of. 
A cause of action pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) does not 
accrue at the time of the act complained of unless some damage has 
occurred. Hawley v. Green, 117 Idaho 498, 788 P.2d 1321 (1990). 
The determination of what constitutes "damage" for purposes 
of accrual of an action pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-219(4), must be 
decided on the circumstances presented in each individual case. 
Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) requires that "some damage occur before the 
action for malpractice accrues and a limitation period begins to 
run." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876 (1990). 
An action for professional malpractice shall be deemed to have 
accrued for purposes of Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) only when there is 
objective proof that would support the existence of some actual 
damage. Chicoine v. Bliss O. Bignall. Jr. et al., 92.18 ISCR 1062 
(1992). 
In a legal malpractice case alleging negligence in the 
performance of criminal defense functions, the applicable statute 
of limitations commences upon the .court's acceptance of the 
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• • Defendant's plea of guilty. It is at such time that the Defendant 
has lost the presumption of innocence and his constitutional right 
to a trial by jury. Stevens v. Bistham, 108 Or.App. 588, 816 P.2d 
700 (1990); See also Richardson v. Denend, 59 Wash.App. 92, 795 
P.2d 1192 (1990). 
To state a cause of action for legal malpractice arising from 
negligent representation in a criminal proceeding, the Plaintiff 
must allege his innocence or a colorable claim of innocence of the 
underlying offense, for so long as the determination of his guilt 
of that offense remains undisturbed, no cause of action will lie. 
Carmel v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d 169, 511 N.E.2d 1126 (1987); See also 
Claudio v. Heller, 119 Misc.2d 432, 463 N.Y.2d 155. 
A Defendant's unappealed conviction upon his plea of guilty 
is conclusive and not subject to collateral act in subsequent 
malpractice action against his attorneys. Carmel v. Lunney, 119 
A.D.2d 50, 505 N.Y.2d 735 (1986). 
The elements of the tort of legal malpractice are ( 1) the 
existence of the attorney-client relationship, (2) the existence 
of the duty of care owed the lawyer to his client, (3) the breach 
of violation of that duty, (4) proximate cause, (5) damages. 
Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 650 (1982). 
A claim for legal malpractice requires a showing that the 
client's injury was caused by the lawyer's malpractice. This 
requires a showing that the result would have been different in the 
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underlying action had the claimant's lawyer not been guilty of 
malpractice. Mylar v, Wilkinson, 435 S.2d 437 (Ala. 1983); see 
also, Tasby v. Peek, 396 F.2d.Supp. 952 (D.C. Ark. 1975), and Kaus 
and Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel - Reflections on 
Criminal Malpractice, 21 UCLA Law Review, 1191. 
III. 
THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
There is no dispute that Mr. Lamb entered pleas of guilty to 
various felony charges on March 23, 1990. The transcript of the 
change of plea hearing unequivocally indicates that Mr. Lamb's 
pleas were made knowingly and voluntarily with knowledge of all of 
the various constitutional rights which he was waiving by entering 
such pleas. There is no dispute that the pleas in question were 
accepted by the Court at that time. The date of March 23, 1990 
serves as the starting date for the running of Idaho's two year 
legal malpractice statute of limitations as described in Idaho Code 
§ 5-219(4). 
There is no genuine issue that if Mr. Lamb suffered any damage 
at all, in the event that his representation by Mr. Manweiler was 
in fact negligent, that such damage commenced as of the time the 
District Court accepted his pleas of guilty, i.e. March 23, 1990. 
It was at that time that Mr. Lamb admitted his guilt, waived his 
constitutional right to a trial by jury, waived his presumption of 
innocence and commenced the sentencing investigation and report 
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• process. It is anticipated that Mr. Lamb will urge the Court to 
start the running of the Statute of Limitations as of the date upon 
which he tried and failed to withdraw a portion of his previously 
entered pleas of guilty, i.e. September 4, 1990. (The court should 
note that Plaintiff's Complaint was filed September 4, 1992). The 
Defendant anticipates that Mr. Lamb's position would be that he did 
not know he was damaged by having entered his pleas of guilty until 
it was apparent to him that he was not going to be allowed to 
withdraw those pleas of guilty. However, Mr. Manweiler would call 
the court's attention to a portion of the change of plea hearing 
held before Judge Goff. In such transcript, the following colloquy 
ensued between the Court, counsel and Mr. Lamb: 
The court: 
Defendant: 
The Court: 
Do you realize that if I accept 
your pleas of guilty, they are 
final pleas? I will not allow 
you to withdraw those pleas like 
I did in the other cases. 
Yes, sir. 
Mr. Manweiler, have you had an 
opportunity to conduct discovery 
in this case and file any motion 
you felt appropriate. 
Mr. Manweiler: Yes, your honor. 
The Court: And have you discussed with Mr. 
Lamb and do you feel he 
understands the nature of the 
offense, the consequences of his 
plea of guilty and the waiver 
of his defenses and the waiver 
of his constitutional rights. 
Mr. Manweiler: Yes. 
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• The Court: Do you have any questions of the 
Court, Mr. Lamb? 
Defendant: No, sir. 
obviously, as of March 23, 1990, Judge Goff had advised Mr. 
Lamb in open Court that he would not allow his pleas to 
subsequently be withdrawn. Mr. Lamb cannot now contend that Mr. 
Manweiler was supposedly negligent in his representation by having 
advised that pleas of guilty could be withdrawn when in fact the 
record is clear that he w,as advised by the handling and sentencing 
judge that such pleas could IlQ.t. be withdrawn. Under such 
circumstances it is the March 23, 1990 change of plea hearing at 
which time Mr. Lamb is damaged, if he has been damaged at all and 
hence his cause of action not having been filed until September 4, 
1992 it is forever barred by Idaho Code§ 5-219(4). 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY APPLICATION OF EITHER 
THE DOCTRINES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA 
After his sentence was imposed by Judge Goff, Mr. Lamb 
iniciated an appeal of his conviction in the Idaho Supreme Court 
and initiated a proceeding under Idaho's Uniform Post Conviction 
Relief procedures. Both the appeal and the Post Conviction 
Petitions alleged negligent and/or ineffective assistance of 
counsel by Mr. Manweiler as a basis to either overturn Mr. Lamb's 
conviction or grant him a new trial. Interestingly enough however, 
in a post sentencing "deal II negotiated between Mr. Lamb and his 
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then counsel, Scott Fouser and the Idaho Attorney General's Office, 
Mr. Lamb agreed to dismiss his appeal and dismiss his Uniform Post 
Conviction Relief proceeding in return for a reduction in his 
sentence and ultimate parole to the Federal Correctional System. 
Surely Mr. Lamb should not be able to negotiate for a reduction in 
sentence through the pursuit of appeals and Post Conviction Relief 
proceedings and then, once obtaining such a reduction in sentence, 
seek to recover monetary damages based upon those same claims which 
he has since dismissed in order to obtain such a reduction in 
sentence. 
V. 
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE ACTIONS OF MR. MANWEILER 
WERE NEGLIGENT, THEY WERE NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF THE LOSS SUFFERED AND DAMAGES SOUGHT BY MR. LAMB 
As indicated in the authorities cited above, proximate cause 
is a necessary element of a legal malpractice cause of action just 
as it is in any other tort. Simply put, even had Mr. Manweiler's 
advice to Mr. Lamb concerning the ability to withdraw his guilty 
pleas constituted negligence, this court cannot conclude as a 
matter of law that Mr. Lamb's conviction and incarceration flowed 
as the natural consequence of that advice. 
In a perfect world, Mr. Lamb would have been allowed to 
withdraw his pleas of guilty at which time he would have had the 
privilege to proceed to trial on nine felony counts. The ultimate 
outcome of which could certainly have resulted in a period of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO DISMISS/ 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14 
s/229 
000168
(. I. /.-..• · I· \ 
incarceration in excess of that which he received per his 
negotiated pleas. In the case of Carmel v. Lunney, supra, an 
unhappy criminal Defendant sued his attorneys for alleged 
negligence arising out of their representation of the Defendant in 
certain Grand Jury investigations. The attorneys motion for 
summary judgment was denied, to which the Defendant-lawyers 
perfected an appeal. Upon appeal, the order denying the Motion for 
summary Judgment was reversed and Plaintiff's Complaint dismissed. 
In so ruling, the Court in Carmel held: 
The special term erred in denying the Motions 
for summary Judgment. Plaintiff's conviction 
upon his plea of guilty, the validity of which 
cannot be attacked in this action, precludes 
him as a matter of law from establishing that 
Defendant's alleged malpractice was a proximate 
cause of the damages sustained by Plaintiff. 
This conclusion may be obtained by following 
any one of three distinct but related paths of 
reasoning. As in Claudio v. Heller (cited 
above), the damages sustained by Plaintiff 
flowed directly from his guilt of the criminal 
acts conclusively established by his plea of 
guilty. At best, Defendant's inadequate and 
improper advice at the investigative stage of 
the criminal process was a contributing factor 
in the disclosure of Plaintiff's criminal 
conduct. The criminal conduct remains the sole 
proximate cause of the ensuing investigation, 
indictment and conviction. Had Plaintiff been 
innocent, Defendant's inadequate and improper 
advice would not have resulted in any of the 
damages claimed by Plaintiff for his testimony 
at the investigative hearing would not have 
revealed any wrong doing. Conversely, had 
Plaintiff received adequate and proper advice 
from Defendant's, Plaintiff would still be a 
wrong doer and it cannot· be said that his 
criminal conduct would have gone undetected. 
certainly the law would hot allow a wrong doer 
to recover on such a premise. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO DISMISS/ 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 15 
s/229 
00Gl30 
000169
• • 
Assuming that Defendant's alleged malpractice 
could be viewed as a cause of Plaintiff's 
damages, the guilty plea entered by Plaintiff 
constitutes a superceding cause. In view of 
the dramatic consequences of the guilty plea 
instance, Plaintiff acted knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently when he entered 
his plea. Any casual link between Defendant's 
conduct and Plaintiff's conviction must be 
considered as having been broken by Plaintiff's 
own voluntary act resulting in his conviction. 
In a similar vein, Plaintiff's conviction upon 
his plea of guilty precludes him from 
establishing that he would have been successful 
in the underlying criminal action if 
Defendant's had exercised due care, a necessary 
element of his malpractice cause of action. 
In particular, Plaintiff cannot claim that he 
is innocent for his plea of guilty signals an 
intention not to litigate the question of his 
guilt nor can Plaintiff contend that he would 
not have entered his guilty plea if he had 
received proper advice from Defendant for a 
claim constitutes an impermissible collateral 
attack upon the validity of the Judgment of 
Conviction which is subject to a presumption 
of regularity. (citing other authority). 
Plaintiff could have raised his claim of 
inadequate representation by way of Post 
Conviction motion. 
To summarize, Plaintiff stands convicted upon 
his plea of guilty in a criminal action and the 
damages claimed by Plaintiff flow directly and 
proximately from that conviction. Since the 
Plaintiff cannot collaterally attack the 
validity of his conviction and guilty plea in 
this action, the Complaint must be dismissed 
for failure to establish that any alleged 
malpractice was a proximate cause of 
Plaintiff's damages. 
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This court is urged to adopt the reasoning enunciated by the 
Court in Carmel as a basis for entering summary judgment in his 
favor in this case. 
While this may seem to operate a harsh result from Mr. Lamb's 
perspective, the existence of unique and legitimate considerations 
relative to the defense of individuals charged with criminal 
conduct require such a finding in this case. As the Court noted 
in Carmel v. Lunney, supra: 
To be sure a Defendant in a criminal proceeding 
might be able to prove malpractice by 
establishing that but for the negligent 
representation he would for example have 
invoked his Fifth Amendment rights or succeed 
in suppressing certain evidence conclusive of 
his guilt. But, because he cannot assert his 
innocence, public policy prevents maintenance 
of a malpractice action against his attorney. 
This is so because criminal prosecution involve 
constitutional and procedural safeguards 
designed to maintain the integrity of the 
judicial system and to protect criminal 
Defendants from over reaching governmental 
actions. These aspects of criminal proceedings 
make criminal malpractice cases unique and 
policy considerations require different 
pleading and substantive rules. 
For the reasons cited herein, the Defendant urges the grant 
of his motion. 
Respectfully submitted this~ day of May, 1993. 
WILSON, CARNAHAN & McCOLL 
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CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _i3. day of May, 1993, I mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO DISMISS/MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by 
regular United States mail with the correct postage affixed thereon 
addressed to: 
Kevin Lamb 
P.O. Box 817 
Gilbert, Arizona 85234 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
KEVIN LAMB, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOWARD MANWEILER, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
OPINION RE RENEWED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
This matter comes before the above-entitled court on 
Defendant's Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff is represented by Allen B. Ellis, Esq. of the law 
firm of Ellis, Brown & Sheils. Defendant is represented by Jeffrey 
M. Wilson, Esq. of the law firm of Wilson, Carnahan & McColl. 
This matter arises out of defendant's representation of 
plaintiff in a felony criminal proceeding and the facts have been 
sufficiently set forth in this court's previous opinion regarding 
motion to dismiss or for Summary Judgment. 
The court stated in its previous opinion: 
Counsel for both parties at oral argument conceded that 
the issue of plaintiff Lamb's guilt on the underlying 
I 
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the issue of plaintiff Lamb's guilt on the underlying 
criminal charges in Case No. 89-12380 would be 
dispositive of the legal malpractice action; if plaintiff 
was in fact guilty of the crimes, any alleged negligence 
on the part of Mr. Manweiler would be of no effect and 
therefore proximate cause would not be established. The 
court agrees. 
The difficulty in resolving whether Mr. Lamb was guilty 
or innocent of the underlying crimes lies in the amount 
of indirect evidence in the record, specifically the 
transcript of court proceedings before Judge Goff, and 
the effect Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1993) has 
on the case. The court believes that the Bailey case is 
instructive regarding whether Lamb must prove "by a 
preponderance of the evidence" that he was in fact 
innocent of the felony charges to which he pled guilty. 
Opinion Re Motion to Dismiss or Summary Judgment and Order, pg. 2. 
Plaintiff opposes Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment arguing that there has been no discovery, and that the 
affidavits filed in support of defendant's motion are defective in 
that they disclose privileged matter or otherwise contain 
irrelevancies and other inadmissible evidence. Furthermore, 
plaintiff argues that the pre-sentence report sought to be admitted 
by defendant is inadmissible and may not be unsealed by this court. 
As set forth above, both parties concede that evidence of Mr. 
Lamb's guilt on the underlying criminal charge is dispositive of 
the motion before this court. This court directly referred to the 
Bailey decision in rendering its previous opinion regarding motion 
to dismiss or summary judgment. The Bailey case clearly sets forth 
that where a plaintiff is bringing a legal malpractice suite based 
upon his unlawful conviction, defendant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is innocent of the crime upon 
which his claim of legal malpractice is based. The Bailey court 
further sets forth that "the purpose of criminal and civil trials 
000174
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is to discover the truth, and if the truth is that the defendant 
committed unlawful acts which constitutes the crime or crimes 
charged, he will not be able to collect damages for this discovery 
of the truth." Bailey, 621 A.2d at 113. 
The directive contained in this court's previous opinion 
required that plaintiff bring forth proof that he was innocent of 
the crimes to which he plead guilty. At the November 23, 1993 
hearing regarding defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment, 
this court inquired of Mr. Lamb whether or not any such evidence 
had been forthcoming. Plaintiff responded that no new evidence had 
been given. 
Plaintiff argues in opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion 
For summary Judgment that to defeat defendant's summary judgment 
motion, he only must show that there is a genuine issue as to any 
material fact and to speak of plaintiff's burden on the negligence 
issue is to gravely misperceive the nature of these proceedings. 
See, Second Supplemental Memorandum With Respect to Miscellaneous 
Motions, pg. 2. 
Regarding plaintiff's burden of proof in the motion before 
this court, Rule 56(e) provides in relevant part: 11 •••• [w]hen 
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
the party does not so respond, summary judgment is appropriate, 
3 
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shall be entered against the party." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled on the burden placed on the 
non-moving party in a summary judgment motion. In McCoy v. Lyons, 
120 Idaho 765, 770, 820 P.2d 360, (1991) the Court held that 
"As long as the non-moving party relies on statements that are 
based on personal knowledge and which would be admissible as 
evidence at trial and does more than rest on mere allegations or 
denials in his pleading, it will be considered sufficient to comply 
with Rule 56{e)." 
The sole issue before this court and to which the parties have 
stipulated in whether Mr. Lamb was guilty of the underlying 
criminal charges upon which he bases a claim of legal malpractice; 
if Mr. Lamb is guilty then the prima facie element of proximate 
cause in Mr. Lamb's cause of action cannot be shown and his claim 
is without merit. 
Attached to the Affidavit of Jeffrey M. Wilson is relevant 
portions of the Change of Plea Hearing wherein plaintiff pled 
guilty to the underlying criminal charges before Judge Goff. The 
court has reviewed this document in addition to relevant portions 
of the sentencing hearing. Both strongly point to the fact that 
not only did Mr. Lamb plead guilty to the crimes with which he was 
charged but he also stated on the record that as far as being 
guilty of the crimes, Judge Goff question Mr. Lamb: "You knew what 
you were doing was wrong didn't you?" to which Mr. Lamb responded, 
"Yes." See, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, pg. 48. 
The court finds that plaintiff has failed to come forward and 
4 
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rebut the record setting forth his admissions of guilt. 
Furthermore, plaintiff has not filed a verified complaint nor 
submitted any other evidentiary matter that would establish a 
genuine issue of fact regarding his guilt after having been given 
ample time to do so. 
Judgment is granted. 
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion For Summary 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this §-J day of January, 1994 . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a case for legal malpractice. Appellant, Kevin Lamb 
(Mr. Lamb) alleges that the Defendant/attorney, Howard Manweiler 
(Mr. Manweiler) provided negligent advice during the course of his 
representation of Mr. Lamb in a felony criminal proceeding arising 
in Canyon County, state of Idaho. Although Mr. Lamb's Complaint 
alleges four separate acts of negligence (Clerk's Record, Page 5), 
Mr. Lamb appears to focus on Mr. Manweiler's alleged negligence 
involving advice relative to Mr. Lamb's entry of pleas of guilty 
and his ability to later withdraw the same. 
In response to this Complaint, Mr. Manweiler raises certain 
affirmative defenses (R., p. 7 and B}, among them the lack of 
proximate cause between the negligent acts, if any, of Mr. 
Manweiler and Mr. Lamb's incarceration or damages he seeks by way 
of his Complaint. Further, Mr. Manweiler alleges as an affirmative 
defense the guilty pleas entered by Mr. Lamb in the criminal case. 
In essence, that the guilt of Mr. Lamb is the sole and proximate 
cause of his incarceration at the Idaho State Correctional 
Institution. 
1 
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course of the Proceedings 
Mr. Manweiler generally agrees with Mr. Lamb's description of 
the course of proceedings below as set forth in Appellant's Brief, 
with the following exceptions: 
a. Mr. Lamb submitted no responsive affidavit to Mr. 
Manweiler's first Motion for summary Judgment or in the Alternative 
to Dismiss per I.R.C.P. 12 {b) (6). At such hearing Mr. Lamb, 
through his counsel, agreed with the Court that Mr. Lamb's guilt 
would be dispositive of his legal malpractice claim because such 
guilt would in and of itself be the sole and proximate cause of Mr. 
Lamb's damages. In so agreeing, Mr. Lamb's counsel had the 
following colloquy with the Court: 
The Court: 
Mr. Ellis: 
The Court: 
Mr. Ellis: 
Alright. Mr. Ellis I take it that you 
agree.that if this case or when this case 
ultimately gets to the jury, that one of 
the elements of the Plaintiff's cause of 
action is the innocence of your client. 
That's correct. 
Okay. What if I required you to file a 
more specific Complaint in this matter 
stating . . requiring you to allege 
your client's innocence and sign it under 
Rule 11? 
I would do so your honor. I would also 
offer up his Affidavit. 
{Tr., Summary Judgment Hearing, June 15, 1993, Page 21-
22, Line 11-25). 
b. In support of Mr. Manweiler's initial Motion 
for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative to Dismiss, there was 
submitted the Affidavit of his counsel that included the transcript 
of Mr. Lamb's entry of his change of plea before Third Judicial 
2 
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• 
District Court Judge Dennis Goff. This transcript is referred to 
in Jeffrey M. Wilson's Affidavit (R., p. 39) as Exhibit "A" to Mr. 
Wilson's Affidavit. This transcript of Mr. Lamb's change of plea 
contains the following colloquy between Mr. Lamb and the Court: 
The Court: 
Defendant: 
The Court: 
Defendant: 
The Court: 
And has your attorney, to your 
satisfaction, explained to you the nature 
of the offense? That's what the state 
would have to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt to 12 people before they could find 
you guilty - the waiver of your defenses, 
the waiver of your constitutional rights 
and the consequences of your pleas of 
guilty? Has your attorney explained 
those things to you ••• 
Yes sir. 
to your satisfaction? Do you 
realize that if I accept your pleas of 
guilty they are final pleas? I will not 
allow you to withdraw those pleas like I 
did in the other cases? 
Yes sir. 
Mr. Manweiler, have you had 
opportunity to conduct discovery in 
case and file any motion you 
appropriate? 
an 
this 
felt 
Mr. Manweiler: Yes, your honor. 
The Court: And have you discussed with Mr. Lamb and 
do you feel he understands the nature of 
the offense, the consequences of his plea 
of guilty, the waiver of his defenses and 
the waiver of his constitutional rights? 
Mr. Manweiler: Yes. 
The court: 
Defendant: 
Do you have any questions of the Court 
Mr. Lamb? 
No, sir. 
3 
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P. 9-10 of Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Jeffrey M. Wilson, 
R., p. 39 •. (The entire transcript of Mr. Lamb's change 
of plea consumes some 18 pages and has not been restated 
here in full in the interest of brevity). 
c. Mr. Manweiler's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 
did expand the record from that established at the time of the 
' 
initial filing of his Motion for summary Judgment. Specifically, 
there were submitted the Affidavits of Kenneth Mallea, Rachel Ochoa 
Dodson and Michael Kane. While it is unclear what reliance the 
trial court placed on such Affidavits in granting Mr. Manweiler's 
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Hart's Decision would 
seem to indicate that significant reliance was placed upon the 
transcript of Mr. Lamb's change of plea hearing. specifically, 
Judge Hart stated in his _opinion Re: Renewed Motion for summary 
Judgment (Clerk's Record, Page 116): 
The Court has reviewed this document in 
addition to relative portions of the 
sentencing hearing. Both strongly point to 
the f ac:t that not only dtd _ Mr. Lamb plead 
guilty.to tp.e crim~s with wp.ic:hhe was charged 
but he also st.ated on the i:ecord that ·as f)i:r 
as being gµilty of the crimes, Judge Goff 
questioned Mr. Lamb: "Yo,u knew what you were 
doing was wrong didn't you?" To which Mr. 
Lamb responded: "Yes". The Court finds that 
Plaintiff has failed to come forward and rebut 
the record setting forth his admissions of 
guilt. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not filed a 
verified complaint nor submitted any other 
evidentfa:riy . matter that ·- would establish . a 
genuine issue : bf fact regar'ding his guilt 
after haVirigbeen given ample time to do so. 
(emphasis added) 
(R., p. 116-177). 
4 
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statement of Facts 
Mr. Manweiler generally agrees with the Statement of Facts as 
set forth in Appellant's Brief. However, the chronology of events 
as described by Mr. Lamb should also include the following: 
a. After entry of sentence by District court Judge 
Dennis Goff, Mr. Lamb initiated an appeal and a post-conviction 
relief proceeding. Both such appeal and post-conviction relief 
proceeding were dismissed by Mr. Lamb via a stipulation with the 
State in which the State agreed to reduce Mr. Lamb's sentence to 
actual time served and agreed not to oppose an early parole for Mr. 
Lamb in order to allow him to serve time on a Federal charge in 
another jurisdiction. 
Wilson, R., p. 41). 
(Exhibit "H" to Affidavit of Jeffrey M. 
5 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. IS RESPONDENT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO APPELLANT RULES 4 0 
AND 41? 
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
I 
STANDARD OP REVIEW 
• 
This appeal deals with the review of the Trial Court's Order 
granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in a legal 
malpractice claim. The standards of review of such cases are as 
set forth in Palmer v. Samuelson, 124 Idaho 120, 856 P.2d 1287 
(Ct.App. 1993). Confronted with an appeal of an Order Granting 
summary Judgment in favor of an attorney/defendant in a legal 
malpractice claim, our Court of Appeals outlined the summary 
Judgment standards of review as follows: 
We use the same standards as used by the trial 
court in passing upon a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. That is, all facts and inferences 
from the record will be viewed in favor of the 
non-moving party to determine whether the 
motion should be granted. The burden of 
proving the absence of material facts is upon 
the moving party. However, the adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleadings, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
(emphasis added). In addition, the affidavits 
submitted in support of or against the motion 
shall set forth facts as would be admissible 
in evidence. A mere scintilla of the evidence 
is insufficient to create a material issue of 
fact. Judgment shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, admissions and 
affidavits on file show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact. Citing, East 
Lizard Butte Water Corp. v. Howell, 122 Idaho 
679, 681, 837 P.2d 805, 807 (1992). However, 
Summary Judgment is properly issued when the 
party bearing the burden of proof fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that 
party's case. (emphasis added). citing, Ada 
7 
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County v. Roman catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 
Idaho 425, 427, 849 P.2d 98, 100 (1993). 
THE SUIT WITHIN A SUIT CONCEPT BAS NO 
APPLICATION GIVEN THE RECORD ESTABLISHED IN 
THIS CASE. 
The elements of a legal malpractice action are: 
a. The existence of an attorney-client relationship; 
b. The existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; 
c. Failure to perform that duty; and 
d. The failure to perform that duty must have been a 
proximate cause of the damage to the client. 
Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 650 
{1982). 
The client/plaintiff in such a legal malpractice action has 
the burden of proof on each of these elements. Id. 
In those particular legal malpractice actions involving the 
representation of defendants in the criminal arena, there has been 
established an additional element of such a claim. Specifically, 
decisions in Peeler v. Hughes and Lace, 868 S.W.2d 823 (Tx.App. 
1993); Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1993); Glenn v. Aiken, 
569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Mass. 1991); Carmel v. Lunney, 511 N.E.2d 1126 
(N. Y .App. 1987) require the Plaintiff to allege and prove his 
innocence of the underlying crime charged or some other exoneration 
of the underlying offense in order to establish proximate cause. 
Mr. Lamb appears to concede this additional element stating in 
\J Appellant's Brief: 
I 
I 
'I· 
\,. ' 
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'l 
\1, 
I/ 
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;J 
If guilty, it is this 
defendant/attorney's negligence, 
the proximate cause of 
incarceration and damage. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 8. 
8 
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Mr. Lamb, while conceding his guilt could be the proximate 
cause of his incarceration and damage, still holds to the notion 
that in the context of a legal malpractice action he is entitled to 
prove his innocence by means of a trial within a trial or a suit 
within a suit. Without conceding this point, it is still 
abundantly clear that he is required to allege his innocence in his 
Complaint or to set forth facts tending to establish his innocence 
via an Affidavit or other pleading in response to the Defendant's 
Motion for summary Judgment. 
Mr. Lamb cites no authority authorizing or requiring the suit 
within a suit or trial within a trial referenced in Appellant's 
Brief. Basic Food Industries. Inc. v. Grant, 310 N.W.2d 26 (1981), 
lv. den. 413 Mich. 913 (1982) recognizes the "suit within a suit" 
concept, but severely limits its application. Specifically, the 
Court limited the application of the "suit within a suit" concept 
to the following circumstances: 
(1) Where an attorney's negligence prevents a client 
from bringing a cause of action, for example where 
the attorney allows the statute of limitations to 
run; 
(2) Where the attorney's failure to appear causes 
judgment to be entered against the client; or 
(3) Where the attorney's negligence prevents an appeal 
from being perfected. Id. 
None of these specific situations exist in this case. Mr. 
Lamb was not prevented from having a trial upon the underlying 
9 
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criminal matter. Rather, on the day his pleas of guilty were 
accepted, Mr. Lamb indicated that he understood all of his rights 
in connection with his guilty pleas, that his pleas were entered 
freely and voluntarily, that his pleas were proffered as a result 
of his own free will, and that he knew his pleas could not be 
withdrawn. The Judgment of Conviction entered against Mr. Lamb in 
the criminal case was as a result of his entry of and Court's 
acceptance of his pleas of guilty. The record also establishes 
that Mr. Lamb was not prevented by any conduct of Mr. Manweiler 
from prosecuting an appeal or a post-conviction relief proceeding 
after his Judgment of Conviction and sentence were entered. 
III. 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UPON 
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED OR HAS FAILED TO 
SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT. 
Mr. Lamb apparently believes that his inability to withdraw 
two of his four pleas of guilty was directly and proximately caused 
by some negligent conduct on behalf of Mr. Manweiler. However, 
there is not a scintilla of evidence in this record tending to 
prove this allegation. All that the Court is confronted with is 
Mr. Lamb's unverified assertion that "Defendant negligently advised 
Plaintiff that the guilty pleas should be entered and could be 
withdrawn at a later date." (R., p. 5). Now, in Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Lamb for the very first time indicates that his pleas of guilty 
were somehow "lawyer induced". Appellant's Brief states at Page 8: 
The very gravamen of Plaintiff's claim is that 
Defendant wrongfully induced the guilty plea. 
Whether Plaintiff is, in fact, guilty depends 
10 
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on the evidence of the underlying transaction, 
not the guilty plea. 
If so, what record has Mr. Lamb established that his pleas of 
guilty were somehow "induced" by Mr. Manweiler? Further, what 
record has Mr. Lamb presented tending to establish evidence of his 
innocence of the underlying criminal charges? Mr. Manweiler would 
submit that there is no record of "induced" guilty pleas, or record 
of Mr. Lamb's innocence, let alone a fact in dispute on this issue. 
Having plead guilty to the underlying criminal charges, which 
pleas and subsequent sentence have gone unappealed, Mr. Lamb is 
judicially estopped from now proving his innocence in this 
litigation. See Peeler v. Hughes and Lace, supra; Ahern v. Turner, 
758 S.W.2d 108 {Mo.App. 1988); state ex rel O'Blennis v. Adolf, 691 
S.W.2d 498 (Mo.App. 1985); People v. Serr, 73 Mich.App. 19, 250 
N.W.2d 535 {1976). 
Mr. Lamb attempts to draw distinctions in the Peeler and 
Carmel cases but still concedes that a prerequisite to the 
liability of the defendant/attorney is the Plaintiff's proof of his 
innocence in the underlying criminal charges. Mr. Lamb has not 
made an issue of his innocence in this case despite having had 
ample opportunity and urging of the trial court to do so. 
While it is conceded that Rule 410 of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence (I.R.E. 401) makes "later withdrawn" guilty pleas 
inadmissible, the Rule is silent as to those guilty pleas for which 
withdrawal has been denied by the court. Put another way, a plea 
of guilty, the withdrawal of which has been attempted and denied, 
is still a plea of guilty, is still an admission of guilt, 
11 
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otherwise. Mr. Lamb argues at length that somehow his guilty pleas 
were induced, that those pleas could have been withdrawn but for 
Mr. Manweiler's negligence and if withdrawn he would have 
subsequently been acquitted at trial. Unfortunately, Mr. Lamb has 
chosen to make no record tending to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to these allegations. 
IV. 
RESPONDENT'S AFFIDAVITS, IF RELIED UPON BY THE 
COURT IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, CONTAINED 
ADMISSIBLE NON-HEARSAY EVIDENCE. 
Mr. Lamb has questioned the admissibility of the Presentence 
Investigation Report and subsequent Affidavits in support of Mr. 
Manweiler's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. It is not clear 
from Judge Hart's decision whether he relied on any of these items 
of evidence in entering his Opinion Re: Renewed Motion for summary 
Judgment. There is no order granting Mr. Manweiler's Motion for 
Judicial Notice of the Presentence Investigation Report. Judge 
Hart's decision would seem to be based solely upon the transcript 
of the pleas of guilty entered by Mr. Lamb and the Plaintiff's 
"failure to come forward and rebut the record setting forth his 
admissions of guilt. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not filed a 
verified Complaint nor submitted any other evidentiary matter that 
would establish a genuine issue of fact regarding his guilt after 
having been given ample time to do so." (R., p. 116-117). 
12 
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Mr. Lamb apparently believes that because of the asserted 
deficiencies in the summary Judgment Affidavits that he was not 
required to respond by Affidavit or otherwise. It should be noted 
that Mr. Mallea's Affidavit stated "Mr. Lamb, in that meeting, 
fully acknowledged his debts to Mr. Pershall." It is clear that 
Mr. Pershall referred to in this statement is the Mr. Pershall that 
was the victim of the criminal charges to which Mr. Lamb plead 
guilty. such a statement does not constitute hearsay and is fully 
admissible and could have easily been responded to by Mr. Lamb by 
way of an Affidavit denying the same or explaining it away. The 
Affidavit of Rachel Ochoa Dodson, likewise contains non-hearsay 
statements of Mr. Lamb tending to further establish his guilt of 
the underlying criminal charges. While the same may have been made 
to the affiant in the context of her preparation of the Presentence 
Investigation Report, there is no Presentence Investigator-Criminal 
Defendant privilege pertaining to such communications under either 
I.R.E. -401 or Rule 32 of the Idaho Criminal Rules . 
v . 
JUDGE HART'S COMMENTS CONCERNING THE 
DESIRABILITY OF ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY DO NOT 
CONSTITUTE THE "LAW OF THE CASE" • 
Judge Hart's observation that "upon completion of further 
discovery, the issue of Plaintiff's guilt or innocence may be 
resolved pursuant to a motion or summary judgment" (R., p. 59) does 
not constitute the law of the case. Mr. Manweiler chose not to 
depose Mr. Lamb. Obviously had Mr. Lamb filed an Affidavit or 
other pleadings tending to establish a genuine issue of material 
13 
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additional discovery would have been prudent under such 
circumstances. 
Judge Hart did not order additional discovery nor did he 
specifically state what type of discovery should be pursued or by 
whom. Judge Hart's off-hand comments during the course of the 
hearing upon Mr. Manweiler's initial Motion for summary Judgment 
cannot be interpreted as the law of the case requiring further 
discovery before the Court could rule upon the pending Motion for 
summary Judgment. 
Mr. Lamb correctly notes that the term "law of the case" 
commonly designates the principal that once an Appellate Court has 
passed upon a legal question and remanded the cause to the court 
below for further proceedings, the legal question determined by the 
Appellant Court will not be differently determined in a subsequent 
appeal in the same case. This doctrine has no application to this 
case. Mr. Lamb's analogy is without foundation. Mr. Lamb had the 
burden to develop facts tending to establish a prima facie case of 
legal malpractice in the criminal defense arena. The Court's dicta 
should not be construed as indicting that summary judgment in favor 
of Mr. Manweiler would not be granted until or unless additional 
discovery took place. 
Rule 56(b) of the Idaho Rules of civil Procedure specifically 
provides that a "Defendant may at any time move for summary 
judgment provided the motion is filed at least 60 days. before the 
trial date." (emphasis added). At stated earlier in this Reply 
14 
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Brief, one of the elements of a legal malpractice claim arising 
from representation in a criminal proceeding is pleading and proof 
of the Plaintiff's innocence in the underlying criminal charge. Mr. 
Lamb's Complaint fails to allege his innocence of the underlying 
criminal charges nor does he allege that his current status as a 
convicted felon is the result of Mr. Manweiler's alleged 
negligence. 
While Mr. Lamb's Complaint alleges several negligent acts (see 
Paragraph 8 of Mr. Lamb's Complaint, R., p. 5), such a list of 
grievances, in and of themselves, however, are not sufficient to 
set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted by the trial 
court. See Schlumm v. Terrence J. O'Hagan, P.C., 433 N.W.2d 839, 
173 Mich.App. 345 (1988); Hogan v. Peters, 353 S.E. 2d 601, 181 
Ga.App. 670 (1987); Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So.2d 1237 (Ala. 1983). 
In Mylar, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that a legal malpractice 
action brought by plaintiff was properly dismissed for failure to 
state a claim where plaintiff's claim was devoid of any averment 
that, apart from the attorney's negligence, plaintiff would have 
obtained a more favorable result. 
Likewise, in Schlumm, supra, the court ruled that summary 
! judgment should have been granted in favor of defendant upon the 
ground that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. Schlumm, at 847. Plaintiff failed to plead in his 
legal malpractice action that, but for his attorney's negligence, 
he would have received a lighter sentence. Id. Absent such 
allegations in Mr. Lamb's Complaint, granting Mr. Manweiler's 
15 
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motion was appropriate by reason of Mr. Lamb's having failed to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
It should be noted that Mr. Manweiler's initial motion was 
framed in the alternative as either a Motion to Dismiss per 
I.R.C.P. 12{b) (6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted or in the alternative, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56, for 
summary judgment there being no genuine issue as to any material 
fact thus entitling Mr. Manweiler to judgment as a matter of law. 
This motion was subsequently renewed by way of Mr. Manweiler's 
motion of October 22, 1993 (R., p. 61). Whether the Court's final 
opinion as contained in R., p. 13, was one granting Plaintiff's 
Motion to Dismiss or Motion for Summary Judgment is immaterial as 
the standard for reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim per Rule 12(b) (6) is the same standard 
as that for entry of an order granting summary judgment per Rule 
56. Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc., 123 
Idaho 650, 851 P.2d 946 {1993). 
VI. 
MR. MANWEILER IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES FOR RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL. 
This Court has authority to award Respondent's attorneys fees 
pursuant to Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellant Rules. The 
record established in this case applying demonstrates that Mr. 
Lamb's action was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, 
and without foundation. Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 
Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078 {1979). The apparent subjective sincerity 
16 
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with which Mr. Lamb or his counsel pursued this appeal is 
irrelevant for purposes of determining whether fees should be 
awarded to Mr. Manweiler. NBC Leasing Co. v. R & T Farms. Inc., 
114 Idaho 141, 754 P.2d 454 (Ct. App. 1988). The law in this case 
is clear and settled. Specifically that in an action for legal 
malpractice arising out of representation in a criminal case, the 
Plaintiff must allege and prove his innocence of the underlying 
charges. Mr. Lamb has made no substantial showing that the 
District Court misapplied this law. If anything, he has succeeded 
in establishing that he failed to do what was specifically 
suggested of him to do namely, amend his Complaint or respond with 
an appropriate Affidavit or other pleading responding to Mr. 
Manweiler's renewed motion. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court does not have to consider the state of the evidence 
in the two separate scenarios of a hypothetically non-negligent 
defendant as depicted in Appellant's Brief. It must consider the 
current state of the evidence. Namely, Mr. Lamb plead guilty and 
his subsequent attempt to withdraw such plea was unsuccessful. He 
now alleges that his inability to withdraw such plea of guilty was 
the result of the negligence or inducement of Mr. Manweiler. In 
such a scenario, Mr. Lamb still has the burden of alleging and 
proving that he is innocent of the underlying criminal charges even 
if he was unsuccessful in having those guilty pleas withdrawn. His 
inability to withdraw such guilty pleas does not automatically 
establish Mr. Manweiler's negligence and more importantly does not 
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negate their impact on the record established thus far in this 
case. 
There is ample evidence offered in support of Mr. Manweiler's 
motion consisting of admissible competent evidence, namely the 
transcript of Mr. Lamb's plea of guilty and portions of those 
Affidavits filed in support of his motion which further indicate 
admission of his guilt. Mr. Lamb was required to allege his 
innocence as an element of his legal malpractice claim against Mr. 
Manweiler and was required to respond by Affidavit or otherwise to 
Mr. Manweiler's Motion for Summary Judgment, having failed to do so 
can only result in this Court affirming the District Court's order 
granting Mr. Manweiler's motion. .J-b. 
Respectfully submitted this~ day of November, 1994. 
WILSON, CARNAHAN & McCOLL 
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Court of Appeals 
Case No. 21266 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
COMES NOW the Respondent, Howard Manweiler, and by and through 
his counsel of record, Jeffrey M. Wilson of the firm of Wilson, 
Carnahan & McColl, and pursuant to I.A.R. 118, and petitions the 
Supreme Court for review of that certain Decision rendered by the 
Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho in Case No. 21266 dated 
August 1, 1995, and that certain order denying Petition for 
Rehearing entered by the Court of Appeals dated September 5, 1995. 
This Motion is made upon the following grounds: 
1. The Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
substance not heretofore determined by the Supreme Court. 
The Respondent filed his Petition for Rehearing, which 
Petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on September 5, 1995. 
This Petition for Review is based upon the following grounds: 
PETITION FOR REVIEW - l 
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a. The record established by the Respondent 
unequivocally established that the Appellant was not factually 
innocent of the -underlying crimes for which he was convicted. 
b. The Court of Appeals failed to adequately consider 
Appellant's statements given at the time of his guilty pleas and 
sentencing which also unequivocally established a lack of factual 
innocence of the Appellant of the underlying crimes for which he 
stood charged: 
c. The Court of Appeals failed to accurately interpret 
the content and import of the Affidavits of Appellant set forth in 
footnote 3 of the Court of Appeals Decision. Specifically, while 
such Affidavits may tend to establish the existence of a legal 
defense to the underlying charges upon which a jury could render a 
verdict of not guilty, the same do not tend to establish that the 
Appellant was factually innocent of the underlying charges. 
This Petition for Review is further supported by that certain 
Memorandum in Support filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this ~day of September, 1995. 
WILSON, CARNAHAN & McCOLL 
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KEVIN LAMB, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
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Court of Appeals 
Case No. 21.266 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a legal malpractice action against the defendant, 
Howard Manweiler ("Manweiler"} , for his alleged negligence in 
representing the plaintiff, Kevin Lamb ("Lamb"} in a criminal 
proceeding. Manweiler filed a motion for summary judgment in the 
trial court, which was granted. Lamb appeals that decision. 
In 1989, Lamb was charged with a number of felonies related to 
his operations in the cattle industry. Lamb retained Manweiler to 
represent him on the charges. As a result of plea negotiations, 
and upon Manweiler' s advice, Lamb .pleaded guilty t·o four felony 
charges and the remaining counts were dismissed. After entry of 
the guilty pleas but prior to sentencing, Manweiler discovered 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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evidence that tended to prove Lamb's innocence on two of the four 
charges to which Lamb had pleaded guilty. Thereafter, Manweiler 
filed a motion·to withdraw the guilty pleas on those two charges on 
behalf of Lamb. The district court granted the motion and the 
State did not pursue those charges further. 
With respect to the two remaining counts for grand theft UD:der 
Idaho Code§§ 18-2403(1) and 18-2407(1), Lamb sought to withdraw 
his guilty pleas to those counts as well. Manweiler determined 
that he could not ethically present a motion to withdraw those 
guilty pleas. Lamb therefore retained another attorney to file the 
motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. After a full hearing on the 
motion, the district court denied the motions. Lamb was ultimately 
convicted upon a plea of guilty of the two remaining charges. He 
filed an application for post conviction relief pursuant to Idaho 
Code§§ 19-4901 et seq., seeking to have the convictions set aside. 
Lamb voluntarily dismissed the post conviction relief action, 
however, upon agreement with the State. 
In September 1992, Lamb filed the present legal malpractice 
action against Manweiler alleging professional malpractice in 
Manweiler's representation of Lamb in the criminal matters. Lamb 
contended that Manweiler negligently: (1) advised Lamb that the 
guilty pleas should be entered and could be withdrawn at a later 
date; (2) advise.d Lamb that the jury would find him guilty of all 
or some of the charges against him; (3) withdrew as Lamb's counsel 
immediately before the hearing on Lamb's motion to withdraw his 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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guilty pleas, thereby prejudicing Lamb's chances of having his 
change of plea accepted; and (4) failed to adequately investigate 
the criminal charges and to determine that the charges were not 
meritorious. Lamb alleged in his complaint that his incarceration 
. ' 
resulted from these negligent acts. 
innocence of the charges. 
Lamb did not allege his 
Manweiler moved for summary judgment and in the alternative 
moved for dismissal of Lamb's complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 
12(b) (6). The trial court initially denied the motion for summary 
judgment upon a determination that the evidence submitted to the 
court was insufficient to determine whether Manweiler was entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. The court did not separately 
determine Manweiler' s motion to dismiss. Four months later, 
Manweiler renewed his motion for summary judgment on grounds that 
Lamb had the burden of proving that he was factually innocent of 
the charges and that Lamb was unable as a matter of law to do so. 
Manweiler argued that by his guilty plea and statements made by 
Lamb at his sentencing hearing, Lamb admitted that he was guilty of 
the underlying crimes~ Lamb did not counter such admission in the 
trial court with any affidavit or evidence asserting his innocence. 
The trial court granted Manweiler' s renewed motion for summary 
judgment. The court held that because Lamb offered no evidence to 
rebut or disavow his prior admissions of guilt so as to create a 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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genuine issue of fact regarding his guilt, Manweiler was entitled 
to summary judgment on the claim. 
Lamb appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Manweiler. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial 
\ 
court's grant of summary judgment. The Court held that Lamb must 
establish his actual innocence as an element of his malpractice 
claim. Despite Lamb's conviction upon guilty pleas and his failure 
to obtain post conviction relief, this Court held that evidence of 
statements made by Lamb during his post conviction relief action 
could be considered in creating a factual issue for purposes of 
denying summary judgment. Manweiler now seeks review of the Court 
of Appeal's reversal of summary judgment and denial of Petition for 
Rehearing on grounds that Lamb has failed to allege or present 
evidence of his factual innocence--a required element of his cause 
of action- -and thus-, Manweiler is entitled to summary judgment as· 
a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
The issue on this Petition for Review is whether Lamb has 
presented evidence of his actual innocence sufficient to maintain 
his legal malpractice action against Manweiler. It is undisputed 
that Lamb must establish his factual innocence as an element of his 
malpractice claim. In this Court's prior opinion vacating the 
district court's grant of summary judgment, it was held that Lamb 
must establish his actual innocence as an element of his 
malpractice claim (Court of Appeals Opinion at 5). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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court similarly held that actual innocence of the client is a 
required element in a legal malpractice action arising out of 
representation in a criminal case (Id.). Lamb has conceded this 
requirement throughout these proceedings. 
' 
The sole issue for 
consideration, therefore, is whether Lamb has presented sufficient 
facts to create a genuine issue of material fact as to his 
innocence of the underlying charges. 
As acknowledged in this Court's prior opinion, the evidence 
presented in this case establishes that Lamb pleaded guilty to two 
counts of grand theft, Idaho Code§§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1) (Id. at 
2). Lamb filed an application for post-conviction relief pursuant 
to Idaho Code§§ 19-4901 et seq., seeking to have the convictions 
set aside (Id.). Lamb voluntarily dismissed the application, 
however, upon stipulation with the State (Id.). Despite Lamb's 
conviction and his failure to obtain post conviction relief, this 
Court held that evidence of statements made by Lamb during his post 
conviction relief action could be considered i~ creating a factual 
issue for purposes of denying summary judgment. Specifically, this 
Court held that 
Lamb's affidavits from his post-conviction proceeding 
controverted the evidence of his guilt upon which 
Manweiler' s summary judgment motion was based and thereby 
framed a factual issue. · 
(Id. at 9.) This Court so held despite the fact, as the Court 
points out, that Lamb did not assert such statements in opposition 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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to summary judgment before the district court or the appeals court 
(Id. ) . 
The Court's admission of Lamb's statements during the 
post-conviction proceedings and its reversal of summary judgment in 
' 
view of Lamb's failure to obtain post conviction relief is against 
authority which holds that a criminal defendant who pleads guilty 
to the underlying criminal charges must successfully obtain 
postconviction relief before he can even file a legal malpractice 
action against his defense attorney. Carmel v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d 
169, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (1987); Shaw V. State, 816 P.2d 1358 
(Alaska 1991); Bailey v. Tucker, 533 Pa. 237, 621 A.2d 108 (1993); 
Weiner v. Mitchell. Silverberg & Knupp, 114 Cal. App. 3d 39, 170 
Cal. Rptr. 533 (1980). 
In Carmel v. Lunney, supra, the court set forth the reasoning 
why a criminal defendant who pleads guilty must obtain post 
conviction relief before bringing a malpractice action against his 
defense attorney: 
To state a cause of action for legal malpractice 
arising from negligent representation in a criminal 
proceeding, plaintiff must allege his innocence or a 
colorable claim of innocence of the underlying offense. 
. . for so long as the determination of his guilt of that 
offense remains undisturbed, no cause of action will lie. 
Here, because plaintiff's. conviction by plea of a 
misdemeanor violation of the Martin Act has not been 
successfully challenged, he can neither assert, nor 
establish, his innocence. He has thus failed to state a 
cause of action, and his claim was properly dismissed by 
the Appellate Division [.] 
To be sure, a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding might be able to prove malpractice by 
establishing that but for the negligent representation he 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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would, for example, have invoked his 5th Amendment 
rights, or succedded in suppressing certain evidence 
conclusive of his guilt. But, because he cannot assert 
his innocence, public policy prevents maintenance of a 
malpractice action against his attorney. This is so 
because criminal prosecutions involve constitutional and 
procedural safeguards designed to maintaln the integrity 
of the judicial system and to protect criminal defendants 
from overreaching governmental actions. These aspects of 
criminal proceedings make criminal malpractice cases 
unique, and policy considerations require different 
pleading and substantive rules[.] 
511 N.E.2d at 1128 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, in Shaw v. State, supra, 816 P.2d at 1360, the 
Alaska Supreme Court held that a convicted criminal defendant must 
obtain postconviction relief before pursuing an action for legal 
malpractice against his defense attorney. The court cited the 
public policy reasons set forth in Carmel v. Lunney, supra. 
Other jurisdictions have held that a criminal defendant who 
pleads guilty to underlying criminal charges must obtain 
postconv~ction relief before pursuing an action for legal 
malpractice against his defense attorney on grounds of collateral 
estoppel. In State ex rel. O'Blennis v. Adolf, 691 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 
Ct. _ App. 1985), for example, the court held that a criminal 
defendant's guilty plea operated to preclude him from bringing a 
legal malpractice action against the public defender who 
represented him on the underlying criminal charges. The conviction 
was affirmed on appeal and the defendant did not seek or obtain 
postconviction relief. 
In the criminal proceedings, the defendant, pleaded guilty to 
charges of assault with intent to kill. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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proceedings, the trial court conducted an extensive questioning of 
the Defendant. In response to a question by the court if the 
Defendant was pleading guilty to the court because he was guilty of 
the crime, the Defendant stated: "To be truthful with the Court 
'· 
and the people that are present, yes. I must say that. 11 The 
prosecutor then gave a summary of the evidence and in response to 
questioning, the Defendant stated that the prosecutor's summary was 
substantially true and correct. The trial court found a factual 
basis for the plea, accepted the plea, and found the Defendant 
guilty.beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In the subsequent malpractice action, the defendant attorney 
moved for summary judgment on grounds that the Plaintiff could not 
establish his innocence based on his guilty plea to the charges. 
The Plaintiff responded by filing an affidavit denying that he 
committed the offense. The trial court denied the motion for 
summary judgment, but the court of appeals reversed. The appeals 
court held that the Plaintiff's guilty plea barred his claim of 
innocence as a matter of law. The court first noted that the 
Defendant's factual innocence was an indispensable element of his 
cause of action. Id. at 503. The court then held that the 
Defendant was parred from asserting his innocence in the 
malpractice action because his guilt had been conclusively 
established by his guilty plea on grounds of collateral estoppel. 
The court stated: 
[I] 11vocation of collateral estoppel precludes 
[Poole] from denying his guilt of the assault charge. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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That plea decided the same issue of fact present in his 
malpractice case; it resulted in a judgment on the 
merits; Poole is a party to both cases; he had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate his guilt or innocence. His 
subjective reasons for entering the plea do not form a 
basis for· a collateral attack on the judgment of 
conviction which his malpractice suit is. 
' Id. Thus, the court granted summary judgment in f aver of the 
defendant attorney. See also Bailey v. Tucker, supra, 621 A.2d at 
115 (holding that in order to state a claim for malpractice, a 
criminal defendant must pursue post-trial remedies and obtain 
relief which was dependent upon attorney error); Weiner v. 
Mitchell, Silverberg & Knupp, supra (valid federal conviction 
cannot be relitigated in malpractice action and must be accepted as 
the proximate cause of plaintiff's conviction); Peeler v. Hughes & 
Luce, 868 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (criminal defendant who 
did not appeal her conviction or attempt to withdraw her guilty 
plea was estopped from asserting her innocence in subsequent 
malpractice action). 
In the instant case, the evidence presented on Manweiler's 
motion for summary judgment established that Lamb pleaded guilty to 
two counts of grand theft (Court of Appeals Opinion at 2). The 
transcript of the guilty plea proceedings established that Lamb 
made his guilty pleas to the charges knowingly and voluntarily. 
Lamb filed a motion for withdrawal of the guilty pleas to the two 
grand theft charges under the representation of another attorney, 
but such motion was denied by the trial court (Id.). Lamb then 
filed an application for post conviction relief seeking to have the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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convictions set aside (Id.). Lamb voluntarily dismissed the 
application upon agreement with the State (Id.) in order to plead 
guilty to federal felonies in Texas. 
Lamb did not allege his innocence in his Complaint and Lamb 
\ 
did not offer any evidence to the trial court to rebut or disavow 
his admissions of guilt made through his guilty pleas (Id. at 3). 
The only allegations whatsoever of Lamb's innocence are contained 
in affidavits submitted in the post conviction relief action in 
which Lamb stated facts which he averred demonstrated that he had 
a legal defense (emphasis added) to the theft charges. (Id. at 9.) 
Lamb voluntarily dismissed the post conviction relief action, 
however, and did not assert such statements in opposition to 
summary judgment before the district court or on appeal to this 
Court (Id.). Thus, there was no evidence before the trial court, 
and there is no evidence before this Court, that Lamb ever asserted 
his innocence to the charges. This Court's consideration of Lamb's 
statements at the post conviction relief proceedings was in error, 
because Lamb had the opportunity to pursue those proceedings to 
determine whether his pleas were properly made, but is now es topped 
to relitigate his contentions in those proceedings. Additionally, 
it would be against public policy to permit Lamb to recover in this 
action when he has wholly failed to allege or to present evidence 
of his factual innocence. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW - 10 
000214
~ ;.i \,-I ..• ' 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above argument and authority, defendant Howard 
Manweiler respectfully requests this Court to review the above case 
and to reinstate the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of defendant Manweiler. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of September, 1995. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
KEVIN LAMB, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
HOWARD MANWEILER, 
Defe11dant/Respondent. 
) Case No. 22549 
) 
) 
) 
) QRIEF IN RESPONSE TO 
) PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Decision of the Court of Appeals: Accepting plaintiffs concession, the Court of Appeals 
concluded (majority decision) that a condition precedent to plaintiffs claim for malpractice was his 
innocence. Rejecting plaintiffs argument that defendant-induced guilty pleas are inadmissible, the 
Court rilled that plaintiff's guilty pleas were evidence of his guilt ( slip op, p. 10). However, the court 
held that plaintiffs "affidavits from his post-conviction proceeding controverted the evidence of his 
guilt", creating a genuine issue of material fact and rendering summary judgment inappropriate (slip 
op, p. 11). 
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With respect to defendant's argument that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a cause of 
action (Rule 12(b)(6)), the Court of Appeals held that because "summary judgment was 
impermissible, it also would have been erroneous for the district court to have granted Manweiler' s 
motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)" (slip op, p.12), without leave to amend (footnote 
5, p. 12). 
Basis of petition for review: Although the Petition for Review asserts that the record 
''unequivocally establishes that plaintiff was not factually innocent", the memorandum focuses on 
the absence of post-conviction relief. Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals' decision is against 
the law because plaintiff, prior to initiating his malpractice suit, must "successfully obtain post-
conviction relief ... " (Respondent's memorandum, p. 6). 
That is, defendant seeks a rule that post-conviction relief is a condition precedent to filing 
a malpractice claim arising from criminal advocacy. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
RESPECTING PLAINTIFF'S GUILT/INNOCENCE 
The Court of Appeals ruled: 
"Evidence of Lamb's admissions made in the criminal proceeding, ifuncontroverted 
by other evidence, would have been sufficient proof of Lamb's guilt to the underlying 
crimes to entitle Manweiler to summary judgment. However, other evidence before 
the district court created a factual issue as to Lamb's guilt or innocence and made 
summary judgment impermissible." 
Slip op., p. 9. 
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The "other evidence" consisted of affidavits of plaintiff submitted post-conviction, setting 
forth his innocence and reasons for pleading guilty. The defendant, in his petition for review alleges 
that the "court of appeals fails to accurately interpret the content and import of the affidavits of 
appellant set forth in footnote 3 ... " Further, defendant argued: 
"Specifically, while such affidavits may tend to establish the existence of a legal 
defense to the underlying charges upon which a jury could render a verdict of not 
guilty, the same do not tend to establish that the appellant was factually innocent of 
the underlying charges." 
Petition for Review, p. 2. 
First, defendant is apparently conceding that the affidavits set forth facts based upon which 
a jury could "render a verdict of not guilty". Obviously, this is tantamount to saying there is a 
genuine issue of material fact. Secondly, defendant argues that the factual affidavits "do not tend 
to establish" plaintiff's innocence. The challenge of the non-moving party in a summary judgment 
motion is not to "establish" any fact of his case but rather to demonstrate the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact. The affidavit set forth at footnote 3 of the Appellate Opinion creates this 
factual issue. If the record contains conflicting inferences and reasonable minds might reach 
different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 4 34, 
807 P.2d 1272 (1991). In evaluating the record on appeal from summary judgment, the facts and the 
inferences to be drawn are to be construed in a light favorable to the plaintiff here as the non-moving 
party. Bunker Hill Co., v. United Steel Workers, 107 Idaho 155, 686 P.2d 835 (1984). 
In his memorandum in support of petition for review, defendant does not set forth an analysis 
of how the Court of Appeals failed to "accurately interpret the content and import of the affidavits 
of appellant." In support of this charge, defendant merely states that ''there was no evidence before 
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF -3 
000219
the trial court and there is no evidence before this court that Lamb ever asserted his innocence to the 
charges." Memorandum in Support of Petition p. 10. This is simply untrue as the affidavit 
referenced in footnote 3 of the Appellate Opinion reflects. Additionally, in his memorandum, 
defendant makes the bare assertion that plaintiff "is now estopped to re litigate contentions in those 
proceedings" (Memorandum in support, p. 10). Defendant fails to identify the theory of estoppel 
on which he relies. 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS NOT 
INDISPENSABLE TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
A large portion of defendant's memorandum is devoted to the assertion that post-conviction 
relief is indispensable to civil damages. 
In order to understand how post-conviction relief pertains to malpractice, if at all, it is useful 
to review the nature of post-conviction relief, what issues it resolves, and where it takes a criminal 
defendant procedurally. For the purpose of this discussion, the term "post-conviction relief' will 
refer to such relief grounded upon competency of counsel. In its simplest terms, post-conviction 
relief addresses issues of attorney error, the effect of this error on the outcome of the proceedings 
(prejudice), and whether there has been a fundamental unfairness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 696 (1984). 
Post-conviction relief does not resolve the guilt or innocence of the defendant; rather if relief 
is granted, the matter is reset for trial. Therefore, the granting of such relief is without resolution of 
the defendant's innocence, which the Appellate Court held to be a factual issue in this malpractice 
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action. Even with the awarding of post-conviction relief, the malpractice action must be held in 
abeyance pending resolution of plaintiffs guilt/innocence. 
With these observations noted, we can now focus on defendant's assertion that post-
conviction relief is indispensable to plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice. Case law seems to deal 
with three separate factual scenarios providing the backdrop to the criminal malpractice claim: (1) 
conviction following trial; (2) entry of a guilty plea with the plaintiff conceding his guilt in the civil 
action; and (3) entry of a guilty plea with the plaintiffs guilt an issue. 
(1) Conviction following trial: Here the collateral estoppel effect of the trial will preclude 
a viable malpractice claim, i.e., plaintiffs adjudicated guilt will cause his claim to fail. Anderson 
v.CityofPocatello, 112Idaho 176,731 P.2d 171 (1987). Ifpost-convictionreliefisobtained,itwill 
neutralize the collateral estoppel effect. In this setting, post-conviction relief is indispensable to a 
malpractice claim. But, in our case, there is no collateral estoppel effect which needs to be 
dissipated. 
As noted in Anderson v. City of Pocatello supra: 
112 Idaho 182. 
"The question of whether a conviction can act as collateral estoppel 
in a subsequent civil action is distinct from and unaffected by the 
question whether a guilty plea or conviction is admissible." ( emphasis 
in original) 
The distinguishing criteria are whether there was "fair opportunity" to litigate and whether 
the issue was "actually" litigated. Anderson, 112 Idaho 183. If these elements exist, collateral 
estoppel may be invoked. Bargained-for guilty pleas fall short of this model, particularly with the 
allegation that defendant Manweiler's advice induced the guilty plea, i.e., diminished opportunity. 
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Where a party settles a lawsuit, such result has no collateral estoppel effect on subsequent 
litigation. This factual situation was dealt with by the Court of Appeals in Blaine County v. Bryson, 
109 Idaho 123, 705 P.2d 1078 (App. 1985): 
" ... the fact remains that the question of a public road was not "actually litigated" 
in that lawsuit. Rather, the suit was concluded with a negotiated settlement and the 
eventual judgment was entered with the consent of both parties. Comment e to 
section 27 of the Restatement declares: 
In the case of a judgment entered by a confession, consent, or default, 
none of the issues is actually litigated. Therefore, the rule of this 
Section does not apply with respect to any issue in a subsequent 
action. 
Accordingly, we hold that the county is not precluded from asserting the existence 
of a public road across Parker's property." 
109 Idaho 126. 
Likewise, plaintiffs guilty plea, although arguably evidence of his guilt, has no collateral 
estoppel effect because the allegations of criminal wrongdoing were never litigated. 
Defendant cites examples of trial to conviction requiring post-conviction relief to neutralize 
collateral estoppel: Carmel v. Lunney, 70 N.Y.2d 169, 511 N.E.2d 1126, (1987); Weiner v. 
Mitchell, Silverberg & Knupp, 114 Cal. App.3d 39, 170 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1980). (Defendant's 
Memorandum p. 6) 
(2) Entry of guilty plea with no pretense of innocence: In this scenario, a plaintiff alleges 
that, although guilt is conceded, the attorney's negligence prevented the plaintiff from taking 
advantage of a technicality or the alleged negligence forced a guilty plea. E.g. Carmel v. Lunney, 
70N.Y.2d 169,511 N.E.2d 1126 (1987) and Peelerv. Huiwes and Lace, 868 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. App. 
1993). Case authority is almost unanimous that plaintiff's guilt renders the alleged negligence non-
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actionable. Although the guilty plea has no collateral estoppel effect on the professional negligence 
action, the plaintiffs concession as to his/her guilt renders the claim non-viable. Presumably, this 
concession would also make post-conviction relief inappropriate in view of the lack of prejudice ( or 
proximate causation). That is, for public policy reasons, plaintiffs admitted guilt, not the attorney's 
negligence, is considered the proximate cause of the conviction. 
(3) The entry of guilty plea with no concession of guilt (the case at bench): It is debatable 
whether a guilty plea made upon recommendation of an attorney can constitute evidence of guilt (in 
a malpractice action), but it must be conceded that guilty pleas may be entered to avoid the risk of 
a harsh sentence or the risk the jury will not buy the defendant's case, not because of perceived guilt. 
We have the admonition of the U.S. Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alvord, 400 U.S. 25 
(1970): 
"They [courts] have argued that, since "guilt, or the degree of guilt, is at times 
uncertain and illusive", "[a]n accused, though believing in or entertaining doubts 
respecting his innocence, might reasonably conclude a jury would be convinced of 
his guilt and that he would fare better in a sentence by pleading guilty ... McCoy v. 
U.S., 124 U.S. App. D.C. 177,179,363 F.2d 306,308 (1966)." 
400 U.S. 33. 
(4) Irrelevance of post-conviction relief: In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals held that 
plaintiffs guilty plea laid alongside his post-conviction affidavits created a question of fact 
respecting his guilt, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. Had plaintiff sought and obtained 
post-conviction relief, the guilty plea would have been withdrawn and the matter reset for trial. 
Defendant argues that plaintiff was required to obtain this relief "before bringing a malpractice 
action against his attorney" (Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review, p. 6). As noted above, 
post-conviction relief does not resolve the guilt or innocence of plaintiff and, therefore, would have 
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no relevance to this proceeding; and unlike a conviction following trial, a guilty plea produces no 
collateral estoppel effect which needs to be neutralized by post-conviction relief. 
( 5) Excessive litigation if post-conviction relief is mandated: In addition to the constitutional 
pitfalls in requiring post-conviction relief (see infra), there are judicial inefficiencies inherent in 
conditioning a malpractice action on obtaining this relief. 
Where a criminal defendant has entered a plea and served his time, under defendant's rule 
he would be required to initiate post-conviction relief in order to bring a malpractice action. This 
would result in litigation which otherwise may not be filed. If a post-conviction proceeding is 
brought and is unsuccessful, because of its collateral estoppel effect there will be no civil damage 
trial. But because of having to file for post-conviction relief in the first instance, nothing is saved. 
However, if post-conviction relief is granted, there will still have to be full-blown litigation 
respecting attorney negligence and proximate causation. This is so because as to defendant attorney 
there is no collateral estoppel effect, the attorney not being a party to the post-conviction relief 
proceedings. See Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 115 (Pa. 1993). 
(6) Defendant's authorities are not on point: Carmel v. Lunney and Peeler v. Hughes, supra, 
(defendant's memorandum pp. 6-10) are distinguishable, as noted, because plaintiffs in those cases 
were not asserting their innocence. In Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1993) (defendant's 
memorandum p. 6), the underlying criminal matter was tried to a verdict; accordingly, absent post-
conviction relief, the verdict is collateral estoppel on the issue of plaintiffs guilt. In Weiner v. 
Mitchell, 170 Cal. Rptr. 533 (App. 1980); the plaintiff had be~n convicted of criminal securities 
fraud (U.S. v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1978)). The court held that, because of the trial and 
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conviction, plaintiff was estopped under the doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating his guilt 
in a malpractice action. Weiner v. Mitchell, 170 Cal. Rptr. 538. 
In State ex rel O'Blennis v. Adolph, 691 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App. 1985), plaintiff was tried 
and convicted of felonious assault. In a post-conviction relief action, relief was initially denied but 
ultimately granted on appeal. Upon retrial, plaintiff pied guilty, notwithstanding his attorney's open-
court admonition that the plea could defeat a malpractice action. In a questionable application of the 
doctrine, the court applied collateral estoppel in the malpractice action. However, the prior jury 
verdict of guilty and plaintiffs attorney's on-the-record acknowledgment that the plea would hurt 
his civil action may have been the driving force behind the court's opinion. 
The holding in Shaw v. State, 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 1991) ( Defendant's memorandum, p. 
6) was that the statute of limitations for professional negligence did not accrue as to plaintiff's claim 
until he had obtained post-conviction relief. The relief was from a full-blown trial and conviction, 
not a guilty plea, 815 P.2d 1359. As acknowledged above, in order to neutralize the effect of trial 
on the merits and conviction, post-conviction relief or appeal is indispensable. 
In summary, although a guilty plea may be evidence of plaintiff's guilt, it does not constitute 
collateral estoppel on that issue because, like any settlement, the issue was not "actually decided" 
in a prior adjudication. And in view of the negligence allegations, there is a question of fact whether 
plaintiff was afforded a "fair opportunity" to litigate. Absent the collateral estoppel effect of the 
guilty plea, there is no necessity of post-conviction relief in order to neutralize the effect of collateral 
estoppel (as would be necessary where there is a conviction following trial). 
In short, defendant's proposed rule respecting post-conviction relief has no practical effect, 
will result in excessive litigation, and may be constitutionally infirm. 
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MANDATING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
In construing the provisions of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (LC. § 19-4901-
4911), the trial and appellate courts of Idaho must conform to the requirements of the U.S. 
Constitution. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 178 U.S. 347 (1964); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 
(1958). For example, the Idaho Legislature cannot impose a heavier burden of proof upon one class 
of civil litigants (felons) than upon another class (non-felons); nor can the Legislature require one 
class oflitigants to complete two separate pieces oflitigation without imposing the same requirement 
upon the rest of its citizens. There is no justification for treating civil claimants differently from 
criminal claimants. 
The courts must observe these same constitutional constraints: 
1. If post-conviction relief is an indispensable requirement to a civil damage action by a 
"criminal" plaintiff who merely pled guilty, that plaintiff, in effect, will have to show greater 
prejudice than his brother, the "civil" plaintiff. 
In Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702,652 P.2d 650 (1982) the Idaho Supreme Court set forth 
the elements of legal malpractice quoting a Washington appellate decision Sheny v. Diercks, 628 
P.2d 1336 ('Wash. App. 1981): 
"The elements of a legal malpractice action are: ( a) the existence of an attorney/client 
relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; ( c) failure to 
perform the duty; and ( d) the negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate 
cause of the damage to the client. ... " 
103 Idaho 706. 
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The requirement of post-conviction relief injects another element into the prima facie case 
articulated in Johnson v. Jones. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the U.S. Supreme 
Court discussed the elements required to entitle a defendant to post-conviction relief. In addition 
to attorney error and prejudice, the court added the element of "fundamental fairness": 
"Although those principles should guide the process of decision, the ultimate focus 
of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is 
being challenged. In every case, the court should be concerned with whether, despite 
the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is 
unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts 
on to produce just results." 
466 U.S. 696. 
Therefore, a criminal litigant seeking civil damages, in addition to satisfying the elements 
in Johnson v. Jones, will have to demonstrate the absence of"fundamental fairness." The Uniform 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act does not concern itself with civil damage remedies nor should the 
court bring its provisions into this substantive area. To do so would result in disparate treatment of 
like-situated citizens. 
By way of contrast, those criminal defendants who have been tried and convicted have "had 
their day in court" and must deal with the fact of an adverse adjudication. Hence, their only option 
is post-conviction relief or appeal. 
2. To require a criminal defendant who has plead guilty to undertake post-conviction relief 
procedures (a civil remedy) in order to enter the civil arena to obtain damages creates an undue 
burden and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
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DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PLEAD OR OTHERWISE PRESERVE 
THE ASSERTED DEFENSE RESPECTING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
For the first time in this litigation, defendant (in his memorandum in support of petition for 
review) asserts that absent post-conviction relief a civil damage suit is barred. This defense was not 
raised as an affirmative defense in defendant's answer to the complaint (R. pp. 8-10), nor at the 
summary judgment proceedings (R. pp. 58-62; pp. 113-117). Nor, until now, has it been raised as 
an issue on appeal. 
Defendant makes the following assertion for the first time in his September 22, 1995, 
memorandum: 
" ... Lamb's failure to obtain post-conviction relief is against authority which holds 
that a criminal defendant who pleads guilty to the underlying criminal charge must 
successfully obtain post-conviction relief before he can even file a legal malpractice 
action against his defense attorney." 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review, p. 6. 
Rule 8(c) I.R.C.P., requires that all defenses "constituting an avoidance" shall be included 
as an affirmative defense. Defendant has not affirmatively pied that failure to obtain post-conviction 
relief is a bar to this action. The district court and appellate records are devoid of any assertion that 
plaintiff is barred from seeking civil damages by the absence of such relief. 
Idaho law is clear that failure to raise an issue in the trial court precludes the party from doing 
so on appeal. Transamerican Insurance Company v. Widmark, 116 Idaho 7, 773 P.2d 275 (1989) 
(statute oflimitations); Callenders Inc., v. Beckman, 120 Idaho 169, 814 P.2d 429 (1991) (waiver); 
Herrmann v. Woodell, 107 Idaho 916,693 P.2d 1118 (App. 1985) (laches). 
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In Schiewe v. Farwell, 125 Idaho 46,867 P.2d 920 (1993), the appellant sought to raise the 
issue of quasi-estoppel which had not been raised before the trial court: 
"On appeal, neither this court, nor the court of appeals, can consider issues which 
were not raised before the trial court [cases cited] .... The elements of false 
representation and reliance indicate that Schiewe raised and argued the theory of 
equitable estoppel, not quasi-estoppel." 
125 Idaho 49. 
In summary, defendant is asserting that the absence of post-conviction relief is a bar to 
plaintiff's claim. However, defendant has not challenged this aspect of plaintiff's case in his motion 
for summary judgment or in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, defendant 
is precluded from raising the issue of post-conviction relief for the first time in his petition for 
review. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals properly identified a "genuine issue of material fact" precluding 
summary judgment. Because a guilty plea does not create collateral estoppel, post-conviction relief 
is not a prerequisite to plaintiffs claim. To require such relief as a mandatory component to civil 
damages will foster litigation and may be constitutionally infirm. In any event, defendant has failed 
to preserve this issue at either the trial or appellate court level. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~ day of December, 1995. 
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED 
Allen B. Ellis 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \ 'J day of December, 1995, I served a copy of 
plaintiff/appellant's BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF by the method indicated 
below and addressed to each of the following: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson, Carnahan & McColl 
420 W. Washngton 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, Idaho 83701"'1544 
__ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
:XXXHand delivery 
__ Overnight mail 
__ Telecopy 
Ailen B. Ellis 
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JEFFREY M. WILSON 
WILSON & McCOLL •, ··~u-J.-----~ ... "':'-
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-9100 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
KEVIN LAMB, 
Case No. 22549 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT'S 
REPLY TO RESPONSE BRIEF 
HOWARD MANWEILER, 
Defendant/Respondent 
________________ ) 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, Howard Manweiler 
("Manweiler") and submits the following Reply Memorandum to 
Plaintiff/Appellant's, Kevin Lamb's ("Lamb"), Brief in Response 
to Petitioner's Brief ("Response Brief"). 
I . ARGUMENT 
A. LAMB'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
PRECLUDES HIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM. THIS HOLDING 
MANDATES A RULING THAT LAMB'S POST-CONVICTION 
AFFIDAVITS DID NOT CREATE A FACTUAL ISSUE AS TO HIS 
GUILT BECAUSE LAMB'S CONVICTIONS STILL STAND. 
The court of appeals held that Lamb must establish his 
factual innocence as an element of his malpractice claim. The 
court stated, 
The district court granted this second motion for 
summary judgment. The court accepted Manweiier's 
position, which was not disputed by Lamb, that Lamb 
bore the burden of proving not only that he would have 
been acquitted of the felony charges if his attorney 
had performed competently, but also that he was, as a 
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fact, innocent of the charges. The district court 
found that Lamb's statements at his change of plea and 
sentencing hearings contained in transcripts placed in 
evidence by Manweiler, were sufficient to establish 
that Lamb was guilty of the two counts of theft. 
Because Lamb offered no evidence to rebut or disavow 
these admissions of guilt so as to create a genuine 
issue of fact regarding his guilt, the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Manweiler. From 
that judgment Lamb appeals. 
Court of Appeals Opinion, p. 3. 
The court of appeals correctly held that "public policy 
considerations militate in favor of a rule that actual innocence 
be proven as a prerequisite to recovery for negligent legal 
representation in a criminal case." Id. at 5. The court stated, 
"It follows that, in order to prevail on his claim against 
Manweiler, Lamb must prove that he did not commit the thefts for 
which he stands convicted." (emphasis added.) Id. at 6. 
Manweiler asserts that there is nothing in the record which 
creates a factual issue as to Lamb's guilt and that the court of 
appeals erred in finding to the contrary. Lamb has not 
exonerated himself by way of appeal, post-conviction relief or 
otherwise. His convictions for theft still stand. 
Lamb attempts to distinguish the case law from other 
jurisdictions which establishes the requirement that the criminal 
defendant be exonerated through appeal, post-conviction 
proceedings or otherwise as a prerequisite to filing a legal 
malpractice claim. Lamb distinguishes those cases based on the 
manner in which the defendant's conviction was established --
(1) conviction following trial; (2) entry of guilty plea with no 
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pretence of innocence1 ; and (3) guilty plea with no concession of 
guilt. Response Brief, p. 5. This is a distinction without 
substance. 
Lamb's attempt to segregate and distinguish the case law on 
point from other jurisdictions fails to recognize one central 
feature that is common to all these cases -- that the defendant's 
failure to obtain post-conviction relief resulted in the 
continued validity of defendant's conviction, no matter how his 
conviction arose. "However a person comes to be convicted --
whether by a plea to the charge, through a plea agreement, or 
after a trial to judge or jury -- for the purposes of a case like 
this one [a criminal malpractice claim], the person convicted is 
deemed equally guilty. 11 (emphasis added.) Steven v. Bispham, 851 
P.2d 556, 562 (Or. 1993). 
Lamb argues that his guilty plea was not a concession of 
guilt, citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33 (1970). 
Response Brief, p. 7. This statement is directly rebutted by the 
record in this case. Lamb did not enter an Alford plea to the 
theft charges. See, Respondent's Brief, p. 3-6. Lamb did not 
plead guilty so that he could take advantage of the plea bargain. 
In fact, there was no plea bargain involved in Lamb's guilty 
pleas. Exhibit A to Jeffrey M. Wilson's Affidavit ("Wilson 
Affidavit"), p. 8. There was no ambiguity in Lamb's guilty 
pleas. Lamb's guilty pleas were admissions that he was in fact 
1 Contrary to Lamb's assertion, the record supports a 
conclusion that his guilty plea was a concession of guilt. 
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO RESPONSE BRIEF - 3 
000233
guilty of the crimes charged. See District Court's comments on 
Lamb's guilty plea during hearing on motion to withdraw plea 
regarding the factual basis of the pleas. Wilson Affidavit, 
Exhibit B, p. 37-38. 
It is the very nature of the criminal justice system and the 
due process afforded criminal defendants which militates in favor 
of requiring one convicted of a crime to obtain post-conviction 
relief, or otherwise exonerate himself, as a prerequisite to 
bringing a legal malpractice claim against his defense attorney. 
The Oregon Supreme Court recently analyzed this issue in 
depth. The ultimate issue before the Court involved when the 
malpractice action accrued for statute of limitations purposes. 
However, the Court's discussion of the criminal justice system 
and the policy behind requiring the defendant to obtain post-
conviction relief before proceeding on his malpractice claim was 
central to the Court's well-reasoned opinion. 
The Court stated, 
Persons accused on criminal offenses in Oregon are 
afforded a wide range of procedural protections, many 
of which are derived from requirements of the Oregon 
and United States Constitutions. For example, one 
accused of a criminal offense is entitled to be 
represented by counsel, ... to be informed of the 
charge against the person, ... to be admitted to 
bail, ... discovery of pertinent information, 
to be tried by a jury ... and to have each element of 
the charge proved beyond a reasonable doubt .... 
After conviction, the person is entitled to have a pre-
sentence investigation ... to be represented by 
counsel throughout the sentencing proceedings ... and 
to be heard personally before any sentence is passed .. 
. Following sentencing, the person is entitled to take 
an appeal ... and to be represented by counsel on 
appeal .... Finally, with all other avenues of relief 
exhausted, the person is entitled to attack 
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collaterally the conviction and sentence under Oregon's 
post-conviction relief law ... on the ground, inter 
alia, that the person's counsel did not provide 
constitutionally adequate representation at trial or on 
appeal .... The list is by no means exhaustive, but 
it does demonstrate that the legislature has seen fit 
to control very fully the criminal justice process from 
pre-trial proceedings through post-conviction relief 
proceedings, and to provide for nearly all conceivable 
contingencies that might arise as a case makes its way 
through that system. The list also demonstrates the 
legislature's intention that only those persons 
deserving of conviction will be, or will remain, 
convicted. But the elaboration and completeness of the 
scheme also appears to establish something else, viz., 
that it is the public policy of this state to treat any 
person who has been convicted of any criminal offense 
as validly convicted unless and until the person's 
conviction has been reversed, whether on appeal or 
thorough post-conviction relief, or the person 
otherwise has been exonerated .... Respecting the 
legislature's comprehensive criminal justice construct 
means, at a minimum, that it is inappropriate to permit 
a person who has been convicted of a criminal offense 
to assert in the courts a claim for legal malpractice 
in connection with that conviction unless and until the 
person has challenged successfully the conviction 
through the direct appeal or post-conviction processes 
now provided by Oregon law, or the person otherwise has 
been exonerated of the offense. (citations omitted.) 
(emphasis added.) 
Stevens, supra at 561. See also, case law cited in Manweiler's 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review, p. 6-10, for 
further discussion of the public policy behind the post-
conviction relief rule. 
Several reasons support the adoption of the foregoing rule. 
First, statutory and constitutional provisions already in place 
adequately protect convicted offenders. It would be 
inappropriate to allow malpractice actions unless it was shown 
that the attorney failed to meet the established standards in a 
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way that would make post-conviction relief appropriate. Id. at 
562. 
A second reason for adopting the post-conviction relief 
requirement concerns the very nature of a criminal conviction. 
[T]o allow a person convicted of a criminal 
offense to sue that person's lawyer without having 
first overturned the conviction would mean that the 
courts would be permitting relitigation of a matter 
that is supposed to be settled: The complaining party 
is deemed by the law to be guilty. The panoply of 
protections accorded to the criminally accused 
(including direct appeal and post-conviction relief) is 
so inclusive, and the significance of a conviction so 
important to vindication of the rule of law, that it 
would appear most unusual to permit a person to 
prosecute a legal malpractice action premised on some 
flaw in the process that led to that person's 
conviction at the same time that the person's 
conviction remained valid for all other purposes. 
(emphasis added.). 
Id. at 562. 
The Stevens Court reasoning is equally applicable to Idaho's 
criminal justice system and this Court should adopt it. It was 
error for the court of appeals to hold that Lamb's affidavits, 
filed in a post-conviction action from which Lamb never obtained 
relief, created a factual issue as to his guilt. Lamb's 
convictions were in no way impugned by the affidavits he filed in 
order to initiate his post-conviction proceedings -- proceedings 
that were not resolved in Lamb's favor. The determination of 
Lamb's guilt remains undisturbed and valid for all purposes. The 
record is devoid of any competent evidence which might create a 
factual issue sufficient to rebut Lamb's convictions. Lamb's 
post-conviction affidavits are simply insufficient to create a 
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factual issue regarding Lamb's guilt when Lamb's convictions for 
the theft charges still stand. 
The fact that Lamb's convictions still stand collaterally 
estops him from attacking those convictions by way of a 
malpractice claim against Manweiler. In Anderson v. City of 
Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 184, 731 P.2d 171 (1986), the Court 
stated, 
In accordance with the modern and better view, we are 
constrained to hold that under the conditions described 
above, collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of an 
issue determined in a criminal proceedings in which the 
party sought to be estopped had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate that issue . ... Whether or 
not the party against whom estoppel is attempted had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue which 
is the subject of estoppel comes into question when the 
offense involved was minor. Defendants in actions 
involving criminal misdemeanors or traffic infractions 
may lack incentive to vigorously defend .... The 
resulting conviction thus may not derive from a full 
and fair litigation .... for this reason, in most 
circumstances a conviction for a relatively minor 
matter such as a lesser misdemeanor, traffic 
infraction, or matter of like import should not act as 
collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil action .. 
(citations omitted.) (emphasis added.) 
The felony charges against Lamb were serious charges. 
Collateral estoppel applies in this case to bar the relitigation 
of a matter that was settled by Lamb's guilty pleas. Lamb had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of his guilt 
during the extensive procedures afforded him as a criminal 
defendant. Lamb failed to exonerate himself in any way regarding 
the charges to which he pled guilty, his post-conviction 
affidavits notwithstanding. As stated in State ex rel. O'Blennis 
v. Adolf, 691 S.W.2d 498, 503 (Mo.App. 1985, "[Defendant's] 
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subjective reasons for entering the plea do not form a basis for 
a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction which his 
malpractice suit is. 11 
Lamb argues that "[b]argained-for guilty pleas fall short" 
of being full and fairly litigated convictions2 • Response Brief, 
p. 5, 8. Lamb cites no authority for this proposition, instead 
relying on an analogy to a civil party settling a lawsuit. 
Response Brief, p. 6. As discussed supra, the policy behind the 
post-conviction relief requirement as a predicate to bringing a 
legal malpractice claim is that the criminal defendant is 
afforded a full panoply of procedural and constitutional 
protections. As discussed infra, regarding Lamb's equal 
protection claim, a criminal defendant and a civil party, both 
claiming that their attorney committed malpractice, are not 
similarly situated due to the unique protections afforded 
criminal defendants versus civil litigants. 
Lamb's argument that a guilty plea is comparable to a civil 
settlement simply is inaccurate and fails to account for the very 
policy reasons the courts have relied upon in holding that post-
conviction relief is a requirement to bringing a criminal 
2 To the extent that Lamb is arguing that Anderson v. City 
of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P.2d 171 (1986) stands for the 
proposition that a conviction resulting from a trial may 
collaterally estop subsequent civil litigation but that a 
conviction resulting from a guilty plea may not, he is wrong. 
The Court in Anderson never made that holding. The citation from 
Anderson that Lamb cites in his Response Brief, p. 5, simply 
notes that the admissibility of a guilty plea or conviction is a 
different question than the collateral estoppel effect of a 
guilty plea or conviction. 
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malpractice action. Lamb's argument that his guilty plea has no 
collateral estoppel effect because it was "never litigated" is 
without authority and unpersuasive in light of the realities of 
the system in which that plea was taken and in which it remains 
in full force and effect. 
Lamb argues, "Post-conviction relief does not resolve the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant; rather if relief is granted, 
the matter is reset for trial. Therefore, the granting of such 
relief is without resolution of the defendant's innocence. " 
Response Brief, p. 4. Lamb is correct in this statement but 
fails to note the most important result of a defendant receiving 
post-conviction relief -- that the defendant no longer stands 
convicted of the charged crime. If Lamb had obtained post-
conviction relief, there would be a factual issue regarding his 
guilt and he would be entitled to a trial to resolve that issue. 
From that relief also flows the conclusion that he would be 
entitled to pursue his malpractice claim against Manweiler. As 
the record stands, however, Lamb has been convicted and remains 
convicted of the grand theft charges. There is no factual issue 
regarding Lamb's guilt. 
Lamb argues that requiring post-conviction relief will 
result in excessive litigation and judicial inefficiencies. 
Response Brief, p. 8. Just the opposite is true. 
The requirement of post-conviction relief promotes 
judicial economy because many issues litigated in the 
quest for post-conviction relief will be duplicated 
later in the legal malpractice action. This is because 
dispositive post-conviction relief is relevant to the 
issue of proximate causation. If the defendant 
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was denied post-conviction relief, the legal principle 
of collateral estoppel would serve to eliminate any 
frivolous malpractice claims .... Thus, by 
prioritizing post-conviction relief judicial resources 
will be conserved. 
Shaw v. State, Dept. of Admin., PDA, 816 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Alaska 
1991). Concerns for judicial economy supports a finding that 
post-conviction relief should be required prior to a criminal 
defendant suing his attorney for legal malpractice. 
This Court should follow the persuasive authority from 
sister states in holding that Lamb was required to obtain post-
conviction relief or otherwise exonerate himself before 
proceeding against Manweiler in a legal malpractice claim. 
Lamb's post-conviction affidavits cannot create a factual issue 
as to his guilt when Lamb's convictions for the theft charges 
still stand. This Court should affirm the district court finding 
that Manweiler is entitled to surmnary judgment. 
B. REQUIRING LAMB TO OBTAIN POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS 
NOT A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. 
The unique nature of the procedural protections afforded a 
criminal defendant militate in favor of a finding that a 
convicted offender filing a malpractice claim against his 
attorney is not in the same position as a malpractice plaintiff 
whose claim arises from a civil suit. 
Lamb argues that treating these two plaintiffs differently 
violates the equal protection clause. Response Brief, p. 10-11. 
Lamb's argument assumes, incorrectly, that these two plaintiffs 
are similarly situated. The fact that they are not similarly 
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situated makes Lamb's equal protection argument unpersuasive. 
Courts addressing this issue have so found. 
In Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 114-115 (Pa. 1993), the 
Court rejected the equal protection argument stating, 
[W]e must emphasize the unique position which a 
client accused of a crime occupies vis a vis a civil 
client. Unlike in the civil litigation area, a client 
does not come before the criminal justice system under 
the care of his counsel alone; he comes with a full 
panoply of rights, powers and privileges. These rights 
and privileges not only protect the client from abuses 
of the system but are designed to protect the client 
from a deficient representative. Thus, where in a 
civil matter a case once lost is lost forever, in a 
criminal matter a defendant is entitled to a second 
(perhaps even a third or fourth chance) to insure that 
an injustice has not been committed. For these reasons 
we are constrained to recognize that criminal 
malpractice trespass actions are distinct from civil 
legal malpractice trespass actions, and as a result the 
elements to sustain such a cause of action must 
likewise differ .... [A] plaintiff will not prevail 
in an action in criminal malpractice unless and until 
he I•.1 pursued post-trial remedies and obtained relief 
which was dependent upon attorney error. 
In Peeler v. Hughes & Lice, 868 S.W.2d 823 (Tex.App. 1993), 
the court addressed the equal protection issue. "A majority of 
states that have directly addressed the issue of attorney 
malpractice in the context of representing criminal defendants 
have de loped a different standard from that used in other civil 
cases." Id. at 829. 
Criminal defendants are not members of a suspect class . 
. . . Therefore, a state's action need only be 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest to 
withstand scrutiny under the equal protection clause .. 
. . As states have a "compelling interest" in 
preventing cri~inals from profiting from their crimes, 
the trial court's ruling [granting summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant/attorney] is in keeping with 
public policy and compelling interests of this State 
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and thus is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest. (citations omitted.) 
Id. at 835. 
In Shaw v. State, Dept. of Admin., 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 
1991), the Court also addressed this issue. The Court 
acknowledged that requiring a successful post-conviction 
proceeding before allowing the legal malpractice action to be 
brought might appear to impose a higher burden on the allegedly 
wronged criminal defendant than the burden faced by a wronged 
civil litigant. The Court stated, however, 
"[T]here is minimal unfairness in such a requirement 
since the ability to have a judgment set aside because 
of the incompetence of counsel is a remedy uniquely 
available to criminally convicted persons. The civil 
litigant has no such remedy." 2 Mallen & Smith, Legal 
Malpractice, 291 § 21.3 (3d ed. 1989). Moreover, the 
two types of malpractice actions involve different 
policy considerations. 
Id. at 1361-1362. 
This Court would not be violating the equal protection 
clause by adopting the post-conviction relief requirement as a 
predicate to legal malpractice actions. 
C. LAMB'S ARGUMENT THAT MANWEILER IS ASSERTING A NEW 
DEFENSE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
Lamb argues that Manweiler is raising the argument that 
Lamb's failure to obtain post-conviction relief precludes him 
from proceeding in a legal malpractice suit as an "affirmative 
defense" for the first time on appeal. Response Brief, p. 12-13. 
Lamb misinterprets the import of Manweiler's summary judgment 
motion and his Petition to this Court for review of the court of 
appeals decision. 
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Manweiler brought his summary judgment motion based on the 
affirmative defense that Lamb's guilt, conclusively established 
by his guilty pleas, was the sole and proximate cause of his 
incarceration. That issue encompasses the issue now before this 
Court. The fact that Lamb failed to exonerate himself through 
direct appeal or post-conviction proceedingw are facts in the 
record which support the argument that Manweiler made in the 
summary judgment proceedings -- Lamb's guilt is factually 
established and remains unchallenged. 
It was the court of appeals which, sua sponte, decided that 
Lamb's affidavits, filed with his post-conviction relief action, 
created a genuine issue of material fact regarding Lamb's 
innocence. Court of Appeals Opinion, p. 9. Neither Lamb nor 
Manweiler ever raised any issue regarding these affidavits at the 
trial level nor before the court of appeals. Court of Appeals 
Opinion, p. 9-10. Manweiler never raised the post-conviction 
proceedings because Lamb never received post-conviction relief, 
making those proceedings essentially irrelevant to a factual 
inquiry into his guilt. Lamb impliedly agreed by failing to 
raise the post-conviction proceedings. 
In holding that Lamb's post-conviction affidavits created a 
factual issue regarding his guilt, the court of appeals failed to 
consider the fact that Lamb never received post-conviction 
relief. The court of appeals failed to consider how that fact 
bears on the issue of Lamb's innocence and on the affidavit 
evidence the court of appeals relied upon. 
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Manweiler's petition to this Court does not raise Lamb's 
failure to obtain post-conviction relief as an affirmative 
defense. Manweiler's argument is that the court of appeals erred 
in finding that Lamb's post-conviction affidavits created a 
factual issue as to Lamb's guilt because Lamb's failure to obtain 
post-conviction relief results in his guilty pleas remaining 
conclusive evidence of his guilt. Lamb's failure to obtain that 
relief supports the trial court's conclusion that there was no 
issue of material fact regarding Lamb's innocence. 
Idaho courts have not addressed the necessity of post-
conviction relief as a prerequisite to a legal malpractice claim. 
Because this is a case of first impression in Idaho, and because 
the court of appeals decision was contrary to the majority of 
jurisdictions which have addressed this issue, Manweiler sought 
review from the Court. The Court's action in granting review was 
essentially a rejection of Lamb's argument that Manweiler was 
raising a new issue on appeal. As the Court stated in Simplot v. 
Owens, 119 Idaho 243, 246, 805 P.2d 449 (1990), "It should 
readily appear that our determination to grant review [of the 
court of appeals decision] is demonstrative of our view that the 
issues at stake were deserving of a final review." The Court 
should decide this issue of first impression and reach the merits 
of Manweiler's petition. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MULLEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Ronald D. Christian, by and through his counsel of record Michelle Points of 
Points Law, PLLC, respectfully submits this Memorandum in support of his Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed herewith. 
A. Introduction 
Plaintiff Molen ("Molen") cannot maintain an action against Mr. Christian, 
because any claim Molen may have had is barred by the applicable statute of limitations 
as dictated by statute and interpreted by Idaho case law. 
Mr. Christian previously filed a motion to dismiss in this case under Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b )( 6) on the premise that the statue of limitation had expired. This 
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Court converted that motion to a motion for summary judgment under Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(c). The Court denied Mr. Christian's motion, stating that there were 
issues of fact as to whether prior to his receiving post-conviction relief, Molen had a basis 
to conclude that Mr. Christian's alleged negligence caused him damage; that the ruling 
delivered by Judge Owen on Molen's post-conviction petition was somehow "objective 
proof' of the alleged negligence. See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss ("Order"), p. 10. 
Since the time he was convicted in 2007, Molen asserted that Mr. Christian's 
actions -those actions on which Judge Owen's post-conviction relief was granted-
caused him damage. That is, Molen has contended since his conviction that he was in 
fact damaged by Mr. Christian not moving for a new trial when evidence not disclosed by 
the state, was disclosed for the first time at trial. 
Idaho follows the "actual damage" rule as it pertains to when the statute of 
limitation accrues on a professional malpractice claim. Idaho requires that in a legal 
malpractice action arising from representation in a criminal proceeding, the person 
pursuing the claim must establish the additional element of actual innocence. There is no 
requirement that a defendant obtain post-conviction relief in an underlying criminal case 
prior to filing a civil attorney malpractice case. Nor is the accrual of an attorney 
malpractice case impacted by a finding of "legal innocence" in Idaho. 
Based on the facts and legal arguments set forth below, there exists no issue of 
material fact and this case should be dismissed as a matter of law as barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
B. Relevant Facts 
On June 29, 2007, Molen was convicted by a Boise County jury of Lewd Conduct 
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with a Minor Child. Mr. Christian represented Molen in the trial of the case. 
During the trial certain photographs of the victim's colposcopic examination were 
revealed for the first time, notwithstanding the fact that the photographs had been 
requested by Mr. Christian on numerous occasions prior to trial, and on record before the 
presiding Court. Notwithstanding this disclosure by the state, the trial proceeded and 
Molen was ultimately found guilty by the jury. 
On June 27, 2007, Molen filed a motion for new trial in which he argued that the 
disclosure of the photographs was unfair and that counsel for the defense (Mr. Christian) 
was ineffective in his defense of this matter. Affidavit of Michelle R. Points ("Points 
Aff. ), Exh. A. 
In addition, on October 3, 2007, Molen, through then counsel Jeffrey McKinnie, 
filed a "Notice of Lodging Affidavits in Support of New Trial-Issue: Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel." Points Aff., Exh. B. 
On October 5, 2007, Plaintiff Molen filed an Amended Motion for New Trial. 
Points Aff., Exh. C. In that Amended Motion, it states that the motion is being amended 
to add a claim of "[n]ewly discovered evidence: Medical reports of alleged Victim's 
hymeneal area", and then references an attached "exhibit A." Exhibit A to that pleading 
is a letter to Connie Molen, PlaintiffMolen's deceased wife, from Stephen Guertin, MD. 
Dr. Guertin was the Medical Director of the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit at Sparrow 
Regional Medical Center. The referenced letter states in pertinent part that the subject 
photographs of the Victim depict a normal exam, i.e. they did not depict signs of sexual 
abuse. The letter is dated October 3, 2007. 
On October 24, 2007, Molen submitted the affidavit of Dr. Edward Freelander in 
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support of his pending Motion for New Trial. Points Aff., Exh. D. Dr. Friedlander was 
an expert witness for Molen during the trial. In his affidavit, Dr. Friedlander discusses 
the "injustice done" by the late disclosure of the subject photographs, and that he looked 
them over with "short notice" during trial. Dr. Friedlander inferred that he didn't know 
what technique was used for the exam, but if he had known, he "would have brought 
evidence, including a new paper in Pediatrics 2007, to show that penetration almost 
certainly did not take place." Dr. Freidlander went on to state that "[i]n my opinion this 
would have resulted in a just verdict of 'not guilty.' This opinion on this point is to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty." Id. 
Judge Carey denied Molen's Motion for New Trial and specifically stated that 
"[i]neffective assistance of counsel is not a ground for granting a new trial under ICR 
Rule 34 and LC. Section 19-2604." 
On May 23, 2011, Molen filed a prose Verified Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief; Molen v. State of Idaho, Boise County Case No. CV-2011-124. In the Petition 
Molen asserted that both Mr. Christian as trial counsel, and his appellant counsel, were 
respectively ineffective. Specifically, Molen asserted that "Mr. Christian did not move to 
continue or to dismiss based on the late disclosure of photographs taken during S.Z.' s 
physical exam by Nurse Ortega." Points Aff., Exh. E, p. 13, ,r 73. Molen alleged "[t]he 
limited time Dr. Friedlander had to review the photographs impacted the value of his 
opinion ... " Id., p. 16, ,r 88. 
The first cause of action listed in Molen' s Verified Petition was ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Molen alleged: 
Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by 
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failing to ensure that Nurse Ortega was interviewed prior to trial. Had 
Nurse Ortega been interviewed, she would have admitted that she took 
photos during her exam as she did during trial. Those photos would have 
then been obtained prior to trial for a careful and thoughtful review by Dr. 
Edward Friedlander. Dr. Friedlander would have deferred to a Master 
Pediatric Gynecologist and Mr. Molen would have been able to consult 
with and hire such a gynolocologist who would have testified. Because 
the prior opportunity to review the photos was not afforded to Dr. 
Friedlander, the prosecutor was able to discredit Dr. Friedlander's 
expertise and credibility. Had Mr. Christian performed effectively in this 
regard, the jury would not have returned a guilty verdict. 
Mr. Christian performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland by 
failing to move to dismiss or to continue for failure to timely disclose the 
photos taken during Nurse Ortega's exam, which were material 
exculpatory evidence. Had such a motion been made, the case would have 
been dismissed or would have been continued and the additional 
investigation would have occurred as described in the preceding 
paragraph. 
Id., p. 22, ,i,i 120 and 121 (internal citations omitted). 
On April 1, 2013, Molen, through appointed counsel, filed a Second Amended 
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction relief, which alleged additional claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In Judge Owen's June 17, 2015 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Stipulation for Summary Judgment and Granting Post-Conviction Relief on Other 
Grounds (hereinafter "PC Order"), he stated that Mr. Christian's actions constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the criminal trial of Molen. Judge Owen's stated 
basis for making this holding was his opinion that Mr. Christian's alleged "failure" to 
seek a continuance or a mistrial based upon the State's failure to disclose the existence of 
photographs of the colposcopic examination of the Victim, which photographs were 
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disclosed to the defense for the first time at trial. 1 
Judge Owen's opinion is entirely consistent with the allegations Molen had been 
making against Mr. Christian since his conviction in 2007. That is, Judge Owen didn't 
tell Molen anything - or give him notice of anything - that he hadn't been proclaiming 
since 2007; he would not have been convicted or damaged but for Mr. Christian's 
actions. 
C. Procedural Posture 
As noted above, Mr. Christian previously filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis 
that the statute of limitation on Molen's claims against him had expired. Because Molen 
filed a copy of Judge Owen's PC Order with his response to the Motion to Dismiss, the 
Court treated the motion as a motion for summary judgment. 
In ruling on the motion, this Court held that "there are questions of fact as to 
when there was objective proof of some damages" and therefore denied the motion. 
Order, p. 11. This Court went on to reason that without Judge Owen's ruling, Molen 
would have no basis to conclude that Mr. Christian's negligence caused damages - that 
is, "without this objective proof." Order, p. 10. 
In sum, this Court found that a fact purportedly "later discovered" may speak to 
the issue of whether an attorney's negligence caused the damage from which Plaintiff 
suffers. Emphasis added. As stated by this Court, however, this finding addresses the 
issue of causation (an element of the malpractice claim), not when Molen incurred 
1 Judge Owen considered counsel's argument that certain Brady material was not 
disclosed during the trial, which consisted of an interview of the Victim that Molen 
claimed impeached statements made by the Victim in another interview. However, Judge 
Owen found that the Victim's statements were not entirely inconsistent to warrant the 
imposition of a Brady violation or suppression of the interview. 
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damages or when the statute of limitation accrued, which is a mutually exclusive inquiry 
from causation. 
D. Applicable Law 
Based on the Court's earlier ruling on Mr. Christian's dispositive motion, distinct 
legal issues have presented that are relevant to this motion. The first issue is, the 
elements a plaintiff is required to establish in an attorney malpractice action arising from 
representation of a defendant in a criminal case. 
The second issue is, the accrual of the statute of limitations in an attorney 
malpractice action arising from the representation of a defendant in a criminal case. 
1. Proof of actual innocence is required in an attorney malpractice case. 
The elements required to establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of 
a civil action are: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a 
duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or of the standard of care by the 
lawyer; and ( 4) the failure to perform the duty must have been a proximate cause of the 
damages suffered by the client. Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13, 813 P.2d 350,352 
(1991). 
In a legal malpractice action arising from representation of a defendant in a 
criminal proceeding, the person pursuing the claim must establish the additional element 
of actual innocence.2 Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269,923 P.2d 976 (1996); see also 
2 This Court stated in its recent opinion that the language in the Lamb v. Manweiler 
opinion did not identify actual innocence as an element in stating "it just says that the 
element was not in dispute in Lamb." Order, p. 6. Upon a closer read of the opinion, and 
the earlier opinion of the Idaho Court of Appeals, it is evident that the Idaho Supreme 
Court has confirmed that actual innocence is an additional element that the plaintiff must 
establish in a malpractice action arising from representation in a criminal proceeding. 
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Lamb v. Manweiler, Docket No 21266, Idaho Court of Appeals (1995)( ... "where one 
convicted of a crime sues for legal malpractice, contending that he would not have been 
convicted but for his attorney's negligent representation, the plaintiff must prove, in 
addition to the elements enunciated in Marias, the further element that plaintiff is in fact 
innocent of the crime"). Points Aff., Exh. F. 
A brief history of the Lamb v. Manweiler is informative. The case was before 
Judge J. William Hart in Ada County. 
A concise statement of the facts of Manweiler was provided by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals: 
Sometime in 1989, Lamb was charged with a number of felonies 
related to his operations in the cattle industry. He employed 
attorney Howard Manweiler to defend him on these charges. As a 
result of plea negotiations, and upon Manweiler' s advice, Lamb 
pleaded guilty to four felony charges, and the remaining counts 
were dismissed. After entry of the guilty please but prior to 
sentencing, Manweiler discovered evidence that cast doubt on the 
underlying factual basis for two of the cour charges to which Lamb 
had pleaded guilty. Thereafter, Manweiler filed on Lamb's behalf 
a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas on these two charges. The 
district court granted the motion. 
With respect to the two remaining counts for grand theft, I.C 
SECTION SECTION 18-2403(1 ), -2407(1 ), Manweiler was of the 
opinion that he could not ethically present a motion to withdraw 
these guilty pleas. Lamb therefore retained another attorney to 
present the motion for withdrawal of the two remaining guilty 
please, but the district court denied the motion. Lamb was 
ultimately incarcerated at the Idaho State Correctional Institution 
for a period in excess of eighteen months on convictions for the 
two counts of grand theft. Lam filed an application for post-
conviction relief pursuant to I.C SECTION 19-4901 et seq., 
seeking to have the convictions set aside. That proceeding was 
dismissed, however, upon stipulation between Lamb and the State. 
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In September 1992, Lamb filed the present civil action against 
Manweiler alleging professional malpractice in Manweiler's 
representation of Lamb in criminal matters ... 
Lamb alleged in his complaint in the malpractice case that "as a direct result of 
Defendant's negligence as aforesaid, the Plaintiff (Lamb) was incarcerated in the Idaho 
State Penitentiary." Points Aff., Exh. G, p. 5 
The parties acknowledged in Manweiler that the issue of Lamb's guilt "would be 
dispositive of the malpractice action; if plaintiff was in fact guilty of the crimes, any 
alleged negligence on the part of Mr. Manweiler would be of no effect and therefore 
proximate cause would not be established." Points Aff., Exh. H, p. 2. 
On May 13, 1993, Manweiler filed a motion under IRCP 12(b)(6) or alternatively 
a motion for summary judgment under IRCP 56(c), asserting that Lamb's case was barred 
by the applicable statute of limitations. 3 In that motion, Manweiler also asserted that 
Lamb's claims were barred because, based on admissions Lamb made in the underlying 
criminal case, he was estopped from asserting his actual innocence, which was a 
necessary element establishing malpractice where the underlying action was a criminal 
proceeding.4 Points Aff., Exh. G, pgs. 11 - 14. 
Judge Hart did not enter ruling on Manweiler' s statute of limitation 
argument. Instead, Judge Hart ruled that Lamb failed to come forward with any fact to 
3 Manweiler asserted that the applicable statute of limitation commenced upon the 
Court's acceptance of the Lamb's guilty plea (March 23, 1990); the date Lamb lost the 
presumption of innocence and his constitution right to a jury trial. The malpractice case 
wasn't filed September 4, 1992. Lamb argued that he didn't suffer "objectively 
ascertainable damage" until he was denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, 
putting him inside of the 2 year statute of limitations in Idaho Code section 5-219(4). 
Lamb asserted that his claims were not barred by collateral estoppel because he was not 
given the opportunity to fully litigate his guilt or innocence in the criminal case. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 9 
JUDGMENT 
000253
• 
rebut the record setting forth his admissions of guilt before the Judge in the criminal 
proceeding, therefore, he could not maintain a malpractice claim against 
Manweiler. Points Aff., Exh. H.5 Specifically, Judge Hart held "if Mr. Lamb is guilty 
then the prima facie element of proximate cause in Mr. Lamb's cause of action cannot be 
shown and his claim is without merit." Id., p. 4. 
Lamb appealed Judge Hart's decision. Lamb asserted, in sum, that there were 
general issues of material fact regarding his guilt and/or innocence that precluded Judge 
Hart from granting Manweiler's motion for summary judgment. Lamb again 
acknowledged in his appeal briefing that if guilty, it is this guilt, not any attorney 
negligence, that was the proximate cause of his incarceration. 
In his Respondent's Brief, Manweiler argued that all Judge Hart was "confronted 
with is Mr. Lamb's unverified assertion that 'Defendant negligently advised Plaintiff that 
the guilty pleas should be entered and could be withdrawn at a later date." Points Aff., 
Exh. I, p. 10. In sum, Manweiler argued that Lamb didn't establish a record from which 
Judge Hart could find an issue of material fact pertaining to his actual innocence. 
In ruling on Lamb's appeal, the Court of Appeals - on the issue of first impression 
in Idaho - that "actual innocence be proven as a prerequisite to recovery for negligent 
representation in a criminal case." Points Aff., Exh. F, p. 6. 
Specifically, the Court of Appeals held ''that where one convicted of a crime sues 
for malpractice, contending that he would not have been convicted but for his attorney's 
5 Judge Hart denied Manweiler' s initial motion for summary judgment, finding further 
discovery needed to take place with respect to Lamb's guilt or innocence. On renewed 
motion for summary judgment, Manweiller submitted several affidavits germane to this 
issue on which Judge Hart granted Manweiler' s renewed motion. 
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negligent representation, the plaintiff must prove, in addition to the elements enunciated 
in Marias6, their actual innocence. The Court of Appeals found that affidavits submitted 
in Lamb's post-conviction proceeding controverted his guilt and created a genuine issue 
of material fact and that Judge Hart's opinion was in error. The judgment was vacated 
and the case remanded. 
On September 22, 1995, Manweiler filed a Petition for Review of the Court of 
Appeals decision based, in sum, on his arguments that the record in the underlying case 
"unequivocally established" that Lamb was not factually innocent of the underlying 
crimes. Points Aff., Exh. J. 
In the Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review, Manweiler asserted that 
"[d]espite Lamb's conviction and his failure to obtain post conviction relief, [the Court of 
Appeals] held that evidence of statements made by Lamb during his post conviction relief 
action could be considered in creating a factual issue for purposes of denying summary 
judgment." Points Aff., Exh. K, p. 5. "This Court so held despite the fact, as the Court 
points out, that Lamb did not assert such statements in opposition to summary judgment 
before the district court or the appeals court." Id. 
In this same Memorandum, Manweiler also states: 
[t]he Court's admission of Lamb's statements during the post-conviction 
proceedings and its reversal of summary judgment in view of Lamb's 
failure to obtain post conviction relief is against authority which holds that 
a criminal defendant who pleads guilty to the underlying criminal charges 
must successfully obtain postconviction relief before he can even file a 
legal malpractice action against his defense attorney. Carmel v. Lunney, 
70 N.Y.2d 169, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (1987); Shaw v. State, 816 P.2d 
1358 (Alaska 1991); Bailey v. Tucker, 533 Pa. 237, 621 A.2d 108 (1993); 
6 Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13,813 P.2d 350,352 (1991), the further element that 
the plaintiff is in fact innocent of the crime." Id., p. 6. 
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Weiner v. Mitchell, Silvergerg & Knupp, 114 Cal. App. 3d 39, 170 Cal. 
Rptr. 533 (1980). 
Id. p. 6.7 
Lamb, in his Brief In Response to Petitioner's Brief, addressed Manweiler's 
argument that the "Court of Appeals' decision is against the law because plaintiff, prior 
to initiating this malpractice suit, must "successfully obtain post-conviction 
relief. .. " Points Aff., Exh. L, p. 2. Lamb goes on to state: "[t]hat is, defendant seeks a 
rule that post-conviction relief is a condition precedent to filing a malpractice claim 
arising from criminal advocacy." Id. Lamb acknowledged that "[p]ost-conviction relief 
does not resolve the guilt or innocence of the defendant; rather if relief is granted, the 
matter is reset for trial. Therefore, the granting of such relief is without resolution of the 
defendant's innocence ... " Id., p. 4. 
Lamb went on to argue that "the Idaho Legislature cannot impose a heavier 
burden of proof upon one class of civil litigants (felons) than upon another class (non-
felons); nor can the Legislature require on class oflitigants to complete two separate 
pieces of litigation without imposing the same requirement upon the rest of its 
citizens. There is no justification for treating civil claimants differently from criminal 
claimants." Id., p. 10. 
In reply, Manweiler continued to make the argument that post-conviction relief 
was a prerequisite for a convicted criminal defendant to pursue a malpractice claim, 
citing, Steven v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 562 (Or. 1993)(statute oflimitations began to 
7 In discussing Shaw v. State, supra, 816 P.2d at 1360, Manweiler states: ''the Alaska 
Supreme Court held that a convicted criminal defendant must obtain postconviction relief 
before pursuing an action for legal malpractice against his defense attorney." Id. p. 7. 
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accrue when post-conviction relief obtained). Points Aff., Exh. M. Manweiler urged the 
Court to adopt the "exoneration" rule, arguing "[s]everal reasons support the adoption of 
the foregoing rule ... it would be inappropriate to allow malpractice actions unless it was 
shown that the attorney failed to meet the established standards in a way that would make 
post-conviction relief appropriate." Id., p. 6, citing Stevens, 851 P.2d 362. Manweiler 
rallied for the adoption of the exoneration rule stating "[t]he Stevens Court reasoning is 
equally applicable to Idaho's criminal justice system and this Court should adopt it." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court was not persuaded by Manweiler' s arguments with 
respect to adoption of the exoneration rule, but nevertheless affirmed the district court's 
decision granting Manweiler's motion for summary judgment, finding "Lamb does not 
dispute the proposition that in a legal malpractice action arising from representation of a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding, the person pursuing the claim must establish the 
additional element of actual innocence of the underlying criminal charges" Lamb v. 
Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269,272,923 P.2d 976,979 (1996). Specifically, the Court found 
that because the District Court had explained to Lamb his rights, including that he 
understood that he was pleading guilty and could not withdraw the guilty pleas, Judge 
Hart was correct in granting Manweiler' s motion for summary judgment in the civil 
malpractice case. 
This additional element of actual innocence of course was established in the 
earlier Idaho Court of Appeals decision in the case, which was confirmed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
Idaho law, requiring proof of the addition element of actual innocence, is similar 
to the law in Washington. In Ang v. Martin, 76 P.3d 787 (Wash. App. Div. 2, 2003), 
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plaintiffs sued their attorneys who had represented them in their defense of criminal 
charges (prior to hiring new attorneys prior to trial) who were ultimately acquitted at trial. 
The plaintiffs in that case asserted that their acquittal proved their innocence in the 
malpractice action. The Court held that to "succeed on a claim of legal malpractice 
allegedly occurring in a criminal trial, a plaintiff must prove 'at a civil trial that he or she 
is innocent of the charged crime' and must do so by a preponderance of the evidence." 
Id. at 790, citing Falkner v. Foshaug, 29 P.3d 771 (2001). 
The Court's discussion in Falkner is helpful: 
A brief overview of other jurisdictions' treatment of criminal 
malpractice claims is instructive. First, many jurisdictions require 
that a defendant obtain postconviction relief [b ]efore initiating a 
malpractice claim, reasoning that it is inappropriate to treat victims 
of alleged negligence by defense counsel as having been harmed, 
for the purpose of maintaining a legal malpractice action ... unless 
they show that their counsel failed to meet the established 
standards in a way that would make postconviction relief 
appropriate . . . many jurisdictions require proof that the criminal 
defendant/malpractice plaintiff is innocent of the underlying 
criminal charges as an additional element of the civil malpractice 
claim. Only an innocent person wrongly convicted due to 
inadequate representation has suffered a compensable injury 
because in that situation the nexus between the malpractice and 
palpable harm is sufficient to warrant a civil action, however 
inadequate, to redress the loss. 
Internal citations omitted; see Wiley v. County a/San Diego, 19 Cal.4th 532, 966 P.2d 
983, 985-986 n. 2 (1998), Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221, 851 P.2d 556 (1993), 
Morgano v. Smith 110 Nev. 1025, 879 P.2d 735 (1994), Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 
S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995), Kramer v. Kirkensen, 296 Ill.App.3d 819,695 N.E.2d 1288 
(1998), Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699, 569 N.E.2d 783(1991), Carmel v. Lunney, 70 
N.Y.2d 169, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 518 N.Y.S.2d 605(1987). 
The distinction is, states such as Idaho require actual innocence as an element of 
proof in an attorney malpractice case, and states that follow the exoneration rule require a 
showing of "legal" innocence prior to allowing a plaintiff to proceed with a malpractice 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 14 
JUDGMENT 
000258
• • 
action; thus, exoneration is an element of proof in an attorney malpractice case. Idaho 
has no such requirement. 
Despite extensive briefing by the parties in Manweiler8, the Idaho Supreme Court 
considered but did not adopt the exoneration rule. Instead, the Court affirmed that in a 
legal malpractice action arising from representation of a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding must establish actual innocence as an additional element. 
2. The statute of limitations commences upon a plaintiff incurring some 
damage. 
As set forth above, in response to Mr. Christian's first dispositive motion, Molen 
asserted that the statute of limitation on his claim did not accrue until he received post-
conviction relief, based on the notion that this Court should follow the exoneration rule 
pertaining to malpractice claims in which the underlying representation was in a criminal 
case. 
Tellingly, none of the statutes of limitation being interpreted by the "exoneration 
rule" states contain language similar to the Idaho statute. As set forth below, the 
language in the Idaho statute is very specific that the statute of limitations begins to 
accrue at the time the alleged actions are committed. Also unlike Idaho, states that 
follow the exoneration rule rely on a discovery rule or otherwise "hold" when a statue of 
limitation accrues, without more.9 
8 This briefing included the cases relied upon by Molen in Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
9 The statutes of limitations being interpreted by states that have adopted the exoneration 
rule differ greatly from Idaho's statute in that they are based on a discovery rule, or 
language akin statutes of limitations commencing when the claim accrues, without 
defining what "accrual" means. For example, in the case of Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 
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This Court has recognized that "Idaho has specifically rejected such a rule 
[referring to the discovery rule] with regard to malpractice claims." Order, p. 10. 
This Court acknowledged that "the decision to adopt an exoneration rule 
ultimately must be made by the Idaho Supreme Court or enacted by specific legislation 
" Order, p. 10. 
There is no dispute that Idaho does not follow the exoneration rule. The 
exoneration rule squarely conflicts with Idaho law as it pertains to the accrual of the 
statute of limitations. There is no ambiguous or qualifying language in Idaho Code § 5-
219( 4), which reads in relevant part: 
An action to recover damages for professional malpractice . . . shall be 
deemed to accrue when the injured party knows or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding the condition or 
matter complained of; but in all other actions, whether arising from 
professional malpractice or otherwise, the cause of action shall be 
deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or 
omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended 
by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom 
or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the 
injured party and the alleged wrongdoer ... 
Emphasis added. 
221, 851 P.2d 556 (1993), the Supreme Court of Oregon recognized that with respect to a 
legal malpractice claim, Oregon follows the "discovery rule" for establishing when a 
claim accrues; the statue of limitations does not accrue in a civil malpractice action until 
the criminal defendant gets post-conviction relief. Id. at 224, 851 P.2d at 559 (emphasis 
added); see also Shaw v. State of Alaska, 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 1991), Alaska 
recognizes the discovery rule which may trigger legal malpractice actions in the future. 
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The statute of limitations accrues on a professional malpractice action when 
"some damage" has occurred. See e.g., Minnick v. Hawley Troxell, et al, 341 P .3d 580 
(2015). 
This Court, in ruling on Mr. Christian's previous dispositive motion held "[b]ased 
on the language from the civil malpractice cases, the Comi could easily conclude Plaintiff 
incurred some damage at the moment of judgment, and determine the statute of 
limitations passed two (2) years after the date the judgment was entered ... The Complaint 
in the case at bar was filed February 17, 2015 -well past two (2) years from any of those 
dates." Order, pgs. 6-7. 
Again, there is no ambiguity in Idaho Code § 5-219(4), which is the only 
applicable law in Idaho, and the law that must be applied by the Court in ruling on this 
motion. 
E. Argument 
Molen argued in his Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that his case was 
not barred by the statute of limitations because "there was no objective proof of some 
actual damage until Mr. Molen obtained post-conviction relief, and thus, his cause of 
action against Defendant accrued, for statute oflimitation purposes, on June 17, 2014, 
when Mr. Molen was granted post-conviction relief." Response, p. 3. 
Again, Idaho law is very clear that the statute of limitations accrues on a 
professional malpractice action when "some damage" has occurred, not when a potential 
plaintiff has "objective proof' of actual damage. Certainly when Molen was convicted for 
Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child and sentenced to prison, he had objective proof that he 
had been damaged. 
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Judge Owen's order granting post-conviction relief has no bearing on whether 
Molen had "objective proof' that he had been damaged, or as this Court stated, whether 
he had "objective proof of some damage occurred before there was proof of Plaintiffs 
innocence." Order, p. 10. 
As stated by Judge Owen "[t]o prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the 
defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency." PC Order, p. 23. The defendant must also 
show "a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the 
outcome of the trial would have been different." Id., p. 24. Judge Owen's ruling doesn't 
speak to when Molen suffered some damage (i.e. when the statute of limitation accrued) 
or whether Molen is actually innocent. In sum, Judge Owen's ruling has no bearing on 
this instant professional practice case whatsoever. 
There is no dispute that Plaintiff suffered ascertainable damage upon his 
conviction in June of 2007 and following. As set forth above, Molen had been asserting 
that Mr. Christian's actions - those actions on which Judge Owen's post-conviction relief 
was granted - caused him damage, since the time he was convicted in 2007 and began 
filing post-trial motions. That is, Molen has asserted since he was convicted that he was 
damaged by Mr. Christian not moving for a new trial when evidence not disclosed by the 
state, was disclosed for the first time at trial. 
It is impossible that Molen could not have know he was damaged until after 
reading Judge Owen's PC Order, and Molen is clearly estopped from making such an 
assertion given his past causes of actions and filings as they relate to Mr. Christian. 
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Nothing in Idaho law bars a plaintiff from attempting to prove actual innocence in 
a malpractice proceeding, even if they are pursing or have received post conviction relief; 
notwithstanding whether they have been found "legally innocent." 
Idaho law does not bar a plaintiff from filing a malpractice action within the 
applicable statute of limitation and moving for a stay of the proceedings pending the 
outcome of post conviction proceedings if they choose to pursue such proceedings. 
However, Idaho law does not allow a potential plaintiff to "toll" the statute of 
limitation until some prerequisite "event" occurs, or deem a cause of action "ripe" only 
upon some necessary ruling (i.e. post conviction relief). 10 
Akin to medical malpractice, the statute of limitations for filing a professional 
medical malpractice claim is 2 years from the date the plaintiff has objectively 
ascertainable damage - not the date the Idaho Board of Medicine finds a physician breach 
the applicable standard of care. 
Obtaining post-conviction relief is simply not an element of a malpractice claim 
in Idaho, and does not serve to accrue the statute of limitations for such a claim. 
The only issue before this Court on this motion is when the statute of limitation 
for the instant attorney malpractice case accrued, and it accrued, as a matter of law, when 
Molen was convicted on June 29, 2007. 
F. Conclusion 
Idaho Code § 5-219(4) and the Idaho cases interpreting that statute are 
10 Requiring exoneration as a pre-condition to filing a malpractice action is a legal fiction 
under Idaho law. That is, that an innocent person convicted of a crime suffered no actual 
injury until he or she is exonerated through post-conviction relief. A defendant is harmed 
by his or her conviction and incarceration, not by obtaining post-conviction relief. See 
Rantz. v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d (Colo. 2005), other citations omitted. 
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unambiguous as to when the statute of limitations accrues in an attorney malpractice 
case; when the client suffers some damage as a result of the acts or omissions of the 
attorney. 
Molen was damaged upon his conviction and could thereafter have recovered 
from Mr. Christian had he filed within the applicable statute oflimitations, and of course 
satisfied all the elements of an attorney malpractice claim. 
Molen cannot maintain this claim against Mr. Christian as his complaint was filed 
well beyond the exp~ of th 
DATED THIS 1-:__ day o~ 
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13y HALEY MYERS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-OC-15-03024 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Michael Scott Molen ("Mr. Molen"), by and through his 
attorney of record Elisa G. Massoth of the firm Elisa G. Massoth, PLLC, and hereby 
submits Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Ronald D. Christian (hereinafter "Christian") previously filed a Motion 
to Dismiss in this case contending Mr. Molen's cause of action was barred by the statute 
oflimitations. On April 9, 2015, a hearing was held on Christian's motion before this Court. 
On May 21, 2015, this Court issued its Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, concluding 
"there are questions of fact as to when there was objective proof of some damages ... " and 
denied Christian's Motion to Dismiss. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss ("Order"), p. 11. 
Christian's pending Motion for Summary Judgment contends Mr. Molen's cause 
of action is barred by the statute of limitations. In his Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Memo."), Mr. Christian argues 
a plaintiff must establish the additional element of "actual innocence" in a criminal legal 
malpractice case, while "exoneration" is not a required element. Defendant's Memo., pp. 
7-14. While this Court previously addressed the "exoneration rule" as it relates to when the 
statute oflimitations accrues in a criminal legal malpractice case (Order, pp. 5-10),1 in an 
abundance of caution, Mr. Molen hereby incorporates by this reference Plaintiffs 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in its entirety filed on April 6, 2015 and the 
Court's Order. Therefore, this response will address Mr. Christian's analysis ofldaho case 
law regarding actual innocence as a required element of in a criminal legal malpractice 
case and the accrual of the statute of limitations in a criminal legal malpractice case. 
1 After extensive discussion of relevant case law this Court reasoned, without ruling, it "is inclined to adopt 
the approach taken by other courts utilizing an exoneration rule." Order, p. 9. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
On April 10, 2013, undersigned counsel, Elisa G. Massoth, filed a substitution of 
counsel for Mr. Molen concerning his pending petition for post-conviction relief in Boise 
County Case No. CV-11-124. Affidavit of Elisa G. Massoth in Support of Plaintiff's 
Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Aff. Massoth"). 
On December 7, 2013, Cari Caruso, a Registered Nurse licensed in the State of 
California and a Forensic Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner for Adolescent/ Adult, submitted 
a report of her findings after reviewing the photographs and trial transcripts related to Mr. 
Molen's criminal case. Aff. Massoth, Ex. A. In her report, Nurse Caruso disputed the 
findings and testimony of Alisa Ortega, the CARES Nurse who examined the complaining 
witness in Mr. Molen's criminal case. 
On December 26, 2013, Mr. Molen and the State filed a Statement of Stipulated 
Reasons to Resolve Post-Conviction Case ("Stipulated Reasons"). Aff. Massoth, Ex. B. 
The State also submitted for the Court's consideration a binding Rule 11 Plea Agreement 
(involving an Alford plea) which would have resulted in the resolution of Mr. Molen's 
post-conviction case. Id. Nurse Caruso's December 7, 2013 report was attached to the 
Stipulated Reasons, as well as the Affidavit of Dr. Stephen R. Guertin dated October 24, 
2007,2 and a letter written by Dr. Friedlander to the Idaho Attorney General dated 
December 1, 2008. 3 In the Stipulated Reasons, the parties agreed that Christian failed to 
2 Dr. Guertin's affidavit attached as an exhibit to the Stipulated Reasons in Mr. Molen's post-conviction 
case is the same document provided by Christian in the Affidavit of Michelle Points in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Aff. Points"), which is attached as Ex. D. In an abundance 
of caution, Dr. Guertin's affidavit is attached as Ex. C to the Aff. Massoth. 
3 Dr. Friedlander's letter is attached as Ex. D to the Aff. Massoth. Also attached to the Aff. Massoth as Ex. 
E is the memorandum and Order Concerning Motion for New Trial issued by the Honorable George D. 
Carey on October 30, 2007. 
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provide Mr. Molen with effective assistance of counsel. Aff. Massoth, Ex. B, pp. 3-7. The 
parties also agreed that the late disclosure of the complaining witness' hymen photographs 
were grounds for relief through due process and/or Brady violation as well as material 
evidence not heard. Id. at pp. 7-8. After reviewing the Stipulated Reasons, the district court 
advised the parties during an in chambers conference that it would not grant the stipulated 
resolution and scheduled the matter for an evidentiary hearing. See Memorandum Decision 
and Order Denying Stipulation for Summary Judgment and Granting Post-Conviction 
Relieve on Other Grounds ("PCR Decision") in Boise County Case No. CV-11-124.4 
On January 21, 2014, the district court issued an Order Granting Motion for 
Discovery based upon a stipulation between the parties. Aff. Massoth, Ex. G. The district 
court ordered discovery of "all CARES files, notes, records, interviews, audio, and/or video 
recording related to the investigation of allegations against [Mr. Molen]." Id. at p. 2. During 
the process of discovery, records from CARES were subpoenaed. See Joint Stipulation of 
Facts and Points of Authority Related to Brady Material and a Motion for Summary 
Judgment in Favor of Petitioner ("Stipulated Brady Issue"). Aff. Massoth, Ex. F, p. 2. 
CARES complied and produced an audio recording of Alisa Ortega's physical examination 
of the complaining witness that had never been disclosed. Id. 
During an in chambers status conference on or about April 7, 2014, the parties 
disclosed they had recently learned of the existence of an additional CARES interview of 
the complaining witness that was never disclosed by the State. PCR Decision, p. 9. Counsel 
represented the undisclosed evidence demonstrated that the complaining witness made 
4 Judge Owen's June 17, 2015 PCR Decision was attached as an exhibit to Mr. Molen's Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed on April 6, 2015. Mr. Molen respectfully requests this Court take 
judicial notice of this document pursuant to I.R.E. 20l(d). 
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statements to Alisa Ortega that contradicted statements the complaining witness made in 
an earlier interview with law enforcement. Id. Counsel advised the statements contained in 
the undisclosed evidence constituted a Brady violation. Id. 
On April 23, 2014, Mr. Molen and the State filed the Stipulated Brady Issue 
asserting that the audio recording contained evidence favorable to the defense and grounds 
for impeachment of several State witnesses, including evidence the defense would have 
provided to experts to refute Alisa Ortega's testimony at trial. Aff. Massoth, Ex. F, p. 7. 
Attached to the Stipulated Brady Issue was the Affidavit of Cari Caruso in Support of Post 
Conviction. Aff. Massoth, Ex. H. In her affidavit Nurse Caruso states she was initially 
provided with the CARES forensic examination report by Alisa Ortega, the colposcope 
photographs, the forensic interview by law enforcement, and the trial testimony of Alisa 
Ortega. Id. at ,r 6. She used this evidence to prepare her December 7, 2013 report. She 
subsequently received and reviewed an audio recording and transcript of Alisa Ortega's 
physical examination of the complaining witness. Id. Similar to her earlier report, Nurse 
Caruso stated that "the physical examination of [the complaining witness] is a normal 
genital examination of a person her age." Id. After reviewing the undisclosed evidence, 
Nurse Caruso explained that Alisa Ortega "put words in the mouth of [the complaining 
witness]." Id. at ,r 14. Nurse Caruso continued "Alisa Ortega's questions were either closed 
ended or she provided the answers. She also obtained detailed information which was not 
included in her written report." Id. at ,r 15. 
On June 17, 2014, Judge Owen issued his PCR Decision. Judge Owen found that 
the undisclosed audio was favorable to Mr. Molen because it was impeaching, and it was 
inadvertently suppressed by the State. PCR Decision, p. 22. However, Judge Owen 
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disagreed with the position that the complaining witness' statements in the undisclosed 
audio were substantially different than those made to law enforcement. Id. Thus, Judge 
Owen concluded that undisclosed audio was not prejudicial and therefore did not constitute 
a Brady violation. Id. at p. 23. 
Despite declining to follow the parties' stipulated Brady issue, Judge Owen granted 
post-conviction relief to Mr. Molen based upon Christian's ineffective assistance. Id. at p. 
26. Judge Owen stated: "Dr. Friedlander was a pathologist. He was not an expert in 
pediatric sexual abuse. This is the field of expertise that was required in this case." Id. at 
p. 25. Referring to Dr. Guertin's October 24, 2007 affidavit, Judge Owen explained that 
Dr. Guertin is an expert in pediatric sexual abuse who determined the photographs 
demonstrated a normal hymen. Id. Judge Owen then explained that Nurse Caruso is an 
expert in pediatric sexual abuse and referenced her April 14, 2014 affidavit,5 which 
concludes that the colposcopic photographs demonstrated a normal genital examination. 
Id. Judge Owen concluded that Christian provided constitutionally ineffective assistance 
and vacated Mr. Molen's conviction. Id. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the affidavits, depositions, admissions, 
and other evidence in the record demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); 
Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847 (1997). When considering a motion for summary judgment, 
the court "liberally construes the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
5 Undersigned counsel believes that a clerical mistake was made in the PCR Decision concerning the date 
of Nurse Caruso's affidavit, as it states her affidavit was dated April 14, 2014 rather than April 21, 2014. 
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motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Brooks 
v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574 (1997). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the 
moving party. Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy Inc., 141 Idaho 622,625 (2005). However, if 
the nonmoving party fails to provide a sufficient showing to establish the essential elements 
of his or her case, judgment shall be granted to the moving party. Atwood v. Smith, 143 
Idaho 110, 113 (2006). 
ARGUMENT 
The decision in Lamb v. Manweiler does not require that a plaintiff in a criminal 
malpractice cases prove the additional element of actual innocence. Further, Lamb does 
not preclude this Court from adopting the exoneration rule. In this case, there was no 
objective proof of some actual damage until Mr. Molen obtained post-conviction relief. In 
the alternative, objective proof of some damage did not occur until Mr. Molen obtained 
and reviewed the undisclosed audio of the physical examination by Alisa Ortega. Thus, the 
date of objective proof can be no earlier than January 21, 2014, when the district court in 
Mr. Molen's post-conviction case ordered disclosure of all CARES records. Therefore, a 
material issue of fact exists in this case concerning the date Mr. Molen obtained objective 
proof of some actual damage. 
I. Actual Innocence Is Not An Element Of Criminal Malpractice Cause Of 
Action And Idaho Case Law Does Not Preclude This Court From 
Adopting The Exoneration Rule 
Christian argues that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Lamb v. Manweiler, 
129 Idaho 269 (1996), "confirmed that actual innocence is an additional element that the 
plaintiff must establish in a malpractice action arising from representation in a criminal 
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proceeding." Defendant's Memo, p. 7 n. 2. However, Christian's interpretation of Lamb v. 
Manweiler is incorrect. As this Court previously recognized, Lamb "does not identify 
actual innocence as an element of a legal malpractice action arising from representation in 
a criminal case - it just says that element was not in dispute in Lamb." Order, p. 6. 
While Christian is correct that the Idaho Court of Appeals held that actual 
innocence is an additional element that a plaintiff must prove in a criminal legal malpractice 
case, See Points Affidavit, Ex. F, p. 6, the Idaho Supreme Court did not confirm, affirm, 
or even address the Idaho Court of Appeals' holding on that issue. Rather, the Court's 
decision in Lamb effectively vacated the Idaho Court of Appeals opinion. In fact, the 
Court's decision was based on the element of proximate cause, not actual innocence. After 
reviewing the record of Lamb's change of plea hearing the Court ruled: 
From the transcript of the pleas it is clear that [Lamb] knew the elements 
and knew the facts. He knew that he might have a defense to the charges 
before he pied guilty. He also knew the choice of whether to plead guilty 
was his, not that of his attorney. The choices he had were explained by the 
district judge and acknowledged by Mr. Lamb. The proximate cause of any 
damage he may have suffered is the decision to plead guilty following a 
thorough advice of rights by the district judge concerning the charge. 
Lamb, 129 Idaho at 274. Thus, the Court affirmed the district court's decision granting 
summary judgment to Manweiler, but based its decision on different reasoning. 
In contrast to the Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning, both the district court and the 
Court of Appeals focused on the stipulated element of actual innocence. In its opinion, the 
district court held that the sole issue before it, which the parties stipulated, was whether 
Lamb was guilty of the underlying charges. If Lamb were guilty, the element of proximate 
cause could not be established. Lamb, 129 at 271; Aff. Points, Ex. H, p. 4. After a review 
of the record, the district court held that Lamb failed to come forward with sufficient 
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evidence to rebut his admissions of guilt and granted Manweiler' s motion for summary 
judgment. Id. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that the inclusion of actual 
innocence as an additional element was not disputed by Lamb, at the district court level or 
on appeal. Aff. Points, Ex. F, p. 5. However, the Court of Appeals ruled sua sponte that 
actual innocence was an additional element. Id. at p. 6. The Court of Appeals also noted 
that actual innocence is distinct from and in addition to proximate cause. Id. at p. 6 n. 2 
("Proof of proximate causation and actual innocence do not necessarily go hand-in-hand."). 
The Court of Appeals found that affidavits attached to Lamb's post-conviction proceeding 
set forth facts that controverted Lamb's guilt and created a genuine issue of fact concerning 
Lamb's actual innocence. Id. at pp. 9-11. 
A review of the three Lamb decisions above demonstrates that the Idaho Supreme 
Court did not confirm that actual innocence is an additional element in a criminal legal 
malpractice case. All three courts based their decisions on distinct reasoning. The district 
court ruled that Lamb failed to establish a genuine issue of fact concerning his innocence, 
and therefore he could not establish the proximate cause element. The Court of Appeals 
ruled that the record contained an issue of material fact concerning Lamb's actual 
innocence, and noted without addressing, that proximate cause is a distinct element. The 
Idaho Supreme Court did not engage in any discussion of Lamb's guilt or innocence, and 
only noted that the element of actual innocence was not in dispute. The Court based its 
decision specifically on the element of proximate cause ("The proximate cause of any 
damage he may have suffered is the decision to plead guilty ... "). Thus, Christian's 
interpretation of Lamb v. Manweiler is incorrect. Despite Christian's assertion, the Idaho 
Supreme Court did not confirm or affirm that actual innocence is an element in a criminal 
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malpractice case. Lamb "does not identify actual innocence as an element of a legal 
malpractice action arising from representation in a criminal case - it just says that element 
was not in dispute in Lamb." Order, p. 6. Mr. Molen submits that actual innocence is not 
an element of a criminal malpractice cause of action. 
Similar to Christian's assertion that the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that actual 
innocence is an element of a criminal legal malpractice suit, he contends that the Court 
"considered but did not adopt the exoneration rule" advanced by Manweiler in his petition 
to the Idaho Supreme Court. Defendant's Memo, p. 15. While it is correct that Manweiler 
argued for the Court to adopt an exoneration rule, just like the actual innocence element, 
the Court did not address the exoneration rule in its decision. That is because the Court 
made its ruling specifically on the element of proximate cause. More importantly, 
Manweiler raised the exoneration rule issue for the first time in his petition to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. Aff. Points, Ex. L, p. 12. ("This defense was not raised as an affirmative 
defense in [Manweiler's] answer to the complaint ... nor at the summary judgment 
proceedings ... nor, until now, has it been raised as an issue on appeal."). Thus, it was not 
an issue properly before the Court in Lamb, and Christian's assertion that the Court 
considered but did not adopt the exoneration rule is not supported by the facts in that case. 
Next, Christian suggests that an actual innocence requirement and an exoneration 
requirement are mutually exclusive. In his memorandum he states: 
The distinction is, states such as Idaho require actual innocence as an 
element of proof in an attorney malpractice case, and states that follow the 
exoneration rule require a showing of 'legal' innocence prior to allowing a 
plaintiff to proceed with a malpractice action; thus, exoneration is an 
element of proof in an attorney malpractice case. 
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Defendant's Memo., pp. 14-15. Even assuming arguendo that actual innocence is an 
element of a criminal legal malpractice case, which Mr. Molen disputes, the adoption of an 
actual innocence element does not preclude a requirement of exoneration. Multiple 
jurisdictions have held that proof of actual innocence and legal innocence ( exoneration) 
are required in criminal legal malpractice cases. See e.g. Levine v. Kling, 123 F.3d 580 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (applying Illinois law); Shaw v. State Dep't of Admin., 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 
1991) (requiring proof of legal innocence); Shaw v. State Dep't of Admin., 861 P.2d 566 
(Alaska 1993) (requiring actual innocence); Therrien v. Sullivan, 891 A.2d 560 (N.H. 
2006). In fact, in arguing that this Court should adopt the additional element of actual 
innocence, Christian quotes language from Falkner v. Foshaug, 29 P.3d 771 (2001). 
Defendant's Memo., p. 14. In Falkner, the Court of Appeals of Washington held that "both 
a successful postconviction challenge and proof of innocence are necessary to maintain a 
criminal malpractice claim." Id. at 773. 
Based upon the above, Mr. Molen submits that the decision Lamb v. Manweiler 
does not require that a plaintiff in a criminal malpractice cases prove the additional element 
of actual innocence. Further, the decision in Lamb does not preclude this Court from 
adopting the exoneration rule. 
II. Mr. Molen's Cause Of Action Did Not Accrue Until He Was Granted 
Post-Conviction Relief; In The Alternative, Mr. Molen's Cause Of Action 
Did Not Accrue Until After The District Court In Mr. Molen's Post-
Conviction Case Ordered Disclosure Of All CARES Records On January 
21,2014 
Mr. Molen maintains his position that his cause of action against Christian did not 
accrue until Mr. Molen was granted post-conviction relief on June 17, 2014. Mr. Molen 
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filed his Compliant on February 17, 2015, which is within the applicable statute of 
limitations. This Court previously stated: 
The Court is inclined to adopt the approach taken by other courts utilizing 
an exoneration rule. First, based on the language in City of McCall v. Buxton 
stating that protective actions are disfavored, the Court believes it is 
unlikely Idaho will adopt a dual track procedure as required in Colorado. 
Second, it seems all of the states rejecting an exoneration-type rule have a 
'discovery' type rule in place related to their statutes of limitations. 
Order, pp. 9-10. Mr. Molen respectfully requests this Court adopt the exoneration rule 
based upon its previous reasoning and deny Christian's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Since this Court previously declined to rule specifically on the exoneration rule and 
instead held that "a material issue of fact exists whether that proof of Plaintiffs innocence 
was known before the 2014 discovery of conflicting statements made by the minor child 
witness, which were not disclosed by the prosecution," Mr. Molen will address that issue 
in the alternative. 
Christian argues under Idaho law, "the statute of limitations accrues on a 
professional malpractice action when 'some damage' has occurred, not when a potential 
plaintiff has 'objective proof of actual damage." Defendant's Memo., p. 17. While 
Christian is correct that a cause of action does not accrue until "some damage" has 
occurred, there must be objective proof that would support the existence of some actual 
damage. See City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 661 (2009) (recognizing "[i]n 
addition, there must be objective proof that would support the existence of some actual 
damage."). As this Court recognized, "[u]nder the Idaho civil malpractice rules, objective 
proof of some damage was required to start the accrual of the statute oflimitations." Order, 
p. 10. 
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Nevertheless, Christian contends that Mr. Molen had objective proof of damage 
when he was convicted and sentenced in his criminal case. Defendant's Memo., p. 17. 
According to Christian, "Molen had been asserting that Mr. Christian's actions - those 
actions on which Judge Owen's post-conviction relief was granted- caused him damage, 
since the time he was convicted in 2007 ... . "Id.at p. 18. Thus, according to Christian, 
Judge Owen's ruling granting Mr. Molen post-conviction relief based upon Christian's 
ineffective assistance has no bearing on this professional malpractice case because his 
ruling does not speak to when Mr. Molen suffered damages or whether Mr. Molen is 
actually innocent. Christian's analysis is incorrect. 
First, Mr. Molen has consistently maintained and asserted his actual innocence of 
the crime and that Christian's ineffective assistance resulted in Mr. Molen's conviction. 
That is to say, Mr. Molen was aware of Christian's negligent acts prior to being granted 
post-conviction relief by Judge Owen. However, as this Court correctly found: "it is not 
necessarily just the negligent act of the attorney which starts the accrual of the statute of 
limitations. There may be some external act after the fact which actually starts accrual." 
Order, p. 11. ( quoting and analyzing Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, 157 
Idaho 863, 868 (2015)). 
Second, Judge Owen's decision granting Mr. Molen's petition for post-conviction 
relief has substantial bearing on this case. When Judge Owen granted Mr. Molen's petition 
Mr. Molen had established his legal innocence of the crime. Mr. Molen's action for 
criminal legal malpractice did not accrue, for statute of limitations purposes, until he 
successfully obtained post-conviction relief. Prior to that date, there was no objective proof 
of some actual damage. See Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221 (1992). As recognized by this 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 13 
000277
Court, Order, p. 6, and discussed more thoroughly above, the exoneration rule is an issue 
of first impression in Idaho. 
This Court previously found: 
In this case, had evidence of the minor child's conflicting statements never 
been disclosed, or other evidence of innocence had not been obtained, 
Plaintiff would likely have remained in prison. He may still have been not 
guilty, but Plaintiff would have had no basis to conclude Defendant's 
negligence caused damages without this objective proof. 
Order, p. 11. Mr. Molen submits that a material issue of fact exists in this case concerning 
the date he obtained objective proof of some actual damage. The date of objective proof 
can be no earlier than January 21, 2014, when the district court in Mr. Molen's post-
conviction case ordered disclosure of all CARES records. It was only after that date that 
Mr. Molen obtained the undisclosed audio of the physical examination of the complaining 
witness. 
First, it was only after the discovery of the undisclosed audio that the State agreed 
to stipulate to an unqualified constitutional violation which warranted post-conviction 
relief, without requiring Mr. Molen enter an Alford Plea to a reduced charge. Had the 
district court followed the Stipulated Reasons filed on December 26, 2013, Mr. Molen 
would have no cause of action for criminal legal malpractice against Christian as he would 
be unable to establish Christian was the proximate cause of any damage. As the Court in 
Lamb explained, any damages to Mr. Molen would be the result of his decision to plead 
guilty. 
Further, the evidence and experts available to Mr. Molen prior to obtaining the 
undisclosed audio did not provide objective proof of some damage. Subsequent to his 
conviction Mr. Molen filed a motion for new trial on June 27, 2007, asserting several 
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grounds, including the unfairness of the late disclosure of the colposcopic photographs. 
Mr. Molen supported his motion for a new trial with affidavits of Dr. Friedlander (Aff. 
Points, Ex. D), and Dr. Guertin (Aff. Massoth, Ex. C). On October 30, 2007, Judge Carey 
denied the motion. Aff. Massoth, Ex. E. Judge Carey found that neither the State nor the 
defense was aware of the existence of the photographs until trial. Id. at p. 5. According to 
Judge Carey, the photographs were produced promptly after the disclosure and Dr. 
Friedlander testified that the photographs showed the absence of physical abuse. Id. Judge 
Carey concluded that the affidavits of Dr. Friedlander and Dr. Guertin, simply reiterated 
what Dr. Friedlander testified to at trial, were merely cumulative, and not likely to produce 
an acquittal. Id. at pp. 5-6. On December 26, 2013, Mr. Molen and the State filed the 
Stipulated Reasons agreeing that relief was appropriate based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel and a Brady violation concerning the colposcopic photograph. Attached to the 
Stipulated Reasons was the affidavit of Dr. Guertin (Aff. Massoth, Ex. C), a letter written 
by Dr. Friedlander to the Idaho Attorney General (Aff. Massoth, Ex. D), and Nurse 
Caruso's report (Aff. Massoth, Ex. A). After reviewing the stipulation, Judge Owen 
advised he would not grant the stipulated resolution. 
It was not until after Mr. Molen obtained and reviewed the undisclosed audio that 
Judge Owen granted Mr. Molen's petition. It is important to note that Judge Owen 
recognized Dr. Guertin as an expert in pediatric sexual abuse, and referenced the same 
affidavit that he, as well as Judge Carey, previously reviewed. Judge Owen also recognized 
Nurse Caruso as an expert in pediatric sexual abuse, and referred to her April 2014 affidavit 
that had been prepared subsequent to a review of the undisclosed audio and transcripts of 
the audio. The external act in this matter was obtaining and reviewing the undisclosed 
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audio. It supported Mr. Molen's claim based upon ineffective assistance. Prior to obtaining 
the undisclosed audio, Mr. Molen did not have an objective record of Alisa Ortega's 
physical examination which detailed the method she used in questioning and conducting 
the physical examination. The undisclosed audio served to further discredit Alisa Ortega's 
conclusions at trial and in her written report. Also, it assisted Nurse Caruso in providing a 
more complete assessment of the physical examination, and enhanced the credibility of 
Nurse Caruso and Dr. Guertin's evaluations and findings. As indicated by this Court, the 
undisclosed audio evidence of the complaining witness' statements and physical 
examination by Alisa Ortega was the objective proof of some damage. Had that evidence 
not been disclosed, Mr. Molen likely would have remained in prison despite his innocence. 
In this case, there was no objective proof of some actual damage until Mr. Molen 
obtained post-conviction relief. In the alternative, objective proof of some damage did not 
occur until Mr. Molen obtained and reviewed the undisclosed audio of the physical 
examination by Alisa Ortega. The date of objective proof can be no earlier than January 
21, 2014, when the district court in Mr. Molen's post-conviction case ordered disclosure 
of all CARES records. This is within the two year statute of limitations. Therefore, Mr. 
Molen submits that a material issue of fact exists in this case concerning the date he 
obtained objective proof of some actual damage. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Molen respectfully requests the Court deny 
Christian's motion for summary judgment. 
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DEMAND FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Christian previously filed a Motion to Dismiss in this case contending Mr. Molen's 
cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. After the parties submitted briefing 
on the issue and a hearing, this Court converted Christian's motion to a Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denied Christian's motion, concluding genuine issues of material 
of fact existed in this case. Christian's pending Motion for Summary Judgment is his 
second dispositive motion contending Mr. Molen' s cause of action is barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
Christian has failed to fetter out additional facts and/or a basis upon which to 
successfully seek summary judgment. Mr. Molen is left responding at his own expense. 
Rule 56( c) allows an award of attorney fees by the court to Mr. Molen. In Christian's first 
motion to dismiss, he supplemented his argument after hearing and argued that Lamb v. 
Manweiler required the additional element of actual innocence in a criminal malpractice 
case. This Court disagreed, and noted that the parties in Lamb simply did not dispute that 
issue. In this motion, Christian again asserts that the decision in Lamb confirms that actual 
innocence is an additional element and submits multiple exhibits from the Lamb 
proceedings. As set forth above, Christian's analysis is incorrect-the Idaho Supreme Court 
did not confirm that actual innocence is an additional element. In addition, Christian has 
argued in both motions that the statute of limitations accrued in this case when Mr. Molen 
was convicted, but has failed to provide any supporting documents which demonstrates 
Mr. Molen suffered objective proof of some damage. While Christian submitted post-trial 
documents concerning Mr. Molen's criminal case, he relies on the same arguments - Mr. 
Molen knew he was damaged at the time of conviction and Judge Owen's decision granting 
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post-conviction relief was inconsequential. Christian does not have a good faith basis upon 
which the second dispositive motion has been filed. Attorney fees should be awarded to 
Mr. Molen in being forced to respond. 
Dated this 2ist day of September, 2015. 
ELISA G. MASSOTH, PLLC. 
ELISA G. MASSOTH 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Michelle R. Points 
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Boise, ID 83702 
D U.S. Mail 
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1!5y HALEY MYERS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Payette ) 
Case No. CV-OC-15-03024 
AFFIDAVIT OF ELISA G. 
MASSOTH IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Your Affiant, Elisa G. Massoth, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
states as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF ELISA G. MASSOTH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1 
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1. I am an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho and represent Michael Scott 
Molen ("Mr. Molen") in the above-entitled action. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts of the underlying criminal case. 
3. On April 10, 2013, I filed a substitution of counsel for Mr. Molen 
concerning his pending petition for post-conviction relief in Boise County 
Case No. CV-11-124. 
4. The attachments submitted with this Affidavit are true and correct copies 
of the following: 
a. Exhibit A - Cari Caruso Report, December 7, 2013. 
b. Exhibit B - Statement of Stipulated Reasons to Resolve Post-
Conviction Case, December 10, 2013, Boise County Case No. 
CV-11-124. 
c. Exhibit C - Dr. Stephen R. Guertin Affidavit, October 24, 
2007, Boise County Case No. CR-05-1748. 
d. Exhibit D - Dr. Edward R. Friedlander Letter to Idaho 
Attorney General, December 1, 2008. 
e. Exhibit E - Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion for 
New Trial, October 30, 2007, Boise County Case No. CR-05-
1748. 
f. Exhibit F - Joint Stipulation of Facts and Points of Authority 
Related to Brady Material and a Motion for Summary 
Judgment in Favor of Petitioner, April 23, 2014, Boise County 
Case No. CV-11-124. 
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g. Exhibit G- Order Granting Motion for Discovery, January 21, 
2014, Boise County Case No. CV-11-124. 
h. Exhibit H- Cari Caruso Affidavit, April 21, 2014. 
Further your Affiant saith naught. 
Elisa G. Massoth 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this d { day of September, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21st day of September, 2015, I caused to be 
served, by the method(s) as indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Michelle R. Points 
420 W. Main, Ste. 206 
Boise, ID 83 702 
D U.S. Mail 
D 
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1 Date: 12-7- 13 
2 
3 Michael Scott Molen 
4 V 
5 State of Idaho 
6 Case #2011-0000124 
7 
8 Attorney: Elisa G. Massoth 
9 
T 
Forensic Nurse Professionals, Inc. 
Cari Caruso RN SANE- A 
4225 Valley Fair St. Suite #105 
Simi Valley, California 93063 
Office: 805 522-9939 Fax: 805 522-9936 
fnpi@sbcglobal.net 
10 I , Cari Caruso RN SANE-A, am a Registered Nurse, licensed in the State of California and 
11 Board Certified by the Forensic Nursing Certification Board, now called the Commission for 
12 Forensic Nursing Certification, as a Forensic Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner 
13 Adolescent/ Adult (SANE-A). I am currently a consultant for Mr. Molen's attorney. If called 
14 to testify to the facts stated herein, I would do so competently and objectively. 
15 Expert Qualifications: I have been a Registered Nurse, in good standing, since 1974. 
16 In my career, I have worked primarily in Emergency Department , Pediatrics, Pediatrics 
17 Emergency, and Woman's Health. charge nurse of a post-surgical unit , and time spent in GI 
18 Lab. I have been involved in forensic nursing since 1990. I have worked in 5 sexual assault 
19 programs and have been the director of two of those programs. 
20 I am currently a Board Certified Forensic Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner and in that 
21 capacity, I have conducted sexual assault evidentiary examinations on reported victims and 
22 suspects of sexual assault events, and have test ified at trial, as an expert witness for 
23 prosecution, relative to those cases. I am the owner of Forensic Nurse Professionals, Inc. , 
24 in Simi Valley, California where I continue my practice as a consultant , expert witness, and 
25 educator. 
26 I teach Forensic and Sexual Assault Examiner Courses for the University of California, 
27 Riverside, Extension, and for the American Institute of Forensic Education. Those courses 
28 include Adult , Adolescent, and Pediatric Forensic Examinations, Forensic Approaches to 
29 Human Abuse Injuries, and Forensic Implications: The Older Adult. I have served on the 
30 committee for the Sexual Assault Examiner Educational Guidelines for IAFN. 
31 Findings and observations as related to Documentation Reviewed: Although , I 
32 have no presumption or bias, there are elements that are very concerning regarding the 
33 genital findings in this case. There have been some serious and significant errors made in 
34 the interpretation of the reported genital findings. 
PLAINTIFF'S 
~ EXHIBIT 
~ A 
000286
1 The following are my comments regarding the forensic examiner's findings. 
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1. The physical examination of S.Z. is a normal genital and examination of a 
person of her age. There are no acute findings and the hymen is 
uninterrupted with smooth edges and no defects. This patient's genitalia is in 
transition from child anatomy into puberty. In this pre-pubescent stage the 
hymen begins to thicken, become 'fluffy.' elastic, and redundant or 
'fimbriated.' What redundant means is that the tissue begins to fold over on 
itself and become scalloped, and that is the finding which the examiner has 
identified as, 'Two old, well healed tears,' [Jury trial 6-19-07 page 469, L 
19]. The examiner has stated that they are 'clefts or a healed transection,' 
[Jury trial 6-19-07 p 740 LlO]. A healed transection can be identified by the 
observation of a gap which bisects the hymenal tissue. There is no such 
finding at that location. There are no tears at that location. The tissue is 
beginning to fold as it is becoming estrogenized. 
2. 1he examiner has identified a mound at the 6 o'clock position on the hymen 
as an abnormal finding. In transition, the hymen changes shape. As it 
changes, the tissue adjusts and forms a mound or a bump. This is a normal 
part of the anatomical physical development of the genitals. There is no 
physical evidence that there was ever any injury at that location. Mounds, 
clefts, and bumps are naturally occurring. 
3. In order for a prior healed injury to be identified, at a specific location , the 
acute injury must be observed and followed through to the healing stages 
and observe a scar at the exact same location, in order to be able to call it 
an injury or transection [Adams, 2005]. 
Findings Described in newborns or cmnmonly seen in non-abused 
children 
llPeriurethral or vestibular bands 
D Intravaginal ridges or columns 
DHymeneal tags or septal remnants 
Dlinea vestibularis 
DHymeneal bumps or mounds 
DHymeneal clefts in anterior (superior) hymen 
0Shallow/superficial notches in posterior rim of hymen 
In this case the patient was not examined at the acute phase in order to 
have observed an acute injury. The genital examination, of this patient, is a 
normal genital examination. 
4. The examiner has stated, [Jury trial 6-19-07, page 471 L 5] that, "At some 
point, in the child's life, something has gone through that hymen big enough 
to tear it." She also stated, •r believe it was blunt force, penetrating 
trauma," This is completely conjecture with absolutely no basis in fact. All 
the structures, in the genital examination, are normal without evidence of 
ever being penetrated. What the nurse believes should, at the very least, be 
based on some kind of scientific observation. 
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5. The nurse examiner's examination and her testimony regarding the protocol 
and procedures of a sexual assault examination, in the jury trial on 6-19-07, 
with the exception of some faulty and outdated information, was fairly 
reliable, from an academic standpoint. That is why it is so shocking to see 
how terribly she failed at the interpretation of the physical examination 
findings. She failed to recognize that the structures of the vulva were all 
within normal limits and that this was a normal examination. 
6. The examiner cited some literature during her testimony rn·s Normal to be 
Normal," Pediatrics, September 1, 1994, p 310 to317] and I implore the 
reader to note the date of that article. It is 1994; nearly 20 years old. 
Surely, the nurse examiner should have a more up to date reference which 
defines the characteristics of normal genitalia, growth and development, and 
asserts that mounds, bumps, and clefts are not diagnostic of sexual 
abuse/assault. Statistics do not assist in the accurate evaluation of physical 
findings. Failure to recognize normal findings is inexcusable. 
7. The examiner stated in testimony, [Jury trial 6-19-07, p 463 L I 3] that she 
is, nlooking for scarring and abnormalities." Perhaps, she felt obliged to find 
something to support the patient's history. We have no idea of the veracity 
of the patient's history. That is why it is extremely important to do an 
objective and nonbiased examination, regardless of the history told to us. It 
is not our role to believe or not to believe the patient history; it is our role 
to accurately document it. 
8. Clearly, there was some vital discovery which was not provided to the 
experts prior to trial. The photographs were not provided in a timely manner 
and, even at this point in time, I am not convinced that we have all the 
materials created in relation to this examination and patient. Most every 
State, County, or SANE Program has specific forms to use for the 
documentation of forensic sexual assault examinations, with information 
provided by the patient, as well as diagrams for the examiner to list and 
describe the findings. I have not yet seen such a document. If defense had 
utilized an expert, perhaps, that expert would have inquired about obtaining 
the exam photographs and any and all materials related to this case and 
examination. 
9. When it is documented [CARES History and Physical report], that, "The 
patient prefers to answer questions by shaking or nodding her head." That 
tells me that the patient was not providing a narrative account, in her own 
words, of the alleged history. It means that the patient is responding to 'yes' 
or 'no' questions and perhaps, reacting to suggested questions and answers 
by not utilizing open ended questions. 
10. There is nothing in this forensic genital examination that could confirm, with 
certainty, whether there was or ever had been any penetration or acute or 
healed tears or sexual contact of any kind. The examining nurse described 
her findings as, "Indeterminate/ and as, "Blunt force penetrating trauma, 
often seen in sexual assault." [CARES History and Physical and Jury Trial 6-
19-07, p 467 L 14] Those statements ore contradictory. If a finding is 
'indeterminate' it means that the finding is non-specific and the origin or 
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causation of that finding is unknown and could be from sexual abuse or other 
mechanisms. This patient had a normal exam with no suspicious findings. A 
patient having no findings could mean that something occurred that left no 
marks, something occurred that has completely healed leaving no marks, or it 
could mean that there was no sexual contact, at all. There are no physical 
findings that are diagnostic of sexual contact or anything to support the 
history. 
11. This was a non-acute examination, which means it is beyond the time frame 
for collection of biological samples or having recent visible findings of injury, 
should there have been any. There is no way to attribute the nurse 
examiner's so-called findings to any alleged event(s). 
In this case, there are no genital findings to support the history of genital 
contact. The nurse examiner failed to recognize the normal growth and 
development of the transitioning hymen in the prepubertal patient. The 
nurse examiner's findings of 'deep notches,' the significance of, 'a mound at 6 
o'clock,' and 'healed tears,' are grossly exaggerated and incorrectly 
overstated. It would be inexcusable if this case was propelled forward due 
solely to the flawed and erroneous genital evaluation by this nurse examiner. 
22 Summary: Genital or anal findings, by a nurse examiner, can not substantiate force 
23 or confirm that a sexual assault occurred. 
24 Absence of genital findings cannot attest that a sexual assault did or did not occur. 
25 When so much time has passed since the alleged event, and there are no physical findings, 
26 there is no evidence to support a history that penetration ever occurred. 
27 Findings may not always be related to the event for which the patient is being examined. 
28 There are many conditions that are natural occurrences and non-sexual in nature. The 
29 examining nurse must be very discriminating, objective, and aware of the possibility that 
30 other conditions may exist and not be related to a reported event. It is essential that the 
31 examiner be objective and has in depth, current knowledge of anatomy and physiology, and 
32 growth and development, and avoids statements that could be construed as biased. 
33 
34 
35 
36 Cari Caruso RN SANE-A 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
My opinion may not be limited to the statements above. I reserve the right to modify these 
opinions should significant additional information be received. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
V. 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2011-0000124 
STATEMENT OF STIPULATED 
REASONS TO RESOLVE POST-
CONVICTION CASE 
Petitioner Michael Scott Molen, by and through his attorney Elisa G. Massoth of 
the firm Elisa G. Massoth, PLLC and Boise County Prosecutor Ian Gee and Deputy 
Prosecutor Jay Rosenthal have submitted for the Court' s consideration a binding Rule 11 
Plea Agreement that would result in the resolution of this post-conviction case. The 
Court has asked the parties to provide justification for this proposed resolution. This brief 
provides the primary reasons upon which the parties, believe the proposed resolution is in 
the interest of justice. Additionally, Boise County Prosecutors have contacted S.Z. as the 
complaining party in the original criminal case and her mother Tiffany Davidson. They 
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approved a resolution and expressed desire not to cooperate further with the prosecution 
of Mr. Molen. 
INTRODUCTION 
The underlying Second Amended Post-Conviction Petition includes a multitude 
of allegations and grounds for post-conviction release. The most significant are 
explained in this briefmg with key supporting corroboration attached in the form of 
Exhibits A-H. It is the parties' intention to explain why it is in the interest of justice to 
resolve this matter in a format that focuses on the primary issues in the Second Amended 
Post-Conviction Petition. Additionally in making these arguments the parties note that 
although Mr. Molen filed a direct appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court after his conviction, 
the issues that are discussed in this brief were not matters placed before the appellate 
court because they are matters properly raised in post-conviction. Were this matter to 
proceed, the parties believe that the issues would be properly addressed in a time 
consuming and costly evidentiary hearing that would require extensive discovery and 
expert testimony. 1 The resources required to engage in such a process have been a part of 
the consideration of all parties. 
LEGAL BASIS 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act Idaho § 19-4901 provides a remedy is 
available when a petitioner proves: 
1 There are 4 defense experts at this time: Dr. Esplin, Dr. Friedlander, Dr. Guertin, and Cari 
Caruso--SANE nurse. Each of these experts maintain a finn belief that Mr. Molen was 
wrongfully convicted. For three of the experts it has been 7 years that they have held this 
belief and have not changed their position. The newest expert, Ms. Caruso, maintains the 
same position. 
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(1) that the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution 
of the United States or the Constitution of the laws of this state and ... 
(4) that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously 
presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or 
sentence in the interest of justice . . . . 
In this case Mr. Molen's Petition for Post-Conviction is supported with evidence that his 
conviction is in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights to effective 
assistance of counsel and due process. There is also "evidence of material facts, not 
previously presented and heard". Each of these is addressed in turn below. 
I. Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
Trial counsel for Mr. Molen was Ron Christian.2 Ron Christian received 
disciplinary action by the Idaho State Bar for his conduct involved in this case. The most 
problematic of Mr. Christian's conduct was the depths of his alcoholism at the time that 
he was supposed to be preparing and investigating the facts of the case for trial. Attached 
as Exhibit A is the record from the Idaho State Bar regarding the disciplinary action taken 
against Mr. Christian. It can be seen from the disciplinary action that not only were there 
ethical problems with how he handled Mr. Molen's case, but other clients were affected 
as well. Other attachments corroborating Mr. Christian's inability to adequately prepare 
for trial include records of his two DUI arrests during the pendency of Mr. Molen's case 
(prior to trial), attached as Exhibit B, and a copy of notes that were made by Mr. 
Christian when he was extremely intoxicated and preparing with the Molen' s for trial. 
See Exhibit C. Rather than meet and prepare with experts, interview critical witnesses, or 
2 Mr. Molen also retained the services of attorney Gar Hackney as his first trial date 
approached and Mr. Christian's alcoholism was so severe. Gar Hackney was suffering 
from brain cancer at the time (the Molens did not know this) and did not actually end up 
able to assist at trial. He did witness Mr. Christian's drunkenness during trial preparation. 
In fact, Gar Hackney was the attomey who secured the expert services of Dr. Esplin when 
he realized that the expert Ron Chrisltian had Mr. Molen pay to retain, Dr. Charles Honts, 
was not properly disclosed or qualified for the issues in the trial. 
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follow up with lUliesolved motions in limine and unanswered subpoena duces tecums, 
Mr.Christian drank. He never adequately investigated or prepared Mr. Molen's case for 
trial. 
At the first trial setting in this case, Mr. Christian appeared for trial intoxicated 
and was unable to proceed. He was taken to the Boise County Sheriffs Office where he 
blew a .32/.33. He admitted himself into in-patient treatment prior to the second trial 
setting and was monitored by the Idaho State Bar. 3 After in-patient treatment Mr. 
Christian continued to drink. In order to pass the urine tests that he was subjected to he 
would drink Noni Juice. Southwest Associates would call him and give him notice that 
he needed to provide a urine sample, Mr. Christian would drink Noni Juice and he would 
pass the urine test. Also during this time frame, Mr. Christian was so intoxicated that he 
passed out, urinated on himself and an ambulance had to be called to assist him. Gar 
Hackney was a witness to this incident and told Mr. Molen that he would report it to the 
Idaho State Bar. 
To convince Mr. Molen that he was capable of handling the trial, Mr. Christian 
asked the Molens to move in with him. Two weeks prior to trial they did. They took Mr. 
Christian to AA/NA meetings but continued to find empty bourbon and vodka bottles 
hidden in the bathroom and other cupboards of the house. Molens lived with Mr. 
Christian for a period of time prior to the second trial. During this time frame Mr. 
Christian, again, did not prepare expert witnesses, prepare himself to cross examine the 
3 Mr. Christian did offer to withdraw from the case at that time and return fees. However, 
there were no fees in Trust. Mr. Christian did not have fees to return to Mr. Molen. Mr. 
Molen had liquidated his assets to pay for experts, fly experts to Idaho for the trial that Mr. 
Christian appeared drunk for, pay investigators, pay Mr. Christian, and pay Mr. Hackney. 
He did not have funds to retain a new attorney to prepare for a trial, especially when 
experts had to be flown to Idaho again for a second trial. 
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state expert witnesses, or interview key witnesses that were supposed to testify at trial. 
From the time Mr. Christian was out of inpatient treatment (the end of March of 2007), 
he had a mere two months to prepare for a second set jury trial. He did not maintain 
sobriety. 
During the week of trial he stayed in Boise County in a motel room. Attached as 
Exhibit D is an Affidavit by Scott Molen indicating that he not only smelled alcohol on 
his trial counsel's breath during trial but also received comments from Mr. Christian's 
secretary that Mr. Christian would be better if he was able to take a few "nips" of alcohol. 
Also attached as Exhibit D is an Affidavit of Connie Molen stating that she observed Ron 
Christian under the influence of alcohol during the trial of Scott Molen. Mr. Christian 
did represent on the record to Judge Carey that he was not consuming alcohol. However, 
during the week of trial he was staying in a motel in Boise County and there was no 
actual breath or urine analysis done. Substantiation of Mr. Christian's odd behavior 
during the course of trial can be found in Dr. Phil Esplin's Affidavit wherein he explains 
how Mr. Christian did not prepare him as an expert for trial and refused to return his 
phone calls even though he had flown into Idaho to testify. See Exhibit E. 
As noted in Dr. Esplin's Affidavit, Mr. Christian's alcoholism impacted his ability 
to prepare adequately for trial with expert witnesses. Another expert witness that Mr. 
Christian did not adequately prepare was Dr. Freidlander. Attached as Exhibit F is a 
letter from Dr. Freidlander written after Mr. Molen's conviction. Dr. Freidlander wrote 
this letter to the Idaho Attorney General (handling prosecutor Justin Whatcott's boss at 
the time) pleading for a review of Mr. Molen's conviction and expressing grave concerns 
about pictures of the hymen that were disclosed during the trial. In Dr. Freidlander's 
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testimony it was apparent that he had more communication with the Prosecutor Mr. 
Whatcott than with defense counsel. Mr. Freidlander started his testimony with his 
discussions regarding his communication with the State and ended his testimony by 
acknowledging that he had not had communications with Mr. Christian other than just 
prior to trial that day. This is very important because the State had failed to disclose 
photographs taken of the hymen of S.V.4 
The testimony related to the photographs of the hymen was impacted by Mr. 
Christian's failure to adequately prepare his experts. Additionally, it was ineffective on 
Mr. Christian's part to not immediately move for a mistrial or immediately request for a 
continuance based on the late disclosure of the only physical evidence in the case. Mr. 
Christian was ill-equipped to properly cross-examine Alisa Ortega (the nurse who 
examined S.Z.) in part because he was surprised by the late disclosure of the photographs 
and in part because he failed to communicate with his expert who would have prepared 
him in proper cross-examination of her. 
Attached as Exhibit G is an Affidavit of Dr. Stephen Guertin. Because of the 
late disclosure of the photographs of the hymen, the only physical evidence that was 
available in this case, a pediatric gynecologist, or other appropriate medical expert was 
not retained by the defense. Therefore, after the conviction of Mr. Molen, the defense 
obtained the expertise of Dr. Stephen Guertin. His Affidavit is attached as Exhibit G and 
indicates that he would have contradicted Alisa Ortega's testimony. 
4 The Prosecutor Justin Whatcott did not fail to disclose these photographs intentionally, 
rather the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare had been difficult throughout the 
pretrial proceedings in responding to court orders and subpoenas regarding the evidence 
in this case. Mr. Whatcott called Alisa Ortega, the examining nurse as a State witness, and 
at that time all parties learned that there were photographs that neither the State nor the 
defense had received. 
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The parties agree that the combination of the very serious issues presented by 
ineffective preparation and investigation by trial counsel warrant post-conviction relief on 
the grounds that Mr. Molen's Constitutional rights were violated. This relief is warranted 
based either on ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of due process, or both. 
II. Material Evidence Not Heard 
The late disclosure of the hymen photographs are grounds for post-conviction 
relief on the basis of Constitutional violations of Mr. Molen through due process and/or 
Brady violation as well as material evidence not heard. 
To begin with, it is important to note, as discussed earlier, that in a pretrial motion 
for underlying criminal action the first prosecutor Theresa Gardunia subpoenaed the 
CARES records. There was actually a hearing held in front of Judge Stricklen about the 
production of these records. CARES not only ignored the subpoenas but did not appear 
in court for the hearing related to their production. CARES was subpoenaed both by the 
State and by the defense. Mr. Christian did not ever follow-up on this and the only 
evidence that was produced by CARES was an interview of S.V. and some portion of the 
examination report by Alisa Ortega. While Dr. Esplin and Dr. Freidlander testified that 
based on their experience it was common for photographs to be taken in an exam in a 
sexual abuse case, they were both told that no such photographs existed. Dr. Freidlander 
specifically testified that he was handed the photographs for review the day of his 
testimony and that he disputed Alisa Ortega's testimony that there were deep notches but 
most importantly would defer to a pediatric gynecologist. The jury did not hear from a 
defense expert with those credentials. Had such an expert been presented, the material 
evidence that they would have heard was testimony from Dr. Guertin that contrary to 
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Alisa Ortega's testimony about S.V.'s hymen, there were not deep notches and he 
disagreed with her assessment. See Exhibit G 
To further illustrate the problematic nature of this testimony, attached is the most 
recent review of a SANE nurse out of California, Cari Caruso. Exhibit H is a copy of her 
curriculum vitae as well as her report related to the review of the photographs and the 
testimony that was heard by the jury. Ms. Caruso disputes the accuracy of Alisa Ortega's 
review on the following grounds: 
1) The report is missing a standard examination form used in Idaho; 
2) The report that was produced contains very important inconsistencies; 
and 
3) The testimony of Alisa Ortega was that there were deep notches or 
findings of trauma to the hymen. Cari Caruso vehemently disputes this 
conclusion and explains why in her report. 
CONCLUSION 
The parties agree that the information contained in this Statement of Reasons, 
while not the only issues raised in Mr. Molen's Petition, nor the only problematic areas of 
the underlying case, are significant grounds and warrant post-conviction relief. While this 
may be a unique case in that both parties agree that post-conviction relief is warranted, it 
is not an anomaly. 5 Mr. Molen has never admitted guilt or confessed to the underlying 
5 Ms. Massoth consulted with Brad Andrews of the Idaho State Bar regarding post-
conviction stipulated resolutions as a result of attorney conduct. Mr. Andrews gave the 
example that attorney Robert Pangburn who was disbarred had several cases which 
resulted In post conviction relief stipulated by the parties. Additionally, he has seen 
several cases across the state of Idaho where conduct that warrants disciplinary action 
such as Mr. Christian's in this case, resulted in post conviction relief that the attorneys 
agreed to short of a full evidentiary hearing and further appeal. 
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facts of his conviction. He has always maintained his innocence. The proposed binding 
Rule 11 agreement, which involves an alford plea to felony injury to child because facts 
exist upon which a jury could convict, is middle ground that allows relief that is in the 
interest offi-
Dated thi day of December, 2013 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
f!i 
Dated thi?~ay of December, 2013 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the) ~ day of December 2013, I caused a true 
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Boise County Prosecutor 
Ian Gee 
Deputy Prosecutor Jay Rosenthal 
406 Montgome1')' St. 
Idaho City, Idaho 83631 
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o Fedel'al Express 
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Boise, Idaho 83707 
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Fax (208) 336-2088 
Attorney for Defendant 
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lN-TH"E DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FOURIB JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COO:NTY BOISE 
STATEOFIDAH:O, 
Pla5rttiff. 
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' MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN~ 
Defendant. 
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Case No. CR2005-l 748 
AFFmA VIT OF :OR. STEPHEN R. 
GUERTIN 
Stephen R. Guertin being :first duty sworn, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. I am over tll,i:, age of majtltity, a:rn comp~tent to testify, and make this affidavit on 
personal knowledge. 
2. I am a physician specializing in pediatric care and fot more than 20 years have 
been e-xamining children suspected of having b~ $~~ally abused. 
3. I have had the oppC>rtunity to review the five colposoopic photographs that were 
done on Savannah Zenor. They ar~ of e:x:.cellent quality. 
4. These photographs show a very typical mildly irregular po~terior rim 
.<!·, 
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configuration hymen. Th~ is a fairly prominent bump fu>ro the 5:00 to 6:00 position. The 
hym~nal edge is completely unintern+pted and is completely and Wc.11 YisW\lizcd. There are llO 
notches, clefts, tears, lacerations1 scars, distortions or areas of marked focal narrowing. There is 
no evidence of venereal disease. 
5. An irregular hymen is found in up to 44% of oases of normal chil~en who have 
not been aouaed: 
6. Asymmetry of the hymenal orifice is t)'pical; in fact this is present in 
ap~:roxima.Jely SO% or more-'of no:nnal children. 
I 
7. In Savannah's case, approximately 2S% of the introitns is coveted by hymen 
which is found in between 25% and 40% of normal children. The prese11ce of a bump or mound 
is seen in up to 33% ofnoJIDal Qhildren. 
8, Alth.ougb I do not see aQtual mes.Eluremente, the gr~dually con~ve areas at 3;30 
and at 9:00, where ther~ is relative naIJ:Owing, do not havi;: the shatp angulation nor arc they deep 
enough to be oharaeterized as acroa.l notches. Also, the hymen in that location appi::iars to still be 
arteast 1.0 mm or gi"Caterin width. 
9. In other words1 you ~ve a nonnal shaped hym~. You have it:fegalarity of the 
hymen which is normal. You have a bump or mound of the hymen which is normal. You have 
~c!t12I co:nfavities which are normal. You do I;LQt h,ave e,x~sive fq~al ttatre>W'in,g (~g~in 
nonual). The eombfuation of all of these nomi.al findings adds up to. a normal exam. 
10. One of the purposei, oftalcingpb,otos is to allow for a.review of them by someone 
who was not the ~- I am co~pletely co~fident that an academic rerview of thefle 
pbotographsi will conolude that what is seen on thettt is norm.al. 
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December 1, 2008 
Lawrence Wasden, Idaho Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
700 West State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Dear Attorney General Wasden: 
This letter"is my request that you allow a ,new trial for Michael 
Scott Molen, who is incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional 
Center. Although I was a participant in the proceedings, this 
letter is written from the point of view of a concerned citizen. 
Mr. Wasden, I am writing partly on behalf of Mr. Molen, but also 
for your own sake. You have the opportunity to be remembered 
in legal history as a man of courage and integrity. 
Over the past few decades, the scientific community has 
learned a great deal about the tricks our minds can- play on us. 
There is also a scientific consensus that emotion, in the 
absenc:e of physical evidence, has resulted in numerous 
miscarriages of justice. 
As .an attorney, you are surely familiar with the two mental 
health frauds of the late 1900's ("recovered memories" and 
"facilitated communication"). The refereed medical literature 
reaffirms that these resulted in wrongful convictions. We also 
know that the wrong kind of questioning can produce false 
memories, even fantastic untruths. When the history is finally 
written, future generations will honor those men and women 
-who had the courage to stand up for common sense against 
paparazzi junk science. And we also laud those who have 
helped the many men wrongfully convicted of rape who have 
proved their innocence by DNA technology. 
As a medical student, I learned how to try to get the truth from 
patients. As an interested observer, I have watched forensic 
interviewing of children begin to catch up with medicine. I 
believe we are progressing away from the era of asking leading 
questions, of believing all accusations, and of taking all denials 
as "proof that the child is in denial." Again , there is an honored 
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place in history for those who sought the truth; rather than what was politically 
expedient. 
Mr. Wasden, I am still shocked by the clear injustice surrounding my 
participation in the Moten trial. I was ~rst told.that the photos were not available, 
which would have been a breach of the standard of care for a practi,tioner. Then 
they appeared during the trial. I was allowed to examine the photographs of the 
child's "injuries" only about an hour before I testified. Surety this should not have 
happened. As soon as I saw them, it was clear to me that the examining nurse 
had misinterpreted the findings. One "lesion" was the edge of a simple mound. 
The other was a fold that could have been revealed as such with a proper exam 
(i.e., a bit of water on a Q-tip.) Despite the child claiming that she had been fully 
penetrated ten or twelve times over the course of one year. she was a fully intact 
virgin. Surely a jury of grown-ups would realize the absurdity. 
As a pathologist, I have built a career largely on the examination of tissue - at the 
bedside, in the autopsy suite, in the surgical processing area, under the 
microscope, and in photographs. I know the nuances and the pitfalls. J can 
distinguish a scar, a fold, and a minor birth anomaly, regardless of location. I 
was right, and the nurse examiner was wrong. 
What should have happened is this. I should have been allowed to review the 
findings beforehand. Defense would then have obtained the services of an 
expert pediatric gynecologist to verify that I was right. I am not a lawyer, but I 
believe that had this happened, the outcome would probably have been different. 
As soon as it became clear that there was a new issue involving the 
interpretation of the findings, my sense is that a mistrial should have been called. 
Common sense says this alone is a denial of justice. 
I am not going to address what I have heard about Mr. Christian being drunk in 
court. I took vacation time to come to Idaho, but I was not paid the honorarium 
Mr. Christian promised after my trip, though Ms. Molen says she gave it to Mr. 
Christian. When I spoke with the prosecutor and his teammate on the phone 
prior to visiting Idaho, everything was cordial, and he was obviously sincere in his 
belief in Mr. Molen's guilt because he found the child's testimony conviDcing. I 
forgive him for questioning my character and credentials in his closing statement, 
and I hope that he, too, will want to see a retrial. What I would like most is to get 
a panel of physicians together and reach a consensus beforehand, as I have 
done in other cases. 
Mr. Wasden, once again this letter is largely written out of concern for you as a 
professional. Of course, this is pro bona, as will anything I do in the future for Mr. 
Molen_ As you know, North Carolina prosecutor Mike Nifong was disbarred tor 
. \ 
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withholding evidence from the defense in a sex-crime case based on 
uncorroborated, false testimony. As America comes to her senses about 
convictions based on uncorroborated child testimony, I want you to be 
remembered as having taken the· right course of action. 
Thank you for your consideration. If you have any questions, please do not 
hesitate to phone me at 816-283-2208. 
Sincerely, 
9-tf W 
Edward R. Friedlander, M.D. 
Chairman, Department of Pathology 
State ofill&_,~unty~~ 
$: ore me on titisci.PJ!. day · 
of by-----~ 
"NOTARY SEAL., 
· Stephanie Keen, Notary Public 
Ola)' County, State of Mls!lour! 
My Commlaalon Elcplr9811 /18/2012 
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C 
CASE NO. CR2005-i748 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
CONCERNING MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
Defendant Michael Molen was charged with and convicted by a jury of one count of lewd 
conduct with a child under the age of sixteen. 
The defendant has filed a motion for a new trial asserting a number of grounds. 
The court has wide discretion to grant or refuse a new trial, but it must perceive the issue as 
one of discretion, it must act within the outer bounds of its discretion, it must act consistently with 
applicable legal standards, and it must reach its decision by an exercise of reason. See, State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 P .2d 1331 (1989). The court may grant a new trial in a criminal case if 
required m the interest of justice. ICR Rule 34. The statutory grounds are as follows: 
1. When a felony trial is lrnld in tl;ie absence of the defendant; 
2. When tl:i.e jury has received evidence out of court other than a view of the premises; 
3. When the jury has separated withoµt leave of court after retirmg for deliberation;· 
4. When the jury has-b~en guilty of any misconduct by which a fair and just consideration of 
the case has been prevented; 
5. When the verdict has been decided by lot or any means other than a fair expression of 
CRIM\NEWTRIAL.MOLEN 
DEPUTY 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
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ophtl~~~ the part of the .... jur-or_s_; 
6. When the court has misdirected the juty; 
7. When the-court has erred in a decision of law during the trial; 
8. When the verdict is contrary to law or evidence; 
9; When new evidence is discovered material to the defendant, which he could not with 
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at trial. 
I.C. Section 19-2406. 
It is an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial for a reason that is not delineated by statute or 
to grant or d¥ny a new trial manifestly contrary to the interest of justice. State v. Gomez, 126 
Idaho 83, 86,878 P.2d 782 (1994). The "interest of justice", however, is not an independent ground 
for a new trial. Rather it simply states the standard the court must apply when it considers applicable 
statutory grounds for a new trial. State v. Cantu, 129 Idaho 673, 931 P.2d 1191 (1997). 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED UPON CONTENTION THAT THE VERDICT WAS 
CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. 
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support ajuryverdictis challenged by a motion for a 
new trial, the test is whether there was substantialevidence from which the trier of fact could have 
found each of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Olsen, 119 Idaho 370, 
806 P.2d 963 (Ct. App. 1991). Itis true that the evidence in this case, as presentedbyhothsides, was 
in conflict. Nevertheless there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have found each 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The motion based on this ground is denied. 
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MonoN FOR NEW TRIAL BASED uroN siATENl\IBms coNcERNING 
. DEFENSE COUNSEL 
In bis motion the defendant asserts that "the jury was prejudiced by incorrect statements 
regarding defense counsel to the extent that Defendant was denied a fair trial." This is not a 
statutory ground for a new trial. 
The motion based on this ground is denied. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Ineffective assistance of counsel is not a ground for granting a new trial under ICR Rule 34 
and I.C. Section 19-2604. It is an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial on that basis. See. e.g., 
State v. Cantu; State v. Gomez. Ineffective assistance of counsel properly is raised on appeal or, 
more typically, on a petition for post-conviction relief. 
The motion: based on this ground is denied. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON JUROR MISCONDUCT OR RECEIPT OF 
EVIDENCE OUTSIDE OF COURT 
Before a new trial may be ordered o'n the basis of jury misconduct, the defendant must show 
by clear and convincing evidence that misconduct by one or more jurors occurred, and the trial court 
must be convinced that the misconduct reasonably could have prejudiced the defendant. State v. 
Sieber, 117 Idaho 637, 791 i>.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1989). 
According to the affidavit of Jan Fowler, she witnessed on June 19th ''Daniel Holt and 
Nicole Holt, witnesses for the prosecution, speaking with sever.al members of the jury during a 
break in the trial." The defendant has not presented any evidence of the nature of the conversation 
or conversations. 
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and their infant were sitting outside the courthouse while waiting to testify. During a recess a male 
juror commented to Ms. Holt and her husband_·tb.at their baby was "smiley and cute." Neither Mr. 
Holt nor Ms. Holt told the juror that they were potential witnesses, nor did either of them discuss 
with the juror any of the facts of the case. Neither of the Holts had any other contact with any 
juror. 
Recognizing that the court has an obligation to determine whether there has been a 
showing that prejudice reasonably could have occurred, Leavitt v. Swain, 133 Idaho 624, 629, 991 
P.2d 349-(1999), there is no credible evidence to suggest juror misconduct, and there is nothing to 
suggest any prejudice to the defendant from a juror's innocent comment to potential witnesses that · 
they had a "smiley and cute" baby. Likewise there is nothing to suggest that a juror received 
evidence outside the court. 
The motion based on this ground is denied. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
The defendant contends that there is newly discovered evidence entitling him to ~ new trial 
under Idaho statutes and rules. I.C. § 19-2406(7); ICR Rule 34. In order to prevail the defendant must 
show: 
1. The evidence is newly discovered and was unk:noWn to the defendant prior to trial; 
2. The evidence was material and not merely cumulative or impeachlng; 
3. The evidence probably will pr?duce an acquittal; 
4. The failure to learn, of the evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant 
or his attorney. 
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State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6,909 P.2d 624 (1995). 
The defendant argues that testimony from a Mr. Ben Carmack is newly discovered and 
probably would produce an acquittal. The record, however, shows that Mr. Carmack was known to 
the defendant's attorney as early as January 2007, because the defense attorney listed him as a 
potential witness on that date. Furthermore the defense~ not presented the court with an affidavit 
from Mr. Carmack of the nature of bis testimony, as required by LC. Section 19-2406(7). 
The defendant also argues that the state failed to disclose exculpatory evidence until the last 
day of trial. This is not a ground for new trial under the ~pplicable statute. Assuming, however, that it 
implicates a claim of newly discovered evidence, the court will review the issue. 
It appears that photographs of a colposcopic exam of the.victim were taken by Alisa Ortega of 
the St. Luke's Regional Medical Center CARES unit. This is a unit of a private hospital and not an 
agency of the state. Prior to trial the state served the hospital with a subpoena duces tecum for all 
documents and records relating to the victim. The hospital did not include the photographs with its 
response, and neither the i,tate nor the defendant was aware of the existence of the photographs. 
On June 19th, Ms. Ortega testified at trial about the existence of the photographs. This was the 
first time either side learned of the photographs. On June 20th the state served St. Luke's with another 
subpoena du.ces tecum. It obtained tb.e11hotogr@hs from St. Luke's and provided them to defense 
counsel on the same day. On the following day the defendant called bis medical expert, Dr. 
Friedlander, to testify. Dr. Friedlander testified at length about Ms. Ortega's examination of the victim 
and about the absence of physical evidence of abuse in the photogr~phs. 
Since that time the defendant has supplied additional affidavits from Dr. Friedlander and from 
another medical expert, Dr. Stephen Guertin. The affidavits reiterate what Dr. Friedlander stated to 
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the jury at tdal. To the extent the foregoing scenario may be treated as newly dis~vered evidence, the 
new evidence is merely cumulative of testimony preseij.\ed at trial and not 1ikely to produce an 
acquittal. 
The motion based on this ground is denied. 
ORDER 
For ail the foregoing reasoliS, the defendant's motion for a new trial is DENIED. 
October 30, 2007 
~M ... ~ George . Carey, SeniorDi.strictfuc}ge 
_,· 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Case No. CV 2011-0000124 
Plaintiff, 
DEPUTY 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND 
POINTS OF AUTHORITY RELATED 
TO BRADY MATERIAL AND A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
PETITIONER 
Petitioner, Michael Scott Molen, by and though his attorney Elisa G. Massoth, 
PLLC moves for summary judgment related to the isolated issue of Brady v. Maryland. 
The motion is supported by the stipulated set of facts and points of law set forth below 
along with the affidavits of Ron Christian, former trial counsel, Cari Caruso, pediatric 
nurse practitioner, and Elisa G. Massoth. Respondent, State ofldaho, joins in the motion 
and stipulates to the set of facts included. Should this case not resolve on this Brady 
issue, the parties agree that all remaining claims raised in the Petition for Post Conviction 
may proceed. Respondent stipulates to the set of facts included in this motion. 
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL IDSTORY 
I 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
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A jury convicted Mr. Molen on June 22, 2007 of Lewd Conduct with a minor in 
front of the Honorable G.D. Carey in State v.Molen, CR-2005-0001748. Judge Carey 
sentenced Mr. Molen to 8 years fixed, 12 years indeterminate for a unified term of 20 
years. Mr. Molen filed a Motion for a New Trial on June 29, 2007 which was denied on 
October 30, 2007, and he was sentenced on January 4, 2008. He filed an Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 Motion which was denied on May 21, 2008 and appealed to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. A Petition for Post Conviction followed in this case alleging numerous state and 
federal constitutional violations. On December 8, 2013 the parties files a Stipulated 
Statement of Reasons to resolve the post conviction case and underlying criminal case. 
The Court rejected the stipulation and requested that the parties present evidence 
supporting their joint concerns about the underlying conviction. A Motion for Discovery 
filed by Petitioner was pending and the parties stipulated to conduct certain depositions 
and subpoena certain records. The Court entered an Order based on the stipulation for 
discovery. 
An evidentiary hearing was schedule for April 28-29, 2014. In the process of 
discovery, records from Children at Risk Evaluation Services ("CARES") were 
subpeoned. The deposition of Mandi White, Alisa Ortega, and Ron Christian were 
scheduled. CARES complied and produced, among other records, an audio recording of . 
Alisa Ortega's physical examination of S.Z., the victim in the underlying criminal case. 
The audio recording is Brady material that had never been disclosed. 
At status conference on April 7, 2014, the parties notified the Court of the new 
development and how it related to the Brady issue raised in the Second Amended Post 
Conviction Petition. This matter is scheduled for oral argument on April 28, 2014. 
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Rather than proceed to a full evidentiary hearing on all matters, the parties submit that the 
Brady issue is dispositive. Should this court find otherwise, Mr. Molen will proceed with 
all underlying post conviction claims. 
BRADY ISSUE 
In the Second Amended Petition Mr. Molen asserts that his right to a fair trial was 
denied when CARES failed to disclose colposcope photographs prior to jury trial in 
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Within the argument Mr. Molen 
pied facts and attached expert affidavits explaining the prejudicial nature of late 
disclosure of the photographs and how such impacted the trial. He also pled generally a 
denial of due process and a fair trial on state and federal constitutional grounds. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
I) Mr. Molen raised a state and federal constitutional due process claim in 
the form of a Brady claim in his Second Amended Petition for Post 
Conviction and the matters pertaining to this Motion for Summary 
Judgment have been timely and adequately raised. 
2) Children are referred to CARES only by child protective services, law 
enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and the court. On the St. Luke's 
website related to CARES it states: "[r]eferrals cannot be taken directly 
from parents, counselors, attorneys, or others. Such concerns will be 
directed to Child Protective Services or law enforcement agencies." See 
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Affidavit of Elisa G. Massoth ("Massoth Aff. "), Exhibit 1 and Affidavit 
of Ron Christian ("Christian Aff. ") 
3) In 2005, at the inception of this case, CARES did the forensic 
investigation and physical examination based on a law enforcement 
referral. See Massoth Aff. Exhibit 2 CARES file, tracking sheet related 
to S.Z. 
4) On November 9, 2005 CARES tracking form for S.Z. notes that a full 
written record and video tape, per a subpoena was sent to Theresa 
Gardunia. No other records are noted as having been sent out related to 
S.Z. on this form. Id. 
5) CARES received multiple subpeones after November 5, 2011 in this 
case and failed to comply. Id. See also Transcript of Hearing on Motion 
to Dismiss and Christian Aff. Exhibit C. 
6) The subpeones included requests to produce documents or appear at 
court and CARES neither provided complete documentation nor 
appeared at court. Id. 
7) CARES had on file a release signed by S.Z. 'smother Tiffany Davidson 
granting them permission to release their materials to the governmental 
agency involved in investigating the case. Tammy Kennedy, Boise 
County Sheriff's Department was listed as the referring agency. Id at 
Bates 8. 
8) CARES, by and through its medical director, Dr. Michael Sexton, 
refused to comply with subpoenas absent a court order. Id 
JOINT STIPULATION WITH STATEMENT OF REASONS 4 
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9) Judge Sticklin signed an Order for CARES to deliver records to the 
prosecutor's office on April 14, 2006. The Order specified records 
related to D.Z. who was S.Z.'s brother and who S.Z. has supposedly 
disclosed the abuse to. Id at Bates 37-38. 
I 0) CARES never produced photographs or an audio recording of a 
physical examination of S.Z. Id 
11) CARES staff: Alisa Ortega, pediatric nurse practitioner and Stacy 
Lewis, LCSW testified for the State at the jury trial. 
12) Alisa Ortega opined that S.Z.'s hymen showed· blunt force trauma. 
13) Alisa Ortega testified at trial that she had taken photographs of S.Z.' s 
hymen. 
14) Theresa Gardunia experienced significant problems with law 
enforcement and CARES compliance with discovery from the inception 
of the case. Id See also Christian Aff. 
15) Lead investigator Corporal Tammy Kennedy lost her audio recording of 
S.Z., Tiffany Davidson, and Stacy Ross. Corporal Kennedy disclosed 
this loss of audio on April 6, 2006, after the preliminary hearing and in 
response to a defense Motion to Dismiss. See Christian A:ff. Exhibit D. 
16) Critical issues at trial were the credibility of S.Z. and the physical 
examination conducted on S.Z. by CARES pediatric nurse Alisa 
Ortega. 
17) CARES complied with a court order to produce evidence in this post 
conviction case. Production included a copy of an audio recording of 
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the physical exam conducted by Alisa Ortega See Massoth Aff. Exhibit 
3, Transcript of Audio of physical examination by Alisa Ortega. 
18) Trial counsel Ron Christian never received the audio recording and first 
learned of its existence on April 1, 2014. See Christian Aff. 
19) S.Z.'s answers to Alisa Ortega's questions during the physical 
examination were substantially different from her statements in the 
forensic interview minutes prior. 
20) S.Z.'s statements to Alisa Ortega differed as to time of alleged abuse, 
location, nature of contact, and clothing worn. 
21) S.Z.' s statements to Alisa Ortega differed regarding a set of supposed 
bloody underwear that S.Z. said did not belong to her. 
22) Alisa Ortega's method of questioning S.Z. was very leading in nature 
and put words in S.Z.'s mouth. 
23) Alisa Ortega's written report was not completely consistent with the 
actual recorded examination and made no reference to colposcope 
photographs. 
24) Alisa Ortega allowed Stacy Ross and Tiffany Davidson to be present 
during the physical examination of S.Z. This was not mentioned in her 
report and was unknown to the defense. 
25) S.Z. made inconsistent statements in every interview and every time she 
testified, but the audio recording made by Alisa Ortega was the only 
recorded statement that contradicted the CARES forensic interview, 
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especially in light of the "lost" audio recording of Corporal Tammy 
Kennedy. 
26) The audio recording contains evidence that is favorable to the defense 
and would have been grounds for impeachment of several state 
witnesses at trial. 
27) The audio recording contains evidence that the defense would have 
provided to experts to refute Alisa Ortega's testimony at trial. 
28) Mr. Molen has diligently pursued every avenue to appeal his conviction 
including: a Motion for a New Trial with supporting affidavits of 
experts disputing the conclusions reached by Alisa Ortega, a Rule 35, a 
direct appeal, and now this post conviction case. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists ''no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The moving party for summary judgment always bears 
the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323 (1986) .. The nonmoving party is required to tender 
evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits or discovery material, supporting the 
nonmoving party's contention that a dispute exits. See I.R.C.P. 56(e). In this case both 
parties agree summary judgment in favor of Petitioner is appropriate. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
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Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) sets the standard that ''the individual 
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government's behalf in the case, including the police." The correct standard of Kyles and 
its progeny is that once the defendant produces an inference that the government 
possessed or knew about material favorable to the defense and failed to disclose it, the 
burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the prosecutor satisfied his duty to 
disclose all favorable evidence known to him or that he could have learned from "others 
acting on the government's behalf." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. 
In Mr. Molen's case, CARES was acting on behalf and at the request of the state 
and law enforcement. Therefore the state had a duty to and could have learned of the 
existence of photographs and an audio recording of the physical exam by speaking with 
its witness Alisa Ortega. The individual prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of all 
information gathered in connection with the government's investigation. Youngblood v. 
West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867 (2006). "The important determinant is whether the person or 
agency has been acting on the government's behalf" Kyles, supra 514 U.S. at p. 437. 
Any other conclusion ''would leave the defendant's due process rights to the fortuity of a 
subordinate agency's procedural protocol, which the Supreme Court has squarely 
rejected." Id at 438. 
A case which is nearly factually identical the scenario presented here is People v. 
Uribe 162 Ca. App. 4th 1457 (2008). See Massoth Aff. Exhibit 5. In Uribe, the California 
Court of Appeals vacated and remanded a jury verdict based on the same type of Brady 
violation. The California Supreme Court affirmed by rejecting review. 
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Corporal Tammy Kennedy referred the case to CARES. See Massoth Aff, Ex 2 
(under seal). CARES accepts case referrals only from IDHW or law enforcement. See 
Massoth Aff. Ex. I and Christian Aff. In this case, as in all criminal cases, CARES was 
a part of the investigative team conducting a forensic interview and physical examination. 
Massoth Aff. Ex. 3 and 4. Transcript of Stacy Lewis CARES interview and Transcript of 
Alisa Ortega physical examination. Given the role of CARES, the prosecution had a duty 
to find and disclose the audio recording of the physical exam. 
This Court could either construe that the state inadvertently failed to disclose the 
evidence because the prosecutor did not specifically ask Alisa Ortega if photographs or 
an audio existed, or could construe that CARES, as a member of the prosecution team, 
willfully withheld evidence by failing to comply with subpoenas and court orders. 
Exhibit 2 to the Affidavit of Elisa Massoth is a copy of the CARES file produced in 
discovery in these proceedings. Within that file are many subpoenas from the prosecutor 
for records. However, there are also written notes indicating that "only the tape" was 
needed and the prosecutor's office would pick it up. Additionally, in the Affidavit of 
Ron Christian, he indicates that he subpeoned all records for CARES and received no 
response. C~S not only failed to respond, they failed to maintain a record of such 
defense subpoenas, and repeatedly wrote to the prosecutor indicating an unwillingness to 
comply. Given Mr. Christian's argument at a hearing on a Motion to Dismiss that 
CARES discovery was being withheld, that CARES did not appear at the hearing despite 
being subpoenaed, and the prosecutor repeatedly told the defense no photographs existed, 
there is evidence of willful withholding. See Christian Aff. Ex. B and C. Another 
important fact is a face sheet indicating CARES records were routed to Corporal Tammy 
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Kennedy as the reporting law enforcement personnel. See Massoth Aff. Ex.2, Bates 1 and 
3. While there is no reference to an audio recording of the physical exam, the records 
indicate the cooperation between CARES and law enforcement. 
Upon review of the evidence in Mr. Molen's trial, it is clear that Alisa Ortega's 
physical examination audio recording was favorable to the defense as impeaching and as 
exculpatory. See Affidavit of Cari Caruso, Pediatric Nurse Practitioner and Christian Aff. 
To constitute a Brady violation ''the evidence must be favorable to the accused, either 
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching, that evidence must have been 
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently, and prejudice must have 
ensued." State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380, 274 P.3d 582,607 (2010) citing 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,281-82 (1999). 
Prejudice ensued as a result of the Brady violation. Mr. Molen did not receive a 
fair trial and the record within this Motion for Summary Judgment is replete with the 
deficiencies that exist because of the Brady violations. A ''reasonable probability" of a 
different result is shown when the government's suppression of evidence undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,682(1985); 
State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428,436,885 P.2d 1144,1152 (2013) 
Three experts have concluded that the photographs taken by Alisa Ortega were 
key evidence and did not represent what she testified that they represented. The affidavits 
of those experts are attached to the Affidavit of Elisa G. Massoth as follows: 
1) Dr. Friedlander's post trial Affidavit the photos that suddenly appeared 
at trial amounted to ''no more than a dimple on a chin." Massoth Aff. 
Ex 8. 
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2) Dr. Stephen Guerten's, a pediatric doctor concluded S.Z. "hymen was 
normal." Massoth Aff. Ex 9. 
3) Cari Caruso, pediatric SANE nurse's affidavit that the photographs 
depict a normal hymen, Alisa Ortega's conclusion and testimony was 
wrong, and the audio recording of the physical examination was critical 
because it disclosed the method of Alisa Ortega's exam, interview, and 
the fact that she took pictures. See Affidavit of Cari Caruso. 
In addition to experts, the jury foreman came forward in 2008 and expressed the 
he had serious misgivings about the jury verdict. He felt the State did not prove its case 
and the jury was confused about the jury instructions. He also stated that the forensic 
interview seemed to put words in S.Z.' s mouth. See Massoth Aff. Ex. 7. Given these 
concerns of the jury foreman, including the fact that a contradictory recording of S.Z. 
existed but was not presented to the jury because it was not disclosed, there is no possible 
way to conclude that the jury verdict may not have been different had this evidence been 
available at trial. 
Finally, the Affidavit of Ron Christian explains in detail how he would have 
presented the defense case had he known of the audio recording. This is simply not a 
case where there was overwhelming evidence of guilty or even substantial evidence of 
guilty. Instead this is a case full of inconsistencies and many expert witnesses whose 
testimony went improperly uncontradicted due to withheld evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons and argument that will presented at hearing. Mr. Molen 
requests that the jury verdict that has held him in prison since 2007 be vacated and that he 
be released ftom prison pending any other further proceedings. 
Dated this ~ay of-,qf,1-+,-1.-"""' ··J~----~
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ?-;;- day of April, 2014, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be served. by the method(s) as indicated, upon: 
Boise County Prosecutor 
Ian Gee 
Deputy Prosecutor Jay Rosenthal 
406 Montgomery St. 
Idaho City, Idaho 83631 
o U.S.Mail 
.er' Hand Delivery 
o Federal Express 
0 Facsimile 
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Filed JAN 2 1 2014 --
Elisa G. Massoth, ISB No. 5647 
Dartanyon G. Burrows, ISB No. 8259 
ELISA G. MASSOTH, PLLC. 
14 S. Main St., Suite 200 
P. 0. Box 1003 
Payette, ID 83661 
Telephone: (208) 642-3797 
Facsimile: (208) 642-3799 
emassoth@kmrs.net 
dburrows@kmrs.net 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
By Q., ~ · Gier:, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
MICHAEL SCOTI MOLEN, Case No. CV 2011-0000124 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
DISCOVERY 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
THIS Matter having been brought before this Court by stipulation between 
Petitioner Michael Scott Molen, and Respondent/State, and good cause appearing, 
therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that discovery shall occur as follows: 
I) The Deposition of Ron Christian, Duces Tecum, with any client electronic or hard 
file kept related to his representation of Michael Scott Molen, including any file 
that may be in the possession of Ron Christian that was kept by Gar Hackney; 
2) The Deposition of Alisa Ortega, nurse for CARES; 
3) The Deposition of Ben Carmack; 
4) The Deposition of Mandy White, legal assistant for Ron Christian; 
No. 
DEPUTY 
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5) Subpoena Duces Tecum of the Idaho State Bar disciplinary file r 
any Bar complaints filed or investigations regarding attorney Ro Christian; 
6) Subpoena Duces Tecum of any and all disciplinary records of Officer Tammy 
Kennedy, which shall be produced to Court Chambers at Ada Count and reviewed 
in camera by the parties for relevance to the case; 
7) Subpoena Duces Tecum, of all CARES files, notes, records, interviews, audio, 
and/or video recording related to the investigation of allegations against 
Defendant. 
If the parties deem that further discovery is warranted they may bring such matter 
before the Court. 
Dated This _3f___ day of ~ , 2014. 
~) ~,JZd ~ iu:fr, (1.1,-
r~- '6 ~Pa~~ 
Boise County Prosecutor 
Deputy Prosecutor Jay Rosenthal 
406 Montgomery St. 
Idaho City, Idaho 83631 
ELISA G. MASSOTH, PLLC. 
14 S. Main St., Suite 200 
P. 0. Box 1003 
Payette, ID 83661 
o U.S. Mail 
~ Hand Delivery 
o Federal Express 
o Facsimile (208-392-3760) 
o U.S. Mail 
_,,.-J:Y. Hand Delivery 
o Federal Express 
o Facsimile (208-392-3760) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DISCOVERY 2 
000326
e 
. ••'{' cou·..,T BOISE COUNTY, .... ' ,;., 
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Elisa G. Massoth, ISB No. 5647 
Dartanyon G. Burrows, ISB No. 8259 
ELISA G. MASSOTH, PLLC. 
Page __ .. · · · • 
r:8:o,ded in Boo\'----
14 S. Main St., Suite 200 
P. 0. Box 1003 
Payette, ID 83661 
Telephone: (208) 642-3797 
Facsimile: (208) 642-3799 
emassoth@kmrs.net 
dburrows@kmrs.net 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOISE 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
Case No. CV 2011-0000124 
AFFIDAVIT OF CARI CARUSO IN 
SUPPORT OF POST CONVICTION 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
: ss. 
County of Ventura ) 
Your Affiant Cari Caruso, RN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. I am a Registered Nurse, SANE-A, licensed in the State of California and 
Board Certified by the Forensic Nursing Certification Board, now called 
the Commission for Forensic Nursing Certification, as a Forensic Sexual 
Assault Nurse Examiner Adolescent/Adult (SANE-A). I am currently a 
PLAINTIFF'S 
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consultant for Mr. Molen's attorney. If called to testify to the facts stated 
herein, I would do so competently and objectively. 
2. I have been a Registered Nurse, in good standing, since 1974. In my 
career, I have worked primarily in Emergency Department, Pediatrics, 
Pediatrics Emergency, and Woman's Health, charge nurse of a post-
surgical unit, and time spent in GI Lab. I have been involved in forensic 
nursing since 1990. I have worked in 5 sexual assault programs and have 
been the director of two of those programs. 
3. I am currently a Board Certified Forensic Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner 
and in that capacity, I have conducted sexual assault evidentiary 
examinations on reported victims and suspects of sexual assault events, 
and have testified at trial, as an expert witness for prosecution, relative to 
those cases. I am the owner of Forensic Nurse Professionals, Inc., in Simi 
Valley, California where I continue my practice as a consultant, expert 
witness, and educator. 
4. I teach Forensic and Sexual Assault Examiner Courses for the University 
of California, Riverside, Extension, and for the American Institute of 
Forensic Education. Those courses include Adult, Adolescent, and 
Pediatric Forensic Examinations, Forensic Approaches to Human Abuse 
Injuries, and Forensic Implications: The Older Adult. I have served on the 
committee for the Sexual Assault Examiner Educational Guidelines for 
IAFN. 
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5. Although, I have no presumption or bias, there are elements that are very 
concerning regarding the genital findings in this case. There have been 
some serious and significant errors made in the interpretation of the 
reported genital findings. 
6. Initially, I was provided with the Idaho CARES forensic examination 
report by Nurse Alisa Ortega and the colposcope photos, in digital form, 
on a disc. I was also provided the forensic interview video by Stacy Lewis, 
and the trial testimony of Alisa Ortega. I used that information to create a 
report which I submitted to the defense on December 7, 2013. 
Subsequently I received an audio recording and corresponding transcript 
of Alisa Ortega's physical exam of S.Z. 
6. Upon review of the colposcope photos and the physical exam report, I 
determined that the physical examination of S.Z. is a normal genital 
examination of a person of her age. There are no acute findings and the 
hymen is uninterrupted with smooth edges and no defects. This patient's 
hymen is in transition from a thin, translucent, wispy child hymen into the 
characteristics of a maturing, pubertal hymen. In this prepubertal stage the 
hymen begins to thicken, become 'fluffy,' elastic, and redundant or 
'fimbriated.' What this means is that the tissue begins to change 
configuration, become thickened and begins to fold over on itself. The 
edges remain smooth but sometimes they become uneven, irregular, and 
scalloped. Alisa Ortega has identified these normal changes as, 'Two old, 
well healed tears,' [Jury trial 6-19-07 page 469, L 19]. Alisa Ortega 
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testified that they are 'clefts or a healed transection,' [Jury trial 6-19-07 p 
740 LIO]. I disagree with Alisa Ortega's testimony and conclusions. A 
cleft is not the same as a transection and is often a normal finding. It is 
certainly not diagnostic of sexual abuse especially in a nonacute 
examination. A healed transection can be identified by the observation of a 
gap which bisects the hymenal tissue. There is no such finding at that 
location. There are no acute or nonacute tears at that location. The tissue is 
simply uneven with an irregular shape. 
7. Alisa Ortega identified a mound at the 6 o'clock position on the hymen as 
an abnormal finding. In transition, the hymen changes shape. As it 
changes, the tissue adjusts and forms a mound or a bump. This is a normal 
part of the anatomical physical development of the hymen. This is called a 
Longitudinal Intravaginal Ridge. There is no physical evidence that there 
was ever any injury at that location. Mounds, clefts, and bumps are 
naturally occurring. 
8. In order for a healed injury to be identified, at a specific location, the acute 
injury must be observed and followed through the healing stages with a 
residual scar identified at the exact same location as the acute injury was 
originally observed. [Adams, 2005]. 
Findings Described in newborns or commonly seen in non-abused children 
D Peri urethral or vestibular bands 
D Intravaginal ridges or columns 
D Hymeneal tags or septa! remnants 
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0 Linea vestibularis 
DHymeneal bumps or mounds 
OHymeneal clefts in anterior (superior) hymen 
OShallow/superficial notches in posterior rim of hymen 
In this case, the patient S.Z. was not examined at the acute phase in order 
to have observed any acute injury. The genital examination, of this patient, 
is a normal genital examination. 
9. Alisa Ortega stated, [Jury trial 6-19-07, page 471 L 5] that, "At some 
point, in the child's life, something has gone through that hymen big 
enough to tear it." She also stated, "I believe it was blunt force, 
penetrating trauma," This is completely conjecture with absolutely no 
basis in fact. All the structures, in the genital examination, are normal 
without evidence of ever being penetrated. What the nurse has stated is 
pure speculation and editorial comments. When making official 
statements, the nurse should, at the very least, communicate information 
which is based on academic scientific knowledge rather than making 
editorial comments. 
12. Alisa Ortega's testimony regarding the procedures of a sexual assault 
examination, in the jury trial on 6-19-07, with the exception of some faulty 
and outdated information, was fairly reliable, from an academic 
standpoint. Alisa Ortega referenced some literature during her testimony 
["It's Normal to be Normal," Pediatrics, September 1, 1994, p 310 to317] 
and I implore the reader to n<?te the date of that article. It is 1994; nearly 
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20 years old. Surely, the nurse examiner should have a more up to date 
reference when defining the characteristics of normal genitalia. Mounds, 
bumps, and clefts are not diagnostic of sexual abuse/assault; they are a 
normal part of growth and development and the article asserts that. 
Statistics do not assist in the accurate evaluation of physical findings. 
Failure to recognize that this patient had normal findings is inexcusable. 
She failed to recognize that the structures of the vulva were all within 
normal limits and that this was a normal examination. It is shocking to see 
how terribly she failed at the interpretation of the physical examination 
findings. 
13. Prior to reviewing the transcript of the audio recording of Alisa Ortega's 
physical exam I asserted, in my December 2013 report, that "The 
examiner stated in testimony, [Jury trial 6-19-07, p 463 L 13] that she is, 
"looking for scarring and abnormalities." Perhaps, she felt obliged to find 
something to support the patient's history. We have no idea of the veracity 
of the patient's history. That is why it is extremely important to do an 
objective and nonbiased examination, regardless of the history told to us. 
It is not our role to believe or not to believe the patient history; it is our 
role to accurately document it." 
14. Now, that I have reviewed the transcript of the physical examination I 
conclude that Alisa Ortega asked questions of S.Z. that put words in the 
mouth of S.Z. and did not include audible responses from S.Z. Alisa 
Ortega did not ask questions in an open ended form that required S.Z. to 
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verbally explain what she claimed to have occurred in her own words. It 
is best practice, to have a patient/child to answer audibly as opposed to 
shaking or nodding their head. This allows the patient to describe the 
event in her/his own words. It is also best practice, based on education and 
training to not provide positive feedback, verbal, or physical reward 
(toys/stuffed animals) that indicates approval for what the patient has said. 
15. When it is documented [CARES History and Physical report] that, "The 
patient prefers to answer questions by shaking or nodding her head." That 
tells me that the patient was not providing a narrative account, in her own 
words, of the alleged history. It means that the patient is responding to 
'yes' or 'no' questions and perhaps, reacting to the questioner's suggested 
answers, by not utilizing open ended questions. In actuality, after 
reviewing the transcript of the physical examination, Alisa Ortega's 
questions were either closed ended or she provided the answers. She also 
obtained detailed information which was not included in her written 
report. Significant portions of the S.Z.'s answers were inconsistent with 
the CARES forensic interview that immediately preceded Ortega's 
'interview.' This illustrates the precise reason that a nurse must remain 
objective and neutral in a forensic examination and not seek to make the 
findings match what was told to her by other parties. Alisa Ortega draws 
conclusions that are not supported by the physical examination, the 
photos, the forensic CARES interview, or her own interview. Prior to 
reviewing the audio recording/transcript of the physical exam, my 
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December 2013 report stated: "Clearly, there was some vital discovery 
which was not provided to the experts prior to trial. The photographs were 
not provided in a timely manner and, even at this point in time, I am not 
convinced that we have all the materials created in relation to this 
examination and patient .... " The colposcope photos were such discovery 
as was the audio recording of the physical examination. 
17. There is nothing in this forensic genital examination that could confirm, 
with certainty, whether there was or ever had been any penetration. There 
is no evidence of acute or healed tears or sexual contact of any kind. The 
examining nurse described her findings as, "Indeterminate," and as, "Blunt 
force penetrating trauma, often seen in sexual assault." [CARES History 
and Physical and Jury Trial 6-19-07, p 467 L 14] Those statements are 
contradictory. If a finding is 'indeterminate' it means that there is a 
finding and that finding is non-specific and the origin or causation of that 
finding is unknown. This patient had a normal exam with no suspicious 
findings. A patient having no findings could mean that something 
occurred that left no marks, something occurred that has completely 
healed leaving no marks, or it could mean that there was no sexual 
contact, at all. There are no physical findings that are diagnostic of sexual 
contact. 
18. This was a non-acute examination, which means it is beyond the time 
frame for collection of biological samples or having recent visible findings 
of injury, should there ever have been any. In a nonacute examination, 
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such as this one, there is no way to attribute Alisa Ortega's so-called 
findings to any alleged event(s) or place in time. In this case, there are no 
genital findings to support the history of genital contact. Alisa Ortega 
failed to recognize the normal growth and development of the 
transitioning hymen in S.Z., the prepubertal patient. Alisa Ortega's 
findings of 'deep notches,' and the significance of, 'a mound at 6 o'clock,' 
and 'healed tears,' are erroneous, grossly exaggerated, and overstated. It is 
unfortunate that this case was propelled forward due to the flawed and 
mistaken genital evaluation by Alisa Ortega. 
19. Alisa Ortega's physical examination did not include some vital inspection 
techniques used to properly evaluate the hymen. S.Z. was examined in 
only the supine position ( on her back). Putting S.Z. in a prone position (in 
knee chest position, face down, with knees bent) or floating the hymen, 
with water, would have provided alternative visualization to verify the 
smooth, uninterrupted hymenal edges. Both are techniques that should 
have been used for a more complete examination on S.Z. 
20. Genital or anal findings, by a nurse examiner, if they are present, can not 
substantiate force or confirm that a sexual assault occurred. 
21. Absence of genital findings cannot attest that a sexual assault did not 
occur. 
22. When so much time has passed since the alleged event, and there are no 
physical findings, there is no evidence to support a history that penetration 
ever occurred. Findings, when they are present, may not always be related 
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to th!vent for which the patient is being exam!d. There are many 
conditions that are naturally occurring, and non-sexual in nature, that can 
be confused for sexual findings. Hymens do not appear exactly the same 
in every patient The examining nurse must be very discriminating, 
objective, and aware of the possibility that other conditions may exist and 
not be related to a reported. event It is essential that the examiner be 
objective and has in-depth, current knowledge of anatomy and physiology, 
and growth and development. The examining nurse must avoid statements 
that could be construed as biased or misleading. 
23. The defense's cross examination of Alisa Ortega was very limited and 
clearly lacked the preparation that would have been required for an 
adequate set of probative questions. A prior review of ~e photographs and 
.. . 
interviews would have provided. valuable information that could have 
contributed to a more insightful cross examination. 
Further your Affiant saith naught. 
~--~ 
Cari Caruso, RN - "-
stale of California 
County of Ventura 
Sub8cribed and swom to (or affimled) i.are me on 
this_:ZL_ day of '°9ri I • 20J.Y...t,y 
Cel ti CArve:> 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactoly evidence to 
be the person~ who appeared before me 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 17 day of April, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 72-. day of April 2014, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be served, by the method(s) as indicated, upon: 
Boise County Prosecutor 
Ian Gee 
Deputy Prosecutor Jay Rosenthal 
406 Montgomery St. 
Idaho City, Idaho 83631 
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Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224 
POINTS LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main, Ste. 222 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: 208.287.3216 
Facsimile: 208.336.2088 
Email: mpoints@pointslaw.com 
Attorney for Defendant Ronald D. Christian 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MULLEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV OC 1503024 
vs. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant Ronald Christian, through his counsel of record Michelle Points of 
Points Law, PLLC, respectfully submits this brief in reply to Plaintiffs Response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Response Brief'). 
A. Introduction 
Plaintiff maintains that he had no objective proof of damages until he obtained 
post-conviction relief. This is simply an unbelievable statement that cannot be accepted 
by the Court to create and issue of fact on this motion. 
There is no requirement in Idaho law that a malpractice plaintiff obtain some type 
of confirmation from a judge or other third party that yes, they may actually have been 
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damaged·by the negligence of another, or that the negligence caused them damage. 
The determination of what constitutes both damage and objective proof must be 
decided on the circumstances of each case. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 543, 808 
P.2d 876,880 (1991). The statute oflimitations on a professional malpractice case 
accrues when the plaintiff suffers "some damage" that could be recovered in a 
malpractice action. Reynolds v. Trout Jones et al, 154 Idaho 21, 25,293 P.3d 645, 649 
(2013). 
Plaintiff plainly knew that he was damaged when he was convicted !,111d 
incarcerated, and has claimed that damage was caused by Mr. Christian since that time in 
2007. If determined to be the prevailing party, Plaintiff could have recovered from Mr. 
Christiim upon his conviction and incarceration. 
By claiming the statute oflimitations didn't accrue on his claim until he received 
post-conviction relief, Plaintiff is simply attempting to create a heightened notice-type 
requirement that simply is not present in Idaho law; 
There is no question pertaining to causation in the motion before the Court. Nor 
is it relevant if or when Plaintiff's claims of causation were confirmed by Judge Owen. 
The discrete question at issue in this motion is when Plaintiff incurred damage to 
trigger the running of the statute of limitation. 
There is no question that Plaintiff was damaged when he was convicted and 
subsequently incarcerated and his claims against Mr. Christian are barred by the statute of 
limitation. 
Mr. Christian will address the arguments raised by Plaintiff in his Response Brief, 
in turn. 
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B. Actual innocence is an element of a criminal malpractice case, but even if 
the Court does not so find, this case is nevertheless time barred. 
Plaintiff takes the position that Idaho law does not require a convicted criminal 
defendant to establish actual innocence in a subsequent claim against his defense 
attorney. Plaintiff also takes the position that even if Idaho did require the plaintiff to 
prove actual innocence, this Court can nevertheless still adopt the exoneration rule. 
1. Actual innocence 
Mr. Christian brought the "actual innocence" law outlined in Lamb v. Jvfanweiler, 
129 Idaho 269,923 P.2d 976 (1996), to the Court's attention to address statements made 
by the Court in its recent opinion. Specifically, the Court stated that Judge Owen's order 
granting post-conviction relief - or establishing Plaintiffs legal innocence - somehow 
gave Plaintiff objective proof of his damages. 
Mr. Christian's position is that Idaho law on professional negligence claims does 
not center on a finding of legal innocence and therefore the granting of post-conviction 
relief is of no relevance to the elements that Plaintiff has to establish at trial, or to the 
questions of when or whether Plaintiff suffered damages. That a finding of legal 
innocence is in any way pertinent to this motion is a "red-herring" argument by the 
Plaintiff. 
In sum, whether or not the Court finds that Idaho does or does not require proof of 
actual innocence is insignificant to the motion before the Court because establishment of 
legal innocence is not dispositive of anything having to do with the accrual of the statute 
of limitation. This motion is only about when the statute of limitation was triggered; 
when Plaintiff suffered some damage. 
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In Idaho, a finding legal innocence triggers nothing; it is a finding that someone's 
actions likely caused a defendant to be convicted. It has nothing to do with when a 
criminal defendant suffered damage and it certainly does not trigger the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
Judge Owen's order granting post-conviction relief ("PCR Order"), spoke to the 
issue of causation, not damages. The PCR Order has nothing to do with the accrual of 
the statute of limitations, or when Plaintiff suffered some damage. 
Plaintiff attempts to convolute the opinions discussed in Lamb v. Manweiler, the 
case in which actual innocence requirement is addressed by the District Court, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals, and the Idaho Supreme Court. In that case the District Court (Judge 
Haii) found that actual innocence was an element of a criminal defendant bringing a 
subsequent attorney malpractice case, and that because Lamb didn't raise any fact before 
the comi pe1iaining to his innocence, he granted Mr. Manweiler's motion for summary 
judgment. 
The Idaho Court of appeals, looking at a record that was not before Judge Hart, 
found that there was an issue of fact raised by Lamb (in his post-conviction case) 
pertaining to his innocence, and reversed Judge Hart's opinion on that ground. However, 
in analyzing the finding of Judge Hart that a criminal defendant had to prove their actual 
innocence in a subsequent malpractice proceeding, the Court looked at other the laws of 
other states and analyzed a number of cases. The Court ruled as a matter of first 
impression in Idaho appellate courts, that as an element of proof, criminal defendants had 
to prove their actual innocence in a subsequent malpractice proceeding, thus affirming 
Judge Hart's finding on that issue. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the Idaho Court of Appeals decision and 
affirmed the District Court; that District Court opinion that held that a criminal defendant 
must prove their actual im1ocence in a subsequent malpractice case against their attorney. 
The Idaho Supreme Court stated in its opinion "Lamb does not dispute the proposition 
that in a legal malpractice action arising from representation of a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding, the person pursuing the claim must establish the additional element of actual 
innocence of the underlying criminal charges" Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 ldaho 269,272, 
923 P.2d 976, 979 (1996). The Court did not just "acknowledge" Lamb's position. It 
had clearly reviewed the decision of Judge Hart (which it affirmed) and the decision of 
the Court of Appeals that affirmed that portion of Judge Hart's decision that contained 
the actual innocence element. 1 Based upon a plain reading of the opinions in the case, 
one cannot reach any other conclusion than under Idaho law, a criminal defendant's 
"actual im1ocence" is an element their malpractice claim under Idaho law. 
Plaintiff takes above stated quote from the case out of context by asserting that the 
"Court's decision was based on the element of proximate cause, not actual 
innocence." See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Response Brief'), p. 8. The respective courts weren't focusing on the acts of the 
1 In Lamb, Lamb plead guilty and didn't dispute his guilt before Judge Hart. 
Lamb failed to establish he was innocent thus couldn't argue in subsequent proceedings 
that counsel caused his incarceration. Contrary to Plaintiff's briefing, the Idaho Supreme 
Court did engage in a discussion about Lamb's guilt. Specifically, the Court found that 
because the District Court had explained to Lamb his rights, including that he understood 
that he was pleading guilty and could not withdraw the guilty pleas, Judge Hart was 
correct in granting Manweiler's motion for summary judgment in the civil malpractice 
case because there was no issue of fact raised by Lamb regarding his innocence; he could 
not prove the element of actual innocence. Lamb's admission of guilt was the basis of 
Supreme Court's affirming Judge Hart's decision. 
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attorney, they were focusing on the acts of the criminal defendant. 
If a criminal defendant admits his guilt via a guilty plea, he cannot establish that 
an attorney proximately caused his conviction. Put another way, unless a criminal 
defendant can establish he or she is actually innocent, they cannot attempt to establish 
that their attorney caused their conviction. They have to prove their actual innocence 
before they can get to the issue of the attorneys negligence and causation for 
conviction. They are separate and distinct elements of proof. 
Putting the issue of the actual innocence element aside, the crux of this motion is 
that the grant or denial of post-conviction relief does not address and is not relevant to the 
question of when a criminal defendant has suffered some damage, which is the only 
trigger of the statute of limitations in a professional malpractice case. 
The only material fact at issue is when Plaintiff suffered damage. Plaintiff has 
been saying he was damaged by Christian since he was convicted 2007; he has repeatedly 
asserted he was only damaged because Christian didn't move for a new trial. 
There is simply no question that Plaintiff suffered damage upon his conviction 
and subsequent incarceration to trigger the accrual of the statute of limitations. To hold 
otherwise would be contrary to the applicable statute and established Idaho case law. 
2. Exoneration Rule 
With respect to Plaintiffs request that the Court "adopt" the exoneration rule, 
such an adoption would be an abuse of discretion given the status of Idaho law on the 
subject. Nothing in Idaho law supports the proposition, or even the notion, that a 
convicted criminal defendant must obtain post-conviction relief before pursuing a legal 
malpractice action against his defense attorney. 
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Rather, in Idaho, once a criminal defendant suffers some damage, they are free to 
bring a suit against their attorney and they are not required to bring a separate post-
conviction relief case, but if they do, they are free to ask for a stay of their malpractice 
action pending the outcome of the post-conviction case. The outcome of the post-
conviction case does not dictate whether or not they can proceed with their malpractice 
case. 
As set forth in Mr. Christian's opening brief on this motion, there is no dispute 
that Idaho does not follow the exoneration rule. The exoneration rule squarely conflicts 
with Idaho law as it pertains to the accrual of the statute of limitations. There is no 
ambiguous or qualifying language in Idaho Code § 5-219(4), which reads in relevant 
part: 
An action to recover damages for professional malpractice ... shall be deemed to 
accrue when the injured paiiy knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
been put on inquiry regarding the condition or matter complained of; but in all other 
actions, whether arising from professional malpractice or otherwise, the cause of action 
shall be deemed to have accrued as of the .time of the occurrence, act or omission 
complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any 
continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional 
or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer ... 
Emphasis added. 
The statute of limitations accrues on a professional malpractice action when 
"some damage" has occurred. See e.g., Minnick v. Hawley Troxell, et al, 341 P.3d 580 
(2015). 
This Court, in ruling on Mr. Christian's previous dispositive motion held "[b]ased 
on the language from the civil malpractice cases, the C~urt could easily conclude Plaintiff 
incurred some damage at the moment of judgment, and determine the statute of 
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limitations passed two (2) years after the date the judgment was entered ... The Complaint 
in the case at bar was filed February 17, 2015 -well past two (2) years from any of those 
dates." Order, pgs. 6-7. 
Again, there is no ambiguity in Idaho Code § 5-219(4), which is the only 
applicable law in Idaho, and the law that must be applied by the Court in ruling on this 
motion. 
Also in his opening brief on this motion, Mr. Christian pointed out that the Idaho 
Supreme Court was presented with an argument made by Mr. Manweiler in Lamb, supra, 
that post-conviction relief was a prerequisite for a convicted criminal defendant to pursue 
a malpractice claim; the exoneration rule. This is the same argument that Plaintiff would 
make to the Idaho Supreme Court in this case. 
Plaintiff asserts that because the Idaho Supreme Court didn't write about the 
exoneration rule in their opinion in Lamb, that they didn't reject it. Akin to the same line 
of argument, the Court did not adopt the exoneration rule despite the fact that it was 
extensively briefed, and given the state of the law in Idaho, one would not expect it to. 
Plaintiff takes the position that even if Idaho law does require a criminal 
defendant to prove innocence in a subsequent malpractice case, the Court should still 
adopt the exoneration rule. As explained in Mr. Christian's opening brief, those states 
that follow the exoneration rule also have a discovery rule. This Court has acknowledged 
that Idaho does not follow the discovery rule. By inviting this Court to adopt the 
exoneration rule, Plaintiff is inviting the Court to adopt a law that is clearly contrary to 
Idaho law, as it would impose a discovery exception to existing law, and only to criminal 
defendants pursuing civil malpractice claims against their attorney. Adopting such a rule 
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would be analogous to holding that a criminal defendant cannot know (or discover) as a 
matter of law, that their attorney caused them some damage until a judge grants post-
conviction relief. Such a holding would be obviously inconsistent with existing Idaho 
statutory and case law. 
Criminal defendants, like everyone else, are bound by controlling law. Obtaining 
post-conviction relief does not serve to accrue the statute of limitation, nor does pursuing 
post-conviction relief toll the statute of limitation. 
C. Plaintiff suffered some damage when he was convicted and incarcerated. 
Plaintiff asserts that his cause of action didn't accrue until he was granted post-
conviction relief or alternatively, when he learned of certain CARES records that were 
disclosed while the post-conviction case was pending. This line of argument is frivolous. 
The Court cannot accept the premise of Plaintiffs legal conclusions. Plaintiff is 
essentially saying "I was damaged but I didn't have any proof of it until Judge Owen's 
decision." Such a proposition is not believable or plausible. Being convicted of a crime 
and being incarcerated is proof of actual damage. Plaintiff seeing photos that could speak 
to the issue his guilt or innocence may be relevant in a subsequent malpractice case, but 
they have nothing to do with when he suffered some damage. 
Obtaining post-conviction relief is not a criminal defendant's "first proof' of 
damages. In addition, an order for post-conviction relief speaks to the issue of causation, 
i.e. did the attorney allegedly cause the criminal defendant to become incarcerated, which 
has nothing to do when the criminal defendant suffered some damage. 
Plaintiff's statement that he would not have a substantive cause of action against 
Mr. Christian but for the post-conviction relief is false. In Idaho, one does not even have 
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to file for post-conviction relief to maintain a malpractice action. Plaintiff was free to 
argue that Mr. Christian acted with negligence and caused him damage notwithstanding 
any post-trial motions. Plaintiff did not need Judge Owen to endorse that allegation 
before he could file a malpractice case. 
D. Attorney fees 
There is no basis for attorney fees even in the event the Court denies this 
motion. Although it should not have been necessary, Mr. Christian didn't have the 
opportunity to establish a record in the previously filed IRCP l 2(b )( 6) motion to dismiss 
and should be afforded the opportunity to submit a complete record for this Court to 
consider given that the granting of the motion will be dispositive of the entire case. 
E. Conclusion 
The issue before the Court is not whether Mr. Christian's alleged acts or 
omissions caused Plaintiffs conviction, or whether Judge Owen's post-conviction relief 
order supports Plaintiffs malpractice claim. The inquiry before the court is not whether 
there is an issue of fact as to Mr. Christian was negligent. The facts of the underlying 
case are not at issue. 
The only issue before the Court is when Plaintiff suffered some damage. There is 
no dispute that he suffered some damage upon his conviction and incarceration in 2007. 
Plaintiff is bound by Idaho law. There is no basis, given a plain reading of that 
law, for the Court to adopt new law in the form of an exoneration rule, or to look past 
existing and adopt some form exception for criminal defendants. 
Plaintiffs claims against Mr. Christian are time barred and the case should be 
dismissed. 
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DATED this 24th day of September, 2015 
Atto ·ney for Ronald D. Christian 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of __ , 2015, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below and addressed 
to each of the following: 
Elisa G. Massoth 
Dartanyon G. Burrows 
ELISA G. MASSOTH, PLLC 
14 S. Main Street, Ste. 200 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
__ U.S Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
c/ Fax (208) 642-3799 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-OC-2015-3024 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 7, 2015, came before the Court 
for oral argument on October 1, 2015. 
Appearances: 
Dartanyon Burrows for Plaintiff Michael Scott Mullen 
Michelle R. Points for Defendant Ronald Christian 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial alleging legal malpractice 
and breach of contract against Defendant Ronald Christian, arising out of a criminal lawsuit in 
which Defendant Christian defended Plaintiff. 1 Defendant thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss 
on Mar. 10, 2015, in which Defendant contended that the case was barred by the applicable 
statute oflimitations.2 The Court issued an Order Denying Motion to Dismiss on May 21, 20153, 
in which the Court stated, "[T]here are questions of fact as to when there was objective proof of 
some damages. "4 
2 
3 
4 
On Aug. 7, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that, 
Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed Feb. 17, 2015. 
Motion to Dismiss, filed Mar. 10, 2015, p. 1. 
Which provided a summary of the facts of this case, which will not be repeated here. 
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, filed May 21, 2015, p. 11. 
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"Plaintiffs claim against Defendant is barred under the applicable statute of limitation."5 
Defendant also filed a supporting affidavit and memorandum. 6 In his motion, Defendant spends a 
considerable amount of time discussing the elements of a legal malpractice case, including 
whether (in the criminal legal malpractice context), the Plaintiff must prove actual innocence as 
an element of the case. 7 Defendant also argues that damages accrued, thus starting the running of 
the statute of limitations, when Plaintiff was convicted in 2007. 8 This second issue is similar, if 
not identical, to the issue decided by the Court in the May 21, 2015 Order Denying Motion to 
Dismiss. 
Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, with supporting 
affidavit of counsel,9 on Sept. 21, 2015. Plaintiff also presents argument on whether actual 
innocence is an element of a criminal legal malpractice case. 10 However, Plaintiff argues his 
damages did not accrue until around the time he obtained post-conviction relief. 11 Plaintiff also 
requests attorney fees for having to respond to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the grounds that it was not brought in good faith. 12 
Defendant filed reply briefing on Sept. 24, 2015. 13 Neither party has objected to the 
evidence presented to the Court, and therefore to the extent there were any issues with lack of 
foundation or hearsay, such issues are waived. 14 The Court considers all information that has 
been presented in support of and opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
5 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 7, 2015, p. 1. 
6 Affidavit of Michelle Points in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 7, 2015; 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 7, 2015. 
7 Memorandum in Support ofDefendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 7, 2015, pp. 7 -15. 
8 Id., p. 19. 
9 Affidavit of Elisa G. Massoth in Support of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed Sept. 21, 2015. 
10 Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Sep. 21, 2015, pp. 7 - 11. 
11 Id., pp. 11 - 16. 
12 Id., pp. 17 -18. 
13 Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Sep. 24, 2015. 
14 Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 881, 693 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Ct. App. 1984); Naccarato v. Viii. of Priest 
River, 68 Idaho 368,372, 195 P.2d 370,373 (1948) ("A party who fails to object to the admission of evidence 
waives an objection to the subsequent admission of the same or similar evidence."); Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. 
Simplot Co., 124 Idaho 613, 617, 862 P.2d 305, 309 (Ct. App. 1992) affd in part, rev'd in part, 124 Idaho 607, 862 
P .2d 299 ( 1993) ("[U]nless noncompliance of an affidavit with Rule 56( e) is brought to the lower court's attention 
by a proper objection and motion to strike, it is waived."). 
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LEGAL STANDARD 
The present motion is styled as a Motion for Summary Judgment. However, because 
Defendant is essentially asking for the same relief that was asked for in the Motion to Dismiss, 
the Court treats the present motion as a motion for reconsideration. "The burden is on the 
moving party to bring the trial court's attention to new facts" and the trial court is not required 
''to search the record to determine if there is any new information that might change the 
specification of facts deemed to be established." Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 344, 179 
P.3d 303, 307 (2008). "However, a motion for reconsideration need not be supported by any new 
evidence or authority." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012), 
reh'g denied (Aug. 1, 2012). 
Regardless of whether the Court treats the motion as one for summary judgment or for 
reconsideration, it does not substantively change the standard of review. "For an appeal 
reconsidering a summary judgment motion, this Court will review whether the district court 
acted within the legal standards applicable to summary judgment." Marek v. Lawrence, 153 
Idaho 50, 53, 278 P.3d 920, 923 (2012). Because the Court treated the Motion to Dismiss as a 
motion for summary judgment, 15 on reconsideration the Court would have to again apply the 
summary judgment standard. 
Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the nonmoving party's "pleadings, 
affidavits, and discovery documents ... read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002) 
(quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). Summary Judgment is available for a claimant, "upon all or any part 
thereof," of a claim or counterclaim, if moved at least twenty days after service of process upon 
the adverse party. I.R.C.P. 56(a). The court must construe the evidence liberally and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 84-85, 73 
P.3d 94, 97-98 (2003). If the facts, with inferences favorable to the nonmoving party, are such 
that reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions, summary judgment is not available. 
Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005). 
The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 
15 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, filed May 21, 2015, pp. 2-5. 
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material fact, and then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient 
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 
Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (1994). When the nonmoving party bears the burden of 
proving an element at trial, the moving party may establish a lack of genuine issue of material 
fact by establishing the lack of evidence supporting the element. Id. (concluding moving party's 
burden "may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving 
party will be required to prove at trial"). "Such an absence of evidence may be established either 
by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the 
nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is lacking." Id. at 
fn. 2. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response ... must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). Such evidence may consist of 
affidavits or depositions, but "the Court will consider only that material ... which is based upon 
personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial." Harris v. State, Dep 't of Health & 
Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297-98, 847 P.2d 1156, 1158-59 (1992). If the evidence reveals no 
disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains on which the court may then 
enter summary judgment as a matter of law. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 443, 
445, 65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003). 
ANALYSIS 
The present motion for summary judgment deals with two issues. The first is when the 
cause of action for the criminal legal malpractice claim accrued. This issue is dispositive of the 
entire case. The second issue is whether actual innocence is an element of a criminal legal 
malpractice claim. This issue is not dispositive, but is important to the ultimate resolution of this 
case. What causes the Court concern is that there is no substantive caselaw in Idaho discussing 
either issue. 
A. Accrual of Cause of Action 
Legal malpractice cases have a two-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code § 5-
219(4). See Parsons Packing, Inc. v. Masingil/, 140 Idaho 480, 482, 95 P.3d 631, 633 (2004). 
"An action to recover damages for 'professional malpractice' must be commenced within two 
years after the cause of action has accrued." Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 
396, 399 (2002). The question of accrual has previously been discussed by this Court. The 
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Supreme Court recently analyzed this issue: 
"An action to recover damages for 'professional malpractice' must be commenced 
within two years after the cause of action has accrued." Lapham v. Stewart, 137 
Idaho 582,585, 51 P.3d 396,399 (2002) (citing I.C. § 5-219). The cause of action 
accrues "as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of, and the 
limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any continuing consequences 
or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial 
relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer." I.C. § 5-
219( 4). This Court has held that a cause of action for professional negligence 
cannot accrue, however, until "some damage" has occurred. Stephens v. Stearns, 
106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984). The reason for the "some damage" 
rule is that "in order to recover under a theory of negligence, the plaintiff must 
prove actual damage." Id. The statute's accrual standard operates under a 
completed tort theory in that the cause of action accrues when the tort is 
completed, an event that corresponds with the first objectively ascertainable 
occurrence of some damage. See, e.g., Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 178-80, 
706 P.2d 63, 67-69 (1985). What constitutes some damage turns on the facts and 
circumstances of each case. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 543, 808 P .2d 876, 
880 (1991). 
Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, 157 Idaho 863, 341 P.3d 580, 583-84 (2015) 
( quotations and emphasis in the original). There is no suggestion by either party that the rule set 
forth in this language is incorrect. The issue presented by the parties is when accrual actually 
occurred. 
The first issue to establish is that accrual does not necessarily happen at the time the 
attorney commits the wrongful act. Legal malpractice is a negligence-based cause of action.16 
The attorney's negligent act matches up with the breach element of a negligence cause of 
action. 17 However, breach is not the only element of a malpractice cause of action, and until the 
tort itself is completed, there is no actual accrual of the cause of action. Just as in a normal 
negligence claim, there must be causation and damages.18 Thus, until there is both causation and 
16 See Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,620,272 P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012); Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of 
Idaho, 86 Idaho 485,495, 389 P.2d 224,230 (1964); Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661, 662 (1932). 
17 Compare Nation v. State, Dep't of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953, 965 (2007) ("A cause of 
action for common law negligence in Idaho has four elements: (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the 
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the 
defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.") with Marias v. Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 
13, 813 P.2d 350,352 (1991) ("The elements ofa legal malpractice action are: (1) the existence ofan attorney-client 
relationship; (2) the existence ofa duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the failure to perform that duty; and (4) the 
failure to perform the duty must be a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the client."). 
18 See Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,620,272 P.3d 1247, 1251 (2012) ("[T]he negligence of the lawyer 
must have been a proximate cause of the damage to the client."); Harrigfeldv. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 
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damages, there is no accrual. 
Idaho caselaw makes it clear that in legal malpractice cases, there is a possibility that a 
third-party action, or event not under the control of the parties, could be what starts accrual. 19 
Based on this, the next step is to determine when the tort in this case was completed. In this case, 
the parties dispute when this occurred. Defendant alleges that the tort was completed on the date 
Plaintiff was convicted. 20 Plaintiff, on the other hand, alleges the accrual date could have been 
any number of acts which occurred in 2014, including when CARES produced the audio 
recording of Nurse Ortega's physical examination of the victim during the post-conviction 
proceedings,21 when expert testimony was obtained tending to show Plaintiff's innocence,22 or 
when Judge Owen actually found there to have been ineffective assistance of counsel.23 The 
Court previously determined that there was an issue of fact in this regard. However, the Court is 
no longer convinced this determination is correct. When a cause of action accrues can be a 
question oflaw or a question of fact. 
The time when a cause of action accrues may be a question of law or a question of 
fact, depending upon whether any disputed issues of material fact exist. Where 
P.3d 884, 886 (2004) ("We have always stated the fourth element of the cause of action, however, as requiring proof 
that the attorney's breach of duty was a proximate cause of injury or damage to 'the client."'); Murray v. Farmers 
Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224,227, 796 P.2d 101, 104 (1990) ("In a malpractice action, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving not only the negligence of the attorney, but also that the negligence was the proximate cause of the loss of a 
rift to recover in the underlying case."). 
1 In Minnick, it was not the attorney's failure to subordinate the deed that started the accrual of the cause of 
action; rather, it was the IRS's later action which completed the tort. Minnick at 868, 341 P.3d at 585. In Griggs v. 
Nash, it was not the attorney's action which caused accrual; instead the Supreme Court found that the later filing of 
a lawsuit constituted the date the cause of action accrued. Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 234, 775 P.2d 120, 126 
(1989). In Streib v. Veigel, the Supreme Court found that no accrual happened until, "[T]he time of the Internal 
Revenue Service's assessment of penalties and interest." Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 178, 706 P.2d 63, 67 
( 1985). In City of McCall v. Buxton, the Supreme Court stated, ''the existence or effect of any alleged negligence on 
the part of the City's Attorneys regarding their legal advice and strategy depended upon the outcome of the litigation 
against the City by Wausau and St. Clair." City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 663, 201 P.3d 629, 636 (2009). 
This is not an exclusive list of cases where accrual started based on a third-party act or event. But these cases show 
the acts starting accrual are all acts outside of the control of the attorney and the client, or were after the alleged 
breach of the duty by the attorney. As the Supreme Court explained in Bonz v. Sudweeks, "All of the above-cited 
cases have a common thread. The damage, for statute of limitation purposes, occurred long after the negligent act." 
Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 542, 808 P.2d 876, 879 (1991). As further indicated in City of McCall, the act 
itself is insufficient to cause accrual. "Clients involved in lengthy litigation would have to file protective lawsuits 
against their attorneys when following their advice and strategy, without yet having any objective proof of actual 
damage or being able to prove a cause of action for professional malpractice." Id. 
20 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Aug. 7, 2015, p. 19. 
21 Affidavit of Elisa G. Massoth in Support of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed Sep. 21, 2015, Ex. F (p. 2). 
22 Id., Ex. H. 
23 Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed Apr. 6, 2015, Ex. A. 
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there is no dispute over any issue of material fact regarding when the cause of 
action accrues, the question is one of law for determination by the court. 
However, where there is conflicting evidence as to when the cause of action 
accrued, the issue is one of fact for the trier of fact. 
Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 148, 90 P.3d 894, 898 (2004). 
In this case, the parties clearly dispute when the malpractice action against Defendant accrued. 
However, the Court cannot find that there is a dispute as to any material fact surrounding the 
question of accrual. Though Plaintiff claims the tort was completed ( and thus the cause of action 
accrued) in 2014, and Defendant argues for the date to be 2007. However, these are not issues of 
fact. The parties agree on what happened when, and only disagree as to how these facts apply to 
the law. There is little to no dispute as to the timing of events. Therefore, there is no issue of fact, 
and the Court must decide, as a matter of law, when the cause of actions against Defendant 
accrued. 
At the outset, the Court acknowledges that this area of law is undecided in Idaho. The 
Court, in its earlier decision, indicated it was inclined to adopt the exoneration rule because such 
rule fit more in line with Idaho's public policy based on civil legal malpractice cases. However, 
the Court did not adopt such rule because such adoption, if it happens, must come through the 
Idaho Supreme Court. 24 The Court again refrains from adopting such rule, and instead makes the 
present determination based purely on the facts of the case and relevant Idaho caselaw. 
Though Lamb does not discuss accrual, it provides hints as to the resolution of this case. 
In Lamb, the plaintiff pied guilty to four of nine charged felonies on advice of counsel. Lamb v. 
Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269,271, 923 P.2d 976, 978 (1996). The Supreme Court then notes, 
Prior to Lamb's sentencing Manweiler discovered evidence which cast doubt on 
the validity of two of the four guilty pleas. Manweiler moved to withdraw two of 
the four guilty pleas, and the district court granted the motion. Manweiler 
withdrew as Lamb's attorney on the remaining counts on the grounds that he 
could not ethically present a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas on the two 
remaining charges. New counsel presented a motion to withdraw the remaining 
two guilty pleas. The district court denied the motion. 
Id. Lamb thereafter alleged, "[T]hat it was Manweiler's negligent advice that caused Lamb to 
enter the guilty pleas." Id. at 272, 923 P.2d at 979. The Court, however, determined it was the 
guilty pleas that were themselves the proximate cause of his incarceration. The decision in Lamb 
24 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, filed May 21, 2015, pp. 9-10. 
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was not based on accrual, but on causation. Causation is still essential to an accrual 
determination, if the Court operates under a completed tort theory as stated in Minnick. 
In this case, there are several different options of when the cause of action accrued 
causing the statute oflimitations to begin running. The first is that Mr. Molen's bad acts occurred 
before and during trial, and that the cause of action accrued when the jury determined Mr. Molen 
was guilty. Molen was then sent to jail for eight years which could be connected with damages. 
The second option relates to the events which occurred in 2014. As stated above, there 
are several possible events in 2014 which could start the accrual of the cause of action, including 
release of the new CARES information, obtaining new expert testimony, and even Judge Owen's 
grant of post-conviction relief.25 Arguably, any of these events could be the outside or third-party 
event comparable to what occurred in Minnick, Griggs, or Streib that cause accrual to occur. The 
Court notes that the exoneration rule, if adopted, would likely only match up with Judge Owen's 
June 17, 2014 Memorandum Decision in which he granted post-conviction relief. The other two 
events listed simply match up with the potential for third-party events which cause accrual to 
begin running. The Court also notes that the Plaintiff did not plead guilty in the underlying 
criminal case, which makes this case unlike Lamb. Plaintiff fought the criminal charges through 
trial, and therefore Plaintiff avoided attaching causation being attached as dispositive at 
Plaintiff's guilty plea. 
In examining the correctness of the Court's prior order, the Court concludes that it is not 
at liberty to just determine there is a question of fact and let the parties move on with discovery. 
Based on the facts which are not in dispute, the Court feels it is constrained to conclude that 
Plaintiff's causes of action against Defendant began accruing in 2007. The undisputed facts at 
this point in this case show that Defendant's conduct related to Plaintiff's criminal trial was 
sufficiently bad, that regardless of whether Plaintiff was actually guilty or not, there was 
"objectively ascertainable occurrence of some damage" (and related causation) in 2007. 
Defendant showed up so drunk to the originally scheduled trial as to be essentially incapacitated. 
Defendant showed up inebriated to the rescheduled trial. Defendant's alcoholism arguably 
prevented him from doing sufficient pre-trial investigation and incapacitated his judgment in 
whether to move for a mistrial. These undisputed facts alone were sufficient to put Molen on 
25 The Court notes that any of these three events would be timely under the two-year limitation stated in Idaho 
Code§ 5-219(4) as this case was filed in February 2015, and so the Court does not differentiate between them. 
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notice of Christain's malpractice. While notice is irrelevant (because there is no discovery 
standard for malpractice actions,)26 the Court finds that the notice does create an objectively 
ascertainable occurrence of both causation and damages. 
The Court does not find this result particularly equitable. Plaintiff deserved better 
representation at trial, and it seems unfair to deny Plaintiff his right to pursue and prove damages 
against Defendant. However, the Court concludes this is the proper legal result under current 
Idaho caselaw as it stands today. There is no need for an outside event or act of a third-party to 
start accrual of the cause of action because the tort was completed in 2007 when the jury entered 
a guilty verdict against Mr. Molen. This is not a case, as outlined in Bonz, where the damage 
came long after the tortious act. In this case, the damage came right on the heels of the 
Defendant's alleged tortious activity, and there is objective evidence of a causal connection. 
Therefore, under Idaho Code § 5-219(4), the statute of limitations for this case ran two years 
later in 2009, well prior to the suit being filed in February 2015. Given this conclusion, the 
Court GRANTs summary judgment for the Defendant. 
B. Actual Innocence 
Both parties spend a significant amount of time discussing whether "actual innocence" is 
an element of a criminal legal malpractice claim. The Court mentioned this issue in the May 21, 
2015 Order.27 Lamb does not address statutes oflimitations or accrual and it would only be if the 
Idaho Supreme Court adopts the exoneration rule that the issue of whether actual innocence is an 
element of a criminal legal malpractice claim will have to be resolved. 
The elements of a criminal legal malpractice action have already been laid out by the 
Idaho Supreme Court: 
The elements required to establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out of 
a civil action are: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the 
existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or of the 
standard of care by the lawyer; and ( 4) the failure to perform the duty must have 
been a proximate cause of the damages suffered by the client. 
Lamb at 272, 923 P.2d at 979. This says nothing about actual innocence as an element. However, 
26 Idaho has specifically rejected the discovery rule with regard to malpractice claims. See Lapham v. Stewart, 
137 Idaho 582,587, 51 P.3d 396,401 (2002) ("Whether there was some damage, or whether that damage was 
objectively ascertainable, does not depend upon the knowledge of the injured party."); Elliott v. Parsons, 128 Idaho 
723, 725, 918 P.2d 592, 594 (1996). 
27 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, filed May 21, 2015, p. 6. 
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by its plain language, this quote from Lamb only states the elements for malpractice arising out 
of a civil action. The Supreme Court then goes on to make the following comment: "Lamb does 
not dispute the proposition that in a legal malpractice action arising from representation of a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding, the person pursuing the claim must establish the additional 
element of actual innocence of the underlying criminal charges." Id. The Court does not view 
Lamb as indicating the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted actual innocence as an element of a 
criminal legal malpractice claim. The entire statement in Lamb quoted above is dicta without 
analysis. The parties in Lamb essentially stipulated to an extra element for a legal malpractice 
case and such stipulation has not happened in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 7, 
2015, is GRANTED. 
ORDERED this ~of October, 2015. 
L~ 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
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RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
The complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 
ORDERED this26':; of October, 2015. 
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Di:PUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MICHAEL SCOTT MOLEN, 
Appellant/Plaintiff, 
v. 
RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, 
Respondent/Defendant. 
Case No. CV-OC-15-03024 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, RONALD D. CHRISTIAN, AND 
THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, MICHELLE R. POINTS, 420 W. MAIN, SUITE 206, 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702, Telephone number: 208-287-3216, Email: 
mpoints@pointslaw.com, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, Michael Scott Molen, appeal against the above-
named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment, entered 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 1 
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in the above-entitled action on the 26th day of October, 2015, by the District 
Court, the Honorable Lynn Norton presiding. 
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court; and the judgment 
described in Paragraph 1 above is an appealable judgment under and pursuant 
to Rule (1) of Rule 1 l(a), I.A.R. 
3. The issues on Appeal which Appellant intends to assert include but are not 
limited to: 
a. Whether the district court erred in holding that a cause of action for 
criminal legal malpractice can accrue, for statute of limitations 
purposes, prior to a convicted criminal having his conviction set aside 
or otherwise being exonerated of the crime? 
b. Whether the district court erred in holding that Appellant suffered 
damages at the time of his conviction, and thus, ruling that the statute of 
limitations accrued in 2007? 
4. Pursuant to I.A.R. 17(k), no part of this case's record has been sealed. 
5. Pursuant to I.A.R. 17(h), Appellant requests the standard transcripts of hearings 
held before the district court, with Penny Tardiff as Court Reporter, on the 
following hearings and dates: 
a. Hearing on Motion to Dismiss held on April 9, 2015 at 2:45 p.m.; and 
b. Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment held on October 1, 2015 at 
2:45 p.m. 
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Each of the above-listed transcripts are estimated to be less than 100 pages. 
Appellant requests he receive transcripts in both hardcopy and electronic 
format. 
6. Pursuant to I.A.R. 17(i), Appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant 
to I.A.R. 28(b )(1 ). In addition to the standard record, Appellant requests the 
following documents be included in the record: 
a. All affidavits filed by the parties, including, but not limited to those filed 
on August 7, 2015 and September 21, 2015. 
b. The following motions, briefs and memoranda filed by the parties, and 
the order and memoranda issued by the district court: 
1. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed March 10, 
2015; 
11. Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed on 
April 6, 2015; 
111. Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
filed on April 7, 2015; 
1v. Supplemental Authority in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, filed on April 13, 2015; 
v. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, issued on May 21, 2015. 
vi. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed on August 7, 2015; 
vn. Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed on September 21, 2015; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 3 
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viii. Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; and 
1x. Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary 
Judgment. 
7. Pursuant to I.A.R. 17G), Appellant requests that the following Exhibits be 
copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
a. Exhibit A attached to Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss filed on April 6, 2015; 
b. Supplemental Authority Idaho Supreme Court Opinion 
attached to Supplemental Authority in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss filed April 13, 2015; and 
c. Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H attached to Affidavit of 
Elisa G. Massoth filed on September 21, 2015. 
8. I certify: 
a That service of this Notice of Appeal has been made upon the reporter 
of whom a transcript has been requested; 
b. That a transcript fee of $140.00 has been paid to the Clerk of the Court 
for payment in full of the requested transcripts; 
c. That the estimated fee to prepare the clerk's record has been paid; 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to I.A.R. 20. 
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• 
DATED This __J_ day of December, 2015. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 5 
ELISA G. MASSOTH, PLLC 
By: 
""<11 ....... .,a: . Massoth 
· ttomey for the Appellant, Michael Scott 
Molen 
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Notice is hereby given that on January 11, 2016, I 
lodged a transcript 37 pages in length for the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of 
Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District. 
Penny L. Tardiff CSR 
1-11-2016 
Hearing Dates: April 23 & October 1, 2015 
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I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 13th day of January, 2016. 
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